Forum adverts like this one are shown to any user who is not logged in. Join us by filling out a tiny 3 field form and you will get your own, free, dakka user account which gives a good range of benefits to you: No adverts like this in the forums anymore. Times and dates in your local timezone. Full tracking of what you have read so you can skip to your first unread post, easily see what has changed since you last logged in, and easily see what is new at a glance. Email notifications for threads you want to watch closely. Being a part of the oldest wargaming community on the net. If you are already a member then feel free to login now.

I would think about why some people want to attack the west and what could be done to change their minds.

Attacking Afghanistan didn't stop them attacking London, Bali, Madrid, the Israeli airliner and a bunch of other stuff.

And leaving them alone, helping in Somalia, supporting them in Afghanistan against the Soviets and fighting a war to stop aggression against them in Bosnia didn't help either.

Let me restate Killkrazy. I'm not advocating staying there or not staying there. I'm not advocating nation building (as noted I could care less and personally am much more in favor of pulling back to the continental US and some strategic bases). I'm saying we need to look at history before figuring out what to do.

Terrorism did not start in 2003.

Frazzled wrote:And leaving them alone, helping in Somalia, supporting them in Afghanistan against the Soviets and fighting a war to stop aggression against them in Bosnia didn't help either.

Let me restate Killkrazy. I'm not advocating staying there or not staying there. I'm not advocating nation building (as noted I could care less and personally am much more in favor of pulling back to the continental US and some strategic bases). I'm saying we need to look at history before figuring out what to do.

Terrorism did not start in 2003.

Nor will it end in 2008, or any time in the near future. The way to fight terrorism, from a military standpoint, is essentially two-fold.

1) Pick a side. Terrorism only works when the terrorist group is a disembodied entity. As soon as any given group of people is tied to a single region they open themselves up US air power. Something which makes the provocation of America dubious at best. As such, we should mirror the CIA sponsored conflicts of the Nixon era; supplying weapons and training to guerrilla forces in the interests of creating sympathetics, or at least territorial, regimes.

2) Specialize in retributory violence. This one of the few things Rumsfeld got right. His Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) dealt with the systematic expansion of the special forces and general electronic warfare capability. The aim being to gather information on potential threats so that we could preempt them with minimally invasive surgical strikes; assassination and precision bombing. However, that turn towards preemption was a misstep. The general approach is correct, but it should be used as a response, not a provocation.

Of course neither of these tactical approaches should be considered outside a diplomatic framework. Diplomacy must always be the first, and primary, option. There is no reason to destabilize a potential ally. That's why Afghanistan was a mistake, we chose to invade in lieu of negotiating with the Taliban. Something we have a long history of doing; Karzai was at one point a liaison between the Taliban and Unocal.

Any tactical approach whatsoever had to be considered within a diplomatic framework and a thorough strategic plan which accounts for things going differently to the way we want them to.

Lillkrazy I dare you to try to say that five times in a row, out loud. Can't do it!



Dogma you've made good points. Now I disagree on the initial start -we had to do something. Any president not dramatically taking action would have been successfully impeached in 30 seconds. However your follow on points are well taken. What would you recommend in Afghanistan at this point, not including the Russian approach of course.

Not fair! I have been drinking Spanish brandy.

Exactly. If you had been drinking tequila we wouldn't be having this conversation as you would be on the floor...

I know from experience.

Frazzled wrote:
Dogma you've made good points. Now I disagree on the initial start -we had to do something. Any president not dramatically taking action would have been successfully impeached in 30 seconds. However your follow on points are well taken. What would you recommend in Afghanistan at this point, not including the Russian approach of course.

I'm in the mood for a detailed response. So I'll open with some context.

I agree that something had to be done, but what we did was inappropriate as a simple response to terrorism. Terrorists are criminals, and should be treated as such. This means they should be found, and apprehended with as little collateral damage as possible. This is not a job for the regular army, indeed I question whether it is a job for the armed forces at all. This is a problem that Rumsfeld recognized. Driving him to expand the special forces into a kind of quasi-independent branch of the services under the directive of the Undersecretary of Intelligence for Defense (UID). Pretty much as close as it comes to the kind of black-bag organization you see in the spy movies.

On the whole this was a good idea. It only became problematic when our nominally civilian intelligence organizations were pulled into the Pentagon through the Office of Homeland Security, also overseen by the UID. This connection permitted the exertion of military force in the name of private satellite groups employed/maintained by the NSA, NRO, and others as well as similar groups attached to the Pentagon itself. These satellite groups, nominally private military companies run by recently retired military personnel, are themselves frequently owned by larger corporations. The textbook example is Kellogg, Brown, & Root, the military subsidiary of Halliburton. Brown & Root was hired by the military to build and maintain bases like Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo. In order to do this the Pentagon issued them an open ended cost plus contract as payment for services rendered. I'm sure you can see the implicit issue in giving an open-ended financial agreement, and commitment of military support, to a subsidiary of an oil company in a region where oil pipelines are being considered.

