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In many of my classes, they talk about the Schlieffen Plan as if it could never have worked and was foolish as a strategy. Is that true?

I know Von Moltke made a number of small adjustments to it up to the implementation including shifting forces form West to East. I know the initial plan was tweaked and modified by the General Staff frequently with adjustments.

However, there were a few things against it:

1. Massive logistical challenges
2. Belgians put up a stiffer fight than expected
3. The Russians were coming, The Russians were coming
4. New weapons and tactics


What do you think? Is there a scenario where the Schlieffen Plan could work and knock France out of the war early?

While admitting I am not familiar with the subject, just looking up what it is and some of the history of it the whole thing reeks of "X could have won the war if Y hadn't done Z."

aka, armchair generals writing fan fiction.

Maybe.

Reminds of the "if Lee didn't pull back from Harrisburg" and "if Hitler hadn't attacked Stalingrad" arguments that generally ignore all the very pertinent reasons those choices were made in the first place.

Once america got involved in the war and hitler attacked russia, ghawd him,self could not have saved nazi germany. It was simply buried under the output of two industrial titans.

The fact hitler based a lot of his tactics on the image of the heroic knights from ancient times charging into battle and crushing all before them thru sheer superiority didn;' help. His obsession with bigger and bigger tanks and guns ignored the fact that mass produced and sustainable, replaceaBLE units like the legendary T-34 and the sherman tank were what it took to win an industrial war.

Add in germany's limited resources and the allies ability to keep germany from having adequate access to them and it was doomed from the get go. Thankfully.

Edit: dammit, Techpriestsupport, this is about WWI not WWII.

 Easy E wrote:
In many of my classes, they talk about the Schlieffen Plan as if it could never have worked and was foolish as a strategy. Is that true?

I know Von Moltke made a number of small adjustments to it up to the implementation including shifting forces form West to East. I know the initial plan was tweaked and modified by the General Staff frequently with adjustments.

However, there were a few things against it:

1. Massive logistical challenges
2. Belgians put up a stiffer fight than expected
3. The Russians were coming, The Russians were coming
4. New weapons and tactics


What do you think? Is there a scenario where the Schlieffen Plan could work and knock France out of the war early?

Ultimately, could it have worked? Possibly. Lots of variables and gambles involved, and had some gone another way, it could have worked. Had Belgium stood aside, had there been a couple missed or intercepted communiques during the allied retreat, had a different government been in power in the UK, had France been unable to rally behind a Joffre, etc ad nauseum. Ultimately however, it did not work as intended.

I think it can ultimately be said however, it was a solid plan that worked better than anyone else's war plan in the early days. The Schlieffen plan meant the war and its devastation was fought in France and French cost, it took the allies and the combined weight of the bulk of the world economy four of the most grueling years of brutal warfare in human history to undo those gains. On the other side, how many people today even know of France's Plan XVII? All it did was generate 320k casualties smashing itself into Lorraine achieving squat all. The BEF's initial plans certainly never came to fruition. The Austro-Hungarian war plan certainly didn't work when it invaded Serbia and promptly fell on its face. Russia's cobbled together attempts ended disastrously at Tannenberg.

None of these plans really worked. But I think the Schlieffen Plan was by far the best in theory and execution.

Remove the US from the equation and it was working in a bit of a reverse order, defeating Russia first then bringing the pain to France and England.

Is it true? I think history has proven it was a foolish plan because it failed.

Sometimes perfectly good plans fail due to unforeseen circumstances, or just plain bad luck.

They say no plan survives contact with the enemy.

I prefer no plan survives contact with reality, just because you know. Lots of plans weren't nearly as good as they seemed in the first place XD

 ProtoClone wrote:
Is it true? I think history has proven it was a foolish plan because it failed.

Everyone's plan failed at the outbreak of WW1, that's part of what made it such a shitshow was because it turned out nobody knew what they were doing or how to handle all this newfangled stuff.

Only the Schlieffen plan however came even remotely close to working.

 Vaktathi wrote:

 ProtoClone wrote:
Is it true? I think history has proven it was a foolish plan because it failed.

Everyone's plan failed at the outbreak of WW1, that's part of what made it such a shitshow was because it turned out nobody knew what they were doing or how to handle all this newfangled stuff.

Only the Schlieffen plan however came even remotely close to working.

"Close" doesn't win wars.
Best laid plans of mice.

That is a great point Vaktathi!

I would also say the Russian plan was not terrible, but the local commanders WERE terrible. The plan itself was fine, but the local commanders just were not up to it, and they faced better German commanders.

The French plan and strategic doctrine prior to the war was just terrible all around. The only good thing they did was cozy up to Russia and Great Britain. Other than that, militarily they were a train wreck, almost as bad as Austro-Hungary.

