Proof


Final

Proof


Final

Proof


Final

Proof

Proof


Final

Proof


Final

Proof


final









[code]

Proof

Proof


Final

Proof


final

Proof


final

Proof


final

Proof

Proof


Final

Proof

Proof


final

Proof


Final

Proof


final

Proof


Final

Proof

Proof


final

Proof


Final

Proof


final

Proof


Final

Proof

Proof:


final

[url=https://www.dakkadakka.com/gallery/928861-Burna%20Boyz%2C%20Burnas%2C%20Orks%2C%20Tank%20Busta%2C%20Tank%20Buster%2C%20Tankbustas%2C%20Tankbusters.html][/url

Proof


final

Proof


final

Proof


final

Proof


Final

Proof


final

Proof


Final

How far was decolonisation in India the product of nationalism?

The end of the British Raj was the first and arguably the largest step in the astoundingly rapid break-up of the British Empire over the course of the second half of the 21st Century. It took place just after the British had paradoxically both secured victory over the Axis Powers, yet its cities and industry were left in ruins and its economy had been decimated. It was against this backdrop that the ‘scuttle’ of 1947 the Labour government had been trying to avoid in 1946 took place. The eventual collapse of British rule in India can be attributed to a number of factors, broadly brought under four different concepts. First, the nationalism of the Indians themselves. In recent years there has been an increased focus from historians such as Phillipa Levine on the nationalism of the colonial subjects of the Empire, and India is no exception. However, there are more factors to consider, such as the ‘Metropolitan’ school that attributes the end of Empire to a change in British attitude, the impact of the USA, as well as the economic impact of the two world wars, a view heavily supported by Niall Ferguson in his book Empire. This essay will align itself more with the three latter reasons rather than the argument that India nationalism was the caused the end of British rule. It seems that nationalism was not the driving force, merely a catalyst. For the purposes of this essay, nationalism refers to the ideas of national identity and the organisations that acted on those ideas. Instead, the economic and political situation in Britain required for empire had been deteriorating since World War I (WWI), and as such Britain had neither the ability nor the willpower to hold onto India. That said, it is notable that Indian nationalism was so strong and developed by 1945 that it was the first territory to be given independence after World War II (WWII), despite its fragmentary nature. Put another way, whilst the decolonisation of India was inevitable due to the metropolitan and economic situations, the growth of nationalism forced Britain to leave India almost as soon as WWII was over, rather than later. The international politics of the time is not highly significant, especially before the Suez Crisis and the first active intervention by the USA to help end Empire, however, it should be noted that America had a very dim view of Empire and this was important to the process of decolonisation, especially when combined with the economic ties between Britain and the USA created by WWII.

