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 H wrote:

 Azreal13 wrote:
Except I'm not arguing everything is binary. Which, frankly, misrepresents my position so far as to be off topic.

I'm suggesting that, in this instance to try and argue that there is some sort of exception to the rights and wrongs of bringing an actor back from the dead based on how their likeness is used is a decidedly weak position to take.

Your own words were "the morality is that it either always is (with the blessing of any it might legitimately impact) or it never is" but it's off topic to ask why you assume this case must be a binary? I should have chosen my words better, but I am specifically asking why, in this case, is it a fact of that matter that it must either always be right or always wrong?

Voss basically channelled my answer for me. This isn't a question of right and wrong, in the grand sense, this is simply a question of acceptability. Is it ok to use dead people for the entertainment of the public?

If you're willing to suggest a non yes/no answer to that question that isn't just an arbitrary delineation, I'm willing to discuss it.

Voss wrote:
We don't need to be absolutist about it. But it is quite bizarre to take the contrary position: that the exact same thing is OK for one person and not OK for another, depending on who is getting digitized or what franchise they were in.

Dean is dead, Cushing is dead. Having either in a film is exactly equivalent, so 'Dean is wrong, but Cushing is OK' is pure cognitive dissonance.

No, the 'character' doesn't matter. No, Tarkin wasn't somehow necessary for Rogue One. White cloak guy was invented to be the manager of the death star project, and ghost Tarkin muddying up the plot with some upper level management shenanigans didn't make it better.

I'm not sure how you start by saying there is no need to be absolutist, then present an appeal to absolute morality. Do we need to, or not? Is it bizarre to consider that circumstances could indicate to us a differing moral outlook depending on their nature and composition? You seem to advocate that the answer is no. That is an absolute position, it is never moral. That is moral absolutism.

There is a value in something like a strict Kantian deontological paradigm, in certain cases, in certain respects. But in this one? I don't see it. Also, it should be noted that I never mentioned Cushing/Tarkin, because I believe the case to be different than with Fisher. Two, I already raised what I see as the plausible, though debatable, notion of implied consent. In fact, we "run" on implied consent all the time with respect to somethings, so it's not a bizarre notion. If you are injured and arrive at a hospital unconscious, they take on implied consent that they can work on you, probably invasively, to save your life. You can't consent in that case and they can't know if you would want them to save you or not, yet, there is a standing notion of implied consent.

Again, I do not make the case that Fisher and Cushing are A-OK cases. Rather, I only presented plausible reasons why they could be seen as such with the Dean case being "different." Again, the position was advanced that there was "difficult to object on a moral angle" and there I disagree. So, I made what I felt was a plausible case. You can disagree. Fair enough, but nothing presented so far tells me my case was implausible, even if it might still be objectionable or not.

 Mad Doc Grotsnik wrote:
Imagine Rogue One without Tarkin. And then, come a New Hope? Who is this guy?

He's the regional governor. We get that information at the start of ANH, just as we did before Rogue One existed.

Could they have told the same story without Tarkin?

Yup. There was nothing in Tarkin's role that required him to be physically present. He could have been present by hologram (which would have allowed them to fuzz it enough to use a lookalike, or remove the uncanny valley effect of his CGI-ness), or his role could have been filled by another Moff acting with his authority. And then right at the end of the movie, someone mentions that Governor Tarkin is on his way to assume direct control of the station. Done.

Keeping Fisher and Cushing's likenesses for the sake of continuity is one thing, especially in little bit parts.

This is like using John Wayne's computer generated avatar to make a new 'John Wayne' movie.

 H wrote:

Voss wrote:
We don't need to be absolutist about it. But it is quite bizarre to take the contrary position: that the exact same thing is OK for one person and not OK for another, depending on who is getting digitized or what franchise they were in.

Dean is dead, Cushing is dead. Having either in a film is exactly equivalent, so 'Dean is wrong, but Cushing is OK' is pure cognitive dissonance.

No, the 'character' doesn't matter. No, Tarkin wasn't somehow necessary for Rogue One. White cloak guy was invented to be the manager of the death star project, and ghost Tarkin muddying up the plot with some upper level management shenanigans didn't make it better.

