Associate Justice Antonin Scalia was found dead of apparent natural causes Saturday on a luxury resort in West Texas, federal officials said.
Scalia, 79, was a guest at the Cibolo Creek Ranch, a resort in the Big Bend region south of Marfa.
According to a report, Scalia arrived at the ranch on Friday and attended a private party with about 40 people. When he did not appear for breakfast, a person associated with the ranch went to his room and found a body.

Chief U.S. District Judge Orlando Garcia, of the Western Judicial District of Texas, was notified about the death from the U.S. Marshals Service.
U.S. District Judge Fred Biery said he was among those notified about Scalia's death.
"I was told it was this morning," Biery said of Scalia's death. "It happened on a ranch out near Marfa. As far as the details, I think it's pretty vague right now as to how," he said. "My reaction is it's very unfortunate. It's unfortunate with any death, and politically in the presidential cycle we're in, my educated guess is nothing will happen before the next president is elected."

The U.S. Marshal Service, the Presidio County sheriff and the FBI were involved in the investigation.
Officials with the law enforcement agencies declined to comment.
A federal official who asked not to be named said there was no evidence of foul play and it appeared that Scalia died of natural causes.
A gray Cadillac hearse pulled into the ranch last Saturday afternoon. The hearse came from Alpine Memorial Funeral Home.

Texas Gov. Greg Abbott released a statement Saturday afternoon, calling Scalia a man of God, a patriot and an "unwavering defender of the written Constitution."
"He was the solid rock who turned away so many attempts to depart from and distort the Constitution," Abbott said. "We mourn his passing, and we pray that his successor on the Supreme Court will take his place as a champion for the written Constitution and the Rule of Law. Cecilia and I extend our deepest condolences to his family, and we will keep them in our thoughts and prayers."
Scalia was nominated to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1986 by President Ronald Reagan.

Staff writers Vianna Davila, Tyler White and Richard A. Marini, John MacCormack and Guillermo Contreras contributed to this report.

 Peregrine wrote:
And not a single tear should be shed for him.

 KaptinBadrukk wrote:
OK, 2016. Stop it. We've had enough.

 Peregrine wrote:

 KaptinBadrukk wrote:
OK, 2016. Stop it. We've had enough.

Let's keep it polite

 hotsauceman1 wrote:
Can obama appoint a judge this late in his term?
How will this affect the elctions if so?

 djones520 wrote:
It's unlikely to affect the election in any meaningful manner. Given the total lack of any discussion I've seen on this topic, it is clear that the US doesn't give a gak.

 djones520 wrote:
Given the total lack of any discussion I've seen on this topic, it is clear that the US doesn't give a gak.

 Co'tor Shas wrote:

 Peregrine wrote:
And not a single tear should be shed for him.

Peregrine, please, I have no particular love if him either, and vehemently disagree with his politics, but don't be donkey-cave about it.

 dogma wrote:

 djones520 wrote:
It's unlikely to affect the election in any meaningful manner. Given the total lack of any discussion I've seen on this topic, it is clear that the US doesn't give a gak.

It will once Obama appoints someone. Cruz, and Cruz supporters, will have a field day.

 djones520 wrote:

 dogma wrote:

 djones520 wrote:
It's unlikely to affect the election in any meaningful manner. Given the total lack of any discussion I've seen on this topic, it is clear that the US doesn't give a gak.

It will once Obama appoints someone. Cruz, and Cruz supporters, will have a field day.

I doubt it. Going after Obama won't do much, since he's a "lame duck". Their going to continue hammering on Clinton/Sanders more.

 djones520 wrote:

I doubt it. Going after Obama won't do much, since he's a "lame duck". Their going to continue hammering on Clinton/Sanders more.

 Ouze wrote:
I'm surprised Turd Cruz didn't accuse Obama of killing him.

 djones520 wrote:

 dogma wrote:

 djones520 wrote:
It's unlikely to affect the election in any meaningful manner. Given the total lack of any discussion I've seen on this topic, it is clear that the US doesn't give a gak.

It will once Obama appoints someone. Cruz, and Cruz supporters, will have a field day.

I doubt it. Going after Obama won't do much, since he's a "lame duck". Their going to continue hammering on Clinton/Sanders more.

 d-usa wrote:
He is going to nominate himself and seal his path of destruction of American values!

 d-usa wrote:
The Onion nailed the headline.

 Ahtman wrote:

 d-usa wrote:
The Onion nailed the headline.

Clinton Aide Told To Leave Behind Weak Volunteer Who Collapsed During March To South Carolina? That was the headline when I checked.

 hotsauceman1 wrote:
Can obama appoint a judge this late in his term?
How will this affect the elctions if so?

 Breotan wrote:

I suppose some in the Left wing will also become energized by the opportunity to change the makeup of the court for a long time to come but I don't see that energy being as strong as with the Right.

 d-usa wrote:

 Breotan wrote:

I suppose some in the Left wing will also become energized by the opportunity to change the makeup of the court for a long time to come but I don't see that energy being as strong as with the Right.

The 4 - 4 tie currently predicted for one of the biggest abortion cases in decades will bring out the Left. As will the upcoming case about Executive Orders with Climate Change and Immigration. Add on the feelings about Citizens United and Guns and you have a mix that will get both sides fired up.

Slate wrote:
Antonin Scalia Will Be Remembered as One of the Greats

When news of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia’s death at age 79 broke on Saturday afternoon, the partisan split over the justice’s legacy was immediately obvious. Some liberals were quick to use his death as an occasion to jeer Scalia’s tenure, largely dwelling on his vociferous opposition to minority rights. Meanwhile, conservatives mourned the loss of their greatest judicial advocate, lauding Scalia as a giant of constitutional law. That’s fine and fair: Scalia was a political lightning rod, repulsing Democrats as much as he beguiled Republicans. But as time goes on and the sharp partisan contours of his most famous rulings blur, I have little doubt that Scalia will be remembered as one of the truly great justices on the United States Supreme Court.

Liberals—and, as a shorthand, many journalists—labeled Scalia a “conservative.” That was true as far as political temperament went; from his notorious friendship with Dick Cheney to his thinly veiled delight at the outcome of Bush v. Gore, Scalia was a Republican at heart. But to call him nothing more than a “conservative” would be to overlook the remarkable nuance and complexity of his jurisprudence. Scalia cast a decisive vote in the most important free speech case of the 1980s, Texas v. Johnson, which held that flag burning qualified as constitutionally protected expression. He wrote the landmark majority opinion in 2011’s Brown v. EMA, a double victory for First Amendment advocates that protected both depictions of violence and minors’ rights. And he dissented in Maryland v. King, arguing that the Fourth Amendment forbids law enforcement from collecting DNA from arrestees. (His fierce dissent sounds like it could have sprung from the pen of Edward Snowden.)

