This year is the 150th Anniversary of the start of the US Civil War. This article below is a pretty succinct synopsis of the causes and myths surrounding it:
One hundred fifty years after the Civil War began, we’re still fighting it — or at least fighting over its history. I’ve polled thousands of high school history teachers and spoken about the war to audiences across the country, and there is little agreement even about why the South seceded. Was it over slavery? States’ rights? Tariffs and taxes?
As the nation begins to commemorate the anniversaries of the war’s various battles — from Fort Sumter to Appomattox — let’s first dispense with some of the more prevalent myths about why it all began.
1. The South seceded over states’ rights.
Confederate states did claim the right to secede, but no state claimed to be seceding for that right. In fact, Confederates opposed states’ rights — that is, the right of Northern states not to support slavery.
On Dec. 24, 1860, delegates at South Carolina’s secession convention adopted a “Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union.” It noted “an increasing hostility on the part of the non-slaveholding States to the institution of slavery” and protested that Northern states had failed to “fulfill their constitutional obligations” by interfering with the return of fugitive slaves to bondage. Slavery, not states’ rights, birthed the Civil War.
South Carolina was further upset that New York no longer allowed “slavery transit.” In the past, if Charleston gentry wanted to spend August in the Hamptons, they could bring their cook along. No longer — and South Carolina’s delegates were outraged. In addition, they objected that New England states let black men vote and tolerated abolitionist societies. According to South Carolina, states should not have the right to let their citizens assemble and speak freely when what they said threatened slavery.
Other seceding states echoed South Carolina. “Our position is thoroughly identified with the institution of slavery — the greatest material interest of the world,” proclaimed Mississippi in its own secession declaration, passed Jan. 9, 1861. “Its labor supplies the product which constitutes by far the largest and most important portions of the commerce of the earth. . . . A blow at slavery is a blow at commerce and civilization.”
The South’s opposition to states’ rights is not surprising. Until the Civil War, Southern presidents and lawmakers had dominated the federal government. The people in power in Washington always oppose states’ rights. Doing so preserves their own.
2. Secession was about tariffs and taxes.
During the nadir of post-civil-war race relations — the terrible years after 1890 when town after town across the North became all-white “sundown towns” and state after state across the South prevented African Americans from voting — “anything but slavery” explanations of the Civil War gained traction. To this day Confederate sympathizers successfully float this false claim, along with their preferred name for the conflict: the War Between the States. At the infamous Secession Ball in South Carolina, hosted in December by the Sons of Confederate Veterans, “the main reasons for secession were portrayed as high tariffs and Northern states using Southern tax money to build their own infrastructure,” The Washington Post reported.
These explanations are flatly wrong. High tariffs had prompted the Nullification Controversy in 1831-33, when, after South Carolina demanded the right to nullify federal laws or secede in protest, President Andrew Jackson threatened force. No state joined the movement, and South Carolina backed down. Tariffs were not an issue in 1860, and Southern states said nothing about them. Why would they? Southerners had written the tariff of 1857, under which the nation was functioning. Its rates were lower than at any point since 1816.
3. Most white Southerners didn’t own slaves, so they wouldn’t secede for slavery.
Indeed, most white Southern families had no slaves. Less than half of white Mississippi households owned one or more slaves, for example, and that proportion was smaller still in whiter states such as Virginia and Tennessee. It is also true that, in areas with few slaves, most white Southerners did not support secession. West Virginia seceded from Virginia to stay with the Union, and Confederate troops had to occupy parts of eastern Tennessee and northern Alabama to hold them in line.
However, two ideological factors caused most Southern whites, including those who were not slave-owners, to defend slavery. First, Americans are wondrous optimists, looking to the upper class and expecting to join it someday. In 1860, many subsistence farmers aspired to become large slave-owners. So poor white Southerners supported slavery then, just as many low-income people support the extension of George W. Bush’s tax cuts for the wealthy now.
Second and more important, belief in white supremacy provided a rationale for slavery. As the French political theorist Montesquieu observed wryly in 1748: “It is impossible for us to suppose these creatures [enslaved Africans] to be men; because allowing them to be men, a suspicion would follow that we ourselves are not Christians.” Given this belief, most white Southerners — and many Northerners, too — could not envision life in black-majority states such as South Carolina and Mississippi unless blacks were in chains. Georgia Supreme Court Justice Henry Benning, trying to persuade the Virginia Legislature to leave the Union, predicted race war if slavery was not protected. “The consequence will be that our men will be all exterminated or expelled to wander as vagabonds over a hostile earth, and as for our women, their fate will be too horrible to contemplate even in fancy.” Thus, secession would maintain not only slavery but the prevailing ideology of white supremacy as well.
4. Abraham Lincoln went to war to end slavery.
Since the Civil War did end slavery, many Americans think abolition was the Union’s goal. But the North initially went to war to hold the nation together. Abolition came later.
On Aug. 22, 1862, President Lincoln wrote a letter to the New York Tribune that included the following passage: “If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union.”
However, Lincoln’s own anti-slavery sentiment was widely known at the time. In the same letter, he went on: “I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men every where could be free.” A month later, Lincoln combined official duty and private wish in his preliminary Emancipation Proclamation.
White Northerners’ fear of freed slaves moving north then caused Republicans to lose the Midwest in the congressional elections of November 1862.
Gradually, as Union soldiers found help from black civilians in the South and black recruits impressed white units with their bravery, many soldiers — and those they wrote home to — became abolitionists. By 1864, when Maryland voted to end slavery, soldiers’ and sailors’ votes made the difference.
5. The South couldn’t have made it long as a slave society.
Slavery was hardly on its last legs in 1860. That year, the South produced almost 75 percent of all U.S. exports. Slaves were worth more than all the manufacturing companies and railroads in the nation. No elite class in history has ever given up such an immense interest voluntarily. Moreover, Confederates eyed territorial expansion into Mexico and Cuba. Short of war, who would have stopped them — or forced them to abandon slavery?
To claim that slavery would have ended of its own accord by the mid-20th century is impossible to disprove but difficult to accept. In 1860, slavery was growing more entrenched in the South. Unpaid labor makes for big profits, and the Southern elite was growing ever richer. Freeing slaves was becoming more and more difficult for their owners, as was the position of free blacks in the United States, North as well as South. For the foreseeable future, slavery looked secure. Perhaps a civil war was required to end it.
As we commemorate the sesquicentennial of that war, let us take pride this time — as we did not during the centennial — that secession on slavery’s behalf failed.
Sociologist James W. Loewen is the author of “Lies My Teacher Told Me” and co-editor, with Edward Sebesta, of “The Confederate and Neo-Confederate Reader.”
Proctor: All right, here's your last question. What was the cause of the Civil War?
Apu: Actually, there were numerous causes. Aside from the obvious schism between the abolitionists and the anti-abolitionists, there were economic factors, both domestic and inter--
Proctor: Wait, wait... just say slavery.
Apu: Slavery it is, sir.
Thank your selfs lucky you've only had the one in your short history Civil wars...not really that civil, if any thing more bloody than reguler wars. It so much easier when it's about religion or the rights of succession to the throne, or the rights of the poor.
I thought the Skrulls caused it? Luckily we had Captain Union, cleverly disguised as mild mannered William Tecumseh Sherman to save the day.
Evil Villain Longstreet "heh heh now that we have found the Evil Rhombus of Doom, the Union is finished heh heh surrender now Lincoln or the girl gets it!"
Captain Union "Surrender, what do you think the U on my boots stands for... France?"
Evil Villian Longstreet " Oh nos its Captain Union. Curses, foiled again."
Captain Union "that was fun. Anyone know which way to Atlanta?"
What's silly about it? There are a lot of historical revisionists out there who actively endeavor to pretend and to convince others that slavery was not the primary cause of seccession, and thus for the war.
The article is silly because it attempts to saddle racism on the South.
Sure, the Civil War was indeed about slavery, but by extension. Many Abolitionists of the time wanted the slaves freed not because they believed in equality of man, but rather because they believed that slavery was an infectious disease that poisoned the hearts of good and upstanding white men.
