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It is an amazing story, and we must always remember the blood of the Soviet people that was shed.

It is terrible that so much of the blood was down to Stalin's incompetence and butchery of the officer class.

I'll check out the Edgerton book. In the meantime, I have to say Vasily Grossman's Life and Fate is the most amazing novel of the Soviet experience, all based on his life as a war correspondent. Quite possibly the greatest novel of the last century, written as a modern version of War and Peace and quite possibly its superior. How it actually got published is an amazing story too.

I think there are a lot of scenarios where the Germans could have captured Moscow. However, it's worth remembering that Napoleon succeeded in capturing Moscow, and it didn't do him any good. I think Hitler would have studied the Napoleonic wars (being an admirer of Napoleon), which might be why he didn't commit to an all-out drive toward Moscow when he had the opportunity.

Enemy at the Gates
Kusk (I think both are by Glantz)

Zaloga has excellent more university level works comparing Soviet and German armor and TO & Es.
I would recommend Companion To the Red Army, Top Tanks of World War II, and King Tiger vs. IS2 all from Zaloga

 Do_I_Not_Like_That wrote:
I was going to post a thread on this very subject, but you beat me too it.

Two questions I was going to focus on:

1. Could Barbarossa have succeeded?

Personally, I don't think so at all. Russia's landmass, raw mass in the military and industrial fields and the sheer scale of the task presented to the Nazis rendered the whole thing an exercise in futility. Even with the best gear, the best laid plans, the best intelligence and no need to divert troops and resources anywhere else, it still would have been an impossible aim.

On the other hand, it absolutely could have gone far better for the Germans than it did in reality. The whole operation lacked any clear war aim, beyond wiping the USSR as an entity, and even the military objectives were muddled beyond belief. Three targets at once undermined any advantage of blitzkrieg as the Wehrmacht was spread far too thinly, capturing Moscow or Leningrad or even Stalingrad would do very little to destabilise Russia politically or physically, and throughout the campaign this problem onlygot worse, Hitler letting his ideological priorities get in the way of conducting an effective war. His unwillingness to listen to the generals telling him how unsound these plans were exacerbated what was already an insurmountable task. Combine that with poorly managed resources, lack of preparation for the climate and environment, and it's easy to see why it all well apart.

Credit must also be given to the Red Army, though their initial losses were immense and they spent a few months very much on the back foot, when they did manage to rally some kind of organised counterattack as early as September 41 they did it damn well. David M. Glantz has written a lot on this, well worth checking out for a somewhat different perspective; the failure of the attack was as much in what the Red Army did right as what the Wehrmacht did wrong.

 Paradigm wrote:

 Do_I_Not_Like_That wrote:
I was going to post a thread on this very subject, but you beat me too it.

Two questions I was going to focus on:

1. Could Barbarossa have succeeded?

Personally, I don't think so at all. Russia's landmass, raw mass in the military and industrial fields and the sheer scale of the task presented to the Nazis rendered the whole thing an exercise in futility. Even with the best gear, the best laid plans, the best intelligence and no need to divert troops and resources anywhere else, it still would have been an impossible aim.

On the other hand, it absolutely could have gone far better for the Germans than it did in reality. The whole operation lacked any clear war aim, beyond wiping the USSR as an entity, and even the military objectives were muddled beyond belief. Three targets at once undermined any advantage of blitzkrieg as the Wehrmacht was spread far too thinly, capturing Moscow or Leningrad or even Stalingrad would do very little to destabilise Russia politically or physically, and throughout the campaign this problem onlygot worse, Hitler letting his ideological priorities get in the way of conducting an effective war. His unwillingness to listen to the generals telling him how unsound these plans were exacerbated what was already an insurmountable task. Combine that with poorly managed resources, lack of preparation for the climate and environment, and it's easy to see why it all well apart.

Credit must also be given to the Red Army, though their initial losses were immense and they spent a few months very much on the back foot, when they did manage to rally some kind of organised counterattack as early as September 41 they did it damn well. David M. Glantz has written a lot on this, well worth checking out for a somewhat different perspective; the failure of the attack was as much in what the Red Army did right as what the Wehrmacht did wrong.

