Given the force brought to bear on the Atlantikwall I don't really think there could have been any other outcome barring a freak storm strong enough to overpower the landing crafts.
I suppose if something similar to Market Garden had happened the invasion could have been contained somewhat but once the USA's industrial might was fully committed to the Allied cause the ending was inevitable. Though I suppose with additional delays to the breakthrough the following Cold War borders might have turned out somewhat differently at the outset.
Still 75 years ago. How little we seem to have learned. Or rather, how quickly we seem to regress.
If the German army didn't take the bait about Dover, far more would have died on the beaches.
Those inflatable tanks in Operation ‘Fortitude’ must have saved hundreds of lives.
US/UK have to spend some time preparing another attempt, the Soviet army takes Berlin and more of Europe in the final peace agreement, and there's a decent chance Germany lasts long enough to get nuked instead of Japan.
Well, we know what a failed attempt would have been like in the instant, 'cause Operation Jubilee tried and failed to take Dieppe in '42. So like that, only more so.
In a wider sense, Stalin might, like Tsar Aleksandr, make it to Paris. Perhaps then Operation Unthinkable becomes not so unthinkable?
AFAIK, the 'funnies' were highly-experimental and no-one really knew if they would work, the mulberries could have sunk/been damaged leaving us without a working-port... Getting onto the beaches, getting bogged-down and then cut off was probably the biggest danger.
US/UK have to spend some time preparing another attempt, the Soviet army takes Berlin and more of Europe in the final peace agreement, and there's a decent chance Germany lasts long enough to get nuked instead of Japan.
^^^^^
Largely this. The ultimate importance of the Normany landings weighs much more on how the postwar map looks and reducing the final bodycount than deciding the final fate of the 3rd Reich.
Bran Dawri wrote: Given the force brought to bear on the Atlantikwall I don't really think there could have been any other outcome barring a freak storm strong enough to overpower the landing crafts.
I suppose if something similar to Market Garden had happened the invasion could have been contained somewhat but once the USA's industrial might was fully committed to the Allied cause the ending was inevitable. Though I suppose with additional delays to the breakthrough the following Cold War borders might have turned out somewhat differently at the outset.
Still 75 years ago. How little we seem to have learned. Or rather, how quickly we seem to regress.
This basically. With the amount of force and preparation that was brought to bear there was unlikely to be another outcome except for a freak storm aborting the landing. The Germans put up almost the best effort they had bottling the Allies up in Normandy given the balance of power. Of course more people could have died on D-Day, but the outcome of the war was clear.
Skinnereal wrote: If the German army didn't take the bait about Dover, far more would have died on the beaches.
Those inflatable tanks in Operation ‘Fortitude’ must have saved hundreds of lives.
Not to mention double agents like Garbo, who received both the Iron Cross and an MBE for his supplying the Germans with information leading up to D-Day (including telling them the invasions were happening on the day of the invasion so that later when he said it was a feint for a larger force at Dover he would be absolutely credible).
Not to mention Garbo's network of fake agents in the UK brought in a nice sum of money for the UK, direct from Nazi Germany
Bran Dawri wrote: Given the force brought to bear on the Atlantikwall I don't really think there could have been any other outcome barring a freak storm strong enough to overpower the landing crafts.
I suppose if something similar to Market Garden had happened the invasion could have been contained somewhat but once the USA's industrial might was fully committed to the Allied cause the ending was inevitable. Though I suppose with additional delays to the breakthrough the following Cold War borders might have turned out somewhat differently at the outset.
Still 75 years ago. How little we seem to have learned. Or rather, how quickly we seem to regress.
This basically. With the amount of force and preparation that was brought to bear there was unlikely to be another outcome except for a freak storm aborting the landing. The Germans put up almost the best effort they had bottling the Allies up in Normandy given the balance of power. Of course more people could have died on D-Day, but the outcome of the war was clear.
The Germans didn't really give the best possible defense.
If the Panzer divisions had been immediately deployed its possible the invasion could have been stymied on the beaches. A failed invasion of Europe would have been very demoralizing for the UK and America.
The Normandy invasions were also conducted in large part because of pressure from Stalin. he wanted the allies to open a 2nd front to ease his efforts. In hindsight, the Russians would have beaten the Germans on their own eventually. However, the fog of war that exists during a conflict can make lopsided victories possible because the superior side falters with doubt about how things might proceed.
If the Germans had thrown back the Normandy landings, and a quick counterattack with the Panzer divisions might have been able to do that, the invasion could easily have been called off. The allies aren't going to throw all their troops into a meatgrinder on the beaches if it looks like they can't do it. And pulling back would really cause issues back home.
Bran Dawri wrote: Given the force brought to bear on the Atlantikwall I don't really think there could have been any other outcome barring a freak storm strong enough to overpower the landing crafts.
I suppose if something similar to Market Garden had happened the invasion could have been contained somewhat but once the USA's industrial might was fully committed to the Allied cause the ending was inevitable. Though I suppose with additional delays to the breakthrough the following Cold War borders might have turned out somewhat differently at the outset.
Still 75 years ago. How little we seem to have learned. Or rather, how quickly we seem to regress.
This basically. With the amount of force and preparation that was brought to bear there was unlikely to be another outcome except for a freak storm aborting the landing. The Germans put up almost the best effort they had bottling the Allies up in Normandy given the balance of power. Of course more people could have died on D-Day, but the outcome of the war was clear.
The Germans didn't really give the best possible defense.
If the Panzer divisions had been immediately deployed its possible the invasion could have been stymied on the beaches. A failed invasion of Europe would have been very demoralizing for the UK and America.
The Normandy invasions were also conducted in large part because of pressure from Stalin. he wanted the allies to open a 2nd front to ease his efforts. In hindsight, the Russians would have beaten the Germans on their own eventually. However, the fog of war that exists during a conflict can make lopsided victories possible because the superior side falters with doubt about how things might proceed.
If the Germans had thrown back the Normandy landings, and a quick counterattack with the Panzer divisions might have been able to do that, the invasion could easily have been called off. The allies aren't going to throw all their troops into a meatgrinder on the beaches if it looks like they can't do it. And pulling back would really cause issues back home.
Those tank formations would of had to have survived the artially envelope of nearly 200 warships and massive allied Air power though. Inside 10 - 20 orso miles it would be a death trap.
They may have stalled it maybe but the sheer amount of allied fire power in place would of hammered thr tank formations. Especially when they redirected the sheer massive allied air forces to delay a xoj ter attack.
Bran Dawri wrote: Given the force brought to bear on the Atlantikwall I don't really think there could have been any other outcome barring a freak storm strong enough to overpower the landing crafts.
I suppose if something similar to Market Garden had happened the invasion could have been contained somewhat but once the USA's industrial might was fully committed to the Allied cause the ending was inevitable. Though I suppose with additional delays to the breakthrough the following Cold War borders might have turned out somewhat differently at the outset.
Still 75 years ago. How little we seem to have learned. Or rather, how quickly we seem to regress.
This basically. With the amount of force and preparation that was brought to bear there was unlikely to be another outcome except for a freak storm aborting the landing. The Germans put up almost the best effort they had bottling the Allies up in Normandy given the balance of power. Of course more people could have died on D-Day, but the outcome of the war was clear.
The Germans didn't really give the best possible defense.
If the Panzer divisions had been immediately deployed its possible the invasion could have been stymied on the beaches. A failed invasion of Europe would have been very demoralizing for the UK and America.
The Normandy invasions were also conducted in large part because of pressure from Stalin. he wanted the allies to open a 2nd front to ease his efforts. In hindsight, the Russians would have beaten the Germans on their own eventually. However, the fog of war that exists during a conflict can make lopsided victories possible because the superior side falters with doubt about how things might proceed.
If the Germans had thrown back the Normandy landings, and a quick counterattack with the Panzer divisions might have been able to do that, the invasion could easily have been called off. The allies aren't going to throw all their troops into a meatgrinder on the beaches if it looks like they can't do it. And pulling back would really cause issues back home.
They did given what they had. To actually have that tank counterattack as a valid tactic all of them would have had to be in the right area, the Germans clearly didn't know where the Allies would land. Its unlikely that they would have been able to, firepower was heavily in favor of the Allies as was air superiority. Tanks might survive for a while but all their soft skin and infantry support? Plus why would the Allies not be aware of such a concentration of tank divisions where they plan to land? As for the meatgrinder, its exactly what the Allies did at Anzio, stubbornly cling to their beachhead until they broke out. It saying that if everything went the way of the Germans they might have won WW2
Bran Dawri wrote: Given the force brought to bear on the Atlantikwall I don't really think there could have been any other outcome barring a freak storm strong enough to overpower the landing crafts.
I suppose if something similar to Market Garden had happened the invasion could have been contained somewhat but once the USA's industrial might was fully committed to the Allied cause the ending was inevitable. Though I suppose with additional delays to the breakthrough the following Cold War borders might have turned out somewhat differently at the outset.
Still 75 years ago. How little we seem to have learned. Or rather, how quickly we seem to regress.
This basically. With the amount of force and preparation that was brought to bear there was unlikely to be another outcome except for a freak storm aborting the landing. The Germans put up almost the best effort they had bottling the Allies up in Normandy given the balance of power. Of course more people could have died on D-Day, but the outcome of the war was clear.
The Germans didn't really give the best possible defense.
If the Panzer divisions had been immediately deployed its possible the invasion could have been stymied on the beaches. A failed invasion of Europe would have been very demoralizing for the UK and America.
The Normandy invasions were also conducted in large part because of pressure from Stalin. he wanted the allies to open a 2nd front to ease his efforts. In hindsight, the Russians would have beaten the Germans on their own eventually. However, the fog of war that exists during a conflict can make lopsided victories possible because the superior side falters with doubt about how things might proceed.
If the Germans had thrown back the Normandy landings, and a quick counterattack with the Panzer divisions might have been able to do that, the invasion could easily have been called off. The allies aren't going to throw all their troops into a meatgrinder on the beaches if it looks like they can't do it. And pulling back would really cause issues back home.
They did given what they had. To actually have that tank counterattack as a valid tactic all of them would have had to be in the right area, the Germans clearly didn't know where the Allies would land. Its unlikely that they would have been able to, firepower was heavily in favor of the Allies as was air superiority. Tanks might survive for a while but all their soft skin and infantry support? Plus why would the Allies not be aware of such a concentration of tank divisions where they plan to land? As for the meatgrinder, its exactly what the Allies did at Anzio, stubbornly cling to their beachhead until they broke out. It saying that if everything went the way of the Germans they might have won WW2
Also. Unlike Italy, Britian was one was gigantic aircraft carrier, even of thry got into a pocket. The concentration of force they could brig the to breaking it was enermous.
Its hard to mantain a pocket when your enemy can redirect a thousand heavy bombers to turn the entire area to crators.
Also the big guns. Outdated at times but big.
7 battleships. Anything inside 20 miles was a target and those shells would knock out anything land based and could unlike a airstrike be maintained for hours at a time.
The allies where also landing Suplies at a rate that Germanny could not imagine and had war matteral by the mountain in England to keep it going.
Pluto meant there was a direct, hard to disable, constant supply of fuel to feed the army, its tanks, guns, trucks and armoured engineering machines purpose built for breaking through defences.
Through sheer force and scale they would of broken the panzer even in a worst case delay.
Bran Dawri wrote: Given the force brought to bear on the Atlantikwall I don't really think there could have been any other outcome barring a freak storm strong enough to overpower the landing crafts.
I suppose if something similar to Market Garden had happened the invasion could have been contained somewhat but once the USA's industrial might was fully committed to the Allied cause the ending was inevitable. Though I suppose with additional delays to the breakthrough the following Cold War borders might have turned out somewhat differently at the outset.
Still 75 years ago. How little we seem to have learned. Or rather, how quickly we seem to regress.
This basically. With the amount of force and preparation that was brought to bear there was unlikely to be another outcome except for a freak storm aborting the landing. The Germans put up almost the best effort they had bottling the Allies up in Normandy given the balance of power. Of course more people could have died on D-Day, but the outcome of the war was clear.
The Germans didn't really give the best possible defense.
If the Panzer divisions had been immediately deployed its possible the invasion could have been stymied on the beaches. A failed invasion of Europe would have been very demoralizing for the UK and America.
The Normandy invasions were also conducted in large part because of pressure from Stalin. he wanted the allies to open a 2nd front to ease his efforts. In hindsight, the Russians would have beaten the Germans on their own eventually. However, the fog of war that exists during a conflict can make lopsided victories possible because the superior side falters with doubt about how things might proceed.
If the Germans had thrown back the Normandy landings, and a quick counterattack with the Panzer divisions might have been able to do that, the invasion could easily have been called off. The allies aren't going to throw all their troops into a meatgrinder on the beaches if it looks like they can't do it. And pulling back would really cause issues back home.
The Allies were prepared for this. Immediately means the armor travels during the day through wave after wave of aircraft attacks, into Allied tanks and antitank guns. Its the bockage fight but in reverse, except the Allies have more armor and massive air support.
Additionally, I believe Anzio shows what happens when armored formations attack an Allied beach head with naval support. Finally if the tank divisions bottle up the beachheads, they are in a pincer when Dragoon strikes. Remember Anvil was originally intended to occur simultaneously. If the Normandy invasion gets bogged down, then Anvil will be given a full go (except now Normandy becomes the Anvil to Dragoon's hammer). And of course there's the small matter of 1.6mm screaming Russians joining the party in late June...
