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 LordofHats wrote:

Worthy of expansion here is an intricacy of the domestic situation in Austria-Hungary (I'm unsure of the years). Around the late 19th century, the German Austrian elites realized they were in danger of losing control of their empire. To try and maintain their position they elevated the Hungarian nobility to a position of higher political power (thus Austria became Austria-Hungary).

However this was a move made by the monarchy and a small group of supporters and upset the majority of Austrian nobles. As the years went on, they feared an increasingly vocal and powerful Hungarian nobility and wanted to check them to maintain their dominate position. Enter the Serbs and thus, Austria's interest in the Balklands. The theory was that by incorporating more serbs into their empire, they could play the Hungarians and the Serbs off one another, thus keeping themselves on top. They viewed conflicts abroad in part as a means of stabilizing the domestic situation within their own borders.

Obviously their attempt to secure a larger Serbian population didn't turn out as they expected XD

This is all a little inaccurate.

You're talking about the Ausgleich of 1867. The Hungarian Uprising had been put down with Russian help and the Hungarian constitution revoked. After the lost wars in Italy and against Prussia, Austria was anxious to get Hungary on her side again in order to marshal additional strength for a revenge strike on Prussia (which never happened). Hungary's constitution was reinstated, but the Hungarians insisted that for full "reconciliation", they expected a return to the status quo of Maria Theresia's reign under the provisions of the pragmatic sanction. Everyone involved understood that this would give the Emperor LESS direct control over the realm, especially considering the proverbial stubbornness of the Hungarians, but it was thought that if the Hungarians again had a real stake in the Empire, they would be more useful than as reluctant subjects.

The core of the Serbian problem however, lay with its pursuit of "south-Slavism". This wasn't simply your run-of-the-mill irredentism as known from the Italians - it was a claim to empire, striving to incorporate all the different Slavic ethnicities of southern Europe. In reality, said minorities were less than enthusiastic about such union with their "brothers", whom they did not see as brothers at all. The problem was that the Croatians belonged to the Kingdom of Hungary and felt unfairly treated (which they were), the Slovenes were politically fighting to be even accepted as a seperate ethnicity, and Bosnia was for all intents and purposes run like a colony. So, some, or many (we can't really say for sure) felt that in a Serbian state, they would find more sympathetic rulers, and this really was dangerous for the integrity of the Empire.

Accordingly, when Austria-Hungary went to war with Serbia, the goal was to "feth them up". After the eventual victory, they were quite clueless what to actually do, as highlighted brilliantly by the ministers' conference of 1916 (?) on the topic:

- giving Serbia to Croatia (the reverse of Serbia's own plans) would make Croatians a minority in their own country and lead to Serbification of the whole
- attaching Serbia to Hungary would either create a powderkeg more dangerous than Croatia or require giving Hungary leave to suppress and destroy Serbia's cultural identity
- for want of a legal base, incorporating it as a crown land was impossible
- taking it as another colony would in essence create a single colony of Serbia-Bosnia and strengthen the influence of south-Slavism
- leaving a Serbian rumpstate would just be a return to the undesirable status-quo-ante

Curiously, a decision was postponed.

At no point did any interest group or party entertain the idea of using Serbia, of all possible candidates, much less Serbia's unique idea of a "south Slavic" ethnicity, to balance out the monarchy's dualism. There HAD been plans to transform Austria-Hungary into a Federation of ethnically homogenous states, to at least dissolve the real unions with Croatia and Bohemia or to balance the duality by giving Poland its crown back under personal union, but all of these died with the deaths of Rudolf and Farnz Ferdinand - Emperor Franz Josef would have none of it, and Karl would have been too weak to hold the Empire together even if there had been no war.

Securing a larger Serbian population was the last thing they wanted; on the contrary, it was an additional road-bump on the way to a solution of the whole crux.

 Ensis Ferrae wrote:
Of course, there are some who, depending on experience, just could not handle another minute or day in the trenches... Some had probably never set foot in a trench and were trying to malinger in order to not stay there, etc. But you get those sorts of soldier in basically every war

Enough to voluntarily inoculate themselves with gangrene ? I would not think so.
Seriously, as far as I can tell, the living conditions of soldiers were extremely miserable in the trench.

Proper decisive action. Which was a fairly famous disaster, because the artillery did nothing like the damage it was hoped to achieve, and the troops advancing steadily in formation were slaughtered

I think it was after the war that military leaders saw that infantry was quite reselient to artillery fire. Especially dug in, or even just on open ground, artillery fire might pin a block of infantry, but it's not going to kill a lot of them. This was recognized by WWII but in WWI we had guns capable of blasting dirt hundreds of feet into the air. The power was incapacitating but not particularly lethal.