Despite his King vote, Scalia was widely viewed by many Americans as a harshly law-and-order justice. Again, that label is simply inaccurate. In many contexts, Scalia was extraordinarily protective of Americans’ right to privacy—though he himself would never use that term. He wrote the majority opinion in Kyllo v. United States, a 5-4 ruling that barred police from peeping into a home with a thermal-imaging device. He also wrote the majority opinion in Florida v. Jardines (another 5-4 decision), barring police from entering private property with a drug-sniffing dog without a warrant. Time and time again, he cast votes to protect drivers from intrusive car searches by law enforcement. Just last term, he sided against the police in a landmark ruling that restored constitutional rights to motorists illegally detained by cops.

And then there’s his view of the Confrontation Clause, which guarantees every criminal defendant the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” The Framers of the Constitution intended the clause to forbid hearsay in the courtroom, allowing every defendant to cross-examine, under oath, those who offer testimonial evidence against him. Before Scalia joined the court, this crucial safeguard against faulty trial testimony had been reduced to a constitutional vestigial limb. As a justice, Scalia embarked on an astonishing and almost entirely successful crusade to restore the clause’s place in the pantheon of civil liberties. In a series of landmark rulings—many authored by Scalia himself—he endeavored to halt the trend of prosecutors introducing dubious hearsay evidence against defendants. This crusade often aligned the justice with unexpected allies, such as Ruth Bader Ginsburg (with whom he was great friends) and Sonia Sotomayor (with whom he was not). And just last term, Scalia took on his frequent ideological bedmate, Justice Samuel Alito, when he sensed Alito “shoveling … fresh dirt” on the newly restored right. The Confrontation Clause was Scalia’s fight; if had to vote with Sotomayor or against Alito to reach the right result, so be it.

Any honest assessment of Scalia’s legacy, of course, must contend with his vehement opposition to the rights of historically oppressed groups—namely women’s rights (especially abortion) and gay rights. And yet reading over Scalia’s abortion dissents, it is difficult not to feel a twinge of respect for his consistent constitutional views. Nobody doubts that Scalia personally abhorred abortion. But his abortion opinions read less like the rants of an arch pro-lifer and more like the pained cries of a dedicated textualist who believed, as a matter of pragmatism and constitutional law, that such contentious issues can only be truly resolved by the democratic process. Here’s the despairing peroration of Scalia’s dissent in Planned Parenthood v. Casey:

"There is a poignant aspect to today's opinion. Its length, and what might be called its epic tone, suggest that its authors believe they are bringing to an end a troublesome era in the history of our Nation and of our Court. … [But] by foreclosing all democratic outlet for the deep passions this issue arouses, by banishing the issue from the political forum that gives all participants, even the losers, the satisfaction of a fair hearing and an honest fight, by continuing the imposition of a rigid national rule instead of allowing for regional differences, the Court merely prolongs and intensifies the anguish.
We should get out of this area, where we have no right to be, and where we do neither ourselves nor the country any good by remaining."

Scalia attempted to take the same let the people decide tack on gay rights—but admittedly, it’s harder to view Scalia’s gay rights dissents with cerebral esteem. Scalia’s apparent disdain for gay people bled into his first two gay rights opinions, which compared gays with drug dealers, prostitutes, and animal abusers. In his (still startling) dissent in Lawrence v. Texas, which invalidated Texas’ same-sex sodomy ban, Scalia accused the court of “largely sign[ing] on to the so-called homosexual agenda” and “tak[ing] sides in the culture war.” He wrote in defense of the “many Americans” who view homosexuality as “a lifestyle that they believe to be immoral and destructive” and championed their right pass laws that strip gays of rights and benefits. The Constitution, Scalia insisted, permitted such raw legislative bigotry.

Plenty of people, myself included, have cited these passages as proof that Scalia was little more than a bitter homophobe. And even now, I’m confident Scalia’s anti-gay beliefs will remain as a lasting blotch on his legacy. But in a few decades—when a majority of Americans can’t remember a time when the Constitution did not guarantee gay people the same fundamental rights as heterosexuals—the sting of this rhetoric will dwindle. Scalia, after all, was writing in dissent; his words had little impact on the country. (Any impact they did have was surely positive: Scalia’s first gay marriage dissent accidentally expedited the invalidation of state-level same-sex marriage bans.) Memories of his regrettable prejudices will recede, and in their place will emerge the image of a titan of constitutional law, a deeply principled, sincerely dedicated man who devoted his life to the court he loved.

When I was younger and angrier, I expected to cheer Scalia’s retirement, elated by his absence from the court. Today, I only feel overwhelming sadness. In my time covering the court, I’ve grown to admire the gruff, cantankerous man who lobs bombs and quips at nervous lawyers and bemused justices alike. Scalia was the justice you either loved or hated, relentlessly opinionated, representative of everything that was right or wrong with the Supreme Court. He was witty, unpredictable, caustic, indignant, and brilliant. He was an American original. And after the partisan howling over his legacy fades, that is how his country will remember him.

‘Of thought & expression’
"The opinion is couched in a style that is as pretentious as its content is egotistic. It is one thing for separate concurring or dissenting opinions to contain extravagances, even silly extravagances, of thought and expression; it is something else for the official opinion of the Court to do so. Of course the opinion’s showy profundities are often profoundly incoherent.”
— Obergefell v. Hodges, Scalia, J., dissenting.


‘Raw Power’
“As Justice Stevens has elsewhere explained, ‘this Court’s power to require state courts to exclude probative self-incriminatory statements rests entirely on the premise that the use of such evidence violates the Federal Constitution. ... If the Court does not accept that premise, it must regard the holding in the Miranda case itself, as well as all of the federal jurisprudence that has evolved from that decision, as nothing more than an illegitimate exercise of raw judicial power.’ Quite so.”
— Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 456-457 (2000) (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 370 (dissenting opinion).