Once the allies get the beachnhead, the juggernaut starts rolling.
The Allies were prepared for this.
Immediately means the armor travels during the day through wave after wave of aircraft attacks, into Allied tanks and antitank guns. Its the bockage fight but in reverse, except the Allies have more armor and massive air support.
If I remember correctly, there were indeed some panzer counterattacks in the bocage that performed dismally. The German warmachine had been designing tanks for sniping on the Russian steppe, which is very different from the close-range brawl of tank combat in Normandy. The big cats performed well in ambush, but were very poor at responding to being ambushed themselves, especially Panthers. Panthers suffered from a combination of restrictive turret optics and poor side armour relative to the front. The very long guns also frequently had issues traversing in close terrain. By contrast, the ubiquitous Sherman had a lot of advantages in this regard, being nimble and quick to aim at unexpected targets.
The Allies were prepared for this.
Immediately means the armor travels during the day through wave after wave of aircraft attacks, into Allied tanks and antitank guns. Its the bockage fight but in reverse, except the Allies have more armor and massive air support.
If I remember correctly, there were indeed some panzer counterattacks in the bocage that performed dismally. The German warmachine had been designing tanks for sniping on the Russian steppe, which is very different from the close-range brawl of tank combat in Normandy. The big cats performed well in ambush, but were very poor at responding to being ambushed themselves, especially Panthers. Panthers suffered from a combination of restrictive turret optics and poor side armour relative to the front. The very long guns also frequently had issues traversing in close terrain. By contrast, the ubiquitous Sherman had a lot of advantages in this regard, being nimble and quick to aim at unexpected targets.
In a reserve. Also the allies turned German tank barricades into improvised cutting devices to go though the bocage and go round strong points.
The Good old basic sherman was mechanically reliable, able to use its shorter guns, and could bypass some strong points.
The Allies were prepared for this.
Immediately means the armor travels during the day through wave after wave of aircraft attacks, into Allied tanks and antitank guns. Its the bockage fight but in reverse, except the Allies have more armor and massive air support.
If I remember correctly, there were indeed some panzer counterattacks in the bocage that performed dismally. The German warmachine had been designing tanks for sniping on the Russian steppe, which is very different from the close-range brawl of tank combat in Normandy. The big cats performed well in ambush, but were very poor at responding to being ambushed themselves, especially Panthers. Panthers suffered from a combination of restrictive turret optics and poor side armour relative to the front. The very long guns also frequently had issues traversing in close terrain. By contrast, the ubiquitous Sherman had a lot of advantages in this regard, being nimble and quick to aim at unexpected targets.
Plus its absolutely made for dudes with PIATs, Bazookas, and M10 TDs to get side shots. Who wants to be the Jerry with almost no training trying to go down a bocage road against a bunch of Achilles M10s and Fireflies, after the column of Hanamogs and troops was just rocketed to pieces by Typhoons?
It was the first ship in on the D-Day that was supposed to draw out German fire so that the artillery locations could be pinpointed.
It was essentially a suicide mission.
The thing is, they all knew they were on a suicide mission.
All of them wrote letters home saying goodbye. I've seen something of them. Amazing what 16/17/18 year old boys would write home knowing they were probably going to die.
The Allies were prepared for this.
Immediately means the armor travels during the day through wave after wave of aircraft attacks, into Allied tanks and antitank guns. Its the bockage fight but in reverse, except the Allies have more armor and massive air support.
If I remember correctly, there were indeed some panzer counterattacks in the bocage that performed dismally. The German warmachine had been designing tanks for sniping on the Russian steppe, which is very different from the close-range brawl of tank combat in Normandy. The big cats performed well in ambush, but were very poor at responding to being ambushed themselves, especially Panthers. Panthers suffered from a combination of restrictive turret optics and poor side armour relative to the front. The very long guns also frequently had issues traversing in close terrain. By contrast, the ubiquitous Sherman had a lot of advantages in this regard, being nimble and quick to aim at unexpected targets.
Additionally we have to remember, the Germans were defending 2,000 miles of coastline. If they put tank units close to the beaches, the Allies would not have actually had to face very many tanks. The remaining tanks would have been spread penny packet along the costs, to be shot up on the roads for weeks as they gathered.
My understanding was that the german armour was held en masse as a deterrent to an invansion - it's just that they thought the Normandy landings were a diversion from the main attack on Calais. As Skinnereal points out, a load of inflatable tanks, some double agents and a dead Welsh tramp helped convince them of that until it was too late.
IIRC, the main German force stayed near Calais for a day or two after D-Day, still waiting for the "main" attack.
IIRC, the main German force stayed near Calais for a day or two after D-Day, still waiting for the "main" attack.
More than a few days and they weren't just sitting there, they were being reinforced. 2 armoured divisions 19 infantry divisions were sitting at Calais throughout July and August. In fact there were more German forces at Calais 2 months later than there had been on D-Day itself. The Field Marshall in command refused to send them to Normandy.
I've just finished panzer leader, an excellent book by heinz guderian (the father of armoured manoeuvre warfare) and in his notes about d day, he explained that the German OKH refused to allow the panzer divisions to be pulled back to form mobile reserves able to perform counter thrusts, and forced them to remain as part of the initial defence. So this is another example of Hitler and the high commands lack of tactical acumen affecting the German war effort. They placed all their faith in the Atlantic Wall, and placed no emphasis on strong points or fortifications to fall back on.
I would be wary of Panzer Leader. Guderian had an absolutely massive agenda writing it. Besides clear falsehoods and hiding his own Nazi ties, he misrepresents his own influence in manouvre warfare. He was far from the first or even only one in Germany alone when it came to doctrine, although he was influential the book is ego on display. Blame Hitler is also a postwar favorite of German generals, who weren't all that flawless themselves.
queen_annes_revenge wrote: I've just finished panzer leader, an excellent book by heinz guderian (the father of armoured manoeuvre warfare) and in his notes about d day, he explained that the German OKH refused to allow the panzer divisions to be pulled back to form mobile reserves able to perform counter thrusts, and forced them to remain as part of the initial defence. So this is another example of Hitler and the high commands lack of tactical acumen affecting the German war effort. They placed all their faith in the Atlantic Wall, and placed no emphasis on strong points or fortifications to fall back on.
Rommel was the one who didn't want a mobile reserve. Fire brigades were more effective in Eastern Europe because the Soviets weren't able to fly thousands of interdiction sorties daily. Once D Day started the Germans were effectively unable to move assets during the day. It took weeks to move one division that should have been able to move in hours.
There is an excellent two books of D Day from the German perspective. its actual eyewitness accounts. The ones not on the beach are filled with constant notations of allied planes attacking bunkers and anything that moved in absolute waves of aircraft.
Lets also remember Rommel was injured by aircraft during DDay. When you can't keep your field marshal from getting strafed how are you going to protect mile long columns of hanamogs and trucks trying to get to the coast?
Lets also remember that, when the Germans did throw fire brigades at the allies - particularly the American right hook coming around - that they were absolutely obliterated time after time.
Even when The Allies already have The Mediterranean under their control by then ('Imperial' Italian Navy decimated to the point that it exists on papers and not as a real fleet, Sicily taken with Mafia boss recruited to Allies rank, Anzio/Antium and Via Appia became the next target.. etc.). There are other potential landing points Allies may exploit by the Med sea. (and even Monte Carlo, which also occupied by Axis). Why choose a beach that located next to Caen?
queen_annes_revenge wrote: I've just finished panzer leader, an excellent book by heinz guderian (the father of armoured manoeuvre warfare) and in his notes about d day, he explained that the German OKH refused to allow the panzer divisions to be pulled back to form mobile reserves able to perform counter thrusts, and forced them to remain as part of the initial defence. So this is another example of Hitler and the high commands lack of tactical acumen affecting the German war effort. They placed all their faith in the Atlantic Wall, and placed no emphasis on strong points or fortifications to fall back on.
Rommel was the one who didn't want a mobile reserve. Fire brigades were more effective in Eastern Europe because the Soviets weren't able to fly thousands of interdiction sorties daily. Once D Day started the Germans were effectively unable to move assets during the day. It took weeks to move one division that should have been able to move in hours.
There is an excellent two books of D Day from the German perspective. its actual eyewitness accounts. The ones not on the beach are filled with constant notations of allied planes attacking bunkers and anything that moved in absolute waves of aircraft.
Lets also remember Rommel was injured by aircraft during DDay. When you can't keep your field marshal from getting strafed how are you going to protect mile long columns of hanamogs and trucks trying to get to the coast?
Lets also remember that, when the Germans did throw fire brigades at the allies - particularly the American right hook coming around - that they were absolutely obliterated time after time.
The Eastern front was also partly on the wide steps. Of Russia, the vast areas of Eastern Europe. Its very much a ideal terrain for mass movement. Easy to go round a problem.
The bocage, the fact France was so riddled with those sabotaging routes, roads got blocked by wrecked stuff. Thr heavy tanks where too heavy for regular wreckers to move and required teams of trucks to do.
Rare trucks.
France was a very much diffrent terrain and situation to Russia.
True, it took a elite panxer unit some 2 weeks to reach Normandy. Thry lost a fair few machines and men to to hit and run, and mines etx.
Lone Cat wrote: Even when The Allies already have The Mediterranean under their control by then ('Imperial' Italian Navy decimated to the point that it exists on papers and not as a real fleet, Sicily taken with Mafia boss recruited to Allies rank, Anzio/Antium and Via Appia became the next target.. etc.). There are other potential landing points Allies may exploit by the Med sea. (and even Monte Carlo, which also occupied by Axis). Why choose a beach that located next to Caen?
It was the shortest distance from England to Germany.
Calais was a major port, and the closest to France. The Allies wanted a deepwater port very badly to avoid supply problems (as later occurred once they advanced). They invented Mulberries just to have their own portable harbors.
Interestingly, there is an argument made by experts better than myself, that the Mulberries didn't end up being critically important. The real tonnage was brought over by LSTs, LCTs, and LCIs. When you look at the numbers of ships involved, its really staggering.
Frazzled wrote: When you look at the numbers of ships involved, its really staggering.
Yeah. There's an awesome scene in The Longest Day where a radar operator is looking at the screen on one of the battleships in the D-Day fleet and it is pretty much completely covered by signals. It really demonstrates the sheer scale of the invasion.
There's also Winters looking out the plane door in Band of Brothers as they fly over the invasion fleet.
My personal pleasure: the best scenese in the Longest Day are the two with the German squadron and whoever wrote his scenes. Its hard to portay sarcasm across languages, but you can tell its just dripping.
Also the scene where the corporal is looking through the binocs, sees nothing but fog. Then the fog clears. He sees thousands of ships and JUST FREAKS.
That's Major Pluskat and his dog Harras, but yes, that one really drives the point home.
Also, this is what happens when you mess with (USS) Texas:
Spoiler:
I couldn't find any images of the Tiger Tank that took a near miss from the Warspite's 15" guns and had its turret flung 30 meters or so away, but suffice to say that any tanks going within 30 or so km from the beach would be having a bad day, and that's not taking the air strikes into account.
There's also an anecdote about British forces being pinned down by a sniper while pushing through the Bocage and calling back to the higher-ups for counter-battery fire against the woodland they thought the sniper was in. A few minutes later HMS Rodney obliged them and dropped a bunch of 16" high explosive shells in the woods in the single most uneven shootout in world history.
AlmightyWalrus wrote: That's Major Pluskat and his dog Harras, but yes, that one really drives the point home.
Also, this is what happens when you mess with (USS) Texas:
Spoiler:
I couldn't find any images of the Tiger Tank that took a near miss from the Warspite's 15" guns and had its turret flung 30 meters or so away, but suffice to say that any tanks going within 30 or so km from the beach would be having a bad day, and that's not taking the air strikes into account.
There's also an anecdote about British forces being pinned down by a sniper while pushing through the Bocage and calling back to the higher-ups for counter-battery fire against the woodland they thought the sniper was in. A few minutes later HMS Rodney obliged them and dropped a bunch of 16" high explosive shells in the woods in the single most uneven shootout in world history.
Yeah, there was very few places that could withstand a impacting battleship bombardment. Even super heavy gun implacements would be struggling after a few hits.
That definitely would be a very one sided engagement, though allied morale had to be solid knowing they had that kind of firepower behind them if they needed it. One solider with a radio could take on a tank, company or so.
Warspite was sad she was scrapped. She resisted everything including the effort to scrap her to the end. WW1 veteran, took even missile hits in thr med, and more. Old but when it came to big guns, old or not she was fearsome if firing in your direction.
Frazzled wrote: When you look at the numbers of ships involved, its really staggering.
Yeah. There's an awesome scene in The Longest Day where a radar operator is looking at the screen on one of the battleships in the D-Day fleet and it is pretty much completely covered by signals. It really demonstrates the sheer scale of the invasion.
There's also Winters looking out the plane door in Band of Brothers as they fly over the invasion fleet.
To allied scales. That was ONE fleet. There was more ships in the pacific, equal or more.
The scale of allies production was beyond any Axis dreams.
The Allies were prepared for this.
Immediately means the armor travels during the day through wave after wave of aircraft attacks, into Allied tanks and antitank guns. Its the bockage fight but in reverse, except the Allies have more armor and massive air support.