For many people, Barbarossa's success is judged on the destruction of the Soviet Union. But Germany could have inflicted a major blow, and negotiated a very good treaty with Russia, just like what they did in 1917 with Brest-Litovsk.

Germany didn't have to take out the USSR for Barbarossa to be a success. Bismarck would have known when to stop...

 Do_I_Not_Like_That wrote:

Spoiler:

 Paradigm wrote:

 Do_I_Not_Like_That wrote:
I was going to post a thread on this very subject, but you beat me too it.

Two questions I was going to focus on:

1. Could Barbarossa have succeeded?

Personally, I don't think so at all. Russia's landmass, raw mass in the military and industrial fields and the sheer scale of the task presented to the Nazis rendered the whole thing an exercise in futility. Even with the best gear, the best laid plans, the best intelligence and no need to divert troops and resources anywhere else, it still would have been an impossible aim.

On the other hand, it absolutely could have gone far better for the Germans than it did in reality. The whole operation lacked any clear war aim, beyond wiping the USSR as an entity, and even the military objectives were muddled beyond belief. Three targets at once undermined any advantage of blitzkrieg as the Wehrmacht was spread far too thinly, capturing Moscow or Leningrad or even Stalingrad would do very little to destabilise Russia politically or physically, and throughout the campaign this problem onlygot worse, Hitler letting his ideological priorities get in the way of conducting an effective war. His unwillingness to listen to the generals telling him how unsound these plans were exacerbated what was already an insurmountable task. Combine that with poorly managed resources, lack of preparation for the climate and environment, and it's easy to see why it all well apart.

Credit must also be given to the Red Army, though their initial losses were immense and they spent a few months very much on the back foot, when they did manage to rally some kind of organised counterattack as early as September 41 they did it damn well. David M. Glantz has written a lot on this, well worth checking out for a somewhat different perspective; the failure of the attack was as much in what the Red Army did right as what the Wehrmacht did wrong.

[spoiler]

For many people, Barbarossa's success is judged on the destruction of the Soviet Union. But Germany could have inflicted a major blow, and negotiated a very good treaty with Russia, just like what they did in 1917 with Brest-Litovsk.

Germany didn't have to take out the USSR for Barbarossa to be a success. Bismarck would have known when to stop...

In Bismark's time, I'd agree. But I don't see any situation in which a) Stalin would be open to negotiating with the Nazis and b) Hitler would accept anything less than the total annihilation of the Slavic people and the communists. The war on the Eastern Front was 100% ideological in character, there was never going to be surrender on either side. You see that at Stalingrad, where the Russians hold the line despite everything, you see that in Berlin when Hitler orders every man able to carry a gun into the front line rather than contemplate surrender.

Hitler was no Bismark!

I read an interesting book on WWII what ifs several years ago. I'll have to see if I can dig it up.

WW2 "what ifs" are always entertaining.

If Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan had not signed a treaty, and therefore Germany not declared war on the US, how would the war have gone differently?
Would the US still have entered in to the Lend-Lease treaty with their mortal enemy, the Communists had they not had a mutual foe in Nazi Germany?

I always wondered why Britain and France declared war over Germany's invasion of Poland, but not on the USSR? After all they invaded the other half.

 Paradigm wrote:

 Do_I_Not_Like_That wrote:

Spoiler:

 Paradigm wrote:

 Do_I_Not_Like_That wrote:
I was going to post a thread on this very subject, but you beat me too it.

Two questions I was going to focus on:

1. Could Barbarossa have succeeded?

Personally, I don't think so at all. Russia's landmass, raw mass in the military and industrial fields and the sheer scale of the task presented to the Nazis rendered the whole thing an exercise in futility. Even with the best gear, the best laid plans, the best intelligence and no need to divert troops and resources anywhere else, it still would have been an impossible aim.