‘The wicked flee’
“California conceded below that Officer Pertoso did not have the ‘reasonable suspicion’ required to justify stopping Hodari. That it would be unreasonable to stop, for brief inquiry, young men who scatter in panic upon the mere sighting of the police is not self-evident, and arguably contradicts proverbial common sense. See Proverbs 28:1 (‘The wicked flee when no man pursueth’). We do not decide that point here, but rely entirely upon the State’s concession.”
— Cal. v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991)


In the court of King Canute
“The [Court] majority ... pussyfoots around the lack of coercion by invalidating the Leadership Act for ‘requiring recipients to profess a specific belief’ and ‘demanding that funding recipients adopt—as their own—the Government’s view on an issue of public concern.’ But like King Cnut’s commanding of the tides, here the Government’s ‘requiring’ and ‘demanding’ have no coercive effect.”
— Agency for Int'l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2333-2335 (2013)


‘As night [divides] the day’
“The Framers did not like corporations, the dissent concludes, and therefore it follows (as night the day) that corporations had no rights of free speech. Of course the Framers' personal affection or disaffection for corporations is relevant only insofar as it can be thought to be reflected in the understood meaning of the text they enacted -- not, as the dissent suggests, as a freestanding substitute for that text. But the dissent's distortion of proper analysis is even worse than that. ...”
— Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 386 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring)


‘Distorted view’
“The Court’s distorted view creates an expansive exception to the Confrontation Clause for violent crimes. Because Bryant posed a continuing threat to public safety in the Court’s imagination, the emergency persisted for confrontation purposes at least until the police learned his ‘motive for and location after the shooting.’ ... This is a dangerous definition of emergency ...
— Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting)


‘A cloud of obfuscating smoke’
“Justice Stevens also appeals to the undoubted fact that some in the founding generation thought that the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment should have a narrower meaning, protecting only the Christian religion or perhaps only Protestantism. I am at a loss to see how this helps his case, except by providing a cloud of obfuscating smoke.”
— McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005)


‘Just for the devil of it’
“In a way, using unreliable legislative history to confirm what the statute plainly says anyway (or what the record plainly shows) is less objectionable since, after all, it has absolutely no effect upon the outcome. But in a way, this utter lack of necessity makes it even worse – calling to mind St. Augustine’s enormous remorse at stealing pears when he was not even hungry, and just for the devil of it (‘not seeking aught through the shame, but the shame itself!’). The Confessions, Book 2, P9, in 18 Great Books of the Western World 10-11 (1952).
— Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 391 (2000)


‘Bedeviled’
“Our Religion Clause jurisprudence has become bedeviled (so to speak) by reliance on formulaic abstractions that are not derived from, but positively conflict with, our long-accepted constitutional traditions.”
— Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644 (1992)


‘Happy’
“Imagine, for instance, special place-and-manner restrictions on all speech except that which ‘conveys a sense of contentment or happiness.’ This ‘happy speech’ limitation would not be ‘viewpoint-based’ – citizens would be able to express their joy in equal measure at either the rise or fall of the NASDAQ, at either the success or the failure of the Republican Party – and would not discriminate on the basis of subject matter, since gratification could be expressed about anything at all.”
— Hill v. Colo., 530 U.S. 703, 743 (2000)


‘Sheep’
“The premise of the First Amendment is that the American people are neither sheep nor fools, and hence fully capable of considering both the substance of the speech presented to them and its proximate and ultimate source. If that premise is wrong, our democracy has a much greater problem to overcome than merely the influence of amassed wealth. Given the premises of democracy, there is no such thing as too much speech.”
— McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 258-259 (2003)


‘Juice not worth the squeeze’
“If the Bill of Rights had intended an exception to the freedom of speech in order to combat this malign proclivity of the officeholder to agree with those who agree with him, and to speak more with his supporters than his opponents, it would surely have said so. It did not do so, I think, because the juice is not worth the squeeze.”
— McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 259 (2003)


Virtuosic
“So, what appears to have happened is that the plurality has facially invalidated not § 18.2-423, but its own hypothetical interpretation of § 18.2-423, and has then remanded to the Virginia Supreme Court to learn the actual interpretation of § 18.2-423. Words cannot express my wonderment at this virtuoso performance.”
— Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 379 (U.S. 2003)


‘Avant-garde’
“Those who wish to create indecent and disrespectful art are as unconstrained now as they were before the enactment of this statute. Avant-garde artistes such as respondents remain entirely free to épater les bourgeois; they are merely deprived of the additional satisfaction of having the bourgeoisie taxed to pay for it. It is preposterous to equate the denial of taxpayer subsidy with measures aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas.”
— National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 525 U.S. 569 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)


‘Mea culpa’
“I come, finally, to the Court’s stinging observation that I joined the majority opinion in Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 568 U. S. ___ (2013)—a case that arose in the same posture as this one, but that was resolved without reference to the question whether the appellate courtabused its discretion. ... As for my own culpability in overlooking the issue, I must accept that and will take it with me to the grave. But its irrelevance to my vote in the present case has been well expressed by Justice Jackson, in a passage quoted by the author of today’s opinion: ‘I see no reason why I should be consciously wrong today because I was unconsciously wrong yesterday.’ Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611, 639–640 (1948) (dissenting opinion).”
— Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U. S. __ (2014)


‘Pasties and g-strings’
“I am highly skeptical, to tell the truth, that the addition of pasties and g-strings will at all reduce the tendency of establishments such as Kandyland to attract crime and prostitution, and hence to foster sexually transmitted disease. The traditional power of government to foster good morals (bonos mores), and the acceptability of the traditional judgment (if Erie wishes to endorse it) that nude public dancing itself is immoral, have not been repealed by the First Amendment.”
— City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 310 (2000)


‘Prophylactic’
“And so, to justify today's agreed-upon result, the Court must adopt a significant new, if not entirely comprehensible, principle of constitutional law … that this Court has the power, not merely to apply the Constitution but to expand it, imposing what it regards as useful ‘prophylactic’ restrictions upon Congress and the States. That is an immense and frightening antidemocratic power, and it does not exist.”
— Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 445-446 (2000)


‘Naked’
“This is a naked judicial claim to legislative—indeed, super-legislative—power; a claim fundamentally at odds with our system of government. Except as limited by a constitutional prohibition agreed to by the People, the States are free to adopt whatever laws they like, even those that offend the esteemed Justices’ ‘reasoned judgment.’ A system of government that makes the People subordinate to a committee of nine unelected lawyers does not deserve to be called a democracy.”
— Obergefell v. Hodges, Scalia, J., dissenting


‘Naked Eye’
“Thermal imagers detect infrared radiation, which virtually all objects emit but which is not visible to the naked eye. … The present case involves officers on a public street engaged in more than naked-eye surveillance of a home. … While it is certainly possible to conclude from the videotape of the thermal imaging that occurred in this case that no significant compromise of the homeowner’s privacy has occurred, we must take the long view, from the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment forward. … Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a search and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”
— Kyllo v. United States, 389 U.S. 27 (2001)


‘O’er’
“Hubris is sometimes defined as o’erweening pride; and pride, we know, goeth before a fall. The Judiciary is the ‘least dangerous’ of the federal branches because it has ‘neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm’ and the States, even for the efficacy of its judgments. With each decision of ours that takes from the People a question properly left to them—with each decision that is unabashedly based not on law, but on the ‘reasoned judgment’ of a bare majority of this Court—we move one step closer to being reminded of our impotence.”
— Obergefell v. Hodges, Scalia, J., dissenting


