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Britain had for 200 years held a policy of trying to maintain a balance of powers on the continent and had involved itself in a number of wars in order to do so, using a combination of expeditionary forces, naval campaigns and financial support to allies. France was usually the enemy because France was at the time the most powerful nation in Europe, and continued to be until the late 19th century.

Another policy was to try and maintain naval supremacy, because this was regarded as the key offensive/defensive power for an island nation. (Which obviously is true.) Thus the British fought battles and wars against naval rivals, e.g. wars against the Dutch and campaigns in the Napoleonic Wars to capture or destroy potential enemy fleets (e.g. the Battle of Copenhagen.)

Some modern naval historians of the Victorian to WW1 period believe the German policy of building a fleet to challenge the RN was an important factor in driving Britain to form new alliances to oppose the growth of German power.

As mentioned above by Ketara, France had been regarded as Britain's major rival until a couple of decades before the start of the war. The rapprochement with France (and thereby with France's ally Russia, a combination designed to oppose German power by trapping them between two threats) leading to the entente cordiale coincided with the period in which the Germans legally mandated the creation of a major fleet.

I think the question is a bit too basic to really discuss. Historically, many nations didn't "need" to fight the vast majority of their military conflicts - if we consider need being "solely defending one's land from an aggressor", perhaps the most basic defintion of needing to fight a military conflict. The reason for most military conflicts are simply due to considerations of the time. As has been famously stated, war is simply a continuation of politics by other means.

The common reasons countries go to war include, but are not limited to...

-Fulfulling an allegiance, pact, or treaty (i.e. partaking on behalf of an ally)
-Territorial expansion
-Securing natural resources, trade routes, etc.
-Securing a friendly government, or opposing the rise of an opposing government entity
-Bump starting a failing economy (in many instances, war is often good for the economy - this dates back to the Crusades and before)
-Partaking in a multi-national conflict in order to have a seat at the table when it comes to re-drawing the lines of countries at the end of said conflict
-Sometimes a war or military action is simply used to send a profound political message, warning, etc.
-Taking advantage of an ongoing conflict to seize any of the above while the getting is good, or "Hey, lets take that thing we wanted...they're too busy fighting elsewhere to stop us!"
-Taking a country to stabilize it for fear of the local damage that could be caused by its collapse - often impacting the above
etc.

In the most simple terms, perhaps none of these are "needs" to some people. However they are decisions made by the people in power at the time. In retrospect, looking at the loss of life of most conflicts, there is often regret. War, conflict, and casualties are very much the cost of doing business. Do too little and you're labeled isolationist, jingoistic, etc...do too much and you're considered a warmonger (even by the people who benefit from your country's actions in said conflicts).

You can find fascinating information on why and how countries get involved in confrontations. Some large conflicts have been started on bad information, or lies and deceits. Some conflicts have been started for good reasons and ended poorly, etc. I find it's very difficult to judge stuff even as recently as World War One because we cannot be in the mindset of people, rulers, and soldiers of the time. We often look at the past through a bizarre 2018 filter and seldom appreciate how differently people thought and felt, what they valued, and what emotionally drove them - what they were passionate about.

My question is, did the British have to align with the French and Russians, or should they have aligned with the Central Powers? Was a German, British, and Austro-Hungarian alliance ever possible?

 Easy E wrote:
My question is, did the British have to align with the French and Russians, or should they have aligned with the Central Powers? Was a German, British, and Austro-Hungarian alliance ever possible?

No. Britain's interests always had been to prevent one single European power from becoming too dominant. Joining with the German-Austrian-Hungarian axis would have been directly contrary to that interest. Britain had nothing to gain from an alliance with Germany.

Perhaps, but they also had interests in stopping the Russians from acquiring access to the Med, which could align them with the Ottomans and Austro-Hungarians. It was such a compelling interest that they fought a war over it in the past. The British and the french had long-standing colonial disputes.

If Germany had not been aggressive against Great Britain in the Naval Arms Race, is there a scenario where the Germans could have seduced G.B. to her side?

 Easy E wrote:

If Germany had not been aggressive against Great Britain in the Naval Arms Race, is there a scenario where the Germans could have seduced G.B. to her side?