I'm not sure how you start by saying there is no need to be absolutist, then present an appeal to absolute morality. <snip>

Yeah, no navel gazing. _I_ didn't make any appeal to absolute morality. I merely commented on the cognitive dissonance in holding different opinions about the same situation simply because the actors were different, or that Star Wars makes it OK, when it would be offensive otherwise- which is the premise of the thread, or at least the title. 'Ghoulish' seems an obvious moral judgement, but then Cushing comes up and it suddenly isn't.

I think there is a difference here between something like Cushing/Tarkin and what's being proposed. For me the difference is that the former is recreating a character that already exists while the latter is using a famous dead actor to create a whole new character for...reasons (mainly publicity, I suspect - and it worked!)

It seems quite reductionist from the producers to think you can boil an actor down to simply their likeness. A performance isn't just about a persons face or body or voice - it's a lot more than that, involving interpretation and specific choices. Also, where does it end? Let's say you're making a movie set in the early 60s and you need some female leads. Why bother hunting for decent actresses when you can just put a CGI likeness of Marilyn Monroe or Audrey Hepburn in there? While we're at it, why not make a few adjustments to their figures too, to make them more appealing to modern audiences?

It just seems so needless to me. Are there not enough decent actors out there to fill out the cast? Is a face more important than a performance?

I wonder if the eventual irony will be that its cheaper for hollywood to pay geeks a fortune to re-create dead actors than to pay new talent actors for big budget roles. Certainly the wages that some actors get are well into the realms of being utterly insane.

The Leia and Tarkin thing was a 'nice' way to finish off a prequel movie. The execution was a bit off, but the concept paid off.

Making a movie using the image of a dead actor is not the same. Neither Star Wars character or actor was billed on the posters/promotionals.

As has been said, the movie can probably do without James Dean, and some current actor could probably do a better job of it. But that way, they lose the James Dean branding. Is the movie so bad they need the name to make it work at all?

Voss wrote:
_I_ didn't make any appeal to absolute morality.

But you did. You said, fairly clearly:

"But it is quite bizarre to take the contrary position: that the exact same thing is OK for one person and not OK for another, depending on who is getting digitized or what franchise they were in.

Dean is dead, Cushing is dead. Having either in a film is exactly equivalent, so 'Dean is wrong, but Cushing is OK' is pure cognitive dissonance."

So, you say that the moral issue at hand is absolutely clear, dead is dead, there is no difference in either case. That is absolute, there is no situational consideration, no extenuating circumstance, nothing. Again, that is exactly what appealing to an absolute is. Your point is, it is absolutely morally wrong.

How else should I read your post? What part am I misunderstanding, because I can't find any other way to read what you said that does not have it be an appeal to absolute morality. You said quite plainly that dead is dead, it doesn't matter who, or how, or when, or for what, it's always wrong. How is this not an absolute?

Gotta go with Voss and Azrael on this one, it seems very strange to me to declare Hollywood is in the wrong for dragging a performer out of the grave but it's fine in Cushing's case because of a prior one time appearance in a particular franchise. That's an incredibly arbitrary line to draw in the sand.

It’s not though.

Peter Cushing’s likeness was used to recreate a character he portrayed.

James Dean’s likeness is being used ‘because reasons’.

Neither is exactly fine and dandy. But the latter is without reason or justification beyond ‘we want munneh’.

Now individuals are of course free to disagree. In the OP, I made it clear the use of Cushing and Fisher in this way is ghoulish to some.

But there is no ‘arbitrary distinction’. Just a distinction others don’t agree with.

Except Peter Cushing didn't just make a "one time appearance". How many toys, comic books, cartoons, etc., have used his likeness?
At one point does it stop being Cushing's likeness as Tarkin and instead becomes Tarkin just happens to look like Cushing? At what point is it the character's face and not the actor's?

I don't see what the big deal is.

 Mad Doc Grotsnik wrote:
Apparently with his estate’s blessing.

Is there a conversation beyond this point?

 Mad Doc Grotsnik wrote:
But there is no ‘arbitrary distinction’. Just a distinction others don’t agree with.