‘Vain’
“In its vain attempt to make the incredible plausible, however—or perhaps as an intended second goal—today’s opinion distorts our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and leaves it in a shambles. Instead of clarifying the law, the Court makes itself the obfuscator of last resort.”
— Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting)


‘Under a cloud’
“... And any officers appointed in those circumstances would have served under a cloud, unable to determine with any degree of confidence whether their appointments were valid. Fumbling for some textually grounded standard, the majority seizes on the Adjournments Clause, which bars either House from adjourning for more than three days without the other’s consent. ... It goes without saying that nothing in the constitutional text supports that disposition.”
— NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2598 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring)


Senate on siesta
“To avoid the absurd results that follow from its colloquial reading of ‘the Recess,’ the majority ... identifies no textual basis whatsoever ... It is inconceivable that the Framers would have left the circumstances in which the President could exercise such a significant and potentially dangerous power so utterly indeterminate. ... Yet on the majority’s view, when the first Senate considered taking a 1-month break, a 3-day weekend, or a half-hour siesta, it had no way of knowing whether the President would be constitutionally authorized to appoint officers in its absence. ...
— NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2598 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring)


‘Sphinx of judicial arrogance’
“Today’s judgment converts Miranda from a milestone of judicial overreaching into the very Cheops’ Pyramid (or perhaps the Sphinx would be a better analogue) of judicial arrogance. In imposing its Court-made code upon the States, the original opinion at least asserted that it was demanded by the Constitution. Today’s decision does not pretend that it is—and yet still asserts the right to impose it against the will of the people’s representatives in Congress.”
— Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 465 (2000)


‘Nine-headed Caesar’
“The issue, however, is not whether court rules are ‘mutable’; they assuredly are. It is not whether, in the light of ‘various circumstances,’ they can be ‘modified’; they assuredly can. The issue is whether, as mutated and modified, they must make sense. The requirement that they do so is the only thing that prevents this Court from being some sort of nine-headed Caesar, giving thumbs-up or thumbs-down to whatever outcome, case by case, suits or offends its collective fancy.”
— Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 455 (2000)


The boss is always right
“There was in my view no basis for holding that patronage-based dismissals violated the First Amendment – much less for holding, as the Court does today, that even patronage hiring does so. … The Court holds that the governmental benefits of patronage cannot reasonably be thought to outweigh its ‘coercive’ effects … It seems to me that that categorical pronouncement reflects a naive vision of politics and an inadequate appreciation of the systemic effects of patronage in promoting political stability.”
— Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 97, 103-104 (1990)


The horror
“As to the Court's invocation of the Lemon test: Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free School District. ... Over the years, however, no fewer than five of the currently sitting Justices have, in their own opinions, personally driven pencils through the creature's heart.”
— Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993)


‘Psycho-journey’
“A few citations of ‘research in psychology’ that have no particular bearing upon the precise issue here, cannot disguise the fact that the Court has gone beyond the realm where judges know what they are doing. But interior decorating is a rock-hard science compared to psychology practiced by amateurs. … Whatever the merit of those cases [cited by the majority as precedent], they do not support, much less compel, the Court’s psycho-journey.”
— Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 636 (1992)


‘More Hannibal than Hamlet’
“When it has come to determining what areas fall beyond our Article III authority to adjudicate, this Court’s practice, from the earliest days of the Republic to the present, has been more reminiscent of Hannibal than of Hamlet.”
— Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1790 (2004)


‘Twilight Zone’
“It has come to this. Called upon to explore the jurisprudential twilight zone between two errant lines of precedent, we confront a frighteningly bizarre question: Does the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbid what its text plainly requires? Needless to say (except that this case obliges us to say it), the question answers itself. ‘The Constitution proscribes government discrimination on the basis of race, and state-provided education is no exception.’ Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). It is precisely this understanding—the correct understanding—of the federal Equal Protection Clause that the people of the State of Michigan have adopted for their own fundamental law. By adopting it, they did not simultaneously offend it.”
— Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. ____ (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment.)


‘Outer limits’
“In sum, if this case is, as the Court suggests, within the central core of ‘deterrence’ standing, it is impossible to imagine what the ‘outer limits’ could possibly be. The Court’s expressed reluctance to define those outer limits serves only to disguise the fact that it has promulgated a revolutionary new doctrine of standing that will permit the entire body of public civil penalties to be handed over to enforcement by private interests.”
— Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 208 (2000)


‘Hideous monster’
“If Congress can reach out and command even those furthest removed from an interstate market to participate in the market, then the Commerce Clause becomes a font of unlimited power, or in Hamilton’s words, ‘the hideous monster whose devouring jaws . . . spare neither sex nor age, nor high nor low, nor sacred nor profane.’ The Federalist No. 33, p. 202 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).”
— Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2623 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting)


‘Bulldozer of social engineering’
“As its instrument of destruction, the bulldozer of its social engineering, the Court invents a boundless, and boundlessly manipulable, test of psychological coercion, which promises to do for the Establishment Clause what the Durham rule did for the insanity defense. Today’s opinion shows more forcefully than volumes of argumentation why our Nation’s protection, that fortress which is our Constitution, cannot possibly rest upon the changeable philosophical predilections of the Justices of this Court, but must have deep foundations in the historic practices of our people.”
— Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631-632 (1992)


Grim fairy tales
“Certainly the books we give children to read—or read to them when they are younger—contain no shortage of gore. Grimm’s Fairy Tales, for example, are grim indeed. As her just deserts for trying to poison Snow White, the wicked queen is made to dance in red hot slippers ‘till she fell dead on the floor, a sad example of envy and jealousy.’ Cinderella’s evil stepsisters have their eyes pecked out by doves. And Hansel and Gretel (children!) kill their captor by baking her in an oven.”
— Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2736 (2011)


‘Torturing logic’
“And the argument not only tortures logic, it also distorts reality, resting as it does on the premise that henceforth no ‘responsible attorney’ will fail to include evidence supporting federal jurisdiction in a notice of removal. Even discounting the existence of irresponsible attorneys, but responsible attorneys, and even responsible judges, sometimes make mistakes.”
— Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U. S. __ (2014)


‘Orwellian’
“Despite the Court’s Orwellian assertion to the contrary, it is undeniable that later cases (discussed above) have undermined Miranda’s doctrinal underpinnings.”
— Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000)


Responsible lawyers
“Even in the legal utopia imagined by the Court—a world in which all lawyers are responsible and no lawyers make mistakes—it is easy to imagine ways in which the issue could come back to the circuit court.”
— Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U. S. __ (2014)