 Easy E wrote:
That is a great point Vaktathi!

I would also say the Russian plan was not terrible, but the local commanders WERE terrible. The plan itself was fine, but the local commanders just were not up to it, and they faced better German commanders.

The French plan and strategic doctrine prior to the war was just terrible all around. The only good thing they did was cozy up to Russia and Great Britain. Other than that, militarily they were a train wreck, almost as bad as Austro-Hungary.

At least their plans were better than Italy's. Italy's plan being "Let's attack the enemy's fortified mountain positions head-on". And when that plan obviously turned out to be a disaster, they tried it again. And again. And again. And again. And again. And again. And again. And again. And again. And once more again. Until the point that the Italian army had been so weakened by its ridiculous losses that the Austro-Hungarian defenders could break through their lines with ease.

Luigi Cardorna was a...special kind of general.

 ProtoClone wrote:

 Vaktathi wrote:

 ProtoClone wrote:
Is it true? I think history has proven it was a foolish plan because it failed.

Everyone's plan failed at the outbreak of WW1, that's part of what made it such a shitshow was because it turned out nobody knew what they were doing or how to handle all this newfangled stuff.

Only the Schlieffen plan however came even remotely close to working.

"Close" doesn't win wars.
Best laid plans of mice.

I didn't say otherwise. But no plan survives contact with the enemy, and as far as plans go for the era, calling it foolish just because it failed is missing a lot, and a plan can't control for everything. It obviously did not work, but it was hardly an impossible gamble, and it left Germany in about as advantageous a position as she could have hoped for, given the realities of what became the Western Front. Also, lets be real, if we're talking foolish plans, the plan that ultimately won the war was a clever game of...who runs out of dudes last

And even there the Allies cheated, bringing in a ringer at the last minute.

 thekingofkings wrote:
Remove the US from the equation and it was working in a bit of a reverse order, defeating Russia first then bringing the pain to France and England.

Realistically, I don't think you can say that Germany "beat" Russia when perhaps one of the biggest things that took Russia out of the War, was Germany sneaking a git through Finland and into Russia to completely change the personality/makeup of the country.


When it comes to the Schlieffen Plan, I'm with Vaktathi in saying that it was the "best" early plan of the war, however I think where Germany messed up was in their dogged clinging to that plan, even once the seas had shifted and it was fairly clear it was not gonna work.

How should they have changed course?

A better plan would have been to stop the war once you can see you aren't going to win, but must try and hold out for a stalemate, but is that at all realistic?

At any rate, it was never tried.

Yes, it could.

The German invasion of Benelux and France in 1940 was essentially a cobbled-together version of the Schlieffen Plan.

Plan was sound, but the key was pushing through Belgium and circling Paris. The force was suppose to be stronger to the north, but the force was spread more evenly before the attack. The BEF was in the area and fought like machine gun toting lions even though they had the Lee Enfield rifles.

Original plan was good and could easily have worked. Luckily it was watered down.

I would say it did work, not as spectacularly well as intended, but well enough.

Nothing is guaranteed, and a plan like that was always a gamble reliant on many factors outside of the control of the people in charge. It didn't accomplish its ultimate goal, but turned out pretty well overall for the Germans otherwise. Had the Germans taken Paris, its entirely likely the war would not have ended and the French government in Bordeaux may have opted to continue the war.

None of the initial battle plans of any nation really worked out, but the Schlieffen plan was, by far and without question, the most resoundingly successful, even if it ultimately didnt work out as intended. Austro-Hungaria's plan was obliterated by Serbia, Russia's plan died at Tannenberg, France's plan stopped dead in its tracks with 300k casualties and nothing to show for it, the UK's plan didnt fare much better.

The Schlieffen plan, while failing to take Paris, left Germany in a dominant position in the West, in control of a huge chunk of French resources and industrial capacity and meant the war and its devastation all occurred on French soil. It would take 4 years of the costliest and bloodiest war in human history to that point, and the colonial wealth of a century for several empires and the bulk of world industrial production, to undo those gains.

Short of ending the war then and there, it went about as well as the Germans could have hoped for, particularly coupled with Tannenberg.


Had a different UK government been in power, had Belgium stood aside, had any one of a number of factors changed, the plan could have worked as intended. Ultimately it was a gamble. Mostly it gets used as an excuse by German generals who did not like Moltke for why they lost, but it really didnt turn out all that bad.