If I remember correctly, there were indeed some panzer counterattacks in the bocage that performed dismally. The German warmachine had been designing tanks for sniping on the Russian steppe, which is very different from the close-range brawl of tank combat in Normandy. The big cats performed well in ambush, but were very poor at responding to being ambushed themselves, especially Panthers. Panthers suffered from a combination of restrictive turret optics and poor side armour relative to the front. The very long guns also frequently had issues traversing in close terrain. By contrast, the ubiquitous Sherman had a lot of advantages in this regard, being nimble and quick to aim at unexpected targets.
Additionally we have to remember, the Germans were defending 2,000 miles of coastline. If they put tank units close to the beaches, the Allies would not have actually had to face very many tanks. The remaining tanks would have been spread penny packet along the costs, to be shot up on the roads for weeks as they gathered.
Also, they did have assault gun battalions near the front- the division defending Omaha and the western half of Gold had a StuG battalion in reserve, which did counterattack near Bayeux and was repulsed without making much impact. StuGs are not as good as proper tanks, but they are still very effective when used to attack over known terrain with adequate support. There were also attacks by the 21st panzer near Caen on the 6th, which were simarly repulsed. In other words, the Western Allies could deal with panzer attacks well by June 1944.
The Allies were prepared for this.
Immediately means the armor travels during the day through wave after wave of aircraft attacks, into Allied tanks and antitank guns. Its the bockage fight but in reverse, except the Allies have more armor and massive air support.
If I remember correctly, there were indeed some panzer counterattacks in the bocage that performed dismally. The German warmachine had been designing tanks for sniping on the Russian steppe, which is very different from the close-range brawl of tank combat in Normandy. The big cats performed well in ambush, but were very poor at responding to being ambushed themselves, especially Panthers. Panthers suffered from a combination of restrictive turret optics and poor side armour relative to the front. The very long guns also frequently had issues traversing in close terrain. By contrast, the ubiquitous Sherman had a lot of advantages in this regard, being nimble and quick to aim at unexpected targets.
Additionally we have to remember, the Germans were defending 2,000 miles of coastline. If they put tank units close to the beaches, the Allies would not have actually had to face very many tanks. The remaining tanks would have been spread penny packet along the costs, to be shot up on the roads for weeks as they gathered.
Also, they did have assault gun battalions near the front- the division defending Omaha and the western half of Gold had a StuG battalion in reserve, which did counterattack near Bayeux and was repulsed without making much impact. StuGs are not as good as proper tanks, but they are still very effective when used to attack over known terrain with adequate support. There were also attacks by the 21st panzer near Caen on the 6th, which were simarly repulsed. In other words, the Western Allies could deal with panzer attacks well by June 1944.
Thry did delay the assult on Caen by a day or two. Thry hopes to take it on d day 0 but it did not take long for allies to establish the enermous supporting links that began to feed tanks, artillary and many thousands of men onto the beeches only hours ago in German hands.
The engineers and armoured engineering units where making roads open as soon as they had vaguely secured the areas. In a matter of hours they had clear roads up the beech and the allied army of streaming up them.
It fell in a day to a few days and the impact on the invasion was not crippling.
The Normandy invasions were also conducted in large part because of pressure from Stalin. he wanted the allies to open a 2nd front to ease his efforts. In hindsight, the Russians would have beaten the Germans on their own eventually.
This is untrue. While Stalin did want the Western Allies to open a second front, the US had already wanted to invade mainland Europe well before the summer of 1944, but Churchill convinced Roosevelt that securing the Mediterranean was the higher priority. When the advance up the Italian boot stalled, there was no dissuading the US from a major amphibious assault in France.
As to the OP, I think the deck was pretty heavily stacked against the Germans. The Atlantik Wall was nowhere near the kind of tip top shape that Rommel wanted it to be, and was manned almost entirely by second rate garrison divisions that simply weren't good enough to throw into the meat grinder that was the Eastern Front. Add on top of this Hitler's refusal to pick a side when Rundstedt and Rommel disagreed about how best to use the panzers, resulting in a compromise solution that was probably the worst of both worlds, and you have a recipe for disaster. The Abwehr were nowhere near as effective as Allied intelligence so I highly doubt there was any chance at all that the Krauts would have blown the whistle on Operation Fortitude, and there was simply no way the Luftwaffe was up to the task of contesting the skies against the Western Allies. The Luftwaffe was too heavily depleted after the Battle of Britain, was already over committed in the Eastern Front and Italy, and had to maintain a large fighter reserve at home to fight off the constant and unceasing bombers.
Weather seems like the only thing that could have possibly gone wrong, and did in fact delay the invasion several times. For the Germans to repel D-day basically requires a miracle. They would have had to know the attack would come in Normandy, would have had to commit the bulk of their divisions in France to that area whilst simultaneously not giving this away to the constant Allied air reconnaissance in the months beforehand, and would have had to have the pilots, aircraft, and fuel necessary to contest the skies and deter any ships from shore bombardment. Just seems like an impossibly tall order.
creeping-deth87 wrote: The Abwehr were nowhere near as effective as Allied intelligence so I highly doubt there was any chance at all that the Krauts would have blown the whistle on Operation Fortitude
This is almost an understatement. All but (possibly) one agent that was sent to the UK by the Nazis was captured or gave themselves up, many of them being flipped. The one who maybe didn't get caught might've killed themselves.
The Normandy invasions were also conducted in large part because of pressure from Stalin. he wanted the allies to open a 2nd front to ease his efforts. In hindsight, the Russians would have beaten the Germans on their own eventually.
This is untrue. While Stalin did want the Western Allies to open a second front, the US had already wanted to invade mainland Europe well before the summer of 1944, but Churchill convinced Roosevelt that securing the Mediterranean was the higher priority. When the advance up the Italian boot stalled, there was no dissuading the US from a major amphibious assault in France.
As to the OP, I think the deck was pretty heavily stacked against the Germans. The Atlantik Wall was nowhere near the kind of tip top shape that Rommel wanted it to be, and was manned almost entirely by second rate garrison divisions that simply weren't good enough to throw into the meat grinder that was the Eastern Front. Add on top of this Hitler's refusal to pick a side when Rundstedt and Rommel disagreed about how best to use the panzers, resulting in a compromise solution that was probably the worst of both worlds, and you have a recipe for disaster. The Abwehr were nowhere near as effective as Allied intelligence so I highly doubt there was any chance at all that the Krauts would have blown the whistle on Operation Fortitude, and there was simply no way the Luftwaffe was up to the task of contesting the skies against the Western Allies. The Luftwaffe was too heavily depleted after the Battle of Britain, was already over committed in the Eastern Front and Italy, and had to maintain a large fighter reserve at home to fight off the constant and unceasing bombers.
Weather seems like the only thing that could have possibly gone wrong, and did in fact delay the invasion several times. For the Germans to repel D-day basically requires a miracle. They would have had to know the attack would come in Normandy, would have had to commit the bulk of their divisions in France to that area whilst simultaneously not giving this away to the constant Allied air reconnaissance in the months beforehand, and would have had to have the pilots, aircraft, and fuel necessary to contest the skies and deter any ships from shore bombardment. Just seems like an impossibly tall order.
The LW had been decimated by the air campaign in 1st H 1944. As you noted bomber formations acted as targets for that drew in German fighters into pitched air battles with the now mustang reinforced interceptor squadrons. In tandem an additional campaign started prior to Normandy that sent roving fighter squadrons deep into France to suppress German airfields. This was effective and continued throughout the war (it was a later method the Wallies used to waylay 262 and Komet squadrons).
Much later the Navy employed a similar strategy in the Pacific (the "blue blanket"). It even contemplated using the fast attack fleet to happy Japan before Olympic with carriers armed only with fighters.
creeping-deth87 wrote: The Abwehr were nowhere near as effective as Allied intelligence so I highly doubt there was any chance at all that the Krauts would have blown the whistle on Operation Fortitude
This is almost an understatement. All but (possibly) one agent that was sent to the UK by the Nazis was captured or gave themselves up, many of them being flipped. The one who maybe didn't get caught might've killed themselves.
Allied Intel was pretty much ahead of thr game everywhere. Unlike the UK, we had access to millions of disaffected citizens, the combined resources of multiple nations and best minds, forgers, mathematics and other minds of a good slice of the globe available.
Though without the vast alleince, the polish for starting to crack enigma, the British whom made the computers to crack it in near real time and Americans Magic whom broke Purple, the Japanese code systems.
We knew about the invasion of Russia before they did they just never trusted allied Intels answers. Even feeding it back via a known soviet spy who handily embecane a Intel delivery method.
The Normandy invasions were also conducted in large part because of pressure from Stalin. he wanted the allies to open a 2nd front to ease his efforts. In hindsight, the Russians would have beaten the Germans on their own eventually.
This is untrue. While Stalin did want the Western Allies to open a second front, the US had already wanted to invade mainland Europe well before the summer of 1944, but Churchill convinced Roosevelt that securing the Mediterranean was the higher priority. When the advance up the Italian boot stalled, there was no dissuading the US from a major amphibious assault in France.
As to the OP, I think the deck was pretty heavily stacked against the Germans. The Atlantik Wall was nowhere near the kind of tip top shape that Rommel wanted it to be, and was manned almost entirely by second rate garrison divisions that simply weren't good enough to throw into the meat grinder that was the Eastern Front. Add on top of this Hitler's refusal to pick a side when Rundstedt and Rommel disagreed about how best to use the panzers, resulting in a compromise solution that was probably the worst of both worlds, and you have a recipe for disaster. The Abwehr were nowhere near as effective as Allied intelligence so I highly doubt there was any chance at all that the Krauts would have blown the whistle on Operation Fortitude, and there was simply no way the Luftwaffe was up to the task of contesting the skies against the Western Allies. The Luftwaffe was too heavily depleted after the Battle of Britain, was already over committed in the Eastern Front and Italy, and had to maintain a large fighter reserve at home to fight off the constant and unceasing bombers.
Weather seems like the only thing that could have possibly gone wrong, and did in fact delay the invasion several times. For the Germans to repel D-day basically requires a miracle. They would have had to know the attack would come in Normandy, would have had to commit the bulk of their divisions in France to that area whilst simultaneously not giving this away to the constant Allied air reconnaissance in the months beforehand, and would have had to have the pilots, aircraft, and fuel necessary to contest the skies and deter any ships from shore bombardment. Just seems like an impossibly tall order.
The LW had been decimated by the air campaign in 1st H 1944. As you noted bomber formations acted as targets for that drew in German fighters into pitched air battles with the now mustang reinforced interceptor squadrons. In tandem an additional campaign started prior to Normandy that sent roving fighter squadrons deep into France to suppress German airfields. This was effective and continued throughout the war (it was a later method the Wallies used to waylay 262 and Komet squadrons).
Much later the Navy employed a similar strategy in the Pacific (the "blue blanket"). It even contemplated using the fast attack fleet to happy Japan before Olympic with carriers armed only with fighters.
A decline that had begun really from the very start of the war but had first accelerated in the Battle of Britain. Even in 1941-1943, the Luftwaffe losses over the Meditterranean and Western theatres was significantly greater than those over the Eastern theatre. By the time of D-Day, Luftwaffe operations in the West were entering a steep drop- particularly notable in the loss-per-sortie rate.
This article is a very interesting overview of how the western Allies played by far the most significant role in destroying the Luftwaffe even before 1944, and actually contributed significantly to the ability of the Soviet airforce to operate and perform sorties in support of the Red Army.
Yeah, there was very few places that could withstand a impacting battleship bombardment. Even super heavy gun implacements would be struggling after a few hits.
I don't know about that. Battery-30, which is definitely not called Maxim Gorky I and is (EDIT - was) one of Sevastopol's coastal-guns, took several direct hits from Dora and kept on operating. In reduced fashion for a while, true, but still.
Lone Cat wrote: Even when The Allies already have The Mediterranean under their control by then ('Imperial' Italian Navy decimated to the point that it exists on papers and not as a real fleet, Sicily taken with Mafia boss recruited to Allies rank, Anzio/Antium and Via Appia became the next target.. etc.). There are other potential landing points Allies may exploit by the Med sea. (and even Monte Carlo, which also occupied by Axis). Why choose a beach that located next to Caen?
It was the shortest distance from England to Germany.
If you play Panzer General original before. if you (you can only play as Germany in the original game) playthrough route went to D-Day, if you won (hopefully Major Victory) you will go to Mediterranean side of France to defend it (and found out that this front was much more vulneralbe)
Shortest routes from Britain to Germany through Normandie = YES
Isn't there also a possibility that Francisco Franco will send his 'volunteers' to sting Allies war effort? so another reasons why Med France was not touched.
Lone Cat wrote: Even when The Allies already have The Mediterranean under their control by then ('Imperial' Italian Navy decimated to the point that it exists on papers and not as a real fleet, Sicily taken with Mafia boss recruited to Allies rank, Anzio/Antium and Via Appia became the next target.. etc.). There are other potential landing points Allies may exploit by the Med sea. (and even Monte Carlo, which also occupied by Axis). Why choose a beach that located next to Caen?
It was the shortest distance from England to Germany.
If you play Panzer General original before. if you (you can only play as Germany in the original game) playthrough route went to D-Day, if you won (hopefully Major Victory) you will go to Mediterranean side of France to defend it (and found out that this front was much more vulneralbe)
Shortest routes from Britain to Germany through Normandie = YES
Isn't there also a possibility that Francisco Franco will send his 'volunteers' to sting Allies war effort? so another reasons why Med France was not touched.