‘Special solicitude’ for lawyers
“The Court’s decision displays not only an improper special solicitude for our own profession; it also displays, I think, the very fondness for ‘reform through the courts’ – the making of innumerable social judgments through judge-pronounced constitutional imperatives – that prompted Congress to restrict publicly funded litigation of this sort.”
— Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 562 (2001)


‘Surely, you can’t be serious’
“Governmental ‘neutrality’ between religion and nonreligion? Who says so? Surely not the words of the Constitution. Surely not the history and traditions that reflect our society’s constant understanding of those words. Surely not even the current sense of our society, recently reflected in an Act of Congress criticizing a Court of Appeals opinion that had held ‘under God’ in the Pledge of Allegiance unconstitutional.”
— McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005)


Elementary
“As the Court colorfully puts it, if the dog of legislative history has not barked nothing of great significance can have transpired. Apart from the questionable wisdom of assuming that dogs will bark when something important is happening, we have forcefully and explicitly rejected the Conan Doyle approach to statutory construction in the past. In ascertaining the meaning of a statute, a court cannot, in the manner of Sherlock Holmes, pursue the theory of the dog that did not bark. We are here to apply the statute, not legislative history, and certainly not the absence of legislative history. Statutes are the law though sleeping dogs lie.”
—Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 406 (1991)


‘Illogical’; ‘obvious non sequitur’
“The Court, however, says (quite illogically) that it means the Tenth Circuit must have agreed with the District Court’s incorrect legal analysis. It is hard to imagine a more obvious non sequitur.”
— Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U. S. __ (2014)


‘Solomonic’
“The judgment in today’s case has an appearance of moderation and Solomonic wisdom, upholding as it does some portions of the injunction while disallowing others. That appearance is deceptive. The entire injunction in this case departs so far from the established course of our jurisprudence that in any other context it would have been regarded as a candidate for summary reversal.”
— Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (1994)


Omar the Tentmaker
“If forbidding peaceful, nonthreatening, but uninvited speech from a distance closer than eight feet is a ‘narrowly tailored’ means of preventing the obstruction of entrance to medical facilities (the governmental interest the State asserts), narrow tailoring must refer not to the standards of Versace, but to those of Omar the Tentmaker.”
— Hill v. Colo., 530 U.S. 703, 749 (2000)


‘Hollow’
“The Framers could not have envisioned such a hollow constitutional guarantee. No framing-era confrontation case that I know of, neither here nor in England, took such an enfeebled view of the right to confrontation ...

‘Transparently false’
“Today’s tale—a story of five officers conducting successive examinations of a dying man with the primary purpose, not of obtaining and preserving his testimony regarding his killer, but of protecting him, them, and others from a murderer somewhere on the loose—is so transparently false that professing to believe it demeans this institution ...

‘Faux’
“Today’s decision is not only a gross distortion of the facts. It is a gross distortion of the law—a revisionist narrative in which reliability continues to guide our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, at least where emergencies and faux emergencies are concerned.”

‘Judicial mischief’
“But reaching a patently incorrect conclusion on the facts is a relatively benign judicial mischief; it affects, after all, only the case at hand ...
— Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting)

‘Steamrolling’
“JUSTICE SOUTER’s steamrolling of the difference between civil authority held by a church and civil authority held by members of a church is breathtaking.…

‘Not logical’
“JUSTICE SOUTER not only does not adopt the logical assumption, he does not even give the New York Legislature the benefit of the doubt. The following is the level of his analysis…

‘Facile’
“I turn, next, to JUSTICE SOUTER’s second justification for finding an establishment of religion: his facile conclusion that the New York Legislature’s creation of the Kiryas Joel school district was religiously motivated. But in the Land of the Free, democratically adopted laws are not so easily impeached by unelected judges …

Diverse & multicultural
“I have little doubt that JUSTICE SOUTER would laud this humanitarian legislation if all of the distinctiveness of the students of Kiryas Joel were attributable to the fact that their parents were nonreligious commune dwellers, or American Indians, or gypsies. The creation of a special, one-culture school district for the benefit of those children would pose no problem …”
— Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994)


‘Sham’
“By accepting plaintiffs’ vague, contradictory, and unsubstantiated allegations of ‘concern’ about the environment as adequate to prove injury in fact, and accepting them even in the face of a finding that the environment was not demonstrably harmed, the Court makes the injury-in-fact requirement a sham. If there are permit violations, and a member of a plaintiff environmental organization lives near the offending plant, it would be difficult not to satisfy today’s lenient standard.”
— Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.(TOC),Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)


‘Cavalier’
“The Court’s treatment of the redressability requirement–which would have been unnecessary if it resolved the injury-in-fact question correctly–is equally cavalier.”
— Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.(TOC),Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)


‘Unprincipled’
“The Court attempts to bolster its conclusion with an unprincipled and unequal application of the waiver doctrine.”
— Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U. S. __ (2014)


‘Irrational’
“To avoid the question of Roe v. Wade’s validity, with the attendant costs that this will have for the Court and for the principles of self-governance, on the basis of a standard that offers no guide but the Court’s own discretion, merely adds to the irrationality of what we do today. Similarly irrational is the new concept that Justice O’Connor introduces into the law in order to achieve her result, the notion of a State’s ‘interest in potential life when viability is possible.’ Since ‘viability’ means the mere possibility (not the certainty) of survivability outside the womb, ‘possible viability’ must mean the possibility of a possibility of survivability outside the womb.”
— Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989)


‘Fortunate fit of stupidity’
“The Constitution is not, unlike the Miranda majority, offended by a criminal’s commendable qualm of conscience or fortunate fit of stupidity.”
— Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 449-450 (2000)


Rights for man, not polar bears
“All the provisions of the Bill of Rights set forth the rights of individual men and women – not, for example, of trees or polar bears.”
— Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 391-392 (2010)


‘Boutique of wonderful litigation’
“And in other areas, of course, a whole new boutique of wonderful First Amendment litigation opens its doors. Must a parade permit, for example, be issued to a group that refuses to provide its identity, or that agrees to do so only under assurance that the identity will not be made public? Must a municipally owned theater that is leased for private productions book anonymously sponsored presentations? Must a government periodical that has a ‘letters to the editor’ column disavow the policy that most newspapers have against the publication of anonymous letters? Must a public university that makes its facilities available for a speech by Louis Farrakhan or David Duke refuse to disclose the on-campus or off-campus group that has sponsored or paid for the speech? Must a municipal ‘public-access’ cable channel permit anonymous (and masked) performers? The silliness that follows upon a generalized right to anonymous speech has no end.”
— McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 381 (1995)


If you abhor it, it must be unconstitutional
“The interpretive philosophy of the ‘living constitution’ – a document whose meaning changes to suit the times, as the Supreme Court sees the times – continues to predominate in the courts, and in the law schools. Indeed, it even predominates in the perception of the ordinary citizen, who has come to believe that what he violently abhors must be unconstitutional.”
— Antonin Scalia, Forword to Originalism: A Quarter-Century of Debate, 43 (Steven G. Calabresi, ed. Regnery Publishing 2007).