Since WWI is an area of expertise to me, I would say the Schlieffen Plan wasn't a good plan, but it was pretty much the best plan Germany could have applied considering the alliances in play at the eve of WWI. The Schlieffen Plan wasn't a very good plan because a lot of things could go horribly wrong and indeed did. Mobilisation was slower than expected in Germany. Belgium strongpoints were harder to crack then expect. the Plan was dependant of a magistral effort of logistic that simply couldn't be realised before France could mobilise. Speaking of which, while France mobilisation was slow and their army not quite ready for the war (they planned for 1916), it was fast enough and French soldiers were sufficently trained and equipped to slow down enough the German advance, then force it into a crawl, then to complete stop (their light artillery proved to be key at that point). WWI almost went as good as it could for Germany considering the alliances in effect. They certainly had the best logistic, the best engineers and the best strategists of all forces engaged, but they lacked strong allies.

Slight necromancing...
Somebody has written a very through article of the plan for English Wikipedia, it's not very encyclopedic article, but offers tons of information and insight. Several misconceptions of the plan are dispelled.
-basically, the problem was that much of the German records were destroyed after WW1 and those involved weren't too eager to objectively talk about the war plans. Even more records were lost during WW2.
-Moltke was dead before end of war, so he was convenient scapegoat for official history. His widow tried to fight for his reputation but active officers managed to stop her from publishing most of the juicy stuff.
-Amazingly, it turned out that some records had survived in East Germany and were found there after reunification, clarifying some aspects of the German strategic planning.
-there was never a Schlieffen plan to defeat both France and Russia by attacking France through Belgium. Schlieffen did not think it was possible.

Attacking France through Low Countries was not a new idea. French had made similar plans attacking Germany through Belgium. Schlieffen even wrote about the subject in public. Strategic dilemma for Germans were the French fortification zones which they had estabilished after 1871 defeat. In 1905 Memorandum, Schlieffen proposed a bold solution: Germans should outflank the fortifications by crossing Seine west of Paris, thus forcing French out of the fortifications and into decisive battle of maneuvering. Problem was that it required much larger army than Germany had at the time. Schlieffen used this to argue for expansion of the army. The Memorandum was only for war against France. Russia had just suffered a defeat against Japan, and it was thought it would take very long time to recover.

Germans did not have super detailed operative war plans: they did not think such advance planning was possible in fog and surprises of the war. They had deployment plans which then enabled various offensive or defensive scenarios. There were 'West' and 'Ost' deployment plans named after against which foe Germans would concentrate first. Schlieffen Memorandum became basis for Aufmarsch I West, a deployment plan which was designed for war against France. It called for attack through Luxemburg and Belgium. However after 1910 it was clear that Russia was rearming much quicker than previously estimated and isolated Franco-German war was unlikely.

Aufmarsch II West was designed for two-front war and during Moltke's time in General Staff it became preferred deployment plan. In that plan the focus was to defeat French army first. However, the plan originally called for French Army to be defeated by counter-attack in Germany. Offensive forces it had were insufficient for goals outlined in Aufmarsch I West, much less Schlieffen Memorandum. Timescale was also impossible. Schlieffen had estimated that in two-front war and 'West' scenarios would require Germans to defeat French Army in 3 weeks. This was way too short for invasion deep into France. "Defeat of France in six weeks and then turn towards Russians" was never in Schlieffen's agenda. Russia would be way too dangerous if they were given six weeks to mobilize and advance.

The real mystery of the "Schlieffen plan" is that given all that, how the heck it came that Moltke attempted to defeat France with one-front war plan with forces allocated for two-front war plan? Was it really all Moltke's own design or were some other people influencing things? Seems unlikely he could have made such dramatic decisions all by himself - old Great General Staff was not like Hitler's OKW where Führer called the shots. It was very professional institute with lots of checks against personal incompetence. It is really unfortunate that Eliza von Moltke's "nasty stuff" was never published and apparently destroyed.

I see Dr Zuber rears his head at last!

Schlieffen Plan called for 8:1 superiority for th push to Paris. That is enough for a frontal assault.

It should have worked. Diverting armies east didn't help and cost the Germans dear, but it was no secret that France and Tsarist Russia were allies. The Germans should have accounted for this and raised extra soldiers to hold the eastern front while the western offensive proceeded with full resources.

Yes there were unexpected problems, the BEF was far more effective than its low numbers suggested.

 Orlanth wrote:
Schlieffen Plan called for 8:1 superiority for th push to Paris. That is enough for a frontal assault.

It should have worked. Diverting armies east didn't help and cost the Germans dear, but it was no secret that France and Tsarist Russia were allies. The Germans should have accounted for this and raised extra soldiers to hold the eastern front while the western offensive proceeded with full resources.

Yes there were unexpected problems, the BEF was far more effective than its low numbers suggested.