To a degree.

Where the Germans went wrong was that they thought the British could be bullied into staying neutral, if not allying with Germany altogether.

The Kaiser had a huge amount of affection for Britain. There were days when old cousin Willie hacked him off and he cursed everything over the channel, but as a rule of thumb he saw himself as part of Britannia's wave ruling heritage (to mangle and transplant an old saying). The High Seas Fleet wasn't just a realpolitik strategy, it was something of pride and self-identity for the Kaiser also. That was one of the main reasons that the German fleet was initially built up. Vanity projects for the Kaiser were rarely neglected in Wilhelmite Germany.

At the same time however, the German strategists assumed that imperial commitments would mean that Britain would never concentrate sufficient of her Fleet at home to match a Navy of say, two thirds the size of hers. This strategic bargaining chip would they hoped, incline Britain to keep its nose out of Europe and turn a blind eye to German colonial efforts. Then Germany could rule the 'land' of Europe and Britain the sea around it; hand in hand as anglo-saxon cousins. So the HSF kept increasing in size.

Unfortunately, the Germans hadn't counted on the fact that the British have been scaremongering about invasion threats since Napoleon I. Such things were a consistent feature of the second half of the nineteenth century, and led to the British passing several Bills to increase the size of the Navy. The result being that after the French and Russians turned sweet (on account of worry about Germany and Tsushima respectively), Germany emerged as the primary threat to naval dominance. As the Kaiser started stirring trouble in places like Morocco to try and throw his weight around a bit, and his fleet began reaching dangerous levels (in comparison to British local Navy numbers), this sparked a fresh wave of invasion concerns (see Le Quex's 'Invasion of 1910'). Germany had the largest army after all. If they could throw 300,000 men over the channel in rapid speed, they could potentially bite off the British Navy in chunks with theirs and pull a fresh 1870 off before the British fleet could concentrate and regain control.

The Germans hoped this would lead the British to an accord. In reality, it led to the British public very vocally demanding extra funds be voted to the Navy. The Admiralty itself stole a technological march with Dreadnought, relocated its primary battle strength to the Home isles from the Mediterranean, and when the Germans still insisted on building, simply outbuilt them. By 1914, Germany had fallen well behind and the High Seas Fleet was no match for the British equivalent.


Ultimately, Germany underestimated how severely invasion-phobic the British were and by trying to place them under invasion threat to extract political neutrality/alliance, merely sparked considerable ill will against them, leading certain British factions to tentatively respond to French attempts to feel them out as allies. If the Germans had not done so, it is unlikely that the British would have sided with the French and Russians. It was touch and go as was in 1914. Remove a decade of scaremongering and ill feeling? Re-allocate the funds to the German Army?

The Germans would likely have squashed the French, thrown the Russians out of Europe, and the British would have watched them do it whilst feeling safe and secure behind their fleet. The French would have received a large bill, the British Empire would have made large profit out of selling armaments during the whole affair (much like 1870 and the American Civil War), and German and British officers would still be toasting each other at court events around Europe; each feeling secure in their particular domain of either land or sea.

The argument that Britain could have stayed out without too many ill effects seems to rely on Germany having limited ambitions. It’s hard to be definite about this, as Germany never had a fully defined shopping list... but one thing is certain, whenever they could during the war, they asked for as much as possible (see Brest-litovsk). Putting your trust in the self-restraint of a victorious hegemonic imperial Germany seems extremely risky.

It's too do with seapower. Assuming Germany never bothers to invest in their navy and Britain consequently abstains from WW1; Germany might win the war but would have no real means of striking at Britain if they wanted to and are thus restrained to a degree. Meanwhile, they'd be utterly reliant on British allowance in order to seize France's colonies (something we know they envied). With Britain out of the war, America never enters, and the British (as the workshop of the world still to a degree and centre of the global financial system) make vast sums off the conflict.