Seriously, as far as I can tell, the living conditions of soldiers were extremely miserable in the trench.

Quite miserable. I mean, war conditions for soldiers are typically miserable, but the trench warfare created a situation more miserable than might be considered the norm for a war. The influenza outbreak during the middle(?) of the war never helped anything.

Securing a larger Serbian population was the last thing they wanted; on the contrary, it was an additional road-bump on the way to a solution of the whole crux.

Okay, that makes more sense that what I had going in my head.

Farnz Ferdinand

I do remember reading that there was an irony in Frans Ferdinands assassination, namely that he was willing to give many of the ethnicities in his country greater say in the running of the state?

 LordofHats wrote:

I do remember reading that there was an irony in Frans Ferdinands assassination, namely that he was willing to give many of the ethnicities in his country greater say in the running of the state?

Even more than that. He not only championed Popovici's plans for a radical reconstruction of the Imperial Domain, which scrapped the old feudal borders and proposed 14 (?) states in their stead, but also envisioned re-founding the Empire as the, verbatim, "United States of Greater Austria", which would have copied the USA in every way except one - instead of an elected President, there would have been the Emperor.

Of the few historians who touched the subject, most agree that this would have been impossible to do against the opposition of certain circles in Austria and, more importantly, the Hungarian nobility. Personally, I'm not so sure, because I think that Franz Ferdinand was the only Habsburg who understood that if he brought the people on his side, the nobility would have to yield, and I doubt that the Hungarian people would have rejected democracy in favor of "keeping" Slovakia, for example, a place most Hungarians hadn't seen in their entire lifetime.

Just to make this read less like a declaration of love: Franz Ferdinand was an autocrat with every fibre of his being. Alas, he seemed to believe that by granting a maximum of democratic freedoms, not only would he stabilize his Empire (and possibly even allow it to grow), but secure more power for himself as beloved-by-all "President for life" than he ever had surrounded by court intrigues and noble rivalries.

EDIT: Considering what I just wrote I'm now pretty sure he would have met a bullet anyway.

Thats a positive of the war. The power of royalty to control much of the globe was swept away.

WWII finished that by sweeping away the colonial system.

 Frazzled wrote:
Thats a positive of the war. The power of royalty to control much of the globe was swept away.

WWII finished that by sweeping away the colonial system.

True. But personally I think I'd prefer that it was achieved through a peaceful democractic process than two world wars with a combined death toll of nearly 80 million.

[quote=Ketara 584763 6644800 c7d59b814a5ebcaf21cfb6d2373c5d64.png

Pre-war

 Shadow Captain Edithae wrote:

 Frazzled wrote:
Thats a positive of the war. The power of royalty to control much of the globe was swept away.

WWII finished that by sweeping away the colonial system.

True. But personally I think I'd prefer that it was achieved through a peaceful democractic process than two world wars with a combined death toll of nearly 80 million.

I'm much more of the French Revolution kind of guy. Royalty is a sickness, and Dr. Guillotine has a cure!

Patiently waits for more of Ketara's excelent dissertation

Yeah, just posting to say, quality stuff so far mate, enjoying it but have little feedback except to say, so far you've not said anything I disagree with- I wonder if the disagreement will come down to a difference in values?

In any case, good stuff, looking forward to the next bits.

I suspect that the main difference between the "B" and "C" camps here lies in the degree of abstraction one applies to the question.

I (reluctantly, because I wasn't entirely happy with any choice) picked "B" because I think that the war in general wasn't "necessary"; Europe was fine, compared to any past era. The tensions that existed were - at least from the vantage point of the present, as Ketara noted - artificially created. The continent also wasn't much of a better place after the war. Dozens of millions of dead and wounded seems to me like a steep price for a result that can be summed up as "meh".

From what I gathered so far, the guys who picked "C" see the escalation of the aforementioned tensions by Germany and her allies at the heart of the question, and come to the correct conclusion that this aggression had to be stopped. It was stopped, and there you have your meaning, your purpose that was worth dying for.

Several pages into the thread, I still stick to my opinion, but I came round to see why one might choose the other option and be just as "right". A beautiful discussion.

Also, @ Ketara: You wrote nothing that was new to me, but so far it's hands down one of the, if not THE, best primer/summary on the subject I've ever seen.

Wow, you guys read alot of military history.

Ketara, this is great stuff man. Your last post especially vindicates the belief I've held since doing my undergrad (most of my courses were focused on Germany) that the political turbulence of the early 20th century owes a lot to German unification. You simply can't maintain the status quo on the continent after the creation of an economic and military powerhouse smack dab in the middle of said continent. Not that the Germans could help the unification of their own country of course

I look forward to reading your next post!

Credit to Ketara for some really excellent posts.