Operation Dragoon exists you know that right?
And yes whilest this is wikipedia, it should serve to explain that Franco wasn't really considered a threat due to the dependance of the franco regime for food aid
Per an anecdote in the World at War from a man who seems to have a fondness for the bottle (Wynford Vaughan-Thomas, IIRC), Allied troops landed in the south of France and were greeted by a French citizen carrying a bottle of champagne and opining that they were rather late.
Lone Cat wrote: Even when The Allies already have The Mediterranean under their control by then ('Imperial' Italian Navy decimated to the point that it exists on papers and not as a real fleet, Sicily taken with Mafia boss recruited to Allies rank, Anzio/Antium and Via Appia became the next target.. etc.). There are other potential landing points Allies may exploit by the Med sea. (and even Monte Carlo, which also occupied by Axis). Why choose a beach that located next to Caen?
It was the shortest distance from England to Germany.
If you play Panzer General original before. if you (you can only play as Germany in the original game) playthrough route went to D-Day, if you won (hopefully Major Victory) you will go to Mediterranean side of France to defend it (and found out that this front was much more vulneralbe)
Shortest routes from Britain to Germany through Normandie = YES
Isn't there also a possibility that Francisco Franco will send his 'volunteers' to sting Allies war effort? so another reasons why Med France was not touched.
Operation Dragoon exists you know that right?
And yes whilest this is wikipedia, it should serve to explain that Franco wasn't really considered a threat due to the dependance of the franco regime for food aid
Post revolution Spain was not ina strong state and not up for a large military campaign. Its why they only supplied a few volunteers and never actively declared war or direct actions vs allies.
Between damage done, recovery and such. Spain was not in a very strong position to really be a active Axis nation.
Aye. Spain was for all practical purposes neutral. They were in a terrible economic position, and you could argue that they're still experiencing the fallout from the Civil War even to this day. The government they have today is actually a direct continuation of Francisco Franco's regime, albeit with a little more in the way of democratic reforms.
He has a point as in the King just reeimplemented democracy after Franco's death instead of ruling as a Monarch.
However the democratic government now has not a lot incommon with the regime of Franco.
There's also a lot of the fallout from the Civil War still there, so that coalition governments only build on one side of the spectrum.
So does that make Westminster a "direct continuation" of Oliver Cromwell? I wouldn't say so.
That's not how I read the comment, either. I interpreted it, perhaps incorrectly, as suggesting that Spain's contemporary government is informed by Franco's fascism.
Excommunicatus wrote: So does that make Westminster a "direct continuation" of Oliver Cromwell? I wouldn't say so.
That's not how I read the comment, either. I interpreted it, perhaps incorrectly, as suggesting that Spain's contemporary government is informed by Franco's fascism.
Aye the statement above does sound wierd, suggesting spain would still be a dictatorship.
Excommunicatus wrote: So does that make Westminster a "direct continuation" of Oliver Cromwell? I wouldn't say so.
That's not how I read the comment, either. I interpreted it, perhaps incorrectly, as suggesting that Spain's contemporary government is informed by Franco's fascism.
Its a continuation in the sense than the line of heads of state is unbroken, and without going too deep into politics the current government is starting to creep back towards Franco in a lot of ways. Just look at how the recent Catalonian crisis has been playing out.
Spain's government is not as far removed from it's WW2 state of affairs as most people think, nor as much as many would be comfortable with. And unlike other Constitutional Monarchy's he has real executive power, being both Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces as well as the head of state, Spain is about as close as we can be to having a regular Monarchy in Europe.
Do we know how many guys actually died during the D-Day ? It was such an incredible feat, needing so many department to work, and to work well, together (spies, airforce, ground troops, navy, battle plans...) !
This website says it was something around 22,000 US dead, 335 Canadian, estimates of 2,500 to 3,000 British(no official numbers exist for the British), while the Germans lost between 4 and 9 thousand. Thats just the first 24 hours.
This website says it was something around 22,000 US dead, 335 Canadian, estimates of 2,500 to 3,000 British(no official numbers exist for the British), while the Germans lost between 4 and 9 thousand. Thats just the first 24 hours.
That seemed extremely high, so I checked your source- be careful when reading casualty figures Those are the total dead, wounded, and missing counts. Most deaths estimates are around 4-5 thousand Allied deaths for D-Day.
This website says it was something around 22,000 US dead, 335 Canadian, estimates of 2,500 to 3,000 British(no official numbers exist for the British), while the Germans lost between 4 and 9 thousand. Thats just the first 24 hours.
That seemed extremely high, so I checked your source- be careful when reading casualty figures Those are the total dead, wounded, and missing counts. Most deaths estimates are around 4-5 thousand Allied deaths for D-Day.
It was bloody on Utah, and the Rangers took some heavy losses holding back a German counter attack. Allied losses where lower on other beachs though.
Also the para troopers pulled some pretty high risk missions. Least one warship was sunk by German shore batteries.
Could be a fair figure potentially all in. Land, sea and air forces.
Though at this point, it is fair to say that anybody who is still listed as missing belongs among the dead. Which would make the numbers a bit higher than the official confirmed death counts.
I think the D-Day Memorial lists ~4100 dead, of which something like 3/5 are American, and 2/5 are British and Canadian + a few other nationalities here and there.
Though at this point, it is fair to say that anybody who is still listed as missing belongs among the dead. Which would make the numbers a bit higher than the official confirmed death counts.
Well, either dead or deserted. I suppose thatis probably why they leave those numbers, it is hard to tell which.
Lone Cat wrote: Even when The Allies already have The Mediterranean under their control by then ('Imperial' Italian Navy decimated to the point that it exists on papers and not as a real fleet, Sicily taken with Mafia boss recruited to Allies rank, Anzio/Antium and Via Appia became the next target.. etc.). There are other potential landing points Allies may exploit by the Med sea. (and even Monte Carlo, which also occupied by Axis). Why choose a beach that located next to Caen?
It was the shortest distance from England to Germany.
If you play Panzer General original before. if you (you can only play as Germany in the original game) playthrough route went to D-Day, if you won (hopefully Major Victory) you will go to Mediterranean side of France to defend it (and found out that this front was much more vulneralbe)
Shortest routes from Britain to Germany through Normandie = YES
Isn't there also a possibility that Francisco Franco will send his 'volunteers' to sting Allies war effort? so another reasons why Med France was not touched.
Operation Dragoon exists you know that right?
And yes whilest this is wikipedia, it should serve to explain that Franco wasn't really considered a threat due to the dependance of the franco regime for food aid
Post revolution Spain was not ina strong state and not up for a large military campaign. Its why they only supplied a few volunteers and never actively declared war or direct actions vs allies.
Between damage done, recovery and such. Spain was not in a very strong position to really be a active Axis nation.
I also read somewhere that the axis involvement in the. Balkans ( a forced move by mussolini that Hitler didn't really want) contributed to Spains reluctance to join the axis.
queen_annes_revenge wrote: I've just finished panzer leader, an excellent book by heinz guderian (the father of armoured manoeuvre warfare) and in his notes about d day, he explained that the German OKH refused to allow the panzer divisions to be pulled back to form mobile reserves able to perform counter thrusts, and forced them to remain as part of the initial defence. So this is another example of Hitler and the high commands lack of tactical acumen affecting the German war effort. They placed all their faith in the Atlantic Wall, and placed no emphasis on strong points or fortifications to fall back on.
Rommel was the one who didn't want a mobile reserve. Fire brigades were more effective in Eastern Europe because the Soviets weren't able to fly thousands of interdiction sorties daily. Once D Day started the Germans were effectively unable to move assets during the day. It took weeks to move one division that should have been able to move in hours.
There is an excellent two books of D Day from the German perspective. its actual eyewitness accounts. The ones not on the beach are filled with constant notations of allied planes attacking bunkers and anything that moved in absolute waves of aircraft.
Lets also remember Rommel was injured by aircraft during DDay. When you can't keep your field marshal from getting strafed how are you going to protect mile long columns of hanamogs and trucks trying to get to the coast?
Lets also remember that, when the Germans did throw fire brigades at the allies - particularly the American right hook coming around - that they were absolutely obliterated time after time.
This is is all true, The allies had massive airpower available and had worked out a good system of ground to air control of fighter-bombers to assist the troops. If they wanted to pound a German defensive position they could take 4-engine bombers off strategic targets and use them tactically.
queen_annes_revenge wrote: I've just finished panzer leader, an excellent book by heinz guderian (the father of armoured manoeuvre warfare) and in his notes about d day, he explained that the German OKH refused to allow the panzer divisions to be pulled back to form mobile reserves able to perform counter thrusts, and forced them to remain as part of the initial defence. So this is another example of Hitler and the high commands lack of tactical acumen affecting the German war effort. They placed all their faith in the Atlantic Wall, and placed no emphasis on strong points or fortifications to fall back on.
Rommel was the one who didn't want a mobile reserve. Fire brigades were more effective in Eastern Europe because the Soviets weren't able to fly thousands of interdiction sorties daily. Once D Day started the Germans were effectively unable to move assets during the day. It took weeks to move one division that should have been able to move in hours.
There is an excellent two books of D Day from the German perspective. its actual eyewitness accounts. The ones not on the beach are filled with constant notations of allied planes attacking bunkers and anything that moved in absolute waves of aircraft.
Lets also remember Rommel was injured by aircraft during DDay. When you can't keep your field marshal from getting strafed how are you going to protect mile long columns of hanamogs and trucks trying to get to the coast?
Lets also remember that, when the Germans did throw fire brigades at the allies - particularly the American right hook coming around - that they were absolutely obliterated time after time.
This is is all true, The allies had massive airpower available and had worked out a good system of ground to air control of fighter-bombers to assist the troops. If they wanted to pound a German defensive position they could take 4-engine bombers off strategic targets and use them tactically.
Lots of radio sets. It's how the Germans coordinated the blitzkrieg. Unlike the allies at times who where weaker on that, especially armoured units.
Later on, any American with a radio could call on the wrath of the entire allied army. Any tank could bring up heavy air and artially support. Lots of communication to there fire support, a single American was not alone if they had a radio.
queen_annes_revenge wrote: I've just finished panzer leader, an excellent book by heinz guderian (the father of armoured manoeuvre warfare) and in his notes about d day, he explained that the German OKH refused to allow the panzer divisions to be pulled back to form mobile reserves able to perform counter thrusts, and forced them to remain as part of the initial defence. So this is another example of Hitler and the high commands lack of tactical acumen affecting the German war effort. They placed all their faith in the Atlantic Wall, and placed no emphasis on strong points or fortifications to fall back on.
Rommel was the one who didn't want a mobile reserve. Fire brigades were more effective in Eastern Europe because the Soviets weren't able to fly thousands of interdiction sorties daily. Once D Day started the Germans were effectively unable to move assets during the day. It took weeks to move one division that should have been able to move in hours.
There is an excellent two books of D Day from the German perspective. its actual eyewitness accounts. The ones not on the beach are filled with constant notations of allied planes attacking bunkers and anything that moved in absolute waves of aircraft.
Lets also remember Rommel was injured by aircraft during DDay. When you can't keep your field marshal from getting strafed how are you going to protect mile long columns of hanamogs and trucks trying to get to the coast?
Lets also remember that, when the Germans did throw fire brigades at the allies - particularly the American right hook coming around - that they were absolutely obliterated time after time.
This is is all true, The allies had massive airpower available and had worked out a good system of ground to air control of fighter-bombers to assist the troops. If they wanted to pound a German defensive position they could take 4-engine bombers off strategic targets and use them tactically.
Not really. The accuracy of heavy bombers was known even then to be lacking; they probably wouldn't permit 4-engine bombers to strike tactical targets. As far as I know the only attempt to do so was at Monte Cassino, with less than favorable results. In fact the allies became so afraid of friendly fire incidents, the 4-engine airstrikes set for Omaha beach were directed to release their payloads 20 miles inland to avoid friendly fire casualties! One wonders how many allied soldiers might have been saved if they'd bombed the beachfront area like they were originally supposed to.
queen_annes_revenge wrote: I've just finished panzer leader, an excellent book by heinz guderian (the father of armoured manoeuvre warfare) and in his notes about d day, he explained that the German OKH refused to allow the panzer divisions to be pulled back to form mobile reserves able to perform counter thrusts, and forced them to remain as part of the initial defence. So this is another example of Hitler and the high commands lack of tactical acumen affecting the German war effort. They placed all their faith in the Atlantic Wall, and placed no emphasis on strong points or fortifications to fall back on.
Rommel was the one who didn't want a mobile reserve. Fire brigades were more effective in Eastern Europe because the Soviets weren't able to fly thousands of interdiction sorties daily. Once D Day started the Germans were effectively unable to move assets during the day. It took weeks to move one division that should have been able to move in hours.
There is an excellent two books of D Day from the German perspective. its actual eyewitness accounts. The ones not on the beach are filled with constant notations of allied planes attacking bunkers and anything that moved in absolute waves of aircraft.
Lets also remember Rommel was injured by aircraft during DDay. When you can't keep your field marshal from getting strafed how are you going to protect mile long columns of hanamogs and trucks trying to get to the coast?
Lets also remember that, when the Germans did throw fire brigades at the allies - particularly the American right hook coming around - that they were absolutely obliterated time after time.
This is is all true, The allies had massive airpower available and had worked out a good system of ground to air control of fighter-bombers to assist the troops. If they wanted to pound a German defensive position they could take 4-engine bombers off strategic targets and use them tactically.