 Ketara wrote:
It's too do with seapower. Assuming Germany never bothers to invest in their navy and Britain consequently abstains from WW1; Germany might win the war but would have no real means of striking at Britain if they wanted to and are conceitedly restrained to a degree. Meanwhile, they'd be utterly reliant on British allowance in order to seize France's colonies (something we know they envied). With Britain out of the war, America never enters, and the British (as the workshop of the world still to a degree and centre of the global financial system) make vast sums off the conflict.

That’s great, except:

- German antagonism to Britain predated British involvement in the war

- Germany had been heavily investing in their navy. Why would they stop, when only Britain remained as a challenge?

- Britain had made certain understandings as part of the entente cordiale. If it had reneged on them, then the post war situation would not only see an antagonist Germany but a resentful France . I.e. a very dangerous diplomatic isolation in the face of a continental hegemon.

- I don’t think Germany relied on British imports for its war machine. The amount of profit would have been paltry.

Dice4thedicegod wrote:

That’s great, except:
- German antagonism to Britain predated British involvement in the war

Er. What does this mean? What are you claiming? That Germany would declare war with Britain in 1914 in an explicitly counterfactual scenario where Britain chooses to stay out? That after concluding a crippling modern war with France and Russia, the German Government would decide that they'd rather try to do a Napoleon and seal the Continent against the British from some vague anti-British feeling? I'm really not sure.

Germany had been heavily investing in their navy. Why would they stop, when only Britain remained as a challenge?

Because dreadnoughts are horribly expensive and wars even moreso. Why would they need to carry on building? The primary reason the fleet got built was to try and bully the British into staying out of a potential war. That achieved, why would they restart construction? What would the gain be? The Kaiser didn't particularly want to rule Britain or the waves.

- Britain had made certain understandings as part of the entente cordiale. If it had reneged on them, then the post war situation would not only see an antagonist Germany but a resentful France . I.e. a very dangerous diplomatic isolation in the face of a continental hegemon.

Nothing was nailed down in stone and alliances were ten a penny in the nineteenth century (which had only just passed and many key players of which still survived). As it was, the Cabinet only conceded to war because of Belgium. Had the Germans fought the French across the normal territorial lines, Britain would likely have stayed out. I imagine they'd have declared a 'no war' zone in the channel'/North Sea which would have simultaneously annoyed and pleased both sides (whilst meeting their most solid 'understanding' to the French to secure their northern coast against the HSF). Given the strenuous efforts of the Americans to secure neutral rights before the war, adding Britain to the mix would pretty much set them in stone I should think. Either European side would be too worried about cutting themselves off from supply and guaranteeing all the industrial traffic to their opponent.

Furthermore, why is Germany now antagonist against someone they're explicitly not at war with in our scenario? Not to mention the fact that France spent two third of the prior century grimly staring across the channel (would be assassins of Napoleon III were plotting in London, etc). They never really got anywhere and the British accepted that as a normal state of affairs. So little would change, in reality.

Finally, even if the Germans all plugged into an anti-british hive mind and declared unreasoning, unpurposeful war on the British; the Germans could never touch the British for Navy construction whilst simultaneously maintaining the largest Army in Europe. You can't afford both, and Britain had infinitely more firms and a much larger private warship construction sector than Germany. All a hostile Germany would have achieved with no continental British Army to fight would have been a trade war (to their detriment).

- I don’t think Germany relied on British imports for its war machine. The amount of profit would have been paltry.

In a war, both sides grab munitions and material from wherever they can buy them. It's why we refer to WW1&2 as being industrial wars. You use these things up infinitely faster than you can make them, and the side which makes the most has a good chance of success. Even as things were, the British Government and German Governments had a few trades mid-WW1. If Britain wasn't involved, we'd have been arming both sides quite happily and gouging them for the privilege alongside the States.

I'm certainly not an expert by any stretch on the First World War, and so I speak entirely from an opinion that is "following ones' own nose..."

Here is a link to the UK national archives which I assume sheds academic light on Britain entering the First World War...

http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/greatwar/g2/backgroundcs1.htm

...ultimately it came down to Germany assuming that Britain would not honour an agreement to defend Brussels and could use it's ports to attack France without challenge. Britain, still being a world-class empire, clearly had to send a clear message to Germany.

With that in mind, one could ask; did Germany need to antagonize Britain, knowing its reputation for stubbornly defending territory over principle?