On the other hand, it absolutely could have gone far better for the Germans than it did in reality. The whole operation lacked any clear war aim, beyond wiping the USSR as an entity, and even the military objectives were muddled beyond belief. Three targets at once undermined any advantage of blitzkrieg as the Wehrmacht was spread far too thinly, capturing Moscow or Leningrad or even Stalingrad would do very little to destabilise Russia politically or physically, and throughout the campaign this problem onlygot worse, Hitler letting his ideological priorities get in the way of conducting an effective war. His unwillingness to listen to the generals telling him how unsound these plans were exacerbated what was already an insurmountable task. Combine that with poorly managed resources, lack of preparation for the climate and environment, and it's easy to see why it all well apart.

Credit must also be given to the Red Army, though their initial losses were immense and they spent a few months very much on the back foot, when they did manage to rally some kind of organised counterattack as early as September 41 they did it damn well. David M. Glantz has written a lot on this, well worth checking out for a somewhat different perspective; the failure of the attack was as much in what the Red Army did right as what the Wehrmacht did wrong.

[spoiler]

For many people, Barbarossa's success is judged on the destruction of the Soviet Union. But Germany could have inflicted a major blow, and negotiated a very good treaty with Russia, just like what they did in 1917 with Brest-Litovsk.

Germany didn't have to take out the USSR for Barbarossa to be a success. Bismarck would have known when to stop...

In Bismark's time, I'd agree. But I don't see any situation in which a) Stalin would be open to negotiating with the Nazis and b) Hitler would accept anything less than the total annihilation of the Slavic people and the communists. The war on the Eastern Front was 100% ideological in character, there was never going to be surrender on either side. You see that at Stalingrad, where the Russians hold the line despite everything, you see that in Berlin when Hitler orders every man able to carry a gun into the front line rather than contemplate surrender.

If the Germans had held on in the East in 1943/44, you might have seen an uneasy peace between Germany and the USSR - the Soviet man power shortage was becoming a big problem by then.

 Frazzled wrote:
I always wondered why Britain and France declared war over Germany's invasion of Poland, but not on the USSR? After all they invaded the other half.

I don't recall exactly, but the USSR might have been in there under the guise of a "police action" or some such ruse.

 feeder wrote:
WW2 "what ifs" are always entertaining.

If Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan had not signed a treaty, and therefore Germany not declared war on the US, how would the war have gone differently?
Would the US still have entered in to the Lend-Lease treaty with their mortal enemy, the Communists had they not had a mutual foe in Nazi Germany?

Lend-Lease would still probably have happened as a) money talks, and b) American industry booming was good for America. That kind of thing wins elections


Automatically Appended Next Post:

 Frazzled wrote:
I always wondered why Britain and France declared war over Germany's invasion of Poland, but not on the USSR? After all they invaded the other half.[/quote

Germany invaded on the 1st.

Britain and France declared war on the 3rd.

The Soviets sneaked in on the 20th or something...

Why did they not declare war on the 21st then?

 Frazzled wrote:
Why did they not declare war on the 21st then?

Interesting reading on the subject

As usual, it was politics.

 Do_I_Not_Like_That wrote:
I was going to post a thread on this very subject, but you beat me too it.
Two questions I was going to focus on:

1. Could Barbarossa have succeeded?

 Pete Melvin wrote:
1: Maybe. If the plan had been a little less schizophrenic and stuck to one thing at a time.

It also started much later than was intended, since the Germans were distracted by the fighting in the Balkans. They might have taken Moscow otherwise.
The USSR was a BIG place however, and realistically the sheer number of men and material that the Soviets could call on was almost certainly going to overwhelm the Germans, it might just have taken a little longer.
Hitler was in total denial about this, when Guderian told him during the planning for Barbarossa that the Soviets had thousands of tanks available to them he didn't want to hear it..