‘More than doubly ... plus a little’
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You think the Treaty gives you a more compelling governmental interest than the Controlled Substances Act?
MR. KNEEDLER: I certainly do. And the two together, I think, are doubly compelling, because the Government -- the United States has a compelling interest in encouraging this, and section 801(a) --
JUSTICE SCALIA: More than doubly. It has to be doubly, plus a little, if you said that one is even more than the other.
— Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal, 2005 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 48 (U.S. Trans. 2005)

 Do_I_Not_Like_That wrote:
People will rightfully say that I'm not American, nor am I a lawyer or an expert on American constitutional law, but I believe his judgement on the Heller case woefully misinterpreted the original intent of the 2nd amendment, as written by James Madison.

 AlmightyWalrus wrote:
The same way that "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" are inalienable rights until someone gets jailed?

 whembly wrote:
Scalia's Heller ruling is text book definition of a "Constitutional Interpretation". And, that is, that this right is inalienable. It belongs to individuals. It belongs to citizens.
It is a right on which no government can infringe... without consequence.

 ScootyPuffJunior wrote:

 whembly wrote:
Scalia's Heller ruling is text book definition of a "Constitutional Interpretation". And, that is, that this right is inalienable. It belongs to individuals. It belongs to citizens.
It is a right on which no government can infringe... without consequence.

In affirming that the Second Amendment granted citizens to right to own a firearm unconnected to service in a militia, the Court also held that it is not an absolute right.

“The Second Amendment implicitly recognizes the pre-existence of the right and declares only that it ‘shall not be infringed’ … this is not a right granted by the Constitution.”

“Nowhere else in the Constitution does a ‘right’ attributed to ‘the people’ refer to anything other than an individual right.”

 whembly wrote:

 AlmightyWalrus wrote:
The same way that "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" are inalienable rights until someone gets jailed?

I'm not sure what you're asking here...

 AlmightyWalrus wrote:

 whembly wrote:

 AlmightyWalrus wrote:
The same way that "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" are inalienable rights until someone gets jailed?

I'm not sure what you're asking here...

The US is supposedly founded on the idea of inalienable human rights, as laid out in the Declaration of Independence, but these inalienable rights were apparently alienable enough that imprisonment wasn't banned by the constitution. Why is the right to own guns inalienable when the very reason for the US existing as a sovereign nation in the first place isn't?

 whembly wrote:

 Do_I_Not_Like_That wrote:
People will rightfully say that I'm not American, nor am I a lawyer or an expert on American constitutional law, but I believe his judgement on the Heller case woefully misinterpreted the original intent of the 2nd amendment, as written by James Madison.

You do know that James Madison wasn't he only founder of the US Constitution... right?

Scalia's Heller ruling is text book definition of a "Constitutional Interpretation". And, that is, that this right is inalienable. It belongs to individuals. It belongs to citizens.
It is a right on which no government can infringe... without consequence.

Same thing as his Kelo Eminent Domain ruling... which was an epic dissent.

 AlmightyWalrus wrote:
How much clearer can I get? If the US was founded with the belief that there are inalienable, universal rights, as the Declaration of Independence claims, and the state is allowed to take away two of the three "inalienable" rights used as examples (life and liberty), how is the right to own guns inalienable? Why is it that guns are sacrosanct when life and liberty clearly are not?

 djones520 wrote:
I doubt it. Going after Obama won't do much, since he's a "lame duck". Their going to continue hammering on Clinton/Sanders more.

 whembly wrote:
Here's a few:

“The Second Amendment implicitly recognizes the pre-existence of the right and declares only that it ‘shall not be infringed’ … this is not a right granted by the Constitution.”

An important distinction... no?

 Gordon Shumway wrote:
Because any argument to do so is not only hypocritical, but will fall flat on its face with voters.

 Ouze wrote:
Well, what do they have to lose? Their 12% approval rating?

 Co'tor Shas wrote:

 Gordon Shumway wrote:
Because any argument to do so is not only hypocritical, but will fall flat on its face with voters.

To quote a great man...

 Ouze wrote:
Well, what do they have to lose? Their 12% approval rating?

 Gordon Shumway wrote:
12% nationally, what are they looking like in their own districts where they actually have to get elected. Of course with the gerrymandering the way it is, it probably doesn't matter. Then again, a gerrymandering case is going up before the SC this year and with one less vote, it will likely get kicked back to the lower courts.

 LordofHats wrote:
It's highly unlikely the GOP can stall a nominee for 300 days. Obama is gonna pick someone and they're in all likely hood going to get in.

 AlmightyWalrus wrote:
How much clearer can I get? If the US was founded with the belief that there are inalienable, universal rights, as the Declaration of Independence claims, and the state is allowed to take away two of the three "inalienable" rights used as examples (life and liberty), how is the right to own guns inalienable? Why is it that guns are sacrosanct when life and liberty clearly are not?

EDIT: I suppose I'm arguing against a dead man. We're getting closer to yet another gun thread, so I'll drop it.

 Gordon Shumway wrote:

 Co'tor Shas wrote:

 Gordon Shumway wrote:
Because any argument to do so is not only hypocritical, but will fall flat on its face with voters.

To quote a great man...

 Ouze wrote:
Well, what do they have to lose? Their 12% approval rating?

12% nationally, what are they looking like in their own districts where they actually have to get elected. Of course with the gerrymandering the way it is, it probably doesn't matter. Then again, a gerrymandering case is going up before the SC this year and with one less vote, it will likely get kicked back to the lower courts.

 Ouze wrote:
Just change the URL to 416, I think. You're talking about a vote in 1960, right?

 sebster wrote:

 Gordon Shumway wrote:
12% nationally, what are they looking like in their own districts where they actually have to get elected. Of course with the gerrymandering the way it is, it probably doesn't matter. Then again, a gerrymandering case is going up before the SC this year and with one less vote, it will likely get kicked back to the lower courts.

It's the senate that approves. State lines are screwy at times, but it'd be a stretch to call them gerrymandered

 Co'tor Shas wrote:

Edit: And secondly, why should they hold out? Why should the ignore their constitutional duties to play a partisan game?

 whembly wrote:

 Co'tor Shas wrote:

Edit: And secondly, why should they hold out? Why should the ignore their constitutional duties to play a partisan game?

Advise & Consent *is* there Constitutional duty.

It's not "Advise & Confirm".

 ScootyPuffJunior wrote:

 whembly wrote:

 Co'tor Shas wrote:

Edit: And secondly, why should they hold out? Why should the ignore their constitutional duties to play a partisan game?