Not really. The accuracy of heavy bombers was known even then to be lacking; they probably wouldn't permit 4-engine bombers to strike tactical targets. As far as I know the only attempt to do so was at Monte Cassino, with less than favorable results. In fact the allies became so afraid of friendly fire incidents, the 4-engine airstrikes set for Omaha beach were directed to release their payloads 20 miles inland to avoid friendly fire casualties! One wonders how many allied soldiers might have been saved if they'd bombed the beachfront area like they were originally supposed to.
You are correct. The Wallies did try at least two other times though.
D-Day actually used heavy bombers to hit targets on at least one beach. Unfortunately the bombers mostly hit behind the targets.
https://www.b24.net/D-day.htm
queen_annes_revenge wrote: I've just finished panzer leader, an excellent book by heinz guderian (the father of armoured manoeuvre warfare) and in his notes about d day, he explained that the German OKH refused to allow the panzer divisions to be pulled back to form mobile reserves able to perform counter thrusts, and forced them to remain as part of the initial defence. So this is another example of Hitler and the high commands lack of tactical acumen affecting the German war effort. They placed all their faith in the Atlantic Wall, and placed no emphasis on strong points or fortifications to fall back on.
Rommel was the one who didn't want a mobile reserve. Fire brigades were more effective in Eastern Europe because the Soviets weren't able to fly thousands of interdiction sorties daily. Once D Day started the Germans were effectively unable to move assets during the day. It took weeks to move one division that should have been able to move in hours.
There is an excellent two books of D Day from the German perspective. its actual eyewitness accounts. The ones not on the beach are filled with constant notations of allied planes attacking bunkers and anything that moved in absolute waves of aircraft.
Lets also remember Rommel was injured by aircraft during DDay. When you can't keep your field marshal from getting strafed how are you going to protect mile long columns of hanamogs and trucks trying to get to the coast?
Lets also remember that, when the Germans did throw fire brigades at the allies - particularly the American right hook coming around - that they were absolutely obliterated time after time.
This is is all true, The allies had massive airpower available and had worked out a good system of ground to air control of fighter-bombers to assist the troops. If they wanted to pound a German defensive position they could take 4-engine bombers off strategic targets and use them tactically.
Not really. The accuracy of heavy bombers was known even then to be lacking; they probably wouldn't permit 4-engine bombers to strike tactical targets. As far as I know the only attempt to do so was at Monte Cassino, with less than favorable results. In fact the allies became so afraid of friendly fire incidents, the 4-engine airstrikes set for Omaha beach were directed to release their payloads 20 miles inland to avoid friendly fire casualties! One wonders how many allied soldiers might have been saved if they'd bombed the beachfront area like they were originally supposed to.
They used a heavy bomber strike to help the breakout towards Caen. I don't remember the name of the ridge.but it was heavily defended and the Germans were pounded to bits. THe accuracy of heavy bombing as a lot better during daylight against undefended targets when the Allies had total air superiority.
queen_annes_revenge wrote: I've just finished panzer leader, an excellent book by heinz guderian (the father of armoured manoeuvre warfare) and in his notes about d day, he explained that the German OKH refused to allow the panzer divisions to be pulled back to form mobile reserves able to perform counter thrusts, and forced them to remain as part of the initial defence. So this is another example of Hitler and the high commands lack of tactical acumen affecting the German war effort. They placed all their faith in the Atlantic Wall, and placed no emphasis on strong points or fortifications to fall back on.
Rommel was the one who didn't want a mobile reserve. Fire brigades were more effective in Eastern Europe because the Soviets weren't able to fly thousands of interdiction sorties daily. Once D Day started the Germans were effectively unable to move assets during the day. It took weeks to move one division that should have been able to move in hours.
There is an excellent two books of D Day from the German perspective. its actual eyewitness accounts. The ones not on the beach are filled with constant notations of allied planes attacking bunkers and anything that moved in absolute waves of aircraft.
Lets also remember Rommel was injured by aircraft during DDay. When you can't keep your field marshal from getting strafed how are you going to protect mile long columns of hanamogs and trucks trying to get to the coast?
Lets also remember that, when the Germans did throw fire brigades at the allies - particularly the American right hook coming around - that they were absolutely obliterated time after time.
This is is all true, The allies had massive airpower available and had worked out a good system of ground to air control of fighter-bombers to assist the troops. If they wanted to pound a German defensive position they could take 4-engine bombers off strategic targets and use them tactically.
Not really. The accuracy of heavy bombers was known even then to be lacking; they probably wouldn't permit 4-engine bombers to strike tactical targets. As far as I know the only attempt to do so was at Monte Cassino, with less than favorable results. In fact the allies became so afraid of friendly fire incidents, the 4-engine airstrikes set for Omaha beach were directed to release their payloads 20 miles inland to avoid friendly fire casualties! One wonders how many allied soldiers might have been saved if they'd bombed the beachfront area like they were originally supposed to.
They used a heavy bomber strike to help the breakout towards Caen. I don't remember the name of the ridge.but it was heavily defended and the Germans were pounded to bits. THe accuracy of heavy bombing as a lot better during daylight against undefended targets when the Allies had total air superiority.
Americans had a excellent bomb sght, very good, pretty accurate for thr time and they had no real shortage of them.
If there was air supiority and low wrnough flak they could also operate lower and gain more accuracy too. The German heavy city defenses forced the formations to fly very high to survive.
However if you wanted real acurancy, a smaller tactical bomber like mosquito, the dive bombers and such would be required..
A heavy bomber with a good, well trained and experienced crew and grand slam or tall boy could nail or nail close to a large battleship, heavy bunker or rail bodge etc sozed target though.
While the use of heavy bombers was infrequent to rare, the use of fighter bombers bordered on extreme, especially during the early Normandy campaign. Again, eye witness reports from the Germans all discuss near constant air raids.
Frazzled wrote: While the use of heavy bombers was infrequent to rare, the use of fighter bombers bordered on extreme, especially during the early Normandy campaign. Again, eye witness reports from the Germans all discuss near constant air raids.
Depending on use, the allies had some heavy fighter bomber / medium bombers like the mosquito and others that provided a fairly wide range of duties.
Less up on Americans but sure thry still had some mediums and others in service between fighter bomber and heavy startagic bomber.
Frazzled wrote: While the use of heavy bombers was infrequent to rare, the use of fighter bombers bordered on extreme, especially during the early Normandy campaign. Again, eye witness reports from the Germans all discuss near constant air raids.
Depending on use, the allies had some heavy fighter bomber / medium bombers like the mosquito and others that provided a fairly wide range of duties.
Less up on Americans but sure thry still had some mediums and others in service between fighter bomber and heavy startagic bomber.
Indeed.
The US had excellent medium bombers, with British level badass names (no one names a warship like the British can! They make even the Klingons blush) like the Marauder and Havoc, I was thinking operationally in support of army formations. They used P47s and P51s primarily. Thats the big claim to fame for the P47 (the P51 eclipses in the bomber escot role, but P47s also did extremely well in the air superiority role). Our thunderbolt was like your Typhoon.
On the Pacific side the USMC / USN tended to use the Corsair for similar roles.
Meh. Let's stop messing around with bombers here and go for some real firepower.
Naval broadsides is where the action was. I remember reading about Tiger tanks at Normandy, and how they were picked up and flung around as though they were toys, after getting the 18 inch gun treatment.
That's the way to take out a Tiger.
Frazzled wrote: While the use of heavy bombers was infrequent to rare, the use of fighter bombers bordered on extreme, especially during the early Normandy campaign. Again, eye witness reports from the Germans all discuss near constant air raids.
Depending on use, the allies had some heavy fighter bomber / medium bombers like the mosquito and others that provided a fairly wide range of duties.
Less up on Americans but sure thry still had some mediums and others in service between fighter bomber and heavy startagic bomber.
Indeed.
The US had excellent medium bombers, with British level badass names (no one names a warship like the British can! They make even the Klingons blush) like the Marauder and Havoc, I was thinking operationally in support of army formations. They used P47s and P51s primarily. Thats the big claim to fame for the P47 (the P51 eclipses in the bomber escot role, but P47s also did extremely well in the air superiority role). Our thunderbolt was like your Typhoon.
On the Pacific side the USMC / USN tended to use the Corsair for similar roles.
Yeah, ships like Furious, Warspite, Dreadnought, Victor,y, Warrior, Dragon, Coragous, even Unicorn... Lol. Yes that was real.
Thanks, I know my British alot better. We had alot of types in use, and some bad ass names. Like sea fire, tempest and such. Mosquito was a not such a intimidating name but very effective in battle, and fast. Twin merlins can move.
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Do_I_Not_Like_That wrote: Meh. Let's stop messing around with bombers here and go for some real firepower.
Naval broadsides is where the action was. I remember reading about Tiger tanks at Normandy, and how they were picked up and flung around as though they were toys, after getting the 18 inch gun treatment.
That's the way to take out a Tiger.
True the big old girls could really make the Tigers hurt.
A late war heavy cruiser could throw out a potential 10-20+ tons of rounds a minute out at max rate.
simonr1978 wrote: Only the Yamatos had 18 inch guns, the Allied battleships had 14 to 16 inch main batteries, still very potent but not quite that powerful.
Not know of 18 inch. UK had the slightly eccentric ships.
15 inch battleship guns on ships smaller than some cruisers.
A little out dated, but no one argument a with 15 inch guns.
1 very rare 18 inch Royal Navy Monitor. Using guns from HMS Furious. Most ships where built between 14-16inches though. KgV class, 14, warspite and her sisters 15, vanguard and Rodney 16, battle cruiser Hood was 16
Ah... the Furious had long since lost her 18" gun when she was converted to a full carrier in the 1920s. The largest guns serving in Allied navies in 1944 were all 16".
simonr1978 wrote: Only the Yamatos had 18 inch guns, the Allied battleships had 14 to 16 inch main batteries, still very potent but not quite that powerful.
Not know of 18 inch. UK had the slightly eccentric ships.
15 inch battleship guns on ships smaller than some cruisers.
A little out dated, but no one argument a with 15 inch guns.
1 very rare 18 inch Royal Navy Monitor. Using guns from HMS Furious. Most ships where built between 14-16inches though. KgV class, 14, warspite and her sisters 15, vanguard and Rodney 16, battle cruiser Hood was 16
HMS Hood had the same BL 15" Mk. I guns as the Queen Elizabeth, Revenge, Renown and Vanguard-class battleships and battlecruisers. HMS Nelson and HMS Rodney were the only Royal Navy battleships with 16" guns.
Thanks for the replies, but I think people are missing the point here.
If you're a Tiger tank commander, who has somehow survived a naval bombardment, and you're standing next to your burned out Tiger, assuming you can get past the deep crater holes...
Are you really going to say, it's not so bad, it was only a 16 inch gun, not an 18 inch gun. I mean, c'mon.
Are you really going to say, it's not so bad, it was only a 16 inch gun, not an 18 inch gun.
To be fair, this sounds like something that would be perfect for some kind of WWII comedy about a German soldier bumbling his way from 1939 to 1945 Forest Gump style
If you're a Tiger tank commander, who has somehow survived a naval bombardment, and you're standing next to your burned out Tiger, assuming you can get past the deep crater holes...
Are you really going to say, it's not so bad, it was only a 16 inch gun, not an 18 inch gun. I mean, c'mon.
It may not make a difference to a Tiger tank, but it might to a coastal emplacement.
There is evidence from inspecting the wreck that the 14" shells of HMS King George V failed to penetrate the armour of the Bismarck throughout most of her final battle, but the 16" shells of HMS Rodney smashed right through and caused the lion's share of the damage. A mere 2" extra diametre equates to a noticeably bigger shell, therefore a bigger explosive charge and/or greater armour-piercing capability.
If you increase the diameter of a circle from 14" to 16", the surface area, and mass, goes up by nearly 1/3. If both shells were only 3' in length(and were perfect cylinders), the increase in volume would be nearly 1700 cubic inches of additional space. Which is again roughly 1/3 increase in volume and therefore mass.
One reason why those planned 20" guns on some WW2 warships that were never built would have been so scary.
20" would arguably have been a downgrade from 18" because as the volume of the shell increases so does the size of the machinery needed to reload and aim the guns. Yamato already had 3000-tonne turrets (more than same-era Destroyers!), and 20" guns would have been even heavier. 9 18" guns, like the Yamato, would probably have been far more effective than the 6 20" guns of the A-150 "Super Yamato" the Japanses were working on. 18" guns would already punch through pretty much any contemporary armour; having 50% more rounds per broadside would have been far more effective than overkilling your opponent.
Bear in mind during testing it was found the well made American super heavy shells and 16 inch guns of the Iowa class where equal or exceeded there practical ability to penetrate and had advantages of firing faster. Radar guidenece and excellent reliability and crew training.
The Yamato and likely a 20 inch super had optical systems that would be less effective at night and smoke to track misses. Also acurate to a long range, that Japan while could fire further never turwly had acurate fire at far end.
The Iowa and the Montana, likely with there advanced support systems would have been more than a match even with there "small lol" 16 inch main guns.
jhe90 wrote: Bear in mind during testing it was found the well made American super heavy shells and 16 inch guns of the Iowa class where equal or exceeded there practical ability to penetrate and had advantages of firing faster. Radar guidenece and excellent reliability and crew training.