It is arbitrary. You haven't presented a reason why one is acceptable and the other isn't.

 H wrote:
How else should I read your post?

The correct way?

I don't know whether you're doing it on purpose or just by accident, but you are misrepresenting what Voss has been saying from the word go. Moreover, you're hung up about the moral absolutism when Voss has made it pretty clear that that's not the important part. Voss is saying that taking an absolutist position here is what doesn't make sense. That's what this:

"But it is quite bizarre to take the contrary position: that the exact same thing is OK for one person and not OK for another, depending on who is getting digitized or what franchise they were in."

... means.

 H wrote:
So, you say that the moral issue at hand is absolutely clear, dead is dead, there is no difference in either case. That is absolute, there is no situational consideration, no extenuating circumstance, nothing.

Because there aren't any extenuating circumstances. There is literally no difference between the two. That's not absolutism. That's just fact.

 H wrote:
Your point is, it is absolutely morally wrong.

Based on what metric? Your point seems more emotionally based than logically based.

Just the question of ‘but why?’

 Mad Doc Grotsnik wrote:
Just the question of ‘but why?’

Because money? Because publicity? Because nostalgia? Because genuine affection for the actor by the director/writer/producer/studio/whatever? All of the above.

What would it matter?

The Last Action Hero has a digital recreation of Humphrey Bogart in it. It's used as a sight gag. It was 1993. 26 years later (Jesus I'm getting old) we're doing it again.

The only people who get to have a say in this are the people in charge of his estate. They've said it's ok. That's as far as it goes.

I'd be quite interested if anyone should show me a distinction that could not subsequently be declared by some manner to be "arbitrary."

All judgement is arbitrary, unless there is some absolute ontic fount of judgement I am simply unaware of. I'm certainly not it and I can't imagine how anyone would they they are it either.

I think I did a pretty fair job making a case for a difference. To accuse me of cognitive dissonance smacks of the very same dissonance, presuming there is an absolute moral answer to the question and that is that.

So, you can say that MDG simply wants the cases to be different and only argues to this end, yet, the only case made is just the inverse, starting from the position that the cases must be the same, but with only the seeming evidence that all dead people are dead.

To me, at least MDG and I are making cases with what I can even find as arguments. The retrots aimed at us have only been to appeal to an absolute stance that all cases are the same because dead people are dead, ergo, nothing else applied to differentiate the cases.

Yet, I've provided at least one plausible reason why they might not be. And no one has even addressed it, to even point out why it would not be the case. I've asked for a reason why we should surmise that death is an absolute case that mitigates any other circumstance and situation and the only retort so far as been "I didn't appeal to an absolute."

If it's not, then what is it? If all cases of a dead actor are not absolutely equal and all uses not absolutely equal then what should we consider in each case?

No, the appeal made against me is to an absolute. That all cases are absolutely equal and that any attempt at distinction is mere "cognitive dissonance." Yet, nothing yet given has even the appearance of a substantive claim as to why this would be the case, despite me asking.

If there is a substantive claim which has been made as to why all cases are the same and why there is an absolute morality attached to them, then I profusely apologize and would ask that it be made again for my consideration.

In the meantime, I remain unswayed by what I can only see as claims to an absolute with no justification besides an absolute claim with no seeming justification.

How far does current IP law go to cover a performer? Is it just thier likeness, their famous roles, etc? I don;t think it covers any of that.

What is to stop Hollywood from making such a film WITHOUT the consent of their estate?

I honestly do not know.

 H.B.M.C. wrote:
Because there aren't any extenuating circumstances. There is literally no difference between the two. That's not absolutism. That's just fact.

I hardly see this to be the case. That is an absolute. I already pointed out a reason why the cases could be seen as not equivalent. You might not like it, you might not accept it, but it still is. It seems to me that you think this is a case of a fact of the matter. It's not, it's a case of the interpretation of the matter.

 H.B.M.C. wrote:

 H wrote:
Your point is, it is absolutely morally wrong.

Based on what metric? Your point seems more emotionally based than logically based.