 Ketara wrote:


Pre-war

Spoiler:

So. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, a lot of important stuff had happened (understatement). The Prussians had thrashed the supremely complacent French in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, and been formed into the German Second Reich a year later. Italy had been formed, the Americans were still recuperating from their bout of civil disorder (otherwise known as the civil war), China had been bullied into submission through two opium wars, and the scramble to slice Africa up between European powers began in earnest in the 1880's. It was very similar to the world as we know it today, yet different in many crucial ways.

To give an outline of the world position:- Britain controlled the lion's share of world trade through her vast merchant shipping fleet and the Royal Navy, and wielded tremendous economic power. France was desperate to reclaim some sort of status for herself after the thrashing she received by the Prussians, and began to colonise abroad aggressively. The Ottoman Empire had been on the decline for some considerable time, resulting in the Ottomans being propped up and then sliced apart slowly by the British and French. Austria-Hungary had begun to be overshadowed by their new neighbour of Germany before being formally bound in the Dual Alliance of 1879, and the newly emergent Italy took an interest in trying to control certain chunks of Africa. Russia remained relatively backwards and autocratic, with little industry. America remained insular.

That's roughly where the world was at the start of 1890. I know I'm skimming quite a lot here, but so much happened that it's frankly difficult to summarise in a paragraph or two.
This is roughly where Pax Britannia began to fall apart though. To understand how we ended up in World War one, we need a bit more information on the geopolitics involved from this point on, so skip the next few paragraphs if you don't want World History summary 101.

So. By 1890 France and Russia had gradually become firmly partnered in opposition to Britain's dominance, with France having stood Russia a large loan to try and modernise its economy (unsuccessfully as it turned out). Britain had instigated their Naval Defence Act of 1889, formally adopting a policy of maintaining a Fleet superior to that of any other two world powers (the unspoken two world powers being France and Russia). Africa and Asia had more or less all been carved up into various spheres of European influence.

Meanwhile, after two decades of insularity at home to consolidate the new nation, the great German statesman and manipulator Bismarck had been pushed aside by the new Kaiser. Prior to this point, Bismarck had always used Germany as a wild card in international negotiations, playing the other Great Powers against each other for his own/Germany's benefit. But with the rise of Kaiser Wilhelm II, Germany began to aspire to be a Power in its own right. When the secret Russo-German Reinsurance Treaty came up for negotiation, Wilhelm chose not to renew it. As far as Wilhelm was concerned, Germany deserved its own colonies, a powerful military and navy, and its own 'place in the sun'.

Worried about this new European power bloc, and keen to solidify their advantage in contrast to British economic dominance globally, the French and Russians chose to solidify their friendship with the Franco-Russian Alliance over 1892-94. Military spending in all European nations began to creep up as all parties sought to gain advantage of each other, both abroad and within Europe. Over the following decade, there were to be several tension points between them, but war was rarely seriously considered by any of the powers against each other. Nonetheless, Britain began to feel somewhat isolated by the European blocs, and chose to cement an alliance with the newly emergent Japanese in 1902.

Well...this thread has been educational.

Ketara, there is no such thing as TL;DR with anything you post. Everything is a must-read.

 Ketara wrote:


Pre-war

Spoiler:

So. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, a lot of important stuff had happened (understatement). The Prussians had thrashed the supremely complacent French in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, and been formed into the German Second Reich a year later. Italy had been formed, the Americans were still recuperating from their bout of civil disorder (otherwise known as the civil war), China had been bullied into submission through two opium wars, and the scramble to slice Africa up between European powers began in earnest in the 1880's. It was very similar to the world as we know it today, yet different in many crucial ways.

To give an outline of the world position:- Britain controlled the lion's share of world trade through her vast merchant shipping fleet and the Royal Navy, and wielded tremendous economic power. France was desperate to reclaim some sort of status for herself after the thrashing she received by the Prussians, and began to colonise abroad aggressively. The Ottoman Empire had been on the decline for some considerable time, resulting in the Ottomans being propped up and then sliced apart slowly by the British and French. Austria-Hungary had begun to be overshadowed by their new neighbour of Germany before being formally bound in the Dual Alliance of 1879, and the newly emergent Italy took an interest in trying to control certain chunks of Africa. Russia remained relatively backwards and autocratic, with little industry. America remained insular.

That's roughly where the world was at the start of 1890. I know I'm skimming quite a lot here, but so much happened that it's frankly difficult to summarise in a paragraph or two.
This is roughly where Pax Britannia began to fall apart though. To understand how we ended up in World War one, we need a bit more information on the geopolitics involved from this point on, so skip the next few paragraphs if you don't want World History summary 101.