The article, more specifically the later points, does do a good job of pointing out that the North's initial aim at the onset of the war was not to free the slaves, but rather to keep the Union together. The South seceded from the Union because, as a result of a schism in the Democratic Party, Abraham Lincoln was elected without winning a single southern state, nor all the northern ones. This lead the slave holding South to believe that its largest asset, the largest one in the country, would soon dissipate and from that point on the north could "lord over the South." Sectional fears of "lording over" one another can be traced back to the revolution and do not stem just from slavery, but also points such as assumption and Hamiltonian fiscal policies.
In the end, the North was every bit as racist on the matter as was the South. Granted the North didn't own slaves, but nevertheless it didn't stop New Yorkers from beating and killing blacks during the early stages of the draft. Remember, up until Atlanta, the war was very unpopular in the North and Lincoln was riding the line of public opinion like a tight rope.
In summary, the article comes off in such a way as to put the albatross of racism on the South, when in fact the North could be argued as being every bit as racist and still is. The deep south is not the only place in America that harbors racism. One need only point to the other thread in this forum about the Waldorf-Astoria.
Slavery was a factor in the Civil War. Sectional strife occurs because of the different directions each portion of the nation headed in. You also have to consider the regional religious divides along with cultural and political factors.
Another spin on the slavery issue is in regards to how others saw slavery.
Robert E. Lee, the general in charge of the infamous Army of Norhern Virginia from 1862 to 1865 sided with his state at the onset of the war. His stance on slavery is reflected here in this letter to his wife in the twilight of the year 1856:
The steamer also brought the President's message to Cong; & the reports of the various heads of Depts; the proceedings of Cong: &c &c. So that we are now assured, that the Govt: is in operation, & the Union in existence, not that we had any fears to the Contrary, but it is Satisfactory always to have facts to go on. They restrain Supposition & Conjecture, Confirm faith, & bring Contentment: I was much pleased with the President's message & the report of the Secy of War, the only two documents that have reached us entire. Of the others synopsis [sic] have only arrived. The views of the Pres: of the Systematic & progressive efforts of certain people of the North, to interfere with & change the domestic institutions of the South, are truthfully & faithfully expressed. The Consequences of their plans & purposes are also clearly set forth, & they must also be aware, that their object is both unlawful & entirely foreign to them & their duty; for which they are irresponsible & unaccountable; & Can only be accomplished by them through the agency of a Civil & Servile war. In this enlightened age, there are few I believe, but what will acknowledge, that slavery as an institution, is a moral & political evil in any Country. It is useless to expatiate on its disadvantages. I think it however a greater evil to the white man than to the black race, & while my feelings are strongly enlisted in behalf of the latter, my sympathies are more strong for the former. The blacks are immeasurably better off here than in Africa, morally, socially & physically. The painful discipline they are undergoing, is necessary for their instruction as a race, & I hope will prepare & lead them to better things. How long their subjugation may be necessary is known & ordered by a wise Merciful Providence. Their emancipation will sooner result from the mild & melting influence of Christianity, than the storms & tempests of fiery Controversy. This influence though slow, is sure. The doctrines & miracles of our Saviour have required nearly two thousand years, to Convert but a small part of the human race, & even among Christian nations, what gross errors still exist! While we see the Course of the final abolition of human Slavery is onward, & we give it the aid of our prayers & all justifiable means in our power, we must leave the progress as well as the result in his hands who sees the end; who Chooses to work by slow influences; & with whom two thousand years are but as a Single day. Although the Abolitionist must know this, & must See that he has neither the right or power of operating except by moral means & suasion, & if he means well to the slave, he must not Create angry feelings in the Master; that although he may not approve the mode which it pleases Providence to accomplish its purposes, the result will nevertheless be the same; that the reasons he gives for interference in what he has no Concern, holds good for every kind of interference with our neighbors when we disapprove their Conduct; Still I fear he will persevere in his evil Course. Is it not strange that the descendants of those pilgrim fathers who Crossed the Atlantic to preserve their own freedom of opinion, have always proved themselves intolerant of the Spiritual liberty of others?
In summation, Robert E. Lee believed in the rule of law and the intent of religion in governing slavery. Morally, he saw slavery as wrong, but abided by it because he believed it was a design of God for one set of people to be enslaved as to enlighten them, and that the laws of the United States should protect the institution so long as it existed. In short, slavery would benefit those who were enslaved and would end gradually, eventually assuming Chrisitan values kicked in and God willed it.
Manstein wrote:The article is silly because it attempts to saddle racism on the South.
No it doesn't. Maybe you should read it again. It barely even (if at all) mentions racism. It talks about slavery, and the laws, and the actions and words of delegates, but I don't see any claims that the North wasn't racist.
The article does paint the Southerners as supporting slavery in general. Thats not accurate. The governing class did. 'Rich man's war poor man's fight' was a phrase used on both sides, and your average rebel was a conscript/militia guy. Choice was not an option.
Of course I'd argue much the same on the Northern side. Ignore the blah blah morals. The Irish that stepped off the boat and were given in the nonvoluntary option of picking up a rifle weren't fighting for morals and couldn't give a damn one way or the other. The occasioinal riot demonstrated that well.
Research? Using historical documents? Reading? We know.
Well... yea, but thats a different topic isn't it Ahtman.
Historian William C. Davis labels many of the myths surrounding the war as "frivolous" and included attempts to rename the war by "Confederate partisans" which continue to this day. He claims names such as the War of Northern Aggression and the expression coined by Alexander Stephens, War Between the States, were just attempts to deny that the Civil War was an actual civil war.[25]
Exactly. Call it what it is. Be proud of your ancestors if they are worth being proud of. But all this South shall rise again we wus poh innocents in a holy crusade crap is crap. The average Johnny Reb was fighting because he had to or because his lands were being invaded. But the ledership were fighting to maintain their economic and political position. They lost and should have kissed the ground every day that persons of a stronger bent didn't come to power and exterminate them like they should have been.
Automatically Appended Next Post:
Ahtman wrote:edit: Just because you were being curt and dismissive doesn't necessarily mean I have to reply in kind.
See above, not dismissive. What I meant to say is that I hate the revisionist arguments portrayed. I forget about that nonsense and get really pissed off when reminded about the stupidity of it.
Frazzled wrote:See above, not dismissive. What I meant to say is that I hate the revisionist arguments portrayed. I forget about that nonsense and get really pissed off when reminded about the stupidity of it.
So you agree with Lost Cuase? After all, it is debunking post-war revisionism.
Frazzled wrote:See above, not dismissive. What I meant to say is that I hate the revisionist arguments portrayed. I forget about that nonsense and get really pissed off when reminded about the stupidity of it.
So you agree with Lost Cuase? After all, it is debunking post-war revisionism.
Head...hurts... to be clear I agree that the revisionist arguments are nonsense and posted a quote from the bottom of the thread you mentioned which politely says that better than I can put forth.
I have nothing against reenactors and find civil war weaponry/equipment to be kewl. But thats it.
Fun fact. It could be argued that Custer saved the Union. After being chastened by Lee Stuart indeed attempted to hit the rear of the union lines at gettysberg but was stopped enroute by a foolhardy charge from the newly minted general Custer. Despite initial odds of 10 to 1 he blunted the advance sufficiently to allow other cavalry to arrive and forced Stuart to retreat. Had he not the forces in the center potentially could have been hit by pincer move-Pickett in front and Stuart behind, causing panic and a potential split of the union line.
Pickett's charge was stupid because the other two strikes had already been blunted and he was still ordered to attack. Viva Custer?
Frazzled wrote:Exactly. Call it what it is. Be proud of your ancestors if they are worth being proud of. But all this South shall rise again we wus poh innocents in a holy crusade crap is crap. The average Johnny Reb was fighting because he had to or because his lands were being invaded. But the ledership were fighting to maintain their economic and political position. They lost and should have kissed the ground every day that persons of a stronger bent didn't come to power and exterminate them like they should have been.
I don't see a problem with calling it something other than a civil war, since that is a term (usually) reserved for opposing forces fighting for control over a shared territory. The South wasn't fighting for control over the US, they were fighting for separation. "War for Southern Independence" or "War of the Rebellion" are more appropriate terms.
If you want to insist on calling it the "Civil War," then how was the Revolutionary War any different?
biccat wrote:I don't see a problem with calling it something other than a civil war, since that is a term (usually) reserved for opposing forces fighting for control over a shared territory.