There is no metric. I didn't appeal to an absolute, Voss did, by stating that all cases are absolutely the same. Sure, the word absolute wasn't used as such, but it is still an absolute.

There is no emotion in my case. I am not sure where you see it would enter. Here is the "logic."

Voss says:
All Xes are Ys. Since all Xes are wrong, all Ys are wrong.

That is an absolute. Absolute in that X=Y and in that "all Xes are wrong."

I asked why should we consider that either is the case? To which the only reply seems to be that all dead people are dead. I simply don't see how or why that proves that X=Y or that all Xes are wrong.

Indeed, it seems more the case that Voss, et. al, are making the emotional argument, based on the assertion without seemingly sufficient evidence that all cases are the same and that all cases are wrong.

Circumstances and situations do deem some actions morally acceptable where they would not be in others. Consider killing someone in self defense. Is killing OK? No. Is killing someone who is trying to kill you OK? We have to consider the circumstance and situation. Are we to deny the some cases of killing are different than others? Killing is not an absolute. Neither is using the likeness of a dead actor.

So again, I'm sorry that I don't accept the appeal to the absolute equality of cases, nor an absolute morality attached to them, since I see no evidence as to why I should.

Morality is in the eye of the beholder.

No one has presented a reason why this shouldn't be done outside of arbitrary "This is fine, but this isn't" comparisons.

Besides, we don't have to show there isn't a distinction (can't prove a negative). It's you, H, and Grotsnik arguing that there is a difference. Burden of proof is on you.

H wrote:Indeed, it seems more the case that Voss, et. al, are making the emotional argument, based on the assertion without seemingly sufficient evidence that all cases are the same and that all cases are wrong.

You need to read what people actually write, not fill in non-existent blanks. I never claimed that it was wrong (I honestly don't care what people do with meat puppets after they're rotting) - just that Grotsnik's 'its morally wrong in _this_ instance but fine in _that_ instance was inconsistent.

You're arguing nonsense with a position I didn't take. If you want to argue with phantoms, feel free, but stop referencing me when you do it.

H wrote:Voss says:
All Xes are Ys. Since all Xes are wrong, all Ys are wrong.

Yeah, no. Never said that. Never said ANYTHING like that.
I said this:

We don't need to be absolutist about it. But it is quite bizarre to take the contrary position: that the exact same thing is OK for one person and not OK for another, depending on who is getting digitized or what franchise they were in.

Don't make me your personal strawman.

 H.B.M.C. wrote:
Morality is in the eye of the beholder.

No one has presented a reason why this shouldn't be done outside of arbitrary "This is fine, but this isn't" comparisons.

Besides, we don't have to show there isn't a distinction (can't prove a negative). It's you, H, and Grotsnik arguing that there is a difference. Burden of proof is on you.

My stance was not arbitrary any more so than yours is. I made the case a page ago that one could argue a notion of "implied consent" and MDG made the point, more so, that while it might be moral, there are notions related to the cases that are more or less distasteful. Ergo, that the cases can be seen as not equal.

Yet, it's persisted that, although we presented these notions that our points are not actual reasons. They are reasons and we have reasoned them. They are no more arbitrary than the counter point that they are simply equal. Why is my notion of implied consent not a reason? Why is it, in your estimation, "emotional" and "arbitrary?" If it is, then I will certainly reconsider it. You might not like it. You might not accept it. You might feel it doesn't apply. Yet, no one has made any case as to how or why it does not. Again, only a blanket absolutist case is made for no distinction on the basis of a tautological "all dead people are dead" basis. Sorry that I simply can't take that too seriously.

So, yes, my point is that an action can be more or less moral, more or less distasteful based on who does them, when they do them and why they did them. If you want an absolutist position, make the case for it. I've already made the case against it several times, but no one wants to accept the questions I am asking, only to double down that "there are no distinctions" despite examples of distinction I have offered, or clear cases where the argument that the morality of an action does seem to depend on who does it and why. But again, feel free to ignore that issue and simply assert that I have made no case.


Automatically Appended Next Post:

Voss wrote:

We don't need to be absolutist about it. But it is quite bizarre to take the contrary position: that the exact same thing is OK for one person and not OK for another, depending on who is getting digitized or what franchise they were in.