The Yamato and likely a 20 inch super had optical systems that would be less effective at night and smoke to track misses. Also acurate to a long range, that Japan while could fire further never turwly had acurate fire at far end.
The Iowa and the Montana, likely with there advanced support systems would have been more than a match even with there "small lol" 16 inch main guns.
Of course in reality it was the 200 torpedo bombers coming at her that would undue her...
Intresting topic, but anwer is not so.
If it wasn't D day, it would be E-Day, F-Day G-Day and so on.
1944 was not a breaking point. More like - "Hurry up guys or soviets get all the fun."
Northern shoreline is too stretched to hold it effectively.
The only good defense Germans could have is offence - aircraft, navy, artillery not bunkers, trenches and MGs.
But by that time Reich resources were depleted.
Intresting what-ifs could be raised during Mediterranean operations in 1943. And even then it was far from "gamble"
jhe90 wrote: Bear in mind during testing it was found the well made American super heavy shells and 16 inch guns of the Iowa class where equal or exceeded there practical ability to penetrate and had advantages of firing faster. Radar guidenece and excellent reliability and crew training.
The Yamato and likely a 20 inch super had optical systems that would be less effective at night and smoke to track misses. Also acurate to a long range, that Japan while could fire further never turwly had acurate fire at far end.
The Iowa and the Montana, likely with there advanced support systems would have been more than a match even with there "small lol" 16 inch main guns.
Of course in reality it was the 200 torpedo bombers coming at her that would undue her...
Yes however in a real duel if they ever met, the more acurate, computer guided guns of the Iowa class would have really turned the tables on her bigger foe.
They had some advanced super heavy shells bolstered by american supply of materials to produce very high grade steel etc Japan did not.
But what really matters is being able to land a acurate hit. For all the big 18 inch guns had, they lacked the Acuracy and radar guidenexe to support. In a close up duel matter less but at range, or low visibility the Iowa guns can even target her near blind.
The late war fire control could keep a American warship small as a fletcher class firing at a fair combat speed, acirately, while manooverinf near blinded by smoke. And thr battleship can mount far larger and much higher radar mounts.
It's worth noting that during the Battle off Samar, the destroyers and escorts of Taffy 3 used rain squalls and smoke to great effect while maintaining counterfire with their own radar-aimed guns... in what Drachinifel called a 'terrible abuse of the real-world cover rules...'
Vulcan wrote: It's worth noting that during the Battle off Samar, the destroyers and escorts of Taffy 3 used rain squalls and smoke to great effect while maintaining counterfire with their own radar-aimed guns... in what Drachinifel called a 'terrible abuse of the real-world cover rules...'
Yeah. Japan had mostly optical sights, very good but they rekised on optics and each ship had colour codes dyes to plot there shots etc.
All rather outdated compared to the US Navy, and its also excellent damage control teams and navel design keeping ships fighting that took insane damage.
That and near suicidal bravery. I think it was that battle a Japanese captain even saluted one ship, for the fight they put up against near impossible odds.
It probably helped that the Japanese mis-identified the escort carriers as full fleet carriers, and by size comparison identified the destroyers and escorts as cruisers and battleships, so they kept firing AP shells that would go straight through the unarmored ships of Taffy 3 without exploding
Which takes nothing away from the, as you say, near-suicidal bravery of the sailors on those ships. It just made that near-suicidal defense more successful than it had any right to be.
Vulcan wrote: It probably helped that the Japanese mis-identified the escort carriers as full fleet carriers, and by size comparison identified the destroyers and escorts as cruisers and battleships, so they kept firing AP shells that would go straight through the unarmored ships of Taffy 3 without exploding
Which takes nothing away from the, as you say, near-suicidal bravery of the sailors on those ships. It just made that near-suicidal defense more successful than it had any right to be.
They they had to close to insane ranges too, under 5 miles because of the US torpodoes being pretty primitive vs the Japanese vqrients. They could reach out a fair bit further and faster, against ships that where Yamamoto alone weighing more than the entire trask force. There main guns where smaller than some of the other ships secondaries with armour belts immune to those rounds. Still they turned round what was a battle that's almost impossible to belive.
They got so close they where unloading there bofors guns, and one pistol into the Japanese for good messure.
One shot from thr battleships could have sunk them if in a critical compartment. Still they sank 2 heavy cruisers, damaged 2 more and one destroyer. Ships Japan could not replace easily unlike the US.
Every loss or damaged ship was a blow they could not absorb like the US Navy.
Vulcan wrote: It's worth noting that during the Battle off Samar, the destroyers and escorts of Taffy 3 used rain squalls and smoke to great effect while maintaining counterfire with their own radar-aimed guns... in what Drachinifel called a 'terrible abuse of the real-world cover rules...'
Yeah. Japan had mostly optical sights, very good but they rekised on optics and each ship had colour codes dyes to plot there shots etc.
All rather outdated compared to the US Navy, and its also excellent damage control teams and navel design keeping ships fighting that took insane damage.
That and near suicidal bravery. I think it was that battle a Japanese captain even saluted one ship, for the fight they put up against near impossible odds.
It was the Johnston. The destroyer ran around effectively picking a fight with everybody. It was the TBone of the Destroyer world.
Seriously, whenever Japanese ships appeared, it would go after them like an angry terrier. At one point it and the Heely (?) put a cruiser in a crossfire and knocked it out of action. Johnston got in close and traded fire with the heavies and I think Yamato herself.
One problem for the Japanese was they were engaging with armor piercing rounds. They would hit and go right through the destroyers and jeep carriers. It would punch a whole but not go boom. It was only late in the action that some started switching the HE and promptly blew the crap out of the Gambier Bay, Johnston and Heely(?).
Vulcan wrote: It's worth noting that during the Battle off Samar, the destroyers and escorts of Taffy 3 used rain squalls and smoke to great effect while maintaining counterfire with their own radar-aimed guns... in what Drachinifel called a 'terrible abuse of the real-world cover rules...'
Yeah. Japan had mostly optical sights, very good but they rekised on optics and each ship had colour codes dyes to plot there shots etc.
All rather outdated compared to the US Navy, and its also excellent damage control teams and navel design keeping ships fighting that took insane damage.
That and near suicidal bravery. I think it was that battle a Japanese captain even saluted one ship, for the fight they put up against near impossible odds.
It was the Johnston. The destroyer ran around effectively picking a fight with everybody. It was the TBone of the Destroyer world.
Seriously, whenever Japanese ships appeared, it would go after them like an angry terrier. At one point it and the Heely (?) put a cruiser in a crossfire and knocked it out of action. Johnston got in close and traded fire with the heavies and I think Yamato herself.
One problem for the Japanese was they were engaging with armor piercing rounds. They would hit and go right through the destroyers and jeep carriers. It would punch a whole but not go boom. It was only late in the action that some started switching the HE and promptly blew the crap out of the Gambier Bay, Johnston and Heely(?).
The fact a Destroyer that probbly weighed as much as the Yamatos main gun turret was picking a fight is pure. Well not sure what but that's pretty brazen. Especially when Yamato had fully enclosed turrets and could probbly barely dent her super structure. Yet alone her armour belts what would chipping the paint.
That was true of pretty much all of the Japanese ships present.
However, the Japanese were kind enough to carry large quantities of pure oxygen and high explosives in unarmored mounts on the deck of their cruisers and destroyers. These mounts were called 'torpedo launchers' and were easily set off by destroyer-grade gunfire. BOOM! and now you have a lot of blast damage and a big fire on board.
And while yes, the American destroyers had torpedoes launchers on deck as well, under the circumstances they fired their early... and theirs weren't powered by pure oxygen either.
It's worth mentioning that by this period in capital ship development, the 'all or nothing' armor scheme was in full use. Most ships would have a heavy armor belt over the machinery, weapons, and ammunition, and to a lesser extent fire control stations (and communications from them to the guns)... and just plain sheet steel everywhere else. Shooting up the bridge of a battleship was just as easy as shooting up the bridge of a destroyer. Indeed, one could theoretically significantly slow a battleship with light weapons by shooting up the bow. This would cause some flooding - increasing the weight the ship has to haul around - and cause extra drag on the hull.
I say 'theoretically' because you'd have to get pretty darn close to shoot that precisely with such light and short-ranged weapons, and in the meantime said battleship's main battery fire is getting even more accurate as you close...
Vulcan wrote: That was true of pretty much all of the Japanese ships present.
However, the Japanese were kind enough to carry large quantities of pure oxygen and high explosives in unarmored mounts on the deck of their cruisers and destroyers. These mounts were called 'torpedo launchers' and were easily set off by destroyer-grade gunfire. BOOM! and now you have a lot of blast damage and a big fire on board.
And while yes, the American destroyers had torpedoes launchers on deck as well, under the circumstances they fired their early... and theirs weren't powered by pure oxygen either.
It's worth mentioning that by this period in capital ship development, the 'all or nothing' armor scheme was in full use. Most ships would have a heavy armor belt over the machinery, weapons, and ammunition, and to a lesser extent fire control stations (and communications from them to the guns)... and just plain sheet steel everywhere else. Shooting up the bridge of a battleship was just as easy as shooting up the bridge of a destroyer. Indeed, one could theoretically significantly slow a battleship with light weapons by shooting up the bow. This would cause some flooding - increasing the weight the ship has to haul around - and cause extra drag on the hull.
I say 'theoretically' because you'd have to get pretty darn close to shoot that precisely with such light and short-ranged weapons, and in the meantime said battleship's main battery fire is getting even more accurate as you close...
That's kinda a weakness, however the long lance and others could easily outpace and out range anything anyone else had.
Forgot about all or nothing. However there's still alot of compartments and some of the larger battleships had minor, but some reinforcement to there upper works to withstand the fogrces there main guns generated. Well vs main armour but wrnough to protect the crews from the massive overpressure.
There was a reason some had majority of there AA and so enclosed bar sharpanal. It protected crew from the massive blasts. My grandfather was on them and the entire ship felt it when oyhe main guns where opening up.
Yes. That theory also forgets you somehow have to evade the faster firing secondary guns and rapid fire duel mode AA that's gonna be making your like a misery.
I think my grandfather's in the end boasted over 100 light to medium AA guns and that's not counting her rapid fire secondarys that could churn up a wall of flak too.
The conning towers carried stupidly heavy armour even under the all-or-nothing scheme. From a quick Google, Yamato and Musashi had a whopping 19" of armour covering the conning tower, which is actually heavier than the main belt.
AlmightyWalrus wrote: The conning towers carried stupidly heavy armour even under the all-or-nothing scheme. From a quick Google, Yamato and Musashi had a whopping 19" of armour covering the conning tower, which is actually heavier than the main belt.
Yeah. Misuoui had a small but insanely armrouee central section that the captain and a small number could operate the ship from in battle.
Least a foot thick.
It was narrow to save weight and keep the ships balence low.
Had one or a few post box sized vsion slits to see what was going but other than that. A virtual bunker at sea. Checked. Its 14 inches thick. From some reading the 7 inch deck armour of Yamamoto absorbed 500 pound bombs. This is twice as thick and curved not flat so the energy is deflected or not fully directed. It would take hell of a hit to punch through that.
Especially when as a curve, a angled hit has to penetrate the 14inch straight + the angle.
In effect more like 15-20 inches of armour potential.
AlmightyWalrus wrote: Don't get me wrong, a 16"/50 shell from an Iowa could still punch through it, but you're not doing it with a DD.
Oh yeah. A heavy Ap 16 inch is going through. It was tested vs a spare plate of Yamatos and it managed to penetrate. And that was thickest in world.
A 5-6inch AP is not even standing a chance. A 8 inch that weighed 2.5timws as much is not likely either.
Montana might have been armoured vs own shells but that was nof a fast class, and would have also have had the top grade US steel.
The US BB had a rare ability to be built near entirely of high grade steel far as I understand. Not just armour and so where needed. The US industry meant they could build majority if high end armoured and stronger steels.
Some nations could not afford the expensive nature of that design.
AlmightyWalrus wrote: It wasn't that Japan couldn't afford high-grade steel, they physically couldn't produce it in the quantity needed.
All that steel would have been far better served building carriers or destroyers.
Wouldn't have helped them anyway. At the risk of preaching to the choir, between the failure of Pearl Harbor to sink the US carriers and the fethup in delivering the declaration of war after the attack rather than before the Japanese were never going to get the US to agree to an armistice, which means the US wins through sheer industrial output. You guys built 24 Essex-class carriers (and a bunch of others) throughout the war, IIRC Japan built less than five carriers in total (including Shinano).
Or did you mean the steel in the Iowas would've been better spent on CVs and DDs?
AlmightyWalrus wrote: It wasn't that Japan couldn't afford high-grade steel, they physically couldn't produce it in the quantity needed.
All that steel would have been far better served building carriers or destroyers.
Wouldn't have helped them anyway. At the risk of preaching to the choir, between the failure of Pearl Harbor to sink the US carriers and the fethup in delivering the declaration of war after the attack rather than before the Japanese were never going to get the US to agree to an armistice, which means the US wins through sheer industrial output. You guys built 24 Essex-class carriers (and a bunch of others) throughout the war, IIRC Japan built less than five carriers in total (including Shinano).
Or did you mean the steel in the Iowas would've been better spent on CVs and DDs?
er...yes to that too?
yes the only way Japan could win the war was to not fight the war.
AlmightyWalrus wrote: It wasn't that Japan couldn't afford high-grade steel, they physically couldn't produce it in the quantity needed.