A civil war is a war between organized groups within the same nation state or republic,[1] or, less commonly, between two countries created from a formerly-united nation state.[2] The aim of one side may be to take control of the country or a region, to achieve independence for a region, or to change government policies.[1] The term is a calque of the Latin bellum civile which was used to refer to the various civil wars of the Roman Republic in the 1st century BC.
–noun
a war between political factions or regions within the same country.
— n
war between parties, factions, or inhabitants of different regions within the same nation
: a war between opposing groups of citizens of the same country
There is a commonly accepted name, and then there are other names to which other scholars and peoples call a war.
America Revolutionary War
American War of independence
American Revolution
Revolutionary War
Wiki denotes four different ways to which the war is named that started the path to the United States of America.
Each one means something different and depending on circumstances (including nationality, culture, educational background), one of these titles will be foremost over the others to a particular person.
WarOne wrote:America Revolutionary War
American War of independence
American Revolution
Revolutionary War
Each of those is extremely similar, are interchangeable, and used in all classrooms teaching the subject. There is little similarity between The American Civil War and The War of Northern Aggression, and only one of those is taught in one specific geographic region.
Ahtman wrote: There is little similarity between The American Civil War and The War of Northern Aggression, and only one of those is taught in one specific geographic region.
And where would that be? I schooled in both Louisiana and Mississippi and have only ever heard it referred to as the "War of Northern Aggression" outside of academic areas.
Ahtman wrote: There is little similarity between The American Civil War and The War of Northern Aggression, and only one of those is taught in one specific geographic region.
And where would that be? I schooled in both Louisiana and Mississippi and have only ever heard it referred to as the "War of Northern Aggression" outside of academic areas.
Then again, I went to private schools.
I grew up in Louisiana as well and went to public school. Never heard it called the War of Northern Aggression outside of books or intellectual discussions.
Ahtman wrote: There is little similarity between The American Civil War and The War of Northern Aggression, and only one of those is taught in one specific geographic region.
And where would that be? I schooled in both Louisiana and Mississippi and have only ever heard it referred to as the "War of Northern Aggression" outside of academic areas.
Then again, I went to private schools.
I grew up in Louisiana as well and went to public school. Never heard it called the War of Northern Aggression outside of books or intellectual discussions.
You obviously need to spend more time in MS and Alabama. There aren't to many "South Will Rise Again!"ers in LA.
WarOne wrote:America Revolutionary War
American War of independence
American Revolution
Revolutionary War
Each of those is extremely similar, are interchangeable, and used in all classrooms teaching the subject. There is little similarity between The American Civil War and The War of Northern Aggression, and only one of those is taught in one specific geographic region.
I agree that each term is interchangeable. However, there is a significant difference in the terms that use either Revolutionary War, and War of Independence. Assigning general reasons for war, Revolution and Indpendence carry signficantly different definitions. They both emphasis change in some form, but with cultural and political spin, either one could become a negative connotation in the society that uses either term.
WarOne wrote:
I agree that each term is interchangeable. However, there is a significant difference in the terms that use either Revolutionary War, and War of Independence. Assigning general reasons for war, Revolution and Indpendence carry signficantly different definitions. They both emphasis change in some form, but with cultural and political spin, either one could become a negative connotation in the society that uses either term.
The distinction does appear less important than the one between The War of Northern Aggression and American Civil War
The south was facing an economic collapse before seeing as though they were an export economy, mainly exporting agricultural goods. However, a man by the name of Eli Whitney introduced the Cotton Gin to the south and caused an economic boom thanks to increased production of sorted cotton. This cotton was traded mostly to the English who had a large textiles industry. During the Civil War the English wanted the South to remain as intact as possible and favored the South during the war. They equipped the South with ships and weapons and it wasn't until the battle of Antietem that Abraham Lincoln declared the Emancipation Proclamation which made the war officially about slavery. Seeing as though the English were officially against slavery they stopped overt support of the South, which helped damn the southern war effort.
The South lost a great part of their workforce and land after the war which is why Lincoln wanted to help rebuild the South afterwards(see Reconstruction).
The South could've kept going and going economically as long as the British were buying and boy were they buying.
The south was facing an economic collapse before seeing as though they were an export economy, mainly exporting agricultural goods. However, a man by the name of Eli Whitney introduced the Cotton Gin to the south and caused an economic boom thanks to increased production of sorted cotton. This cotton was traded mostly to the English who had a large textiles industry. During the Civil War the English wanted the South to remain as intact as possible and favored the South during the war. They equipped the South with ships and weapons and it wasn't until the battle of Antietem that Abraham Lincoln declared the Emancipation Proclamation which made the war officially about slavery. Seeing as though the English were officially against slavery they stopped overt support of the South, which helped damn the southern war effort.
The South lost a great part of their workforce and land after the war which is why Lincoln wanted to help rebuild the South afterwards(see Reconstruction).
The South could've kept going and going economically as long as the British were buying and boy were they buying.
However by the time of secession Britain had built its textile industry in India and at home to the point where they could effectively cut the south off. Thats te primary reason they didn't support the south economically during the war, they didn't have to.
You can't have a textiles industry without supplies. The popular supplies being Cotton and Wool back then. The South offered the cheapest cotton thanks to the fact that they didn't have to pay the workers.
It's possible that the British wouldn't have switched exclusively to buying Egyptian cotton if there hadn't been a war on the other side of the pond. The war removed the South entirely from the cotton economy and forced everyone to go elsewhere.
Many historians would argue that the British were on the verge of throwing total support to the Confederacy. By 1963 G.B. had already sent an army to Canada just in case and were simply waiting for a decisive Confederate victory before throwing their hats into the ring.
It seems a little bit unlikely that the British Empire would have supported the Confederacy without the quid pro quo of abolition since it was the Empire which abolished slavery in 1807 and the Royal Navy which attempted to prevent the slave trade.
Melissia wrote:What, you think that a country other than the U.S.A. can't be inherently self-contradictory in its foreign policy?
You do understand not every bit of United States Foreign Policy is "inherently self-contradictory", right? There are more than 3 other nations in the world and there are a lot of things to take into account, sometimes leading to difficult issues.
Either he misunderstood that you were making the same point as him, or he was confused by your use of "inherently". I think your sentence works a lot better without it.
"Inherently" in this case meaning something like "in the nature of something though not readily apparent" (Priceton)-- even if you assume that our only desire in foreign policy is to propagate our own self-interest (hardly an uncommon belief outside of the US), even THAT in and of itself inherently contradictory because we as a nation have conflicting self-interests.
Melissia wrote:"Inherently" in this case meaning something like "in the nature of something though not readily apparent" (Priceton)-- even if you assume that our only desire in foreign policy is to propagate our own self-interest (hardly an uncommon belief outside of the US), even THAT in and of itself inherently contradictory because we as a nation have conflicting self-interests.
Edit: I agree that aspects of our foreign policy are contradictory, but that doesn't mean that US foreign policy is inherently contradictory.
Manstein wrote:Many historians would argue that the British were on the verge of throwing total support to the Confederacy. By 1963 G.B. had already sent an army to Canada just in case and were simply waiting for a decisive Confederate victory before throwing their hats into the ring.
No they wouldn't. Few would, actually.
England imported two things in bulk from the US before the war: cotton and grain. They could wait out a cotton shortage. They could not wait out a grain shortage.
I'd agree that if it looked like the south were going to straight up win, they would have strong armed a peace. But actually getting involved would have disrupted the relative world peace that, Crimea aside, had existed for fifty years.
Manstein wrote:Many historians would argue that the British were on the verge of throwing total support to the Confederacy. By 1963 G.B. had already sent an army to Canada just in case and were simply waiting for a decisive Confederate victory before throwing their hats into the ring.
Looks like the British were slow to get the news. That, or they expected a huge surge in "Southern Pride" after the Kennedy election.
I think one of the reasons there's so much argument about the role of slavery is that for most people, it's intertwined with racism.
the thing is, the racism of today is different than the racism of the past. We now know, through extensive scientific study, how little different there is between the races physiologically, psychologically, cognitively, or genetically.
In 1860, nearly every thinker agreed on white supremacy. So, the average slave owner wasn't really any more "racist" than the average northerner.