Early Indian nationalism, from the formation of the Indian National Congress (INC) to the events of WWI, prompted some changes in the British rule, however, it achieved little on its own. Instead, the greatest achievement of early Indian nationalism was creating an increase in nationalist conciseness. Indeed, this was the aim of the earliest manifestation of Indian nationalism, the INC. From the outset, its first president, Bonnerji said the main practical effect desired was the “Growth of national feelings and the unity of Indians.” It must be remembered that when the British took control of the Indian Subcontinent, it was a large area of different nations, not a unified national entity. Before there could be ‘all-Indian’ independence there had to be a growth of all-India sentiment. In this way, the early nationalists did nothing to directly cause independence, merely indirectly helped by laying the ideological foundations. The second major objective of the early congress was to create a common platform around which political workers in different parts of the country could gather and conduct their political activities, educating and mobilising the people on an all-India basis. In this the early INC was highly successful, by the end of WWI, it had firmly established itself as the largest mass-movement in India, and amongst all colonial nationalism movements. In addition to this long-term achievement, the short-term achievements of early Indian Nationalism need to be considered. An increase of peaceful and violent challenges to British rule after the turn of the century had been brought about by the dissemination of swaraj or ‘self-rule’. Faced with these disturbances, the government offered a limited electorate in 1909, but in 1910 instituted a draconian press censorship act that undercut the small concession of 1909. This pattern of concession followed by crackdown would endure for decades, each time sparking further anti-colonial militancy. It seems clear then that the colonial powers were not seriously threatened by the activates of the early nationalists. The concessions helped keep the peace, however, the military and political control the colonial powers exerted meant these protests achieved nothing of substance. This is especially clear with the Ghadar movement. Many Punjabi immigrants, usually peasants and former soldiers had come to the USA and Canada from 1904 and received sustained unfair treatment. This resulted in sustained agitation up until the war and the creation of a shared nationalist ideal amongst many of the immigrants. The Gahdar movement began in 1913 and was expressly militant. The outbreak of the war led to calls for action and many of the Ghadar returned to India to start the revolt. The British government of India, well aware of this, passed the Ingress into India Ordinance and waited for the returning emigrants. They allowed the safe emigrants home, locked up the dangerous emigrants and forced the less dangerous emigrants to stay in their villages. Of an estimated 8000 retuning emigrants 5000 were allowed to proceed, but up to February 1915 189 had been interned and 704 restricted to their villages. It is clear that the British authorities had control of the situation beyond the abilities of the Gahdaris to dislodge them. Again it is shown that this early nationalism did not achieve much of its own. However, the Ghadaris continued to try and stoke rebellion, yet found Punjab very unresponsive, and despite their touring villages and trying to make army units mutiny, they were unsuccessful. Rash Behari Bose, a prominent revolutionary from Bengal was brought in as a leader to organise the Ghadar movement. It was organised that a mutiny would be staged on the 19th of February, but the Government’s Criminal Investigation Department had penetrated the movement at all levels. Most of the leaders were arrested, although Bose escaped. The Ghadar movement was crushed, and the British authorities held conspiracy trials in Punjab, executing 45 revolutionaries and sending 200 into long terms of imprisonment. Whist the Gahdar movement had helped cement a nationalist sentiment in parts of India, “It appeared that violent opposition to British rule was fated to fail.” The crushing of the Ghadar movement highlights how the British were in supreme control until much later in the colony’s history. Tying into the wider argument surrounding the causes of decolonisation, and how far was decolonisation in India the product of nationalism, although the militancy of Indian nationalism increased and its ideas were spread, the British still had economic and military power, and early nationalism was no threat to British rule.

Indian nationalism after WWI steadily grew, and achieved much, however it is hard to determine how far eventual decolonisation was caused by nationalism rather than nationalism exacerbating other factors, which will be discussed later. Throughout the war, there had bene a growing movement of peaceful civil disobedience encouraged by Gandhi and other nationalists who believed that India was owed greater independence for its forced contribution to the war. However, all Indians who served were volunteers, and enthusiastic ones at that. Whilst there were 3 mutinies by Muslim soldiers fighting in Iraq, these were the exception to the rule. Like the white soldiers of Britain and the dominions, the colonial troops only questioned the demands the empire made of them when they were ill-treated. The military power of Britain was not shaken by any spread of nationalism. It was in this context of growing unrest, yet military stability that Edwin Montague, Secretary of State for India, said there would be a move to self-governance for India, in vague terms. The actual changes in government that followed were minimal, displaying again that without outside factors, nationalism alone was not sufficient to dislodge British power, indeed, the Rowlatt Acts kept in place the emergency war measures which allowed trial without jury and internment without trial. This led to serious protests, marked by the Amritsar Massacre in April 1919 where General Dyer ordered his men to fire into a crowd. The subsequent failure of the British government to meaningfully punish Dyer bolstered Indian anti-colonial nationalism and made Britain’s claims to be a civilising coloniser seem hollow. By 1920 a major campaign of non-cooperation was in full swing. The British responded by enacting The Government of India Act, 1919, creating a dyarchy where both Whites and Indians served in ministerial offices. 3 of the 7 ministers on the executive council were to be Indian, and Indians were to serve in the provincial councils. The law increased the size of the electorate, however, the changes were cosmetic, as the nationalists were well aware. . Legislation from the provinces could be vetoed by the governor-general and the Indian ministers were assigned to softer positions like health and agriculture, rather than policing or revenue. The Indian princes were also brought into the new system in a chamber of princes that the British hoped would act as a conservative counter to radical nationalism. These reforms did nothing to help, causing a swell of nationalist activism in the 20s and 30s. Urban rioting and civil disobedience increased. Calcutta suffered 40 riots in 1926 alone. This led to increasingly punitive military responses from the British. Again, the activities of nationalists were not actually achieving decolonisation, the British simply increased the force used. However, and partly because of the effects of WWI, as will be discussed, the British had to pass some legislation, to placate nationalists whilst maintaining the support of pro-imperialists at home. The Government of India Act, 1935, extended dyarchy to central government while the provincial councils were awarded full self-government. The electorate remained limited (around 30 million) and defence and foreign policy were still reserves of the governor-general. Nonetheless election results in 1937 saw the INC take an absolute majority in 6 of the 11 provinces and form a government in 7 of them. It seems then that Indian nationalism, whilst not actually causing decolonisation, was forcing the British hand.