So. By 1890 France and Russia had gradually become firmly partnered in opposition to Britain's dominance, with France having stood Russia a large loan to try and modernise its economy (unsuccessfully as it turned out). Britain had instigated their Naval Defence Act of 1889, formally adopting a policy of maintaining a Fleet superior to that of any other two world powers (the unspoken two world powers being France and Russia). Africa and Asia had more or less all been carved up into various spheres of European influence.

Meanwhile, after two decades of insularity at home to consolidate the new nation, the great German statesman and manipulator Bismarck had been pushed aside by the new Kaiser. Prior to this point, Bismarck had always used Germany as a wild card in international negotiations, playing the other Great Powers against each other for his own/Germany's benefit. But with the rise of Kaiser Wilhelm II, Germany began to aspire to be a Power in its own right. When the secret Russo-German Reinsurance Treaty came up for negotiation, Wilhelm chose not to renew it. As far as Wilhelm was concerned, Germany deserved its own colonies, a powerful military and navy, and its own 'place in the sun'.

Worried about this new European power bloc, and keen to solidify their advantage in contrast to British economic dominance globally, the French and Russians chose to solidify their friendship with the Franco-Russian Alliance over 1892-94. Military spending in all European nations began to creep up as all parties sought to gain advantage of each other, both abroad and within Europe. Over the following decade, there were to be several tension points between them, but war was rarely seriously considered by any of the powers against each other. Nonetheless, Britain began to feel somewhat isolated by the European blocs, and chose to cement an alliance with the newly emergent Japanese in 1902.

The German perspective

Spoiler:

So. Having established a rough picture of the world at the start of 20th century, let's move swiftly on to the biggest question. What caused the war? Was it just a bunch of old men desperate to send young men to die for king and country for entirely selfish reasons? I don't believe so, and this is why.



The Argument from Economics

As I've already mentioned, Britain controlled the majority of world trade during the period of Pax Britannia. Most of the merchant shipping was built by the British, operated by the British, and taxed by the British. In 1870, Britain also had 35.3% of the world's manufacturing capacity thanks to their early industrialisation, and the best banking system in the world. In short, Britain dominated intercontinental trade, and took a heavy enough cut from what they didn't directly control to grow exceedingly rich off the proceeds.

Germany by contrast, industrialised exceedingly lately if rapidly. The fact that Germany had invested so heavily domestically whilst industrialising meant that it had had little liquidity to invest abroad to expand its influence abroad and little resulting opportunity to compete with the British. This was problematic in light of the Kaiser's intent to make Germany a premier world power. By 1910, Germany had overtaken Britain in terms of manufacturing capacity, but their ability to expand within domestic European markets was ultimately exceedinly limited, leaving areas outside of Europe as the only remaining choice for further economic expansion.When it came right down to it, Germany didn't actually want to oust Britain from their prime economic spot necessarily, but Germany did want to have the freedom themselves to expand, and needed to be able to do so without the risk of British interference.

Germany was also aware of how Britain's economic muscle was derived from its colonial possessions, something which Germany was distinctly lacking in. Most of the world was already carved up according to British, French, Dutch, Portugese, and Belgian interests, leaving little meat behind to sustain a newcomer like themselves. Germany had few colonies to give it the raw materials it needed to continue expanding its domestic manufacturing capacity and economic growth. If Germany wanted to increase what they saw as their fair share of the world market, they'd have to somehow compel the British (the prime global power) to stay neutral in their affairs whilst they took what they could from the powers weaker than themselves. This led onto:

The Argument from Naval Might

British foreign and economic dominance was clearly derived from their naval strength. Germany might have the most powerful military, but like France and Russia, it was completely vulnerable to the Royal Navy if it wanted to build/maintain colonial possessions and international trade links. Germany did not want to maintain a fleet like Britain's. It was too big, too expensive, and the British were seen by the Kaiser as inevitable allies, not rivals. But equally, the British were unlikely to approve of Germany taking their fair share of world commerce, simply because it would disrupt the current order of things. So what to do?

The Germans settled on a novel strategy. By maintaining a fleet that would be just large enough to challenge British power in the North Sea, Britain would respect Germany. Britain would still be able to smash Germany navally if it really wanted to do so as it would have more ships worldwide. But the fact that Germany could disrupt trade to the mother country and possibly land a small invasion force would stay the British hand and guarantee British neutrality in other matters of foreign policy. Germany badly needed to ensure that British neutrality because of:

The Argument from European Encirclement

The French and the Russians had been closely allied since the early 1890's. Germany's expansion abroad was bound to tread on a few toes, as was the fact that they were coming to dominate European trade with their powerful manufacturing base. Germany was certain that it could defeat France or Russia if it really came down to the crunch, but knew it would have its hands full in a war with both of them. If the British intervened on the side of the French/Russia though, victory from military might would be unlikely.