What seems hard to ignore is the economic and social role of slavery, and how hard the ruling class of the south would, as nearly any of us would, fight to preseve it.
Well, techincially it was a number, but it was pretty small. There are records of free blacks owning slaves in the colonial period, and IIRC there were black or mixed race slaveowners in Louisiana. I think many of them actually bought their family members, though, to essentially free them.
And the South (much like the north) was racist, but it was less out of hatred of the other than out of economic need.
Melissia wrote:What, you think that a country other than the U.S.A. can't be inherently self-contradictory in its foreign policy?
No, I'm saying that it wasn't.
Automatically Appended Next Post: The reason Lincoln made the Proclamation of Emancipation after Gettysburg was that by its clear abolitionist stance it convinced the UK not to recognise the south.
All that stuff about the UK preparing to invade the north from Canada is BS.
So is the stuff about the UK selling weapons to the south. UK manufacturers sold weapons to both sides, as allowed by international law.
FWIW, grew up in Tejas and went to private school and was taught that it was over state's rights. My teacher was ridiculously intelligent (he could give you any fact about anything relating to history) and was also a reenactor. I dunno if that adds anything. I just know that I wasn't there so people will believe what they want. I'm also glad it happened then so we're not any more overpopulated now.
My Dad always told me "Son, don't wrestle with a pig. You get dirty and the pig just enjoys it."
I will say that I find the author's attempt to equate hopeful slave owners to people that support the Bush tax cuts a bit telling, and where I suspect we will find his true mind set. It's all about class warfare.
Melissia wrote:What, you think that a country other than the U.S.A. can't be inherently self-contradictory in its foreign policy?
No, I'm saying that it wasn't.
Automatically Appended Next Post: The reason Lincoln made the Proclamation of Emancipation after Gettysburg was that by its clear abolitionist stance it convinced the UK not to recognise the south.
All that stuff about the UK preparing to invade the north from Canada is BS.
So is the stuff about the UK selling weapons to the south. UK manufacturers sold weapons to both sides, as allowed by international law.
If you think it is BS, take it up with renowned Civil War historian and Professor at Yale University, David Blight. Here is his short bio at Yale's website:
David W. Blight joined the department in January 2003 as professor of history. He is one of the nation's foremost authorities on the US Civil War and its legacy. As of June, 2004, he is Director, succeeding David Brion Davis, of the Gilder Lehrman Center for the Study of Slavery, Resistance, and Abolition at Yale. During the 2006-07 academic year he was a fellow at the Dorothy and Lewis B. Cullman Center for Writers and Scholars, New York Public Library.
Blight is the author of A Slave No More: Two Men Who Escaped to Freedom, Including Their Narratives of Emancipation, (Harcourt, 2007). This book combines two newly discovered slave narratives in a volume that recovers the lives of their authors, John Washington and Wallace Turnage, as well as provides an incisive history of the story of emancipation. In June, 2004, the New York Times ran a front page story about the discovery and significance of these two rare slave narratives. Blight is also the author of Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory (Harvard University Press, 2001), which received eight book awards, including the Bancroft Prize, the Abraham Lincoln Prize, and the Frederick Douglass Prize as well as four awards from the Organization of American Historians, including the Merle Curti prizes for both intellectual and social history. Other published works include a book of essays, Beyond the Battlefield: Race, Memory, and the American Civil War (University of Massachusetts Press, 2002); and Frederick Douglass's Civil War: Keeping Faith in Jubilee (LSU Press, 1989). Blight is the editor of and author of six books, including When This Cruel War Is Over: The Civil War Letters of Charles Harvey Brewster (Univ. of Massachusetts Press, 1992); Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, An American Slave (Bedford Books, 1993); co-editor with Robert Gooding-Williams, W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (Bedford Books, 1997); co-editor with Brooks Simpson, Union and Emancipation: Essays on Politics and Race in the Civil War Era (Kent State Univ. Press, 1997); and Caleb Bingham, The Columbian Orator (orig. 1797, NYU Press, 1997), the book of oratory and antislavery writings that Frederick Douglass discovered while a youth. The edited volume, Passages to Freedom: The Underground Railroad in History and Memory, was published by Smithsonian Press in 2004 and is the companion book for the opening of the National Underground Railroad Freedom Center in Cincinnati.
Blight is also a frequent book reviewer for the Washington Post Book World, the Chicago Tribune, the Los Angeles Times, the Boston Globe and other newspapers, and has written many articles on abolitionism, American historical memory, and African American intellectual and cultural history. He is one of the authors of the bestselling American history textbook for the college level, A People and a Nation (Houghton Mifflin). He is also series advisor and editor for the Bedford Books series in American History and Culture, a popular series of teaching books for the college level. Blight lectures widely on Douglass, Du Bois, and problems in public history and American historical memory. He teaches summer institutes for secondary teachers and for park rangers and historians in the National Park Service, devoting a good deal of time to these and many other public history initiatives.
Blight has also been a consultant to several documentary films, including the 1998 PBS series, "Africans in America," and "The Reconstruction Era" (2004). Blight has a Ph. D. from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and did his undergraduate degree at Michigan State University. He has also taught at Harvard University, at North Central College in Naperville, Illinois, and for seven years was a public high school teacher in his hometown, Flint, Michigan. He was also senior Fulbright Professor in American Studies at the University of Munich in Germany in 1992-93.
Blight was elected as a member of the Society of American Historians in 2002. Since 2004 he has served as a member of the Board of Trustees of the New York Historical Society and the board for African American Programs at Monticello in Charlottesville, Virginia. He also serves on the board of advisors to the Abraham Lincoln Bicentennial Commission and is involved in planning numerous conferences and events to commemorate both the Lincoln anniversary and the sesquicentennial of the Civil War. In his capacity as director of the Gilder Lehrman Center at Yale, Blight organizes conferences, working groups, lectures, the administering of the annual Frederick Douglass Book Prize, and many public outreach programs regarding the history of slavery and its abolition.
Professor Blight previously taught at Amherst College for 13 years. He earned his PhD from the University of Wisconsin- Madison and then taught at Harvard and at North Central College in Naperville, Illinois. Before his university career, he taught for seven years in a public high school in his hometown of Flint, Michigan. His courses include seminars in nineteenth-century U.S. history, African- American history, and historical memory.
As you can see, Professor Blight is most certainly not a Souther sympathizer, nor revisionist. If anything, he is as much on the other "side" of that spectrum as you can imagine. Professor Blight's lecture series, which you can watch on youtube here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QXXp1bHd6gI&feature=relmfu explain my position perfectly.
The whole series is 25 or so parts. If you really want a good history of the Civil War, not just a military one but also a social one, check out this guy's series. He explains the history behind the war, the things that took place during the war, and also the legacy after it. Some readers here might want to skip to the end and just watch his class on "the Lost Cause." All of them are good, and in the series (sorry but the exact clip escapes me) Dr. Blight makes statements that back up my own.
I am sure Britain had invasion plans for the North. Heck they might still have some weird invasion plan from Canada now. Thats military contingency planning. But I don't think anyone at the time (outside of the Confederacy) seriously thought they would. Plus with envoys seeing the level of bloodbath going on I'd proffer that would have made them pretty gunshy.
The Green Git wrote:My Dad always told me "Son, don't wrestle with a pig. You get dirty and the pig just enjoys it."
I will say that I find the author's attempt to equate hopeful slave owners to people that support the Bush tax cuts a bit telling, and where I suspect we will find his true mind set. It's all about class warfare.
I think the point he was making is that Americans, by and large, are believers in social mobility. We've historically supported policies that that favor the rich over the poor (compared to alternatives, not in absolute terms) over our entire history.
It's a well known and documented phenomenon, such that is referenced in Broadway musicals.
dogma wrote:@Manstein: I'm not sure why you would appeal to an authority instead of simply arguing the point, because its not a good argumentative tactic.
Listening to what a faceless poster on Dakka has to say is one thing, listening to a credited Historian on the subject is another.
Manstein wrote:
Listening to what a faceless poster on Dakka has to say is one thing, listening to a credited Historian on the subject is another.
I disagree, being a credited historian does not make one's argument better.
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Polonius wrote:I think we'd still rather see what he has to say, not a four paragraph biography.