However, the outbreak of WWII in 1939 put an end to this political experiment. INC leaders resigned in protest at Britain once again declaring war on India’s behalf without consultation. The contrast with the Dominions, where leaders had the right to declare war or not on their own behalf hammered home the different treatment of the white settler colonies and of India. Whilst this incensed the nationalists, it demonstrated the level of control the British maintained, as their resignation had no effect on the participation of British India in WWII. In 1942 the widespread ‘Quit India’ movement was put down in six weeks with the simple arresting of Gandhi and the other leaders, censoring the press and reinforcing the police with troops. The other notable Indian nationalist movement during the war was Bose’s Indian National Army, which had by 1943 11,000 soldiers and another 20,00 in training. However, Bose’s Indian National Army proved to be of little military value. The only serious threat to the British in India were the Japanese divisions in Burma, and they were defeated decisively by the Indian Army at Imphal (March-June 1944). This shows how weak the nationalists actually were, and despite Bose’s efforts, many Indians served faithfully, and stories of Japanese atrocities improved morale. Overall 2.5 million men volunteered for the Indian Army, a stunning show of loyalty. Wartime nationalism did not unseat the British, the after effects of the war had to come about before nationalism could succeed.

It must also be remembered that even at independence, when the Congress ideology of Indian nationalism appeared to have gained dominance, other and often opposed viewpoints were not dormant. Gandhi’s ‘Ramrajya’ thought entailed a very decentralised state, more of a loose collection of largely autonomous local authorities. The Congress rejected Gandhi’s ideas as it wanted to inherit the state at independence and control its power so it could pursue its own interests as the political trustee of the Indian bourgeois and elite. The ‘Ramrajya’ would require a sharing of power with the rest of society that was unacceptable as it would interfere with the Congress’s project. The administrative unity that the British had brought did not equate to a unity of nationalist consciousness that could push for decolonisation as a homogenous body. India was a place of diverse political and religious background, and it showed in the various forms of nationalist thought that emerged. The emergence of the Muslim League in the 1930s as the INC’s main rival caused serious division. Gandhi and the younger leaders of the INC such as Nehru wanted an inclusive concept of anti-colonial populist nationalism. Jinnah’s Muslim League rapidly moved from a position of advocating the Muslim community’s political interests within an overarching nationalist movement to advocating for Partition. This was exacerbated by the overlap the INC had with the Hindu Mahasabah, an explicitly Hindu nationalist group. Whilst the INC may have claimed secularism, three factors helped destroy the credibility of the INC’s secular credentials. First, leaders with one foot in the INC and another in the Hindu Mahasabah as well as Hindi-minded congress leaders, undermined the credibility of the congress as a secular nationalist body. Second, Gandhi’s attempt to mix religion and politics as a universal common denominator led to the misunderstanding that he was pushing a Hindu nationalism. Muslim League leaders persuaded the Muslim masses that the INC was a Hindu organisation masquerading as an all-India movement with a few token Muslims. Third, the ‘holier-than-thou’ secularism of Nehru and he left-of-centre elements of the INC were deeply resented by the Muslim League, for example in the 1937 elections the Muslim League’s desire for two ministerial places was refused on the grounds the INC would not interact with non-secular parties It is clear that the nationalist forces were quite split. The division in the nationalist discourse weakened the movement for an independent India. Clearly, nationalism of this kind alone could not have caused decolonisation, the answer lies in other factors which, when combined with the nationalist movement, created a situation where Britain could no longer hold onto India.