Automatically Appended Next Post:

SamusDrake wrote:
Britain, still being a world-class empire, clearly had to send a clear message to Germany.

And here I am...bollocking myself over grammar mistakes...on an open forum....

...that! is chaos theory!

Right, the big question in my mind is why did German strategy try to antagonize Britain?

I know the Kaiser had some fancy ideas about being a colonial power and needing a Navy in order to have it. I know he really, really like Navies. I also know he had read Alfred Thayer Mahan and was completely bought into the idea that Great Powers had to have a fleet.

All that being said, it still makes very little geo-political sense to antagonize the British when they knew France and Russia were all ready their foes. In Great Power Diplomacy, you wanted to be on the side with 3 nations and not 2. Simple math. With the right diplomacy, could they have seduced Great Britain at least into Neutrality on a case of shared common interests.

I know G.B.'s policy had been to keep the continent de-stabilized and out of the hands of one major power. What could Germany theoretically have done to avoid G.B. involvement? Curtail their desire for world -wide colonies? Keep Russia out of the Med? Prop up the Ottoman Empire? Guarantee the territorial integrity of the Empire outside of Europe?

 Easy E wrote:
Right, the big question in my mind is why did German strategy try to antagonize Britain?

I know the Kaiser had some fancy ideas about being a colonial power and needing a Navy in order to have it. I know he really, really like Navies. I also know he had read Alfred Thayer Mahan and was completely bought into the idea that Great Powers had to have a fleet.

All that being said, it still makes very little geo-political sense to antagonize the British when they knew France and Russia were all ready their foes. In Great Power Diplomacy, you wanted to be on the side with 3 nations and not 2. Simple math. With the right diplomacy, could they have seduced Great Britain at least into Neutrality on a case of shared common interests.

I know G.B.'s policy had been to keep the continent de-stabilized and out of the hands of one major power. What could Germany theoretically have done to avoid G.B. involvement? Curtail their desire for world -wide colonies? Keep Russia out of the Med? Prop up the Ottoman Empire? Guarantee the territorial integrity of the Empire outside of Europe?

The problem with immediately pre-war Germany is that they generally behaved quite boorishly to everybody. Bismarck had played his cards close to his chest to build Germany, and the original Kaiser had played along. Prussia (and the newly created Germany) were thus fairly looked upon by most European powers; even the French.

Good old Wilhelm had something of an invented inferiority complex however. He wanted his country to be pre-eminent in Europe, and everybody else to kowtow appropriately. That led to him insisting on sticking his nose into every pie on the basis that everybody should be listening to what he (and Germany) had to say; even if they were nothing to do with a matter at hand. Perfect example is the second Moroccan Crisis where he dispatched a cruiser to 'protect German interests'; when there were no such interests and he had to actively fabricate some and fast.

When you insist on throwing your internaitonal weight around too much, strongest land army or no, you're eventually going to end up scrapping with one of the people you're throwing it on. The Kaiser knew it, his government and Army knew it, and his neighbours all knew it. Many contemporaries felt it was only a matter of time, whatever various idealistic disarmament campaigners might hope for. And once you believe war to be inevitable (or highly probable), you need to ensure that the odds are in your favour. The actions you see as 'antagonising' the British were ultimately simply those designed to bully the British into avoiding them. Like a dog barking loudly to scare off a rival. Given the choice between the stick and honey; the Germans chose the stick. Why? Because that was the Kaiser's method of international diplomacy and viewing the world. Anything else would have been weakness.

Ironically, the best way to keep the British out would likely have been the polar opposite. Ignore the fleet altogether, meaning Britain feels secure and able to sit out any European event. Pour the funds and men into the Army further still; allowing them to more easily overwhelm the French. The British would be less keen to interfere if the war was over quicker after all; and preponderance on one side more overwhelming. Forge greater links with Britain diplomatically; and stop being such boors towards the British at events like the Hague convention or over the Boer conflict. Really, more or less the opposite of everything they did.

Out of all the powers, Britain wanted to be involved in WW1 the least and had the least to gain. To have pushed them into it in the way Germany did was quite an achievement really.