All that steel would have been far better served building carriers or destroyers.
Wouldn't have helped them anyway. At the risk of preaching to the choir, between the failure of Pearl Harbor to sink the US carriers and the fethup in delivering the declaration of war after the attack rather than before the Japanese were never going to get the US to agree to an armistice, which means the US wins through sheer industrial output. You guys built 24 Essex-class carriers (and a bunch of others) throughout the war, IIRC Japan built less than five carriers in total (including Shinano).
Or did you mean the steel in the Iowas would've been better spent on CVs and DDs?
er...yes to that too?
yes the only way Japan could win the war was to not fight the war.
Except even then they lose. America had cut off their oil. I'll let you imagine the effects upon the nation without any oil. They HAD TO HAVE the oil in Indonesia, or they suffer complete economic collapse.
In the end, while Japan made the decision to start shooting, their only other option was to basically surrender their autonomy completely back in 1941. America had cut off all other options. The ultranationalist government of the time just wasn't going to submit without a fight.
One could argue in light of that, what happened to Japan WAS a victory in the end. Yes, we smashed them flat... but then we helped them back up to vastly greater heights. Had the capitulated in 1941... would we have helped them back up that far afterwards? Somehow, I think not.
AlmightyWalrus wrote: It wasn't that Japan couldn't afford high-grade steel, they physically couldn't produce it in the quantity needed.
All that steel would have been far better served building carriers or destroyers.
Wouldn't have helped them anyway. At the risk of preaching to the choir, between the failure of Pearl Harbor to sink the US carriers and the fethup in delivering the declaration of war after the attack rather than before the Japanese were never going to get the US to agree to an armistice, which means the US wins through sheer industrial output. You guys built 24 Essex-class carriers (and a bunch of others) throughout the war, IIRC Japan built less than five carriers in total (including Shinano).
Or did you mean the steel in the Iowas would've been better spent on CVs and DDs?
er...yes to that too?
yes the only way Japan could win the war was to not fight the war.
Except even then they lose. America had cut off their oil. I'll let you imagine the effects upon the nation without any oil. They HAD TO HAVE the oil in Indonesia, or they suffer complete economic collapse.
In the end, while Japan made the decision to start shooting, their only other option was to basically surrender their autonomy completely back in 1941. America had cut off all other options. The ultranationalist government of the time just wasn't going to submit without a fight.
One could argue in light of that, what happened to Japan WAS a victory in the end. Yes, we smashed them flat... but then we helped them back up to vastly greater heights. Had the capitulated in 1941... would we have helped them back up that far afterwards? Somehow, I think not.
Well already at war. They had been fighting in China since the 30's.
True. And the American oil embargo was in reaction to that ongoing war. I suppose you could say Japan only wins if they don't invade China, Manchuria, and Korea to kick the whole thing off.
But by that point you've gone way past alternate history. An industrialized post-Meji Restoration Imperial Japan that doesn't go to war in Asia is not going to happen.
Well, there was a possibility of causing sufficient casualties to the US that they would choose to back off through pressure back home. The Vietnam route to victory if you like. The entire late war Japanese strategy was basically built around the concept of costing the US as much as possible in order to force an attritional stalemate. The political and social structure of Japan could tolerate much higher losses, and Japan knew it. Japan also knew it could no longer win or draw through conventional means.
The strategy was arguably working- Okinawa and Iwo Jima were very costly, and kamikaze was developing into a remarkably sophisticated system for keeping the pressure on the US fleet too. Invading Kyushu was predicted to cost the lives of a million US servicemen. It is possible that, had US progress up the home islands been slow enough, the US would be forced to the peace table before achieving total victory, which would be a political win for the Japanese regime.
Of course, we know the Japanese did surrender before this point- the exact combination of factors is still heavily debated, so I am just going to say Soviet and nuclear involvement. I know which factor I think is the bigger precipitant of Japanese surrender.
Haighus wrote: Well, there was a possibility of causing sufficient casualties to the US that they would choose to back off through pressure back home. The Vietnam route to victory if you like. The entire late war Japanese strategy was basically built around the concept of costing the US as much as possible in order to force an attritional stalemate. The political and social structure of Japan could tolerate much higher losses, and Japan knew it. Japan also knew it could no longer win or draw through conventional means.
The strategy was arguably working- Okinawa and Iwo Jima were very costly, and kamikaze was developing into a remarkably sophisticated system for keeping the pressure on the US fleet too. Invading Kyushu was predicted to cost the lives of a million US servicemen. It is possible that, had US progress up the home islands been slow enough, the US would be forced to the peace table before achieving total victory, which would be a political win for the Japanese regime.
Of course, we know the Japanese did surrender before this point- the exact combination of factors is still heavily debated, so I am just going to say Soviet and nuclear involvement. I know which factor I think is the bigger precipitant of Japanese surrender.
Yeah, I think very near the end the Soviets where preparing for a pivot and moving forces to pressure and push against the Japanese Chinese territories.
The Soviet armies at this point where battle hardened, well equipped and more than a match for the Japanese forces. Add there advancements in armour and assault guns, plus now no shortage of heavy guns and ability to cordinate the elements to some degree.
It would not have ended well for thr border armies. In the New top of line tanks on show at thr victory parade there latest models mounted 90mm main guns, and armour more like panthers and tigers.
Heavy. But compared to thr majority of Japan's classed light to light medium. It would have been a massacre.
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Vulcan wrote: True. And the American oil embargo was in reaction to that ongoing war. I suppose you could say Japan only wins if they don't invade China, Manchuria, and Korea to kick the whole thing off.
But by that point you've gone way past alternate history. An industrialized post-Meji Restoration Imperial Japan that doesn't go to war in Asia is not going to happen.
Japan already had a pretty bad reputation, nan King and other events. They started a war with Soviets in 1939 ish. It did not end well and where quickly repulsed by the heavier meachanized forced under Zukov. A gak ton of a artillery also greatly helped level the odds to Russain forces.
Yep. That one that Zukov. That's where he first started to get reconized.
If thry did not start one war thry where determined to start another.
Yeah, I think very near the end the Soviets where preparing for a pivot and moving forces to pressure and push against the Japanese Chinese territories.
Oh they didn't just prepare, they actually did attack and it was predictably disastrous for the depleted Japanese garrison forces that were in Manchuria and China. The best men had long since been transferred out for the other campaigns in this theater (Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, etc.). Shockingly, it was this development, not the terrifying new atomic weapon that the US was dropping on their cities, that actually forced the Japanese government to accept unconditional surrender.
Vulcan wrote: True. And the American oil embargo was in reaction to that ongoing war. I suppose you could say Japan only wins if they don't invade China, Manchuria, and Korea to kick the whole thing off.
But by that point you've gone way past alternate history. An industrialized post-Meji Restoration Imperial Japan that doesn't go to war in Asia is not going to happen.
Japan could invade Korea and manchuria.
The second war of course would end with an embargo, as it did.
Infact if Japan would've gone for the whole northern expansion it would've probably never been embargoed in the first place.
Also important to note, Japan was not militaristic constantly after the meji restauration.
The depression lead to failure which was attributed to the democratic system which then was used by the military to essentially take over.
Yeah, I think very near the end the Soviets where preparing for a pivot and moving forces to pressure and push against the Japanese Chinese territories.
Oh they didn't just prepare, they actually did attack and it was predictably disastrous for the depleted Japanese garrison forces that were in Manchuria and China. The best men had long since been transferred out for the other campaigns in this theater (Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, etc.). Shockingly, it was this development, not the terrifying new atomic weapon that the US was dropping on their cities, that actually forced the Japanese government to accept unconditional surrender.
Give the soviet Union had "liberated" from Moscow to Berlin, and did not exactly hand back. They showed no sign of stopping.
Also, Unlike the US, the sabove mentioned stratagy to fight a brutal battle of attrition and so. Well the Soviets would not be so impacted. Or worse for Japan if thry got sandwiched between the massive allied fleets, battleships, carriers and vast 500+ ship bomber formations and the massive Soviet ground armies.
That would be a whole new level of unwinnable to end up sandwiched between two vengeful industrial giants. Japan would be up against millions of battle hardeded troops from the eastern and western armies pivoting East with there experienced troops and leadership.
Yeah, I think very near the end the Soviets where preparing for a pivot and moving forces to pressure and push against the Japanese Chinese territories.
Oh they didn't just prepare, they actually did attack and it was predictably disastrous for the depleted Japanese garrison forces that were in Manchuria and China. The best men had long since been transferred out for the other campaigns in this theater (Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, etc.). Shockingly, it was this development, not the terrifying new atomic weapon that the US was dropping on their cities, that actually forced the Japanese government to accept unconditional surrender.
Give the soviet Union had "liberated" from Moscow to Berlin, and did not exactly hand back. They showed no sign of stopping.
Also, Unlike the US, the sabove mentioned stratagy to fight a brutal battle of attrition and so. Well the Soviets would not be so impacted. Or worse for Japan if thry got sandwiched between the massive allied fleets, battleships, carriers and vast 500+ ship bomber formations and the massive Soviet ground armies.
That would be a whole new level of unwinnable to end up sandwiched between two vengeful industrial giants. Japan would be up against millions of battle hardeded troops from the eastern and western armies pivoting East with there experienced troops and leadership.
Russia didn't have the naval capability to invade the home islands.
Yeah, I think very near the end the Soviets where preparing for a pivot and moving forces to pressure and push against the Japanese Chinese territories.
Oh they didn't just prepare, they actually did attack and it was predictably disastrous for the depleted Japanese garrison forces that were in Manchuria and China. The best men had long since been transferred out for the other campaigns in this theater (Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, etc.). Shockingly, it was this development, not the terrifying new atomic weapon that the US was dropping on their cities, that actually forced the Japanese government to accept unconditional surrender.
Give the soviet Union had "liberated" from Moscow to Berlin, and did not exactly hand back. They showed no sign of stopping.
Also, Unlike the US, the sabove mentioned stratagy to fight a brutal battle of attrition and so. Well the Soviets would not be so impacted. Or worse for Japan if thry got sandwiched between the massive allied fleets, battleships, carriers and vast 500+ ship bomber formations and the massive Soviet ground armies.
That would be a whole new level of unwinnable to end up sandwiched between two vengeful industrial giants. Japan would be up against millions of battle hardeded troops from the eastern and western armies pivoting East with there experienced troops and leadership.
Russia didn't have the naval capability to invade the home islands.
Maybe not. They could take out thr majority of there land holdings and starve them of any of thr resources outside the home islands. Add US blockades and Japan's indutiries and production would be truly crippled.
Also the loss of all there gains would be a severe blownto there pride and honour.
Yeah, I think very near the end the Soviets where preparing for a pivot and moving forces to pressure and push against the Japanese Chinese territories.
Oh they didn't just prepare, they actually did attack and it was predictably disastrous for the depleted Japanese garrison forces that were in Manchuria and China. The best men had long since been transferred out for the other campaigns in this theater (Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, etc.). Shockingly, it was this development, not the terrifying new atomic weapon that the US was dropping on their cities, that actually forced the Japanese government to accept unconditional surrender.
Give the soviet Union had "liberated" from Moscow to Berlin, and did not exactly hand back. They showed no sign of stopping.
Also, Unlike the US, the sabove mentioned stratagy to fight a brutal battle of attrition and so. Well the Soviets would not be so impacted. Or worse for Japan if thry got sandwiched between the massive allied fleets, battleships, carriers and vast 500+ ship bomber formations and the massive Soviet ground armies.
That would be a whole new level of unwinnable to end up sandwiched between two vengeful industrial giants. Japan would be up against millions of battle hardeded troops from the eastern and western armies pivoting East with there experienced troops and leadership.
Russia didn't have the naval capability to invade the home islands.
Maybe not. They could take out thr majority of there land holdings and starve them of any of thr resources outside the home islands. Add US blockades and Japan's indutiries and production would be truly crippled.
Also the loss of all there gains would be a severe blownto there pride and honour.
Soviets weren't even needed for that, they could've just shipped recent excess to the CCCP forces and help them a bit in manchuria, done.
Yeah, I think very near the end the Soviets where preparing for a pivot and moving forces to pressure and push against the Japanese Chinese territories.
Oh they didn't just prepare, they actually did attack and it was predictably disastrous for the depleted Japanese garrison forces that were in Manchuria and China. The best men had long since been transferred out for the other campaigns in this theater (Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, etc.). Shockingly, it was this development, not the terrifying new atomic weapon that the US was dropping on their cities, that actually forced the Japanese government to accept unconditional surrender.
Give the soviet Union had "liberated" from Moscow to Berlin, and did not exactly hand back. They showed no sign of stopping.
Also, Unlike the US, the sabove mentioned stratagy to fight a brutal battle of attrition and so. Well the Soviets would not be so impacted. Or worse for Japan if thry got sandwiched between the massive allied fleets, battleships, carriers and vast 500+ ship bomber formations and the massive Soviet ground armies.
That would be a whole new level of unwinnable to end up sandwiched between two vengeful industrial giants. Japan would be up against millions of battle hardeded troops from the eastern and western armies pivoting East with there experienced troops and leadership.
Russia didn't have the naval capability to invade the home islands.
Maybe not. They could take out thr majority of there land holdings and starve them of any of thr resources outside the home islands. Add US blockades and Japan's indutiries and production would be truly crippled.
Also the loss of all there gains would be a severe blownto there pride and honour.
Soviets weren't even needed for that, they could've just shipped recent excess to the CCCP forces and help them a bit in manchuria, done.