Maybe there was content in that quote box, but it read like "see how smart this guy is? He's got my back."
Exactly.
The point was not to say how smart he is, but to preempt any claims of him being some sort of southern "revisionist." If you want to here what he has to say, look at his lectures that I linked.
Automatically Appended Next Post: Also, a credited historian is a reference and citing references can most certainly make one's argument better.
Ok, well, no offense, but I'm not going to watch a series of lectures.
Feel free to sum it up for us though. I honestly have no clue what you're actually referring. So yeah, you can use what he says, but I need to, you know, know what that is.
Polonius wrote:Ok, well, no offense, but I'm not going to watch a series of lectures.
Feel free to sum it up for us though. I honestly have no clue what you're actually referring. So yeah, you can use what he says, but I need to, you know, know what that is.
I won't even do that unless I get an offer for sweet tea or mint julips.
Manstein wrote:
The point was not to say how smart he is, but to preempt any claims of him being some sort of southern "revisionist." If you want to here what he has to say, look at his lectures that I linked.
Whether or not he's a revisionist is irrelevant. If the argument he makes is good, then its a good argument.
Manstein wrote:
Also, a credited historian is a reference and citing references can most certainly make one's argument better.
Citation attributes credit to points made by others, and makes the reader aware that the author has versed himself in the literature relevant to the topic. Additionally, citation is often used to show that a given piece of work is cumulative, that it builds on what has been already done.
What citation never does is make a particular statement more credible, and using it that way is fallacious by way of appeal to authority, and potentially ad populum.
dogma wrote:Citation attributes credit to points made by others, and makes the reader aware that the author has versed himself in the literature relevant to the topic. Additionally, citation is often used to show that a given piece of work is cumulative, that it builds on what has been already done.
What citation never does is make a particular statement more credible, and using it that way is fallacious by way of appeal to authority, and potentially ad populum.
No offense, but while this might be true in your field, it's not necessarily true in others. If I were to submit a brief that is logically indisputable but contained no citations, it would be laughed out of court. Citations are useful for providing support for claims. They're also a nice way of disproving ad hominem attacks (which this thread is replete with).
biccat wrote:
No offense, but while this might be true in your field, it's not necessarily true in others. If I were to submit a brief that is logically indisputable but contained no citations, it would be laughed out of court. Citations are useful for providing support for claims. They're also a nice way of disproving ad hominem attacks (which this thread is replete with).
Right, if I wrote something which contained no citations, it would never be published. But the reason wouldn't be that the absence of citations made the argument less credible, the reason would be that it violated the conventions of publication, cumulative knowledge being the big one.
Put differently, there is no difference between an argument made by 30 people, and an argument made by 1 person.
As Polonius said, this is different in law, where the facts in question are presented via precedent. Authority is important there because it is systemically critical to the justice system.
I agree, except the reference wasn't posted for purposes of presenting an argument, it was posted for the purpose of demonstrating a factual allegation (the UK stationing troops in Canada in 1963 to invade the Union).
When someone calls your factual assertions "BS", there's nothing wrong with appealing to an authority to substantiate that claim.
edit: and the "citations" I was referring to were citations to evidence, I should have made this clearer. I can say "the arresting officer took the defendant and slammed him into the ground," but it carries a bit more weight when I say "the arresting officer took the defendant and slammed him into the ground (disposition of Officer Jones, page 3)."
edit2: Yes, I'm aware that should probably have been 1863, but it's a typo in the original and it makes me chuckle.
Dogma: in legal arguments, you distinguish betwen facts (the things that happened) and the law (the precendent and statutes that govern what should affect the decision).
That said, you are more than allowed in trial to emphasize the credentials of an expert witness.
Polonius wrote:Ok, well, no offense, but I'm not going to watch a series of lectures.
Feel free to sum it up for us though. I honestly have no clue what you're actually referring. So yeah, you can use what he says, but I need to, you know, know what that is.
Not a problem, and I don't expect you to. I linked the series for those who were interested. I will also clear up my intentions for providing the information.
Originally I made this statement:
Many historians would argue that the British were on the verge of throwing total support to the Confederacy. By 1963 G.B. had already sent an army to Canada just in case and were simply waiting for a decisive Confederate victory before throwing their hats into the ring.
Someone commented that this was BS. In return, I cited a well respected, non "Southern Revisionist" historian as my source on this fact. I then proceeded to link some of his lectures for those who might still be unsure if he was legit or not.
As to his lectures, the whole thing is a semester's worth of knowledge so summing it up isn't much of an option. However, in reference to this discussion we are having... The Professor sums up the British viewpoint as once of extreme caution but also once one of interest interest. The British, although reluctant to send troops, nevertheless positioned themselves in such a way as to be able to take advantage of the situation should a major southern victory take place.
biccat wrote:I agree, except the reference wasn't posted for purposes of presenting an argument, it was posted for the purpose of demonstrating a factual allegation (the UK stationing troops in Canada in 1963 to invade the Union).
When someone calls your factual assertions "BS", there's nothing wrong with appealing to an authority to substantiate that claim.
No, but only if the authority himself cites original source documents.
Saying "Professor Smith argues that England is full of cows" isn't horribly helpful. Saying "Professor Jones, after reviewinig the census documents, argues that England is full of cows" is more helpful. Even then, you'd be better saying "the census records show that england is full of cows, as Professer Smith argues in his essay."
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Manstein wrote:
Many historians would argue that the British were on the verge of throwing total support to the Confederacy. By 1963 G.B. had already sent an army to Canada just in case and were simply waiting for a decisive Confederate victory before throwing their hats into the ring.
Someone commented that this was BS. In return, I cited a well respected, non "Southern Revisionist" historian as my source on this fact. I then proceeded to link some of his lectures for those who might still be unsure if he was legit or not.
As to his lectures, the whole thing is a semester's worth of knowledge so summing it up isn't much of an option. However, in reference to this discussion we are having... The Professor sums up the British viewpoint as once of extreme caution but also once one of interest interest. The British, although reluctant to send troops, nevertheless positioned themselves in such a way as to be able to take advantage of the situation should a major southern victory take place.
Well, I wasn't even sure if the historian you cited was supporting your claim about the British support, which was my confusion.
Though if you can't sum up a semesters worth of knowledge in a paragraph, i'd avoid law school.
I still think you ovesrtated things in your first post. I'd agree based on my limited knowledge that the UK would recognize the CSA if the won a big enough victory to make independence likely, and would have little problem pressuing the US to at least stop the war.
I'm not sure if they'd actually supprot their effort to actually win that fight or gain their victory.
Polonius wrote:
No, but only if the authority himself cites original source documents.
Saying "Professor Smith argues that England is full of cows" isn't horribly helpful. Saying "Professor Jones, after reviewinig the census documents, argues that England is full of cows" is more helpful. Even then, you'd be better saying "the census records show that england is full of cows, as Professer Smith argues in his essay."
Exactly.
Polonius wrote:
I still think you ovesrtated things in your first post. I'd agree based on my limited knowledge that the UK would recognize the CSA if the won a big enough victory to make independence likely, and would have little problem pressuing the US to at least stop the war.
I'm not sure if they'd actually supprot their effort to actually win that fight or gain their victory.
Yes, grain supplies being the major issue, as you pointed out. The Crown leveraged against either victory because they had interests at play on both sides, but they weren't committed to helping one defeat the other.
biccat wrote:I agree, except the reference wasn't posted for purposes of presenting an argument, it was posted for the purpose of demonstrating a factual allegation (the UK stationing troops in Canada in 1963 to invade the Union).
When someone calls your factual assertions "BS", there's nothing wrong with appealing to an authority to substantiate that claim.
No, but only if the authority himself cites original source documents.
Saying "Professor Smith argues that England is full of cows" isn't horribly helpful. Saying "Professor Jones, after reviewinig the census documents, argues that England is full of cows" is more helpful. Even then, you'd be better saying "the census records show that england is full of cows, as Professer Smith argues in his essay."
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Manstein wrote:
Many historians would argue that the British were on the verge of throwing total support to the Confederacy. By 1963 G.B. had already sent an army to Canada just in case and were simply waiting for a decisive Confederate victory before throwing their hats into the ring.