Alternate view:

Yes. Attacking the Soviet Union was not Hitlers 'big mistake', his 'big mistake' was how he attacked the Soviet Union. The alliance with Stalin would not have lasted, had the Nazis not invaded then the sneak attack would have come from the other direction in 1942-3 after the Soviets had reorganised. The concessions Stalin could get from Roosevelt to change sides would well exceed any sweeteners he could get from the Third Reich. This assumes the USA is in the war at the time, which is an unfair level of hindsight for May 1941.

1941 was the correct time to attack. Stalin had ordered another round of army purges based on false intel provided by the Abwehr, the failures on the Finnish campaign and his own paranoia.
Guderians plan was sound however it was interfered with twice by Hitler. First to demand the central attack towards Moscow split to head towards Lweningrad and Stalingrad also and second time when Hitler reversed his decision. His meddling ensured that none of the three targets was achievable before winter.

The other main mistake was allowing the Gestapo to follow the main army. Many Russians saw the Nazis as potential liberators they were alrerady sick of Stalin, with good reason. Had Hitler and his cronies not been ideologically opposed to the Russians as a people they could have not interfered when the more level headed Wehrmacht commanders saw the Russian citzenry, and a large part of its soldiery as potential allies.
This was a double whammy as nobody hold ground like a Russian when his balls are nailed to the floor.

Had Guderian got his way with the handling of the local populace and on the invasion timetable the Germans would have reached Moscow before winter (they did anyway) but with full force of support and time to surround Moscow before the far east divisions could be sent to reinforce. It was primarily the Siberians, not the Russians who defended Moscow in 1941. Had MNoscow been besieged yes the Sioviets would have rerlocated west, but it would have been enough. A Nazi backed popular uprising. particularly in the Ukraine and Baltic states would have occurred. A Nazi allied 'White Russian' republic with Moscow as its capital would have formed and the Soviets would collapse under the baggage of their own brutality. As Moscow is the capital and would be titularly under Russian control it would have had opportunity to recruit for the civil war that followed. Soviets vs Third Reich is one bad logistical scenario, rump Soviets vs Third Reich with White Russian government forces is a completely different picture.

Essentially it was Hitlers fault Barbarossa didnt succeed. Just as well really, the Nazis managed to hold several allies to heel in eastetn Europe. Had Russia been amongst their number the Feurer would have had a good chance of achieving his dreams of global supremacy.

As for canceling Barbarossa to aid in the desert. Had Rommel been reinforced by one light armoured division, a lot of materiel but fairly light compared to the rest of the commitments for Barbarossa, Rommel would have had more than enough to reach the Suez. Barbarossa and the desert campaign were on completely different scales, and though they knew it not the German light armour would have been far more useful in the desert than in Russia, as the Germans found out at Tolochino. Though the Germans could be forgiven for not anticipating the (potential) capabilities of the T-34.

The only failing I place at the Wehrmacht itself is its overreliance on publically avialable maps of the Sioviet Union. Inside the Soviet Union travel was primarily be rail, or air for the party elite. Emphasis of rail travel over road helped cement a centralised state and crushed individualism. Cares mostly existed only for within modern cities. Now the main roads marked on Soviet maps were marked for importance of direction, not for state of road. Main roads were marked in red such as the Smolensk to Moscow highway. This was in actuality a single lane dirt track, and was intended for local transportation. Even so a single dirt track is sufficient if the logistical support was tracked. Germans did have tracked logistical vehicles, but they wre not concentrated enough to support the invasion because the generals believed that the thick red line roads marked were two lane highways and thus ideal for wheeled transport.
Efforts were made to rectify this, but too little too late. Had proper intel been sourced on the lay of the land this could have been anticipated and prepared for.

2. Was the war really won or lost on the Eastern Front?

It was fashionable for years to focus on Britain and America, because of the Cold War, then the wall came done, and the theme became Russia won the war, but now, having read new WW2 history, I'm not so sure if the Russians won it alone...

Take D-Day for example and the campaign in France during June/July/August 1944.

I was looking at the stats for how much damage and casualties the Allies inflicted on Germany during the Normandy campaign, and it's astonishing. Nearly 60 German divisions wiped out, and an entire theatre of German operations removed from the map, as they were chased back to Germany.