Therefore by intimidating the British, the British would be more likely to fall into bed with Germany in the same manner as Austria-Hungary. The British were descended from Germanic roots, and the Kaiser was related to the British Royal Family. Britain and Germany clearly belonged on the same side. But if the British wouldn't intervene on Germany's side, they at least had to stay out of Germany's way and be neutral. Germany was already hemmed in by potentially hostile powers by land. It could not afford to be hemmed in by sea as well.

The Course of events

Germany had been set upon the above policy for some time before the First World War in its quest for international recognition and economic dominance. The Kaiser intervened in Morocco in both 1905 and 1911 in pursuit of these aims, as well as the Boxer Rebellion in China. Yet all that resulted from these occurrences were clear signals from their rivals that Germany would never be allowed to have her place in the sun. When their ally, Austria-Hungary came into conflict with Russia, Germany viewed this as an inevitable clash that had been coming for some decades, and something of an opportunity.

By smashing Russia back into the stone age, Germany would gain fresh territory in the East for settling and industrialising. It would gain a reputation for being a world class power, giving it a freer hand to acquire and cultivate colonial possessions. If France intervened, then so be it. By humbling the ever arrogant France, Germany could seize her colonial possessions. It could also take control of French border forts, ensuring future security of the Reich.

The desirable outcome? The German people would be secure from the constant threat of encirclement hanging over their heads, German business would have the opportunities it desperately needed to continue expanding overseas, and Britain and Germany could work hand in hand to civilise the globe, with German prestige and honour undimmed. What could possibly go wrong?


Now a number of you might regard the above as being intolerable nonsense, and no good reason to go to war in any scenario. But it should be understood that you are viewing events of a hundred years past with the eye of the 21st century. Germany entered hostilities to resolve the security of their people and their economy. They didn't do it specifically to oppress people and cause mayhem and destruction. They just wanted their fair share of the world pie, and unfortunately, they and everybody else had different ideas over what that fair share should be. You may recall that Germany offered French security if they would surrender their border forts to Germany as surety. Germany had no real interest in occupying or controlling France, any moreso than France did when they rather foolishly declared war on Prussia in 1870. It was just standard geopolitics, the likes of which we still regularly see today. Industrialised total war had never before been seen, and it was assumed that this would just be one more limited war over a year or so at most involving specific objectives and then peace.

I'll do the British view next, and then move onto the conduct of the war itself (and bust the daft view of lions led by donkeys that gets propped up so often).

The British Perspective

Spoiler:

So. Pax Britannia.

Britain kind of fell into Empire slightly as a bad habit in a lot of cases. India was conquered under Royal Charter, Africa was seized to stop other European powers nabbing it, etc. Often they'd end up in minor wars more to save face and 'show the natives who's boss' more than out of any genuine desire to conquer them. They were quite happy with their premier spot once they had it, but the British Enpire's sheer size often meant that colonies were considered to be unprofitable, and thus undesirable business. In 1890 where we last left them, Britain was relatively happy with the status quo, and a potentially allied grouping of France and Russia was their biggest concern.

Britain had by this stage gained the wonderful nickname of 'perfidious Albion'. In other words, we had a bad habit of changing political position mid-way, and playing both sides against the middle to suit ourselves diplomatically. She had no allies because she didn't need them. With the supremacy of the Royal Navy, Britain was untouchable by any other power, which bestowed an unwillingness to get involved in continental affairs and wars, which seemed to occur with alarming regularity. Instead, Britain could just sit back, reap the profits of dominating the world trade system, and watch Europe with something of a detached bemusement.

As the Continent began to rearm towards the end of the nineteenth century though, Britain began to feel somewhat more alarmed and less complacent. Whilst the French Jeune Ecole strategy of countering Britain's Navy ended up being nothing more than so much hogwash, the British ended up adopting their two power standard in a very British fashion. In other words, half-heartedly, unwillingly, and much uhm-and ahing. Much like the colonies, a goodly number of politicians of the time saw the whole business as unprofitable and a waste of everybody's time, but sadly necessary for the continuation of Empire. (the two power standard was a policy whereby Britain committed to maintaining a Navy equal to size to the next two largest powers combined, for those unfamiliar with the period).

By the turn of the twentieth century however, Britain was beginning to feel very much alone in the world. Empire and the Navy had always made mutual defence treaties unnecessary and very much a Continental sort of thing from their perspective. But in Germany, Tirpitz's new construction programme was beginning to cause some raised eyebrows. Whilst Germany was still seen as more of an ally than potential enemy, the number of ships being built in the North Sea constituted something of a mild threat to the Home Isles. This made the British sufficiently uneasy so as to conclude a defence pact with the Japanese to help them meet their commitment of defence in the Far East, whilst being able to shift sufficient ships back home to counter the growing German naval equality in the region.