Advise & Consent *is* there Constitutional duty.

It's not "Advise & Confirm".

And by failing to advise and consent they are not fulfilling their constitutional obligation. And of course we all know that "advice and consent" is taken to mean holding some hearings and then putting it to a vote, unless we pretend that none of those things are actually how it works because this time is "different."

Which of course you are because you're pretty much just, unsurprisingly, repeating Ted Cruz and the National Review right now.

 ScootyPuffJunior wrote:

 whembly wrote:

 Co'tor Shas wrote:

Edit: And secondly, why should they hold out? Why should the ignore their constitutional duties to play a partisan game?

Advise & Consent *is* there Constitutional duty.

It's not "Advise & Confirm".

And by failing to advise and consent they are not fulfilling their constitutional obligation. And of course we all know that "advice and consent" is taken to mean holding some hearings and then putting it to a vote, unless we pretend that none of those things are actually how it works because this time is "different."

Which of course you are because you're pretty much just, unsurprisingly, repeating Ted Cruz and the National Review right now.

 Grey Templar wrote:

 ScootyPuffJunior wrote:

 whembly wrote:

 Co'tor Shas wrote:

Edit: And secondly, why should they hold out? Why should the ignore their constitutional duties to play a partisan game?

Advise & Consent *is* there Constitutional duty.

It's not "Advise & Confirm".

And by failing to advise and consent they are not fulfilling their constitutional obligation. And of course we all know that "advice and consent" is taken to mean holding some hearings and then putting it to a vote, unless we pretend that none of those things are actually how it works because this time is "different."

Which of course you are because you're pretty much just, unsurprisingly, repeating Ted Cruz and the National Review right now.

You do realize that they have every right to say No to his nominations. Yes is not the only answer they are allowed to have.

 Kanluwen wrote:

 Grey Templar wrote:

 ScootyPuffJunior wrote:

 whembly wrote:

 Co'tor Shas wrote:

Edit: And secondly, why should they hold out? Why should the ignore their constitutional duties to play a partisan game?

Advise & Consent *is* there Constitutional duty.

It's not "Advise & Confirm".

And by failing to advise and consent they are not fulfilling their constitutional obligation. And of course we all know that "advice and consent" is taken to mean holding some hearings and then putting it to a vote, unless we pretend that none of those things are actually how it works because this time is "different."

Which of course you are because you're pretty much just, unsurprisingly, repeating Ted Cruz and the National Review right now.

You do realize that they have every right to say No to his nominations. Yes is not the only answer they are allowed to have.

That's not what Scooty is suggesting here. The point is that while they certainly do have every right to turn down his nominations, they should behave in good faith. None of this garbage about how he "can't" make a nomination during an election year for example.

McConnell and Friends have already made it clear that they are going to drag their heels on any nominations.

Seaward wrote:
Yeah but when my side does it I can make the argument that it's noble, or at least pretend like it's not happening so I can screech about it when the other side does it next cycle.

 whembly wrote:

I mean... here's Chuckie going on record saying that the Senate not only has the right but the *duty* to block SC nominees from a lame-duck President. Only with an extraordinary nominee should the Senate confirm such an appointment.

 ScootyPuffJunior wrote:

 whembly wrote:

I mean... here's Chuckie going on record saying that the Senate not only has the right but the *duty* to block SC nominees from a lame-duck President. Only with an extraordinary nominee should the Senate confirm such an appointment.

Did you actually listen to what he said? I'm guessing not, because he never said that they have to block nominees from a "lame-duck President" (which of course Obama isn't), he said they have the right to not confirm someone with what he considered fringe ideological beliefs to prevent Court imbalance.

Of course Breitbert is spinning it more or less the same way you are (shocking, I know), so like with so many things, what you believe is more important than what's true.

 whembly wrote:

Hey, they're only following the lead of Chuckie Schumer in 2007:

 whembly wrote:
And how likely do *you* believe that Obama will nominate a Scalia candidate? To maintain "a court balance"??

Exactly.

¿Qué?

Don't read that site... it's a trainwreck.

Maybe you should lay off the TPM/Vox sauce... eh?

 Tannhauser42 wrote:

 whembly wrote:

Hey, they're only following the lead of Chuckie Schumer in 2007:

Didn't I just say in the political thread "the excuse "but they did it, too/first" belongs on the elementary school playground."?

EDIT: Just out of curiosity, if the Senate failing to approve judges in a timely manner leads to a delay in court cases being heard, could not then the Senate be sued for denying someone's right to a speedy trial?

 skyth wrote:
So Whembly keeps up the same disproven lie about 2007...

Automatically Appended Next Post:

 ScootyPuffJunior wrote:

 whembly wrote:
And how likely do *you* believe that Obama will nominate a Scalia candidate? To maintain "a court balance"??

Exactly.

Why do you keep trying to reframe what we're talking about every time I show you that what you said is utter bs? This isn't whether or not Obama will nominate a Scalia-type candidate in the least bit, it's you repeating lies you've read in the derposphere like they're the gospel truth and then actively rooting for the Senate to not do their fething job because you think childish games of "well they said" are a valid excuse to do it (while of course complaining about the fact that they did it) because it's Obama.

But since you asked, I think Fox's 'shortlist' is a pretty good roundup of who will probably get the nomination, particularly Sri Srinivasan or Patricia Millett (both of which are non-ideological moderates from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit). Slate also had them on top of their shortlist as well. I think Srinivasan is the best choice, especially considering he was nominated to the Appeals Court with a 97-0 vote in the Senate and backed by Ted Cruz. The SCOTUSblog's Tom Goldstein thinks the most likely pick is Attorney General Loretta Lynch (his first choice wasNinth Circuit Judge Paul Watford) and he also thinks that a nominee will get a vote.

¿Qué?

Don't read that site... it's a trainwreck.

Maybe you should lay off the TPM/Vox sauce... eh?

Right, there you go again, trying to claim I read some website with no actual proof while you literally regurgitate talking points from Breitbert/The Blaze/Fox News et al. mere hours after the articles post (all websites I actually read, which is how I can spot your use of their articles). Like most stooges that get caught red-handed, you try to shift the conversation away from yourself instead of just fessing up to what we all know is right. Of course you think that because I can rationally dismantled all of you inane talking points and outright lies, I must be on the "TPM (whatever the feth that is) and Vox 'sauce.'" But yeah Whembly, you caught me... I read liberal news sources (just not the ones you think) and I disagree with them. I also read conservative news sources and disagree with them.

I honestly don't think there is a less intellectually dishonest poster in the OT than you: willful ignorance, false analogies, double standards, etc... a veritable greatest hits list of what not do in a conversation.