Don't make me your personal strawman.

So, "the exact same thing" is not a statement of equality? Again, two cases presented, Cushing and Dean, you say they are the "exact same thing." This is not akin to X=Y, or if you like it better X=X? Please explain how so, because I have no idea how to read "the exact same thing" as meaning anything but a statement about equality.

The point at hand we were making that they are specifically not "the exact same thing." I have no idea why you assert that we have different, incongruent moral views on "the exact same thing." Our entire point is that a case can be made how they are not the same thing. How am I strawmanning you, in this case?

So now we're on to two different things?

What you phrased as my "absolutionist" argument was either you're ok with it or not, and that any further rationalisation is arbitrary.

Now you're saying Voss is being absolutionist because he's drawing parity between the Dean and Cushing examples?

These are different stances, and you need to be clear on what basis you're arguing.


Automatically Appended Next Post:
Oh, and for extra credit, you can make clear how writing a movie with the express purpose of using a dead actor and writing a move with the inclusion of a character portrayed by a dead actor, choosing to include the character despite there being no narrative imperative to do so, and then choosing to digitally resurrect them over other possibilities is sufficiently different to warrant a coherent logical difference rather than simply an arbitrary line based on somebody's personal lines in the sand.

 Azreal13 wrote:
So now we're on to two different things?

What you phrased as my "absolutionist" argument was either you're ok with it or not, and that any further rationalisation is arbitrary.

Now you're saying Voss is being absolutionist because he's drawing parity between the Dean and Cushing examples?

These are different stances, and you need to be clear on what basis you're arguing.

No, the equity statement is just the first step on the way to an absolute morality.

Because if all cases are equal, then what applies to one case absolutely applies to the other.

Also, it was not drawing a parallel. It was said they are "exactly the same." That is a parallel?

Furthermore, you said, "If you're willing to suggest a non yes/no answer to that question that isn't just an arbitrary delineation, I'm willing to discuss it." That is exactly what I am suggesting, that there is no binary yes or no answer. Yet, it's persisted that all the cases presented here are equal and that it's morally incongruous to suggest they might not be. If all cases are equal, then all cases are equally moral or not and that is absolutist. I am arguing against that.

I, and MDG, are saying that the cases are not equal and again, I've pointed out how and why one can make that case. Yet, still, it has persisted that I am not making any case. However, no one else has made anything besides the assertion that all cases here are equal based on, well, I don't know. That is arbitrary. The notion I presented about implied consent is not arbitrary as far as I can tell.

I agree they're not equal, what I'm saying is that they're so incredibly similar that drawing one's personal line at that precise point between them is a very odd, and arbitrary, place to put that line.

 Azreal13 wrote:
I agree they're not equal, what I'm saying is that they're so incredibly similar that drawing one's personal line at that precise point between them is a very odd, and arbitrary, place to put that line.

All I can say, is that I disagree. I think they are indeed subtle differences, but those subtle differences are crucial differences in making something either tasteful or distasteful, or more or less so.

Again, there is a huge difference in, say, using someone likeness, like Fisher, to "complete" something they were involved in and, say, using deep-fakes to put her in sexually explicit media, for example.

To MDG's point, I do think there is something very different, again, in using someone in a work "akin" to something they worked in, rather than in something they had nothing on which to even vaguely base a notion of consent. Not to mention the questionable nature of the efforts. Again, one could evoke (rightly or not) a notion of "completeness" in allowing Fisher to "complete" the role she had started. That at least has the air, to me, something at least superficially moral. Where, to me, doing it simply to generate controversy, or to capitalize monetarily on someone's likeness where they could not consent, is much more distasteful.

I find Cushing, Fisher and Dean's cases to all be distasteful, but certainly not equally so. And I do not find them to be morally equivalent, as such. If you want to call my "reasoning" arbitrary, well, I can't stop you. But if that is egregiously arbitrary to you, on what should we base moral judgement, in your opinion? Is it an empirical science? What objective morality can we rely on, in this case?