In 1905, 'Radical Jack Fisher', the controversial naval genius, instigated the construction of the first British Dreadnought battleship. A new type of Battleship worth five of any pre-Dreadnought battleship, it immediately rendered every single other battleship/Navy in the world obsolete at a stroke. Convinced that this was the best way to stop Germany's would be rivalry, he crowed that the Dreadnought would 'stump their building programme for the next two years in one fell swoop!'. He also reformed the British Navy itself from the inside out, scrapping countless older ships and committing the Navy to a new and technologically up to date force.


HMS Dreadnought

Within a few years however, affairs on the Continent had begun to change (as they were ever wont to do). France and Russia had closed ranks to focus on the burgeoning threat of Germany, and as a result, signed an agreement with Britain to finally close some of their ongoing colonial disputes. Germany didn't see this budding peace as a positive sign for world development though, and more as a threat. The seeming accord reached by France, Russia, and Britain meant that Britain needed to be broken off at the source, and the best way to do that was intimidation. Fisher's new Dreadnought might have left Germany in the dust technology-wise, but numbers-wise it left Germany a lot closer to being able to gain parity with Britain.

Determined to force Britain back onto the sidelines (not realising Britain had never particularly left them).Germany stepped up their construction of new battleships at an alarming rate. By the start of 1909, Britain was genuinely facing a dilemma. The number of battleships required to outnumber the German North Seas Fleet had become so large that countering it would mean stripping the rest of the Empire of protection. The financial costs were beginning to weigh heavily on Britain as well, with economic troubles cropping up, and battleships growing ever more expensive. But what to do? As far as Germany was concerned, this was the point at which Britain should have no choice but to concede, and settle into some form of arrangement with Imperial Germany.

Unfortunately, Germany had miscalculated the British priorities. Germany had the strongest army in existence. Were they able to force the North Sea, the British Isles and people themselves would be in genuine peril, and that was simply not an option the British were willing to concede to Germany. Despite a government unwilling to re-arm unnecessarily, their hand was forced, and a two pronged strategy was taken. Rather than come to an accord with Germany, Britain decided to rotate the majority of the new battleships to the Home Fleet, and outbuild Germany. Britain had the largest shipbuilding capacity in the world at that point in time, and pledged to lay two battleship keels for every German one. Reasoning that Germany would soon abandon this madcap scheme, Britain approached Germany several times over the next few years, offering to cancel the construction of their warships if Germany would do the same. Germany, falsely scenting weakness in these approaches, and convinced that they evidenced the British reaching breaking point and the success of their strategy, refused to parley.

But by 1912, Germany began to realise that this was not a race that they were able to compete in. Britain had kept building according to their pledge, and despite Germany's industrial might, they simply could not hope to afford to maintain both the strongest Army and Navy. The Army was baying for the funding being diverted to the Imperial Navy, and with no sign of the British flagging and coming to heel, German priorities reluctantly switched to focus on a potential land war against France and Germany. Britain was safe, for the time being.
But the fears that Germany had provoked in Britain remained nonetheless. Britain might still remain on the sidelines in Europe, but the concerns Germany had raised? They were well remembered on the eve of war in 1914.

So was entering the war a foolish, rash, and unconsidered decision by British politicians?

As we saw in the timeline I posted earlier, Britain was far from interested in engaging in a general European war, and indeed, did absolutely everything that they could do to stay out of it. When the issues in Serbia first kicked off, the British encouraged the Serbians to fold to Austrian pressure. When Austria invaded, the British Government championed mediation, and attempted to get Germany to discuss the whole affair with them. When Germany looked to be about to go to war with Russia, Britain telegraphed Germany to encourage them not to involve France in the dispute. And then, when it seemed inevitable that France would be drawn in, the British Government had still decided that Britain would not intervene.

These are not the actions of statemen rushing to engage in war to buff their foreign policy credentials. In fact, one could even say that the British Government were the most reluctant to engage in hostilities out of all the powers involved. When drawing a line under Belgium as a final point at which they would have to become involved, even then they left a slight get out clause in which Belgium would have to be actively resisting the Germans for them to intervene. So that more or less discredits the notion that the British Government were a bunch of old men eager to send off the youth of the day to die.


Cartoon by F.H. Townsend, Punch, 12th August 1914

I'm sure a number of you are thinking, 'But why did they have to intervene when Belgium was invaded? Why not just stay neutral?' Well, firstly, it is important to remember that no-one quite expected the carnage that was the ensue. Secondly, the facts I mentioned earlier over the German naval buildup should be remembered. From the British perspective, staying neutral and allowing France/Russia to be defeated and Belgium more or less absorbed would result in the Germans holding the whip hand in Europe. The consequences of that would have a profound effect on what little remained of Pax Britannia, and the security of the British homeland.