And the Allies did this with 30 divisions...

It wouldn't have taken until 1948. The western formations were demonstrably weaker than the European formations.

Besides if Germany and Britain are still at war in 1944-1945 and these forces are removed, then whats to keep the Union Jack from retaking Western Europe, thus with the same result?

 Frazzled wrote:
It wouldn't have taken until 1948. The western formations were demonstrably weaker than the European formations.

Besides if Germany and Britain are still at war in 1944-1945 and these forces are removed, then whats to keep the Union Jack from retaking Western Europe, thus with the same result?

Reminds me of operation unthinkable...

 Paradigm wrote:

 Do_I_Not_Like_That wrote:

Spoiler:

 Paradigm wrote:

 Do_I_Not_Like_That wrote:
I was going to post a thread on this very subject, but you beat me too it.

Two questions I was going to focus on:

1. Could Barbarossa have succeeded?

Personally, I don't think so at all. Russia's landmass, raw mass in the military and industrial fields and the sheer scale of the task presented to the Nazis rendered the whole thing an exercise in futility. Even with the best gear, the best laid plans, the best intelligence and no need to divert troops and resources anywhere else, it still would have been an impossible aim.

On the other hand, it absolutely could have gone far better for the Germans than it did in reality. The whole operation lacked any clear war aim, beyond wiping the USSR as an entity, and even the military objectives were muddled beyond belief. Three targets at once undermined any advantage of blitzkrieg as the Wehrmacht was spread far too thinly, capturing Moscow or Leningrad or even Stalingrad would do very little to destabilise Russia politically or physically, and throughout the campaign this problem onlygot worse, Hitler letting his ideological priorities get in the way of conducting an effective war. His unwillingness to listen to the generals telling him how unsound these plans were exacerbated what was already an insurmountable task. Combine that with poorly managed resources, lack of preparation for the climate and environment, and it's easy to see why it all well apart.

Credit must also be given to the Red Army, though their initial losses were immense and they spent a few months very much on the back foot, when they did manage to rally some kind of organised counterattack as early as September 41 they did it damn well. David M. Glantz has written a lot on this, well worth checking out for a somewhat different perspective; the failure of the attack was as much in what the Red Army did right as what the Wehrmacht did wrong.

[spoiler]

For many people, Barbarossa's success is judged on the destruction of the Soviet Union. But Germany could have inflicted a major blow, and negotiated a very good treaty with Russia, just like what they did in 1917 with Brest-Litovsk.

Germany didn't have to take out the USSR for Barbarossa to be a success. Bismarck would have known when to stop...

In Bismark's time, I'd agree. But I don't see any situation in which a) Stalin would be open to negotiating with the Nazis and b) Hitler would accept anything less than the total annihilation of the Slavic people and the communists. The war on the Eastern Front was 100% ideological in character, there was never going to be surrender on either side. You see that at Stalingrad, where the Russians hold the line despite everything, you see that in Berlin when Hitler orders every man able to carry a gun into the front line rather than contemplate surrender.

Stalingrad showed how much names mattered. It was Stalins city. To Hitler a big red flag.
Both fought a titanic battle over the very concept of the war. Stratigic but the name. The name mattered as a symbol of defying the enemy, holding the line.

Any price would e paid to win. The Soviet defence was nothing short of heroic.


Automatically Appended Next Post:

 djones520 wrote:

 LordofHats wrote:
The Panzer Lehr division also took a lot of damage from the Allied bombings that came right before the invasion, and Hitler set them further back than the chief coordinator of Normandy's defense, Rommel, wanted. Those two factors combined to make the German armored divisions in France unable to prevent the formation of an Allied beachhead.

It's very arguable if they would have done any good being closer any ways. The threat of naval bombardment was even worse then aerial.

Even a destroyer could land 5 inch miles inland. And that's smaller on list.
Cruisers 8 inch further
Battleships up to 20km + with main artillery. And they only need a near hit.