Someone commented that this was BS. In return, I cited a well respected, non "Southern Revisionist" historian as my source on this fact. I then proceeded to link some of his lectures for those who might still be unsure if he was legit or not.
As to his lectures, the whole thing is a semester's worth of knowledge so summing it up isn't much of an option. However, in reference to this discussion we are having... The Professor sums up the British viewpoint as once of extreme caution but also once one of interest interest. The British, although reluctant to send troops, nevertheless positioned themselves in such a way as to be able to take advantage of the situation should a major southern victory take place.
Well, I wasn't even sure if the historian you cited was supporting your claim about the British support, which was my confusion.
Though if you can't sum up a semesters worth of knowledge in a paragraph, i'd avoid law school.
I still think you ovesrtated things in your first post. I'd agree based on my limited knowledge that the UK would recognize the CSA if the won a big enough victory to make independence likely, and would have little problem pressuing the US to at least stop the war.
I'm not sure if they'd actually supprot their effort to actually win that fight or gain their victory.
Ehh, the reason I didn't feel confident in summing up his series is that it hits on many social topics that are not really relevant to this discussion: i.e. white supremacy culture, lost cause, social temperments, ect. I will try to comb through the lectures and see if I can find the point where he presents the facts as I stated earlier, its 25+ hours of material, so I doubt I will be able to find it soon.
I will admit, the original post can put off the air that England was on the line of declaring a full scale involved war and duking it out with the Union. If the Brits did join in the war, it would be after after a major CSA victory that could prove fatal to the Union. The British Navy could easily have moved in to secure its interests, and the very threat of land force to the Union in the north, all would (hopefully) be enough to force a peace on the Union.
The Brits were not interested in fighting a land war again by any means, but hoped to use its threat combined with other factors to force the peace, as you have stated.
It's worth pointing out that Russians (who hated the british) activley supported the Union, and sent a small fleet to New York during parts of the war.
Once the Egyptian Cotton crops came in, any real gain the UK would have had in intervening evaporated.
Frazzled wrote:I am sure Britain had invasion plans for the North. Heck they might still have some weird invasion plan from Canada now. Thats military contingency planning. But I don't think anyone at the time (outside of the Confederacy) seriously thought they would. Plus with envoys seeing the level of bloodbath going on I'd proffer that would have made them pretty gunshy.
Good thing too, for Britain.
Lol. You have far too much faith in British military planning. The history of Victoria's war shows miserable planning by the army until the late 1880s and it wasn't rock solid after that.
Frazzled wrote:I am sure Britain had invasion plans for the North. Heck they might still have some weird invasion plan from Canada now. Thats military contingency planning. But I don't think anyone at the time (outside of the Confederacy) seriously thought they would. Plus with envoys seeing the level of bloodbath going on I'd proffer that would have made them pretty gunshy.
Good thing too, for Britain.
Lol. You have far too much faith in British military planning. The history of Victoria's war shows miserable planning by the army until the late 1880s and it wasn't rock solid after that.
Just saw a show detailing the Japanese victory at Malaya. The Brits lost one decisive battle because the Japanese attacked "from the other way" which was previously thought impossible .
Anyways, they must have done something right taking over half the worlds land mass and whatnot.
Frazzled wrote:I am sure Britain had invasion plans for the North. Heck they might still have some weird invasion plan from Canada now. Thats military contingency planning. But I don't think anyone at the time (outside of the Confederacy) seriously thought they would. Plus with envoys seeing the level of bloodbath going on I'd proffer that would have made them pretty gunshy.
Good thing too, for Britain.
Lol. You have far too much faith in British military planning. The history of Victoria's war shows miserable planning by the army until the late 1880s and it wasn't rock solid after that.
Just saw a show detailing the Japanese victory at Malaya. The Brits lost one decisive battle because the Japanese attacked "from the other way" which was previously thought impossible .
Anyways, they must have done something right taking over half the worlds land mass and whatnot.
Yeah, it was called the Maxim gun, that and having a flag
Manstein wrote:Someone commented that this was BS. In return, I cited a well respected, non "Southern Revisionist" historian as my source on this fact. I then proceeded to link some of his lectures for those who might still be unsure if he was legit or not.
As to his lectures, the whole thing is a semester's worth of knowledge so summing it up isn't much of an option. However, in reference to this discussion we are having... The Professor sums up the British viewpoint as once of extreme caution but also once one of interest interest. The British, although reluctant to send troops, nevertheless positioned themselves in such a way as to be able to take advantage of the situation should a major southern victory take place.
I guess what we're looking for is a summation of any evidence he has for that position. Does he have documents from British parliament, or from within any ministry, that mentions the possibility of an invasion from Canada to support the South?
From my understanding the British learned the hard way twice already that it costs a lot of money to fight a war on the other side of the Atlantic, and were extremely wary of getting embroiled in that again. To argue that they'd not only get stuck in again, they'd do so on the side of the slave owners?
It seems very unlikely to me, given their focus on India and their own colonies (full of those much easier to govern brown people... slavery is one thing but racism was everywhere) that they'd look to waste English troops and treasure over there for a third time.
If the professor provided evidence I'd love to see it, but until then I think we're all going to be very sceptical.
sebster wrote:
If the professor provided evidence I'd love to see it, but until then I think we're all going to be very sceptical.
I went and looked him up. His work is mostly about cultural history, particularly the effect slavery had on masculinity in the black community (I mean, he does teach at Yale). To the extent that he has an opinion about the British involvement in the war, he is probably working from another's work.
KamikazeCanuck wrote:Just saw a show detailing the Japanese victory at Malaya. The Brits lost one decisive battle because the Japanese attacked "from the other way" which was previously thought impossible .
Anyways, they must have done something right taking over half the worlds land mass and whatnot.
The British defence of Singapore was basically entirely incompetent. Both in terms of conception (huge investment in sheer manpower, minimal air cover and naval defence based on the myth of the indestructible nature of battleships) and execution (Percival has gone down in history as one of the British Empire's poorest generals).
The Japanese did one thing right early in the war - they got lucky in facing disorganised and inadequately prepared opposition (the destruction of more than 100 aircraft on the ground in the Phillipines was a disgrace, and makes me wonder why so many people like to pretend MacArthur was competent, let alone a skilled general).
Once the US got their act together the Japanese never scored another victory of any note. Note how easily the Russians defeated them, as well.
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dogma wrote:I went and looked him up. His work is mostly about cultural history, particularly the effect slavery had on masculinity in the black community (I mean, he does teach at Yale). To the extent that he has an opinion about the British involvement in the war, he is probably working from another's work.
Fair enough, but even if he was referencing someone else, apparently someone has grounds to claim the UK was considering taking an active role. Which would be pretty important, if true.
I think the British may have welcomed the secession. They weren't stupid: they saw that the US would expand across the continent and do so through immigration and exapnsion, not the subjugation of the local populations.
It doesn't take a lot of brain power to realize that a modern, industrializing country with far more space and resources will outgrow England.
A lot of people were placing bets during the Civil War; Russia, Spain, France, England, whichever European nation had a Navy and knew that America existed...
I mean we had industry, agriculture, and resources. Lumber, tobacco, furs, cotton, coal, etc were all pretty big back then and America had all of them. The Civil War gave certain countries the ability to try to get in with the new guy and either cut some sweet deals or invade after America had weakened itself enough.
As the story goes, the South burned, the Union won, Lincoln tried to start fixing stuff up, Lincoln was shot in the head, people who didn't like the South took over, and Europe was stuck stroking their bushy mustaches in contempt while probably saying something like "Gads! Foiled again!" in a dastardly voice.
The US basically wiped out the Native Americans, and settled the land wholesale. I used subjucate to mean "rule over," much like the most colonies were by European powers (and Japan).
So, while Britain held India, it had to not only defend it from other great powers, but had to deal with internal threats. Compare that to the American West, which the US was going to hold much easier.
halonachos wrote:Yeah, if you really want to see how badly the natives got screwed look at Andrew "I don't give a feth" Jackson. They guy was nuts and really a dick.
He's dreamy. He also stopped that whole SOuth seceding thing in his term but threatening to hang secess politicians. Amazingly they didn't start any gak with the hero of New Orleans.