 Easy E wrote:

Yes, except middle managers are often the ones making the decisions on who and what to automate and therefore get to insulate themselves a bit.

Where the big money is involved, upper management/shareholders ALWAYS make the decisions.


Automatically Appended Next Post:
In the case of Tarkin and Leia, they should have just found actors that looked similar. Audiences 'get it'. People die. I'd rather get a living replacement that's on screen for lots of time than an obviously CGI'd person that's on screen for half a minute.

Soap operas have been replacing actors for decades without issue. Either don't use a character or find someone new to play it, CGI isn't going to give you the spontaneous moments that make great film.

 John Prins wrote:

 Easy E wrote:

Yes, except middle managers are often the ones making the decisions on who and what to automate and therefore get to insulate themselves a bit.

Where the big money is involved, upper management/shareholders ALWAYS make the decisions.


Automatically Appended Next Post:
In the case of Tarkin and Leia, they should have just found actors that looked similar. Audiences 'get it'. People die. I'd rather get a living replacement that's on screen for lots of time than an obviously CGI'd person that's on screen for half a minute.

Soap operas have been replacing actors for decades without issue. Either don't use a character or find someone new to play it, CGI isn't going to give you the spontaneous moments that make great film.

I can concur, as the only reason to bring back JD for an arbitrary movie is a greed issue, But, the world is full of stuff that someone will do/sell if they can make a nickel and really should not do it.

 H wrote:

 Azreal13 wrote:
I agree they're not equal, what I'm saying is that they're so incredibly similar that drawing one's personal line at that precise point between them is a very odd, and arbitrary, place to put that line.

All I can say, is that I disagree. I think they are indeed subtle differences, but those subtle differences are crucial differences in making something either tasteful or distasteful, or more or less so.

Again, there is a huge difference in, say, using someone likeness, like Fisher, to "complete" something they were involved in and, say, using deep-fakes to put her in sexually explicit media, for example.

Yes, that's a huge difference. If we were discussing a scenario that distinct, you'd have fewer people disagree I'm sure. The case in point (Cushing v Dean, Fisher is a red herring as her circumstances are, at time of writing, not the least similar) is not very different at all. If you think those minute differences make a difference then that's fine, I have never once challenged anyone's right to hold their opinion, simply questioned the reasoning as to where they landed. Nobody, you included, has provided me anything like what feels like a sound reasoning for why one (Dean) is sufficiently more unappealing that it crosses the line that Cushing doesn't. But then, that's the nature of arbitrary isn't it?

To MDG's point, I do think there is something very different, again, in using someone in a work "akin" to something they worked in, rather than in something they had nothing on which to even vaguely base a notion of consent. Not to mention the questionable nature of the efforts. Again, one could evoke (rightly or not) a notion of "completeness" in allowing Fisher to "complete" the role she had started. That at least has the air, to me, something at least superficially moral. Where, to me, doing it simply to generate controversy, or to capitalize monetarily on someone's likeness where they could not consent, is much more distasteful.

Again, using existing footage in a movie I'm sure she'd already signed a contract for is nowhere near the same situation. De-ageing a living actress who is able to consent is not the same thing.

I find Cushing, Fisher and Dean's cases to all be distasteful, but certainly not equally so. And I do not find them to be morally equivalent, as such. If you want to call my "reasoning" arbitrary, well, I can't stop you. But if that is egregiously arbitrary to you, on what should we base moral judgement, in your opinion? Is it an empirical science? What objective morality can we rely on, in this case?

There is no objective morality, but there is a binary yes/no answer to the question "do you think dead people should be digitally resurrected for the entertainment of the general public?" You can apply caveats to the "yes" but it is still yes or no, and those caveats are going to be entirely personal and hence arbitrary.

Ultimately, what's the morale difference between an actor playing a dead person, and CGI'ing a dead person? Or animating a dead person? We do these things all the time without much comment, not sure why bringing Dean back in such a manner would cross a red line.

While the extent in new, the concept has been in use since a Diet Coke ad in 1991. If not longer.




Really the onus is on us the audience not to support this stuff.

At least until someone uses 18 year old Jane Fonda in a series of Barbarella sequels.