All of those could destroy a tank.

 jhe90 wrote:

 Paradigm wrote:

 Do_I_Not_Like_That wrote:

Spoiler:

 Paradigm wrote:

 Do_I_Not_Like_That wrote:
I was going to post a thread on this very subject, but you beat me too it.

Two questions I was going to focus on:

1. Could Barbarossa have succeeded?

Personally, I don't think so at all. Russia's landmass, raw mass in the military and industrial fields and the sheer scale of the task presented to the Nazis rendered the whole thing an exercise in futility. Even with the best gear, the best laid plans, the best intelligence and no need to divert troops and resources anywhere else, it still would have been an impossible aim.

On the other hand, it absolutely could have gone far better for the Germans than it did in reality. The whole operation lacked any clear war aim, beyond wiping the USSR as an entity, and even the military objectives were muddled beyond belief. Three targets at once undermined any advantage of blitzkrieg as the Wehrmacht was spread far too thinly, capturing Moscow or Leningrad or even Stalingrad would do very little to destabilise Russia politically or physically, and throughout the campaign this problem onlygot worse, Hitler letting his ideological priorities get in the way of conducting an effective war. His unwillingness to listen to the generals telling him how unsound these plans were exacerbated what was already an insurmountable task. Combine that with poorly managed resources, lack of preparation for the climate and environment, and it's easy to see why it all well apart.

Credit must also be given to the Red Army, though their initial losses were immense and they spent a few months very much on the back foot, when they did manage to rally some kind of organised counterattack as early as September 41 they did it damn well. David M. Glantz has written a lot on this, well worth checking out for a somewhat different perspective; the failure of the attack was as much in what the Red Army did right as what the Wehrmacht did wrong.

[spoiler]

For many people, Barbarossa's success is judged on the destruction of the Soviet Union. But Germany could have inflicted a major blow, and negotiated a very good treaty with Russia, just like what they did in 1917 with Brest-Litovsk.

Germany didn't have to take out the USSR for Barbarossa to be a success. Bismarck would have known when to stop...

In Bismark's time, I'd agree. But I don't see any situation in which a) Stalin would be open to negotiating with the Nazis and b) Hitler would accept anything less than the total annihilation of the Slavic people and the communists. The war on the Eastern Front was 100% ideological in character, there was never going to be surrender on either side. You see that at Stalingrad, where the Russians hold the line despite everything, you see that in Berlin when Hitler orders every man able to carry a gun into the front line rather than contemplate surrender.

Stalingrad showed how much names mattered. It was Stalins city. To Hitler a big red flag.
Both fought a titanic battle over the very concept of the war. Stratigic but the name. The name mattered as a symbol of defying the enemy, holding the line.

Any price would e paid to win. The Soviet defence was nothing short of heroic.


Automatically Appended Next Post:

 djones520 wrote:

 LordofHats wrote:
The Panzer Lehr division also took a lot of damage from the Allied bombings that came right before the invasion, and Hitler set them further back than the chief coordinator of Normandy's defense, Rommel, wanted. Those two factors combined to make the German armored divisions in France unable to prevent the formation of an Allied beachhead.

It's very arguable if they would have done any good being closer any ways. The threat of naval bombardment was even worse then aerial.

Even a destroyer could land 5 inch miles inland. And that's smaller on list.
Cruisers 8 inch further
Battleships up to 20km + with main artillery. And they only need a near hit.

All of those could destroy a tank.

Not really, Destroyers were firing 130mm shells max, a 130mm HE shell isn't going to knock out a tank without a direct hit.

Some UK destroyers packed up to 4.7 inch gun turrets.

Tribal class.

 jhe90 wrote:
Some UK destroyers packed up to 4.7 inch gun turrets.

Tribal class.

That is actually smaller than 130mm :p

 welshhoppo wrote:

 jhe90 wrote:
Some UK destroyers packed up to 4.7 inch gun turrets.

Tribal class.

That is actually smaller than 130mm :p

Ok. 120mm I think. But the gun could still lay down a rapid barrage. Was powerful and even uf not the tank. Shread any support trucks or light armour.