And give up easy lands to liberate. Large chunks of pre communist China where barely industrial, but huge amounts of land and resources.
AlmightyWalrus wrote: It wasn't that Japan couldn't afford high-grade steel, they physically couldn't produce it in the quantity needed.
All that steel would have been far better served building carriers or destroyers.
Wouldn't have helped them anyway. At the risk of preaching to the choir, between the failure of Pearl Harbor to sink the US carriers and the fethup in delivering the declaration of war after the attack rather than before the Japanese were never going to get the US to agree to an armistice, which means the US wins through sheer industrial output. You guys built 24 Essex-class carriers (and a bunch of others) throughout the war, IIRC Japan built less than five carriers in total (including Shinano).
Or did you mean the steel in the Iowas would've been better spent on CVs and DDs?
er...yes to that too?
yes the only way Japan could win the war was to not fight the war.
Except even then they lose. America had cut off their oil. I'll let you imagine the effects upon the nation without any oil. They HAD TO HAVE the oil in Indonesia, or they suffer complete economic collapse.
In the end, while Japan made the decision to start shooting, their only other option was to basically surrender their autonomy completely back in 1941. America had cut off all other options. The ultranationalist government of the time just wasn't going to submit without a fight.
One could argue in light of that, what happened to Japan WAS a victory in the end. Yes, we smashed them flat... but then we helped them back up to vastly greater heights. Had the capitulated in 1941... would we have helped them back up that far afterwards? Somehow, I think not.
No. The point of the oil embargo was for them to quit their depredations in China and Indochina. They could have quit their depredations in China and indochina. After all, they did just fine after the war.
jhe90 wrote:
Japan already had a pretty bad reputation, nan King and other events. They started a war with Soviets in 1939 ish. It did not end well and where quickly repulsed by the heavier meachanized forced under Zukov. A gak ton of a artillery also greatly helped level the odds to Russain forces.
Yep. That one that Zukov. That's where he first started to get reconized.
If thry did not start one war thry where determined to start another.
ZHukov. Georgiy Konstantinovich Zhukov.
Георгий Константинович Жуков. 'Ж' is pronounced 'zhe'. 'З' is Z in Cyrillic, as in 'Звезда/zvezda' (star).
Haighus wrote: Well, there was a possibility of causing sufficient casualties to the US that they would choose to back off through pressure back home.
Not really. The US had complete air and naval superiority and could simply blockade Japan while bombing every square inch of the country into rubble with near-zero casualties. The US has little or no pressure to invade immediately in an era where bombing cities off the map was considered standard procedure instead of a horrifying atrocity. And at some point enough of Japan would be slaughtered that an invasion could succeed.
Haighus wrote: Well, there was a possibility of causing sufficient casualties to the US that they would choose to back off through pressure back home.
Not really. The US had complete air and naval superiority and could simply blockade Japan while bombing every square inch of the country into rubble with near-zero casualties. The US has little or no pressure to invade immediately in an era where bombing cities off the map was considered standard procedure instead of a horrifying atrocity. And at some point enough of Japan would be slaughtered that an invasion could succeed.
Additionally lets not gloss over the planned invasion included multiple nuclear strikes to clear the way.
Haighus wrote: Well, there was a possibility of causing sufficient casualties to the US that they would choose to back off through pressure back home.
Not really. The US had complete air and naval superiority and could simply blockade Japan while bombing every square inch of the country into rubble with near-zero casualties. The US has little or no pressure to invade immediately in an era where bombing cities off the map was considered standard procedure instead of a horrifying atrocity. And at some point enough of Japan would be slaughtered that an invasion could succeed.
Additionally lets not gloss over the planned invasion included multiple nuclear strikes to clear the way.
Well the first two where just almost test runs. They did not spend perhaps the most expensive military project ever for one bomb. It was a production line. In a short time they could of obliterated a city a month or sooner with nukes.
They had fifteen planned for Operation Downfall. This was before fallout was understood though, so Allied troops would have been walking through fallout 24 hours after each blast. Not bueno.
Frazzled wrote: They had fifteen planned for Operation Downfall. This was before fallout was understood though, so Allied troops would have been walking through fallout 24 hours after each blast. Not bueno.
Yeah. That would of been very much a life shortening campaign.
Granted 15 nuclear strikes would have cracked a fair hole in a Japanese defences. They really where not going any degree of subtle against the home islands.
Nuclear strike plans. Battleships working in formations to bombard the coastal sites. My grandfather's was meant yo join least two other BB for a strike mission but thry had a jammed turret.
One alone can be a monster. But a team of battleships laying into you.
Frazzled wrote: Thousands of aircraft using Okinawa and then Kyoshu as air bases vs. two thousand Kamikazes, and divisions of dug in troops. What a blood bath.
And that's just military casualties in the million allied lists.
Japans home islands even the. Where fairly densely populated with civilians, pows and more. The Japanese casualties would be in thr multiple millions to more like maybe 5 million woth the shear level of firepower the allies where planning to bring into the campaign.
AlmightyWalrus wrote: It wasn't that Japan couldn't afford high-grade steel, they physically couldn't produce it in the quantity needed.
All that steel would have been far better served building carriers or destroyers.
Wouldn't have helped them anyway. At the risk of preaching to the choir, between the failure of Pearl Harbor to sink the US carriers and the fethup in delivering the declaration of war after the attack rather than before the Japanese were never going to get the US to agree to an armistice, which means the US wins through sheer industrial output. You guys built 24 Essex-class carriers (and a bunch of others) throughout the war, IIRC Japan built less than five carriers in total (including Shinano).
Or did you mean the steel in the Iowas would've been better spent on CVs and DDs?
er...yes to that too?
yes the only way Japan could win the war was to not fight the war.
Except even then they lose. America had cut off their oil. I'll let you imagine the effects upon the nation without any oil. They HAD TO HAVE the oil in Indonesia, or they suffer complete economic collapse.
In the end, while Japan made the decision to start shooting, their only other option was to basically surrender their autonomy completely back in 1941. America had cut off all other options. The ultranationalist government of the time just wasn't going to submit without a fight.
One could argue in light of that, what happened to Japan WAS a victory in the end. Yes, we smashed them flat... but then we helped them back up to vastly greater heights. Had the capitulated in 1941... would we have helped them back up that far afterwards? Somehow, I think not.
No. The point of the oil embargo was for them to quit their depredations in China and Indochina. They could have quit their depredations in China and indochina. After all, they did just fine after the war.
The odds of that happening are at around the same level as the U.S. letting Japan get away with Pearl Harbor.
Frazzled wrote: They had fifteen planned for Operation Downfall. This was before fallout was understood though, so Allied troops would have been walking through fallout 24 hours after each blast. Not bueno.
A huge amount of our understanding of the effects of radiation exposure over the long term was from treatment of the survivors of the atomic bombings, such as the massive increase in cancer risk (we knew there would be an increase but it was estimated to be linear with dose, reality is closer to exponential) etc.
Without those two horrific events, nuclear medicine might have taken years longer to reach the stage we are at now, with much more people being unnecessarily exposed to radiation through X-rays (especially CT scans), radiotherapy etc.
About the only measurably, definitively good thing that came from the bombings.
AlmightyWalrus wrote: It wasn't that Japan couldn't afford high-grade steel, they physically couldn't produce it in the quantity needed.
All that steel would have been far better served building carriers or destroyers.
Wouldn't have helped them anyway. At the risk of preaching to the choir, between the failure of Pearl Harbor to sink the US carriers and the fethup in delivering the declaration of war after the attack rather than before the Japanese were never going to get the US to agree to an armistice, which means the US wins through sheer industrial output. You guys built 24 Essex-class carriers (and a bunch of others) throughout the war, IIRC Japan built less than five carriers in total (including Shinano).
Or did you mean the steel in the Iowas would've been better spent on CVs and DDs?
er...yes to that too?
yes the only way Japan could win the war was to not fight the war.
Except even then they lose. America had cut off their oil. I'll let you imagine the effects upon the nation without any oil. They HAD TO HAVE the oil in Indonesia, or they suffer complete economic collapse.
In the end, while Japan made the decision to start shooting, their only other option was to basically surrender their autonomy completely back in 1941. America had cut off all other options. The ultranationalist government of the time just wasn't going to submit without a fight.
One could argue in light of that, what happened to Japan WAS a victory in the end. Yes, we smashed them flat... but then we helped them back up to vastly greater heights. Had the capitulated in 1941... would we have helped them back up that far afterwards? Somehow, I think not.
No. The point of the oil embargo was for them to quit their depredations in China and Indochina. They could have quit their depredations in China and indochina. After all, they did just fine after the war.
The odds of that happening are at around the same level as the U.S. letting Japan get away with Pearl Harbor.
Which was their problem. The difference being, no one was attacking them. THEY were attacking China.
Which was their problem. The difference being, no one was attacking them. THEY were attacking China.
I'm not arguing that. It's just that the Japanese government at that time was no more likely to give up their war in China than America would be to give up their war on Japan after the sneak attack at Pearl Harbor. It. just. is. not. going. to. happen. You need to postulate an entirely different government in power in Japan at the time for it to happen.
Haighus wrote: Well, there was a possibility of causing sufficient casualties to the US that they would choose to back off through pressure back home.
Not really. The US had complete air and naval superiority and could simply blockade Japan while bombing every square inch of the country into rubble with near-zero casualties. The US has little or no pressure to invade immediately in an era where bombing cities off the map was considered standard procedure instead of a horrifying atrocity. And at some point enough of Japan would be slaughtered that an invasion could succeed.
So why did they not plan this? The US strategy was to launch an invasion of Kyushu which was predicted to result in a million US servicemen casualties.
Of course, the US strategy changed with the successful deployment of nuclear weapons, but until then, they clearly thought an immediate invasion was necessary. Apparently conventional bombing was not considered effective enough to end the war by itself. Only nukes seem to have changed this.
The Japanese seemed to agree, seeing as it took the nukes to change their tune.
So why did they not plan this? The US strategy was to launch an invasion of Kyushu which was predicted to result in a million US servicemen casualties.
Because that scenario presumes that the US and its allies would willingly sit out Japan and wait for it to surrender for who knows how long, which is a big presumption. If after 6 months the US public asks "when will the war end" and the US government says "whenever Japan gets tired of us bombing them" then people start wondering when their sons/husbands/fathers will ever come home. The troops wonder whenever they'll come home.
War is not a situation where you can really get away with perpetually waiting for the other side to just give up. You either force them into submission, or your own people start wondering what the point is. EDIT: Can see this somewhat in how support for the Vietnam war rapidly dwindled as the years went on with no sign of the situation really improving. Public support for the conflict tanked and the US was eventually left with no option but to withdraw.
Another thing to bear in mind was the Soviet entry into the war against Japan. If America had piddled around too long, the Soviets would have invaded and taken Japan - or at least Hokkaido and part of Kyushu - first.
Vulcan wrote: Another thing to bear in mind was the Soviet entry into the war against Japan. If America had piddled around too long, the Soviets would have invaded and taken Japan - or at least Hokkaido and part of Kyushu - first.
I doubt Russia could have assembled the naval forces required for mass landings, especially on the other side of the world from their industrial areas, in a reasonable time frame. It would have been at least a year or so before they had transports to carry out a landing, let alone naval forces to support them. Japan would probably have capitulated from conventional bombings before Russia could have done anything other than taking stuff on the mainland.
Vulcan wrote:Another thing to bear in mind was the Soviet entry into the war against Japan. If America had piddled around too long, the Soviets would have invaded and taken Japan - or at least Hokkaido and part of Kyushu - first.
Grey Templar wrote:
Vulcan wrote: Another thing to bear in mind was the Soviet entry into the war against Japan. If America had piddled around too long, the Soviets would have invaded and taken Japan - or at least Hokkaido and part of Kyushu - first.
I doubt Russia could have assembled the naval forces required for mass landings, especially on the other side of the world from their industrial areas, in a reasonable time frame. It would have been at least a year or so before they had transports to carry out a landing, let alone naval forces to support them. Japan would probably have capitulated from conventional bombings before Russia could have done anything other than taking stuff on the mainland.
Yes, I think in this context America would be more concerned about the outcome of events in China and not wanting the country to become communist... Which happened anyway but people didn't know that yet in 1945
Vulcan wrote:Another thing to bear in mind was the Soviet entry into the war against Japan. If America had piddled around too long, the Soviets would have invaded and taken Japan - or at least Hokkaido and part of Kyushu - first.
Grey Templar wrote:
Vulcan wrote: Another thing to bear in mind was the Soviet entry into the war against Japan. If America had piddled around too long, the Soviets would have invaded and taken Japan - or at least Hokkaido and part of Kyushu - first.
I doubt Russia could have assembled the naval forces required for mass landings, especially on the other side of the world from their industrial areas, in a reasonable time frame. It would have been at least a year or so before they had transports to carry out a landing, let alone naval forces to support them. Japan would probably have capitulated from conventional bombings before Russia could have done anything other than taking stuff on the mainland.
Yes, I think in this context America would be more concerned about the outcome of events in China and not wanting the country to become communist... Which happened anyway but people didn't know that yet in 1945
Also, China, there was not just China, Burma, Korea and multiple other areas with alot of rescoures and valuable postition out for the taking.
Those are the total dead, wounded, and missing counts. Most deaths estimates are around 4-5 thousand Allied deaths for D-Day.