Polonius wrote:The US basically wiped out the Native Americans, and settled the land wholesale. I used subjucate to mean "rule over," much like the most colonies were by European powers (and Japan).
So, while Britain held India, it had to not only defend it from other great powers, but had to deal with internal threats. Compare that to the American West, which the US was going to hold much easier.
So the morale of the story is don't try to conquer and assimilate, just Genocide 'em?
Polonius wrote:The US basically wiped out the Native Americans, and settled the land wholesale. I used subjucate to mean "rule over," much like the most colonies were by European powers (and Japan).
So, while Britain held India, it had to not only defend it from other great powers, but had to deal with internal threats. Compare that to the American West, which the US was going to hold much easier.
So the morale of the story is don't try to conquer and assimilate, just Genocide 'em?
The point I was making is that while the British Empire 1860 controlled more land area and more people than the USA, the US was far more secure in holding that territory and population.
We also had emptry territory to expand into.
All of this would make them at least passively supportive of the South during the Civil War, as it would weaken a potential rival.
IMO the most fascinating thing about the Civil War is how incredibly incompetent McClellan was. How do you manage to start a campaign, soundly win EVERY SINGLE tactical engagement, not suffer any large losses or have any additional large force coming to disrupt the situation, but end up retreating in defeat? Put a competent general in his place, and you end up with the war ending years earlier!
Manstein wrote:If you think it is BS, take it up with renowned Civil War historian and Professor at Yale University, David Blight. Here is his short bio at Yale's website:
He's not here to take it up with, and you haven't actually cited anything from him, just linked to a long series of lectures that may possibly comment on it somewhere. Exactly which lecture and at what time does he talk about Britain's plan to invade the union? The trick is, there's no doubt that the UK moved a lot of troops to Canada, anyone can find 47,315 cites for that. What you have to actually show to support your claim is historians saying that they were an offensive force and that the UK had serious intention of invading the Union, which needs more than just troop movements, and I doubt that David Blight is saying that (and am not going to watch hours of lecture to find out, tell us exactly where to look if he does say it).
Everything I've ever seen on British thoughts about tangling with the union at the time was that they really didn't want a massive land war. The British Navy would have no problem sweeping the seas of American ships, but by the end of the war the Union army (just in North America) was massively larger than the entire British army, which couldn't all focus on North America anyway, and the only other country in the area that might help (Mexico) had been utterly smashed by the US less than two decades before. That lends a lot of credence to the idea that they were a defensive force, to make sure that the union didn't decide to just snap up Canada.
You can't just say something, name a professor, and declare yourself winner.
Typeline wrote:Being from the South and having traveled over the entirety of the United States I can give you the one and only reason the Civil War was fought...
Sweet Tea
And worth it too!
Automatically Appended Next Post: I would not sit in that firm belief the British navy could have slammed the Union navy. We'd moved ahead a new generation technoclogically with steam powered, turrented iron clads. I don't think the British Navy had anything like that.
The British navy would have played hell with our shipping, but then so would we with theirs. They could try to blockade ports, but the Merrimack showed the difficulties in blockading a port with wooden ships.
It shows how expensive/stupid a war would have been, for so little gain.
I do think any British troop movements in Canada were probably more defensive in nature. You guys do have a habit of trying to steal our maple syrup and beavers.
Typeline wrote:Being from the South and having traveled over the entirety of the United States I can give you the one and only reason the Civil War was fought...
Sweet Tea
And worth it too!
Automatically Appended Next Post: I would not sit in that firm belief the British navy could have slammed the Union navy. We'd moved ahead a new generation technoclogically with steam powered, turrented iron clads. I don't think the British Navy had anything like that.
Polonius wrote:The British navy would have played hell with our shipping, but then so would we with theirs. They could try to blockade ports, but the Merrimack showed the difficulties in blockading a port with wooden ships.
The US had less chance of beating the Royal Navy then than the Royal Navy has of beating the US Navy today, and that's really no chance at all. US ironclads couldn't really touch British shipping, because they were coastal ships - they couldn't do anything more than mess around in the West Indes, which wasn't vital to the UK. Britain and France had been building ironclads before the Union and Confederacy started, had more and better of them, and could have bought more from other European ports if they really needed to. If the Royal Navy did somehow run into any problems fighting the US navy, then the British would turn all of their effort to rectifying it immediately, because without naval superiority Britain would simply cease to be an effective power.
If you look at Killkrazy's link, you'll see that the British and French started competing in building ironclads back in 1858.
Any historian can propose a position and present evidence to support it. It doesn't make him right. I find the idea of any historian realistically entertaining the idea of British involvement post-Emancipation Proclamation to be evidence of bad history more than good argument making.
The Civil War demonstrated rather ideally the role of nation and ideology in coming modern warfare. It's unlikely Britain would become involved following the Proclamation because it would be hard for a nation that abolished slavery to take a position that protected it. In this case they probably couldn't have sold the position to the population. Hell, the South couldn't sell that position. They specifically avoided the subject and touted the states rights issue during the war because asking foreign powers for help in protecting slavery wasn't going to fly.
BearersOfSalvation wrote:IMO the most fascinating thing about the Civil War is how incredibly incompetent McClellan was. How do you manage to start a campaign, soundly win EVERY SINGLE tactical engagement, not suffer any large losses or have any additional large force coming to disrupt the situation, but end up retreating in defeat? Put a competent general in his place, and you end up with the war ending years earlier!
Manstein wrote:If you think it is BS, take it up with renowned Civil War historian and Professor at Yale University, David Blight. Here is his short bio at Yale's website:
He's not here to take it up with, and you haven't actually cited anything from him, just linked to a long series of lectures that may possibly comment on it somewhere. Exactly which lecture and at what time does he talk about Britain's plan to invade the union? The trick is, there's no doubt that the UK moved a lot of troops to Canada, anyone can find 47,315 cites for that. What you have to actually show to support your claim is historians saying that they were an offensive force and that the UK had serious intention of invading the Union, which needs more than just troop movements, and I doubt that David Blight is saying that (and am not going to watch hours of lecture to find out, tell us exactly where to look if he does say it).
Everything I've ever seen on British thoughts about tangling with the union at the time was that they really didn't want a massive land war. The British Navy would have no problem sweeping the seas of American ships, but by the end of the war the Union army (just in North America) was massively larger than the entire British army, which couldn't all focus on North America anyway, and the only other country in the area that might help (Mexico) had been utterly smashed by the US less than two decades before. That lends a lot of credence to the idea that they were a defensive force, to make sure that the union didn't decide to just snap up Canada.
You can't just say something, name a professor, and declare yourself winner.
Careful what you say about McClellan. The guy did make a lot of mistakes and he did eventually show that he lacked virtually any finesse when it came to "going after" the opposing force. Nevertheless, the guy did train and make pretty much "make" the Union army into a well trained and disciplined fighting force. Without the excellent training regimes and micro-management of McClellan, later Generals might have had a rougher time. McClellan, was, in short, a logistician and trainer, not a field commander.
Then again, it might all just be perspective. Although Lee, Longstreet, Stuart and Jackson were no Napoleons, they were certainly brilliant and above average officers, thus making McClellan all the worse. When it came to feeding, managing, and training an army as massive as the army of the Potomac, he was your man.... just maybe not on the battlefield when squared against the likes of Lee.
Manstein wrote:Careful what you say about McClellan. The guy did make a lot of mistakes and he did eventually show that he lacked virtually any finesse when it came to "going after" the opposing force. Nevertheless, the guy did train and make pretty much "make" the Union army into a well trained and disciplined fighting force. Without the excellent training regimes and micro-management of McClellan, later Generals might have had a rougher time. McClellan, was, in short, a logistician and trainer, not a field commander.
Made a lot of mistakes is an understement. He had a campaign that could have won the war early, won every single battle, but kept retreating and eventually called the whole thing off and evacuated his army back to camp. He was, in short, a field commander, and an absolutely terrible one, with the kind of laughable incompetence that people would complain is unrealistic if you put it into a fiction book. There are a lot of commanders that made mistakes (Lee screwed up really badly at Gettysburg, for example), but I can't think of a single other commander who managed to launch a campaign, be successful in every battle, but call off the campaign in spite of the absolute crushing success it had achieved, it's just mind-boggling.