Had the Germans won, their economic power on the continent would be phenomenal. They would hold ports dangerously close to Britain, and have the money and power to build a Navy to rival/exceed the capabilities of the British Navy. British products would be muscled out by German products, and with the German seizure of French colonies, the whole Empire would be at risk. What's more, there would be no easy of counterbalancing Germany. With Russia smashed and France humbled, the only other remaining power capable of opposing Germany would be America. And with a high proportion of German descended immigrants and a high level of insularity, there would be no guarantee that America would be interested in any alliance with Britain.



The result being that when British politicians were backed into a corner by the aggressiveness of Germany, they elected to stand and fight in order to protect the interests and safety of the British Empire. Certainly, they were in no rush to do so, but ultimately to have done otherwise would have been folly. The ramifications of Germany's triumph were so vast that to not attempt to delay or prevent them would have been pure negligence. The British Government did not blindly wander into war as is so often portrayed. They were simply forced to conclude that it was the best option remaining to them after Europe gradually descended into chaos, despite their best efforts to prevent it.


The British military adaptation to new technology and total war


When the BEF landed in France in 1914 under Sir John French, they possessed a mere twenty four five inch guns in terms of artillery. Each battalion had just two maxim machine guns, and a few units were sporadically armed with ineffectual (and dangerous) No.1 Grenades. That was it. They were completely deficient in heavy artillery, mortars, and even most medicines. The recent British experiences in the Boer War had indicated that whilst artillery and machine guns were to be feared, any war in Europe would still ultimately be a mobile one decided by the traditional methods of rifle accuracy and discipline. Proof of this can be found by examining the the Standard Infantry Training Manual for 1914 (copies can be viewed at the Imperial War Museum). A quick skim will show such sections as 'Marching Under Fire, 'Fire and Formations in Battle', and 'Artillery Escorts'.


The British No.1 Grenade

To their credit, the British quickly became aware of the necessity of heavier guns though, and Sir John French immediately ordered the transportation of an obsolete pile of ex-Boer War 6-inch howitzers to the Continent. Those had begun arriving by late September, and Sir French was justified in that decision, later noting in October that, 'Our experiences in this campaign seem to point to the employment of more heavy guns of a larger calibre in the great battles which last for several days'. After seeing the German mortars in action, he quickly placed the first specifications for British production of similar weapons, and was supported in that decision by most of the British General Staff.

Like artillery, the British were also deficient in aeroplanes from quite early on in the war. The RFC took four squadrons of 48 craft with them across to Europe with the BEF at the outbreak of hostilities, but almost forty of these were lost in the British retreat to the Marne in October that year. This was because prior to the war, the RFC was considered to be totally optional to the war effort, and there had been absolutely no procedures put in place to integrate the RFC with the standard Army structure. Aeroplane usefulness in directing artillery fire was quickly utlised though (the first recorded time being on the Aisne as early as September 14th 1914), and by November, French was again pushing to acquire as many aircraft from home as possible. Byt the end of the year, the British Government had ordered another 418 aircraft, a massive increase on the pre-war construction levels.


A portrait of Sir John French

As can be deduced from above, the British Army, whilst totally unprepared, was not immune to learning from the conduct of the war in the early stages. Despite landing with not a single motorised ambulance in September, the BEF had 250 of the things working in France by the end of 1914. The British Army were generally reluctant to adopt new technologies and tactics until they proved their worth, but once that had been done, they would be seized upon and applied across the Front with alacrity.

A good example of this is the Battle of Neuve Chapelle in March 1915. Designed as a breakthrough operation to start a general advance, it brought together the accumulated knowledge of the British Army thus far, and combined it with as much new technology in support as could be mustered. Maps were made of German trenches from aerial photographs, an experimental line of telephone communications laid to try and rectify the serious communication issues that had plagued the British so far, and every single artillery piece that could be mustered was brought to focus on one area.

Unfortunately, it failed due to the shortness of the British artillery barrage (thirty five minutes, mainly due to ammunition shortages), the failure of a large number of British shells to explode (bad fuses), the German barbed wire remaining uncut, and an underestimation of the German machine gun posts. But despite being a failure, the British did take away lessons from the battle. By the Battle of Loos in September 1915, the pre-assault bombardment time had reached a duration of four days! The British were also now utilising gas, within four months of having the Germans deploy it against them. The fact that gas was developed and produced in sufficient quantities for battlefield use within four months should again highlight how the British Army could very much adapt to new circumstances and technology.