Something similar happened in Afghanistan. Here the Pentagon back-stopped the Taliban's rise to power in the interest of bringing a recognizable face to the perpetually unstable region. This was primarily a way of preventing Soviet control of oil in Central Asia. Once the Soviet Union fell there was no longer any major threat to the region; allowing the corporate eye to turn to available natural resources. As a result, the Union Oil Company of California (Unocal) began exploring the possibility of building a gas pipeline from the rich fields in Turkmenistan across Afghanistan; stopping at Pakistan's Arabian Sea port of Gwadar. To facilitate negotiations with the Taliban Unocal employed, among others, Hamid Karzai and Zalmay Khalilzad. Khalilzad was later appointed to the position of Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Planning, under Paul Wolfowitz in GHW's administration. During that time he also remained on the Unocal payroll. In an effort to quell Taliban opposition, Unocal formed the Central Asian Gas Consortium (CentGas); which included Saudi Arabia's Delta Oil, and Russia's Gazprom. Unfortunately this gambit was unsuccessful, the Taliban would not be fooled into accepting a Western corporation. Eventually, after the Clinton administration became openly hostile to the Taliban, Unocal withdrew its support from CentGas. Despite he failure of his agenda Khalilzad must habe made a positive impression , because 9 years late Dick Cheney (HW's SecDef) made him a member of the Transition Team for Defense. He was later reassigned to the National Security Council under Condi Rice. Finally, Kalilzad was made the US Special Envoy to the Afghani government under Karzai. This, along with Halliburton's activities in Iraq, suggests that oil, not terrorism was the driving political impetus of our invasion of Afghanistan. That's why our strategy has depended upon counter-insurgency operations, as opposed the more appropriate counter-terrorist tactical dictum I outline earlier. Reganite supply side economics run-amok.

What should we do now? First understand that the interests of the American people are not equivalent to the interests of corporate America. The Taliban can prevent us from drawing profit from Central Asia, but they cannot threaten our global position. As such, there is no particular reason to occupy Afghanistan. Terrorists can, and will, go elsewhere in the interests of planning attacks on the continental US. Failing that, they will stay right where they are, and harass the US in order to bleed out as many of our resources as possible. The best thing we can do is reduce our footprint in the region; keeping only enough of a presence to facilitate the limited police actions that I proposed above. This means pulling back to bases that are out of country, in states which are more tolerant of our physical presence. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan spring to mind. Kazakhstan is also a viable option.

dogma wrote:

Frazzled wrote:
Dogma you've made good points. Now I disagree on the initial start -we had to do something. Any president not dramatically taking action would have been successfully impeached in 30 seconds. However your follow on points are well taken. What would you recommend in Afghanistan at this point, not including the Russian approach of course.

I'm in the mood for a detailed response. So I'll open with some context.

I agree that something had to be done, but what we did was inappropriate as a simple response to terrorism. Terrorists are criminals, and should be treated as such. This means they should be found, and apprehended with as little collateral damage as possible. This is not a job for the regular army, indeed I question whether it is a job for the armed forces at all. This is a problem that Rumsfeld recognized. Driving him to expand the special forces into a kind of quasi-independent branch of the services under the directive of the Undersecretary of Intelligence for Defense (UID). Pretty much as close as it comes to the kind of black-bag organization you see in the spy movies.

***********
What should we do now? First understand that the interests of the American people are not equivalent to the interests of corporate America. The Taliban can prevent us from drawing profit from Central Asia, but they cannot threaten our global position. As such, there is no particular reason to occupy Afghanistan. Terrorists can, and will, go elsewhere in the interests of planning attacks on the continental US. Failing that, they will stay right where they are, and harass the US in order to bleed out as many of our resources as possible. The best thing we can do is reduce our footprint in the region; keeping only enough of a presence to facilitate the limited police actions that I proposed above. This means pulling back to bases that are out of country, in states which are more tolerant of our physical presence. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan spring to mind. Kazakhstan is also a viable option.

So if I can paraphrase, this is your recommendation going forward: pull back and utilize paramilitary forces? I'd be ok with that if:
A. 1 Forces are not there to apprehend. Kill or capture for interrogation purposes.
A. 2 Any forces in this system have to well controlled within channels (ie controls so they don't go rogue in some manner).

B. More strategically, what to do about nations supporting them? (monetarily and otherwise)

C. More strategically, what to do anbout individuals supporting them? (monetarily and otherwise)

D. Here I'm being altruistic and worrying about the power vacuum. What do we leave behind after the pullout?

Frazzled wrote:

So if I can paraphrase, this is your recommendation going forward: pull back and utilize paramilitary forces? I'd be ok with that if:
A. 1 Forces are not there to apprehend. Kill or capture for interrogation purposes.
A. 2 Any forces in this system have to well controlled within channels (ie controls so they don't go rogue in some manner).