Part of the problem is that the Germans could not raise many more troops at mobilization than they all ready were.

 Easy E wrote:
In many of my classes, they talk about the Schlieffen Plan as if it could never have worked and was foolish as a strategy. Is that true?

I know Von Moltke made a number of small adjustments to it up to the implementation including shifting forces form West to East. I know the initial plan was tweaked and modified by the General Staff frequently with adjustments.

However, there were a few things against it:

1. Massive logistical challenges
2. Belgians put up a stiffer fight than expected
3. The Russians were coming, The Russians were coming
4. New weapons and tactics


What do you think? Is there a scenario where the Schlieffen Plan could work and knock France out of the war early?

Prussians think they can pull a Napoleon and defeat the three other major European powers plus Belgium because they have what, Austria? What a brilliantly bad idea.

 Easy E wrote:

 Orlanth wrote:
Schlieffen Plan called for 8:1 superiority for th push to Paris. That is enough for a frontal assault.

It should have worked. Diverting armies east didn't help and cost the Germans dear, but it was no secret that France and Tsarist Russia were allies. The Germans should have accounted for this and raised extra soldiers to hold the eastern front while the western offensive proceeded with full resources.

Yes there were unexpected problems, the BEF was far more effective than its low numbers suggested.

Part of the problem is that the Germans could not raise many more troops at mobilization than they all ready were.

They could technically but let's just say that these troops would've been even greener then we see in 1915 from the volunteers that died in drooves.



Automatically Appended Next Post:

 Frazzled wrote:

 Easy E wrote:
In many of my classes, they talk about the Schlieffen Plan as if it could never have worked and was foolish as a strategy. Is that true?

I know Von Moltke made a number of small adjustments to it up to the implementation including shifting forces form West to East. I know the initial plan was tweaked and modified by the General Staff frequently with adjustments.

However, there were a few things against it:

1. Massive logistical challenges
2. Belgians put up a stiffer fight than expected
3. The Russians were coming, The Russians were coming
4. New weapons and tactics


What do you think? Is there a scenario where the Schlieffen Plan could work and knock France out of the war early?

Prussians think they can pull a Napoleon and defeat the three other major European powers plus Belgium because they have what, Austria? What a brilliantly bad idea.

Austria hungary, that includes czechs, slovaks, croats, bosnians, romanians poles, etc.

Except Austria is also fighting the Balkans, and the countries you listed where at best a liability.

PLUS...Russia quickly put the hurt on Austrian forces.

Prussia got heady after beating France in the 1870s and then just got stupid. France modernized because it was butthurt, and Prussia excuse me Germany never faced Britain or Russia. To quote the immortal bard..."what were they thinking???"

 Frazzled wrote:
Except Austria is also fighting the Balkans, and the countries you listed where at best a liability.

PLUS...Russia quickly put the hurt on Austrian forces.

Prussia got heady after beating France in the 1870s and then just got stupid. France modernized because it was butthurt, and Prussia excuse me Germany never faced Britain or Russia. To quote the immortal bard..."what were they thinking???"

Actually they were less of a liability then the fething stupid general staff they had in austria hungary.
Look up on youtube the great war channel.

As for Germany meh, the idea is dead since 1848 because they lost the morals and the intelligence there.

Not Online!!! wrote:

Actually they were less of a liability then the fething stupid general staff they had in austria hungary.
Look up on youtube the great war channel.

Before the war, Conrad was viewed as a military genius and signifant asset for Austria-Hungary. He performed really well in staff exercises and his campaign plans were thought to be excellent work. However in the real war, it turned out that A-H army was not up the snuff for executing these plans, or alternatively maybe he wasn't such a genius after all, or maybe bit of both, take your pick.


Automatically Appended Next Post:

 Orlanth wrote:
Schlieffen Plan called for 8:1 superiority for th push to Paris. That is enough for a frontal assault.

It should have worked. Diverting armies east didn't help and cost the Germans dear, but it was no secret that France and Tsarist Russia were allies. The Germans should have accounted for this and raised extra soldiers to hold the eastern front while the western offensive proceeded with full resources.

Schlieffen Memorandum had divisions which did not actually exist. Memorandum was used to argue for much larger army.
The actual attack was undertaken with signifantly smaller force than the Memorandum called for, which directly contributed to defeat at Marne.

But beyond that, there were other issues. Schlieffen planned for attack through Netherlands as well. Operationally this made great deal of sense. However, diplomatically and economically it was much preferable for Germany to leave Holland neutral. So General Staff went for attack through Luxemburg and Belgium only, creating a traffic congestion which hindered German advance and logistics. In fact, it is dubious if they could have used any more forces without invading Netherlands as well.