The Stokes mortar, the Lewis and Vickers machine guns, new grenades, battlefield telephone lines, aircraft with continuous wave transmitters all were instituted, produced, and wheeled out to battlefield en masse by the end of 1915. What's more, a constant stream of fresh tactical manuals and treatises flowed out from the General Staff, attempting to retrain their men to utilise the new technologies to their greatest advantage. The Blackadder view of British soldiers all going over the top in endless waves to mowed down and move Haig's drinks cabinet five centimetres closer to Berlin is a total myth. But we'll explore that perception of the war later on.



The British innovation did not end in 1915 though. In 1916? Tanks. Buzzers. The Fullerphone. Wireless sets. Supply railways. The institution of the British Signal Service. Air combat between newer models of aircraft. Bombercraft. The adoption of the creeping barrage artillery strategy. Microphone sound rangers to detect enemy artillery and help direct British artillery. The adoption of flash spotting. Endless improvements, tactical reshuffles, everything and anything that the General Staff could devise to try and break the stalemate was utilised. The problem was, the Germans were doing exactly the same thing. Until 1916, the British were just playing catch-up to the Germans, and once they'd reached the same level, the Germans continued to innovate alongside them.

But ultimately the problem was that the numbers of men and economies involved were so vast, that a 'decisive battle', as envisaged by all sides before the war, was impossible. The general academic opinion of the British General Staff? They did an alright job, considering the circumstances they found themselves in. Sure, sometimes they missed things that seemed blindingly obvious in hindsight. But other times, they were downright cunning and innovative. Overall, they did the best they could for their men and their country.

Exceptional stuff again, Ketara. It's very enlightening, engaging and fascinating. Thanks for taking the time to post this stuff.

WW1 had always been something that had passed me by much, really.

Though, I have always had the tradition of watching the final episode of Blackadder Goes Forth on Remembrance Sunday. In saying that, I never really did subscribe to belief B, aside from the simple fact of, "an extremely large amount of people died and my Great Grandfather got his hand blown off, which is a bad thing."

In any case, I'm finding Ketara's writing incredibly interesting as well.

Actually....what's Blackadder? I don't even know and it keeps getting mentioned.

British TV show featuring Rowan Atkinson. Each season was set at a different time period, one was set in the trenches during WWI. It was very anti-war and portrayed the top brass as a bunch of fools.

 KamikazeCanuck wrote:
Actually....what's Blackadder? I don't even know and it keeps getting mentioned.

A BBC British Sitcom

Although each series is set in a different era, all follow the "misfortunes" of Edmund Blackadder (played by Atkinson), who in each is a member of a British family dynasty present at many significant periods and places in British history. It is implied in each series that the Blackadder character is a descendant of the previous one (the end theme lyrics of series 2, episode "Heads", specify that he is the great-grandson of the previous), although it is never specified how or when any of the Blackadders (who are usually single and not in a relationship) managed to father children.[2]

As the generations progress, each Blackadder becomes increasingly clever and perceptive, while the family's social status steadily erodes. However, each Blackadder remains a cynical, cowardly opportunist, maintaining and increasing his own status and fortunes, regardless of his surroundings.

The life of each Blackadder is also entwined with his servant, each from the Baldrick family line (played by Tony Robinson). Each generation acts as the dogsbody to his respective Blackadder. They decrease in intelligence (and in personal-hygiene standards) as their masters' intellect increases. Each Blackadder and Baldrick is also saddled with tolerating the presence of a dim-witted aristocrat. This role was taken in the first two series by Lord Percy Percy, played by Tim McInnerny; with Hugh Laurie playing the role in the third and fourth series, as Prince George, Prince Regent; and Lieutenant George, respectively.

Each series was set in a different period of British history, beginning in 1485 and ending in 1917, and comprised 6 half-hour episodes. The first series, made in 1983, was called The Black Adder and set in the fictional reign of "Richard IV". The second series, Blackadder II (1986), was set during the reign of Elizabeth I. Blackadder the Third (1987) was set during the late 18th and early 19th centuries in the reign of George III, and Blackadder Goes Forth (1989) was set in 1917 in the trenches of the Great War.

Blackadder is one of the greatest British comedies of all time, and features 4 generations of the Blackadder family (medieval, Elizabethan, Georgian and First World War) getting up to general misdeedery. The WW1 series in particular is very much a social commentary and focuses on the view that the war was entirely pointless.

I think this scene sums up the show quite well (and is also hugely hilarious):



You should definitely check it out. The cast includes Rowan Atkinson, Tony Robinson, Tim McInnery and Stephen Fry (series 1+2) and in Hugh Laurie replaces McInnery in Series 3. In the fourth series, they're all in it. It's genuinely great stuff.

Ninja'd twice. Oh well, still watch the clip. It's brilliant.

Wibble.