 Ouze wrote:
At least we're no longer paying lip service to each other about how all they are is umpires, calling balls and strikes, huh?

Finally, we can all just admit they're politicians in robes, pretending to be judges.

 whembly wrote:

Nah... it needs to be a rock-solid conservative imo, otherwise, the GOP Senate should simply say "Nein".

 dogma wrote:

 whembly wrote:

Nah... it needs to be a rock-solid conservative imo, otherwise, the GOP Senate should simply say "Nein".

What is a "rock-solid conservative"?

 whembly wrote:

 dogma wrote:

 whembly wrote:

Nah... it needs to be a rock-solid conservative imo, otherwise, the GOP Senate should simply say "Nein".

What is a "rock-solid conservative"?

Scalia or Clerance Thomas?

 whembly wrote:

Scalia or Clerance Thomas?

 dogma wrote:

 whembly wrote:

Scalia or Clerance Thomas?

That isn't an answer, that is a platitude. You clearly don't know what a "rock-solid conservative" is.

 whembly wrote:

You clearly don't know that I don't know...

 dogma wrote:

 whembly wrote:

You clearly don't know that I don't know...

If you don't know, why are you so certain that the Senate should block any Obama appointee who isn't a "rock-solid conservative"?

 whembly wrote:
I ain't reframing gak as anytime an ideological opponent of yours tries to make a point, you want to gak on it on a very schadenboner style. It's about *you* framing a rather one-side conversation about how gakky conservative ideas and generally anything Republicans doing *stuff*.

Nah... it needs to be a rock-solid conservative imo, otherwise, the GOP Senate should simply say "Nein".

Good for you.

You'd be wrong.

 d-usa wrote:
This is the GOP Senate version of being able to win the Super Bowl and deciding to go with the pass play instead of running it.

 ScootyPuffJunior wrote:

Nah... it needs to be a rock-solid conservative imo, otherwise, the GOP Senate should simply say "Nein".

Right, which is proof that the system isn't working as intended, something you celebrate. God forbid we have a moderate jurist with that is non-ideological. The entire country might fething collapse.

 d-usa wrote:
They have everything to lose.

- "they appoint justices" is always a talking point in elections, but knowing that Cruz will appoint a direct representative of his theologically influenced view of the constitution will hurt them during the election.

- "they approve justices" is a bad thing for the very vulnerable senate seats that the GOP is trying to keep this election.
- the lower courts are packed with Obama appointments, and they are going to rule against every decision from the conservative district judges that will be "affirmed" by the SCOTUS due to the tie because they won't affect the liberal circuits.
- they have a huge bargaining chip right now to force concessions from Obama in order for him to get another appointment.

This is the GOP Senate version of being able to win the Super Bowl and deciding to go with the pass play instead of running it.

 whembly wrote:

I'm actually not so certain that this Senate *could* successfully block an Obama appointee to be honest.

 whembly wrote:

However, recognize that this senate has nothing to lose to hold out till November.

 whembly wrote:
But, not Bork.

 ScootyPuffJunior wrote:

 whembly wrote:
I ain't reframing gak as anytime an ideological opponent of yours tries to make a point, you want to gak on it on a very schadenboner style. It's about *you* framing a rather one-side conversation about how gakky conservative ideas and generally anything Republicans doing *stuff*.

No Whembly, that's what you're trying to do, except it's "if the Democrats do it, it's bad but it's okay if Republicans do it because Obama." Unlike you, I don't have a team other than honesty which is why I'm holding you accountable to the stupid gak that spills out of your keyboard.

Case in point: you repeated an exact claim from Breitbart with video "proof" to back it up that, when you actually listen to it, says nothing that you were claiming. However, because you automatically assume that because someone tells you that you're wrong, they've obviously on the other "team" and agree with the exact opposite.

I'm not claiming that Schumer was in the right in his comments, I'm telling you that your (repeated) characterization of them is wrong. Just like you were wrong when you repeated the National Report and Ted Cruz's claim about "NOT appointing justices in an election year."

 ScootyPuffJunior wrote:
The President has a constitutional obligation to nominate a qualified person to fill the seat left vacant by Justice Scalia's passing just like Congress has the constitutional obligation to to confirm that nomination. In case you and the people you vote for have forgotten, that's how this system works.

Nah... it needs to be a rock-solid conservative imo, otherwise, the GOP Senate should simply say "Nein".

Right, which is proof that the system isn't working as intended, something you celebrate. God forbid we have a moderate jurist with that is non-ideological. The entire country might fething collapse.

 whembly wrote:

 Ouze wrote:
Except this exact same thing DID happen, with Reagan, with Kennedy, and he was confirmed 97-0.

But, not Bork.

 Ouze wrote:

 whembly wrote:
But, not Bork.

Right, which again indicates more that there was a specific problem with Bork as a nominee, then an organized partisan bloc dedicated to blocking ANY nominee in an election year. So, the exact opposite of what the GOP is now presumably going to do, as requested by the current GOP front-runners.

They refuse to confirm so-and-so in an up and down vote, that's fair. If there is no vote for ANY nominee, they won't even consider any nominee, that's different and ridiculous.

Spoiler:

 d-usa wrote:

 whembly wrote:

 Ouze wrote:
Except this exact same thing DID happen, with Reagan, with Kennedy, and he was confirmed 97-0.

But, not Bork.

- Bork was nominated on 7/1/87
- Senate Democrats gave their reasons for why they don't like Bork.
- The Senate Judiciary Committee had confirmation hearings.
- The Senate Judiciary Committee voted against him on 10/6/87
- The full Senate voted against him on 10/23/87 with a 42-58 vote and 6 Republicans voting against him as well.

The whole process took 121 days (my math might be off for a couple days).

I for one look forward to being educated on how opposing a particular nominee, holding committee hearings and voting on the committee level, and then proceeding with a vote of the full senate, and striking down a Justice nomination in 121 days (followed up by hearings of another Justice who withdrew due to drug use, and followed up by the approval of Kennedy after 65(?) days) is exactly like opposing every hypothetical nomination that Obama could possible put forward and going on record that there will be no hearings and no votes for the next year.

 whembly wrote:
The ball is in Obama's court... to nominate someone that's agreeable to the GOP Senate.

 whembly wrote:

Again...

Obama needs to nominate someone who would be agreeable for the GOP Senate.

There's no need to go through all that if Obama nominates another Sotomeyer/Kegan.

 d-usa wrote:

They can be the first Senate to refuse to do their job altogether for a year, and reap the damage from that, or they can realize that they have a very powerful bargaining chip and use it to their advantage.

 whembly wrote:

Absolutely, they "should"... I don't don't have any confidence that'll happen.

 whembly wrote:

Meaningless.