Then again, it might all just be perspective. Although Lee, Longstreet, Stuart and Jackson were no Napoleons, they were certainly brilliant and above average officers, thus making McClellan all the worse. When it came to feeding, managing, and training an army as massive as the army of the Potomac, he was your man.... just maybe not on the battlefield when squared against the likes of Lee.
Not on the battlefield, at all, period, and he didn't need to be facing the likes of Lee, he needed to be facing ANYONE. An officer wouldn't have to be above average or brilliant to succeed in a campaign where they won every single battle with minimal losses, they'd just have to not back out when they've won every single engagement. Whatever else he was skilled at, he was such a pathetic field commander that it overrides the rest.
Manstein wrote:Careful what you say about McClellan. The guy did make a lot of mistakes and he did eventually show that he lacked virtually any finesse when it came to "going after" the opposing force. Nevertheless, the guy did train and make pretty much "make" the Union army into a well trained and disciplined fighting force. Without the excellent training regimes and micro-management of McClellan, later Generals might have had a rougher time. McClellan, was, in short, a logistician and trainer, not a field commander.
Then again, it might all just be perspective. Although Lee, Longstreet, Stuart and Jackson were no Napoleons, they were certainly brilliant and above average officers, thus making McClellan all the worse. When it came to feeding, managing, and training an army as massive as the army of the Potomac, he was your man.... just maybe not on the battlefield when squared against the likes of Lee.
You sound like you've read Harry Williams.
I don't think McClellan was as bad as Bearers thinks, but he definitely was not a good combat leader. He had way too much ego and was too obsessed with the concept of mass/concentration (among other things) . He was an excellent administrator, but a horrible Army leader.
Manstein wrote:Careful what you say about McClellan. The guy did make a lot of mistakes and he did eventually show that he lacked virtually any finesse when it came to "going after" the opposing force. Nevertheless, the guy did train and make pretty much "make" the Union army into a well trained and disciplined fighting force. Without the excellent training regimes and micro-management of McClellan, later Generals might have had a rougher time. McClellan, was, in short, a logistician and trainer, not a field commander.
Made a lot of mistakes is an understement. He had a campaign that could have won the war early, won every single battle, but kept retreating and eventually called the whole thing off and evacuated his army back to camp. He was, in short, a field commander, and an absolutely terrible one, with the kind of laughable incompetence that people would complain is unrealistic if you put it into a fiction book. There are a lot of commanders that made mistakes (Lee screwed up really badly at Gettysburg, for example), but I can't think of a single other commander who managed to launch a campaign, be successful in every battle, but call off the campaign in spite of the absolute crushing success it had achieved, it's just mind-boggling.
Then again, it might all just be perspective. Although Lee, Longstreet, Stuart and Jackson were no Napoleons, they were certainly brilliant and above average officers, thus making McClellan all the worse. When it came to feeding, managing, and training an army as massive as the army of the Potomac, he was your man.... just maybe not on the battlefield when squared against the likes of Lee.
Not on the battlefield, at all, period, and he didn't need to be facing the likes of Lee, he needed to be facing ANYONE. An officer wouldn't have to be above average or brilliant to succeed in a campaign where they won every single battle with minimal losses, they'd just have to not back out when they've won every single engagement. Whatever else he was skilled at, he was such a pathetic field commander that it overrides the rest.
Because Fredericksburg was a win? McClellan's troops did not by any means win all or a majority of their battles. One could say the early days of the naval based march on Richmond were filled with victories, but he faced far inferior numbers of Confederates who were only doing delay operations anyway.
Painting McClellan as some fool who won almost everything but failed to follow it up, is far too strong a picture. McClellan could win engagements, but he was simply too cautious and had too much bad information to follow it up. During the second Richmond campaign McClellan, as a result of his calculations and false intelligence, often believed that Johnny Reb had anywhere from 5 to 10x as many troops on the field as they actually had.
Also, don't forget that, other than Scott, the vast majority of both Army's commanders had zero experience on the operational levels of warfare. During the Spanish-American war these guys were dealing with Regiments and Brigades, not Corps and Army's (I use the military definition). During the onset of the war, as well as much of the way through it, generals who had never received training above the regimental level (since those were the largest units at West Point and no training operations above that level were ever done) and maneuvering these massive armies was no simple task.
McClellan was not incompetent, he was not a horrific leader, he was just the wrong man for field work, especially when forced to spar against commanders who are far and wide accepted to be tactically more brilliant than he.
Typeline wrote:Being from the South and having traveled over the entirety of the United States I can give you the one and only reason the Civil War was fought...
Sweet Tea
And worth it too!
Automatically Appended Next Post: I would not sit in that firm belief the British navy could have slammed the Union navy. We'd moved ahead a new generation technoclogically with steam powered, turrented iron clads. I don't think the British Navy had anything like that.
Polonius wrote:The British navy would have played hell with our shipping, but then so would we with theirs. They could try to blockade ports, but the Merrimack showed the difficulties in blockading a port with wooden ships.
The US had less chance of beating the Royal Navy then than the Royal Navy has of beating the US Navy today, and that's really no chance at all. US ironclads couldn't really touch British shipping, because they were coastal ships - they couldn't do anything more than mess around in the West Indes, which wasn't vital to the UK. Britain and France had been building ironclads before the Union and Confederacy started, had more and better of them, and could have bought more from other European ports if they really needed to. If the Royal Navy did somehow run into any problems fighting the US navy, then the British would turn all of their effort to rectifying it immediately, because without naval superiority Britain would simply cease to be an effective power.
If you look at Killkrazy's link, you'll see that the British and French started competing in building ironclads back in 1858.
Interestingly if such a conflict started, it would have been interesting on the UK side as well, as the Union could have potentially sent support to Ireland to create shenannigans there.
Automatically Appended Next Post:
Manstein wrote:
BearersOfSalvation wrote:IMO the most fascinating thing about the Civil War is how incredibly incompetent McClellan was. How do you manage to start a campaign, soundly win EVERY SINGLE tactical engagement, not suffer any large losses or have any additional large force coming to disrupt the situation, but end up retreating in defeat? Put a competent general in his place, and you end up with the war ending years earlier!
Manstein wrote:If you think it is BS, take it up with renowned Civil War historian and Professor at Yale University, David Blight. Here is his short bio at Yale's website:
He's not here to take it up with, and you haven't actually cited anything from him, just linked to a long series of lectures that may possibly comment on it somewhere. Exactly which lecture and at what time does he talk about Britain's plan to invade the union? The trick is, there's no doubt that the UK moved a lot of troops to Canada, anyone can find 47,315 cites for that. What you have to actually show to support your claim is historians saying that they were an offensive force and that the UK had serious intention of invading the Union, which needs more than just troop movements, and I doubt that David Blight is saying that (and am not going to watch hours of lecture to find out, tell us exactly where to look if he does say it).
Everything I've ever seen on British thoughts about tangling with the union at the time was that they really didn't want a massive land war. The British Navy would have no problem sweeping the seas of American ships, but by the end of the war the Union army (just in North America) was massively larger than the entire British army, which couldn't all focus on North America anyway, and the only other country in the area that might help (Mexico) had been utterly smashed by the US less than two decades before. That lends a lot of credence to the idea that they were a defensive force, to make sure that the union didn't decide to just snap up Canada.
You can't just say something, name a professor, and declare yourself winner.
Careful what you say about McClellan. The guy did make a lot of mistakes and he did eventually show that he lacked virtually any finesse when it came to "going after" the opposing force. Nevertheless, the guy did train and make pretty much "make" the Union army into a well trained and disciplined fighting force. Without the excellent training regimes and micro-management of McClellan, later Generals might have had a rougher time. McClellan, was, in short, a logistician and trainer, not a field commander.
Then again, it might all just be perspective. Although Lee, Longstreet, Stuart and Jackson were no Napoleons, they were certainly brilliant and above average officers, thus making McClellan all the worse. When it came to feeding, managing, and training an army as massive as the army of the Potomac, he was your man.... just maybe not on the battlefield when squared against the likes of Lee.
No he made the union army fighting on the East Coast. The more successful central armies were not tainted by his loser presence. Eventually those commanders were the ones that were transferred and won the war. McClellan was an absolute tosser.
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