With a good gun crew it was fast, duel mounted too. Good naval guns can fire very fast and accurate when needed.

 jhe90 wrote:

 welshhoppo wrote:

 jhe90 wrote:
Some UK destroyers packed up to 4.7 inch gun turrets.

Tribal class.

That is actually smaller than 130mm :p

Ok. 120mm I think. But the gun could still lay down a rapid barrage. Was powerful and even uf not the tank. Shread any support trucks or light armour.

With a good gun crew it was fast, duel mounted too. Good naval guns can fire very fast and accurate when needed.

Accurate at a moving target at over 5km range on land is a bit of an overstatement.

A direct hit would feth up anything except a tiger or heavier though thinking about it. Maybe not destroy it utterly but either knock out it's turret, tracks or just give everyone inside a massive concussion depending on where the shell hit.

Then again, russians did try putting naval guns on tanks...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SU-100Y_Self-Propelled_Gun

Destroyers are not intended for shore bombardment, it happened but mostly for nuisance value or to backup capital ships. Destroyers didn't really have the range, they would have to get perilously close to shore where they would be easy targets for artillery, shore based torpedoes and aircraft. Battleships can afford some sea room, which is advisable as and of itself but in wartime allowing for the large speed of aircraft of the day, sitting a mile or two off shore will allow bombing or strafing runs on lowly destroyers before they have reasonable time to react.

Shore bombardment normally meant battleship or heavy cruiser, and naval fire support was for large scale targetting. A bit like using heavy bombers, you could soften up a town prior to sending in a brigade, but you couldnt feasibly use same to tactically support a platoon against a tank.

The exceptions to this are opportunistic, such as: Prinz Eugen sees incautious Russian tank on shoreline. Prinz Eugen shoots tank.

Our glorious HMS Belfast fired the opening shots on D Day. If I remember it also fired the last shots by any naval vessel onto the Western Fromt.

 feeder wrote:
WW2 "what ifs" are always entertaining.

If Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan had not signed a treaty, and therefore Germany not declared war on the US, how would the war have gone differently?
Would the US still have entered in to the Lend-Lease treaty with their mortal enemy, the Communists had they not had a mutual foe in Nazi Germany?

USSR was a mortal enemy? Why?

 Freakazoitt wrote:
USSR was a mortal enemy? Why?

If you've been watching the US election process you'll know how weird Americans get when you mention Communism or Socialism. 50 years of "reds under the bed" has had a pretty negative effect on their political climate.

85% of German materiel to the east, it's pretty clear that this is where the war was lost for them. Western revisionists want to point out that D-Day was critical, but Germany had long since lost the war by this point. From my perspective (born in W. Germany in the 1980s) we were taught D-Day was most important not because it finished the Nazis off, but because it saved the western 2/3 of Germany from Stalin.

Operation Bagration I think could strongly lay claim that it did far more to break the German war machine than Operation Overlord did. Between nearly 90% of all German ground force casualties (and 75% of all German casualties) occurring on the Eastern front, it's no stretch to say that that was the obvious main and decisive theater, without which there likely would have been no convincing victory over Nazi Germany. That said, there's also a good case that the USSR may not have been able to do what they did without the food, munitions, weapons, and logistics support from the Western allies.

 MarsNZ wrote:

If you've been watching the US election process you'll know how weird Americans get when you mention Communism or Socialism. 50 years of "reds under the bed" has had a pretty negative effect on their political climate.

I know, but wasn't it gone really bad after Germany was defeated? As I know, Soviet automobile indistry was builded by americans. Just look at Gaz-AA/Ford-AA working horsy of war. And BT/Christie tanks that tested in Spain civil war and then reinterpreted as a T-34. And bombers design. Other thigs. If look at who was mortal enemy of USSR - it was Germany, a pure anti-communist from beginning (freikorps etc.) and then imperialistic Japan, probably Britain as a long-long rival. do Americans already feared that time the Communists will come (how? walk along the ocean?) and why they were afraid of them