Pretty much. Though I think that your provisions are contradictory. The only real channel of control over a para-military group is force coercion. If they work with us both sides prosper. If not, we replace them through political maneuvering, or in extreme cases, assassination. However, it cannot be overstated that any interests we wish to further must be intrinsically tied to positive gains for the people overseen by our paramilitary/governmental proxies. If we cannot ensure such a connection it is better for us to simply allow the natural progression of conflict to run its course.

Frazzled wrote:
B. More strategically, what to do about nations supporting them? (monetarily and otherwise)

Much of the support for anti-US factions is motivated by the US presence in the theatre of operations. If we aren't there, then there is no reason for nations like Iran to funnel resources into an organization which do not necessarily have their best interests in mind.

Frazzled wrote:
C. More strategically, what to do anbout individuals supporting them? (monetarily and otherwise)

Eliminate them through assassination; political, character, or otherwise. Though we have been, in recent years, far less willing to compromise in order to achieve our goals. That is the great tragedy of the Neocon agenda as personified in Cheney and Rumsfeld. This pretty well gets at my feelings on the matter.

Frazzled wrote:
D. Here I'm being altruistic and worrying about the power vacuum. What do we leave behind after the pullout?

Nothing. Sometimes its best to let violence run its course. Our intervention is likely to simply be perceived as artificial. Something which will only serve to postpone the inevitable resumption of hostilities.

dogma wrote:

Frazzled wrote:

So if I can paraphrase, this is your recommendation going forward: pull back and utilize paramilitary forces? I'd be ok with that if:
A. 1 Forces are not there to apprehend. Kill or capture for interrogation purposes.
A. 2 Any forces in this system have to well controlled within channels (ie controls so they don't go rogue in some manner).

Sorry I was not being clear. Any forces of ours that are paramilitary must have clear channel of control. By paramilitary I mean special forces, James Bond Guys whatever. I just don't want this group to go rogue. This is very foggy but there was an argument that Shultz/North were effectively trying to do in the early 80s, creating a force that was not answerable to anyone. Thats strictly no bueno.

Otherwise we're actually in agreement (checks to see if pigs have gained flight). Frazzled and Dogma on the same page, that has to be the Seventh Sign or something.

Ah, I see now. Also, I agree. One way to do that is to break up Homeland Security, and abolish the Undersecretary of Intelligence for Defense. If the military doesn't have authority over strategic intelligence they won't be able to to dig up 'support' for pet projects so easily. Similarly, I would like to see certain categories of defense contractors forced to operate as non-profits. That will help to prevent any more of this Halliburton nonsense.

This isn't the seventh sign though, its the eighth. Palin was the seventh.

You won't see defense contractors work as non-profits. There's no incentive for them to, er, work. The military would have to do the actual manufacturing. Outiside of limited areas its not something the military does or is particulary good at.

I won't discuss the Homeland Security. None of us are particularly qualified in that area. but I am not keen on strategic intelligence as a standalone. These are bureacratic secretive organizations. Siloing starts from day one and is partially what brought us to 9/11. But I freely admit I'm not sure how to address that, hence staying away with the exception of "make it better."

The type of defense contractors I'm talking about are the consultant firms formed by retired generals and intelligence operatives. Right now they have to be authorized by the DoD whenever they take foreign contracts. This is meant to be a check on their tendency to work for corporate interests. Of course, when the DoD is lead by aging Reaganites there is a major impetus to see corporate good as being tacit to public good. In that sense the most important thing is simply to push the agenda that the private sector is not a holy grail of efficiency against which all others organizations should be modeled.

However, if we force these consulting groups to operate as non-profits we can make it far less attractive for corporations to purchase them. With those that do being more actively considerate of the risk inherent in dictating operations abroad. The money will still be plenty good in an individual sense. People like Kissinger will still have a multi-million dollar income. Its just that their advice will not be so deeply tied into private interests as their personal station will be divorced from corporate success.

The reason strategic intelligence needs to be a standalone entity is that it places a check on the power of the Pentagon and the intelligence community. By building a bureaucratic wall between the two entities it helps to set the priorities of each group against on another. The centralization of intelligence and military command allows those in power to cut out voices they find inconvenient; like the DCI and other CIA officials who repeatedly stated that Iraq had no connection to 9/11.

Speaking of 9/11. This type of attack is going to happen again, and no amount of intelligence or military action will prevent it. We can stack the odds against repetition, but we will never have a perfect system. The CIA, in its guise prior to the Bush administration, has been remarkably effective in preventing attacks on US territory. Indeed, the real failure of 9/11 was not with the CIA (who foresaw it), but with the Bush administration which ignored the intelligence. Either out of a lack of faith in 'soft' power, or a desire to manipulate the strike into support for their own purposes; likely a combination of the two. The occasional 9/11 is a small price to pay for the maintenance of public authority.