An important factor in the decolonisation of India was the change in British attitude. Returning to Amritsar, it seems to be the first visible turning point within the context of India. To the nationalists, Dyer was not punished according to his actions. To them, Dyer had fired into a gentle and unarmed crowd of men, women and children due to a combination of racism, aggression and revenge that was symptomatic of the bankruptcy of imperial rule. Previously, Dyer’s actions would have been treated as a necessary response to the threat of widespread disorder. However, after Montague’s change of rhetoric, a sacrifice was required. After an inquiry ordered by the Secretary of State, Dyer was criticized for making an ‘‘error of judgment’’ and retired on the grounds of ill health. His treatment sent a clear message to those upholding British power overseas that they could no longer count on their government’s automatic support and sympathy. When Montagu’s Government of India Act was introduced in December 1919, it permanently altered British rule. Instead of witnessing a new imposition of imperial strength after the military rebirth of WWI, the events of 1919 changed the attitude of Britain’s Indian administrators and undermined their control of the subcontinent. By handing over significant responsibilities to Indian politicians, hoping that this would not destabilize the Raj, Montagu set Britain on the road towards granting Indian independence. Whilst historians like Levine may see the Government of India act as minimalist concession making, as mentioned earlier, Lloyd is right to assert that it was the start of decolonization. A change in attitude had to come from the British for them to let go of the subcontinent, and once the reforms of government had started to loosen colonial power, it was very hard to reverse the change in attitude that led to the decolonization of India.

The other main building cause of the beginning of decolonisation was the economic and psychological impact of WWI and the changes in British policy that stemmed from it. The crisis of confidence in the Empire had its roots in the high cost of victory over Germany in WWI. The British Isles lost 750,000 men, 1/16 of all men from 15 to 50 years old. Economically, by 1920 there was a superficial return to normal, the gold standard was nominally restored and wartime control on capital movement lifted. However, the Empire’s economy was fundamentally broken. The creation of huge debts by the war was one reason, another was the hoarding of gold by the American and French banks. The biggest problem though was that economic policy, once based on liberal tenants that budgets should be balanced and banknotes converted to gold, was now subject to the whims of democratic politics, making investors less confident. Paying for the war had caused a tenfold increase in national debt, which consumed almost half the government’s budget by the mid-1920s. The decision to return to the overvalued 1914 gold standard condemned Britain to a decade of deflationary policies. As the 20s went on and unions held more power real wages increased and so did unemployment, and in January 32 at the height of the depression nearly 3 million people, close to a quarter of all insured workers, were unemployed. Yet compared to the US and Germany Britain did not do so badly, due to the creation of the Sterling Bloc, abandoning the gold standard and returning to the Empire markets. However, the control of and defence of the Empire became less important in the eyes of the British. Under pressure from voters to honour wartime pledges to build ‘homes fit for heroes’ and hospitals and schools, British politicians neglected then abandoned Imperial defence, cutting the defence budget by a third between 1922-32. Neville Chamberlain admitted as Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1934 that “It was impossible for us to contemplate a simultaneous war against Japan and Germany; we simply cannot afford the expenditure involved.” As chief of the Imperial General Staff, the one thought of General Archibald Mongomery-Massingberd between 1928-40 was to “postpone a war – not look ahead.” Britain had not yet totally abandoned its commitment to defending the empire, however, there had been a great change in British attitude due to the economic position Britain found itself in after WWI. This made it even weaker going into WWII, contributing heavily to the decolonisation of India.

WWII and its economic, phycological and political effects was the greatest factor in the decolonization of India. The political and economic effects were in many ways tied together. The British war effort had been dependent on massive loans from the United States and the liquidation of overseas assets. This meant that by the end of WWII, Britain was overspending its own income by over £2,000 million a year, its industry was worn out and it had lost 2/3rds of the value of its exports. The labour government was forced to negotiate a loan from the US of $3.75 billion. As a condition sterling had to be fully convertible to the dollar by July 1947, effectively ending the Sterling Bloc that Britain had been relying on. N White believes Britain was suffering from ‘imperial overstretch’, exacerbated by Labour. This is because when Labour won in July 1945, it brought in a mandate of domestic renovation and a welfare state, the NHS, the expansion of education, council housing, old age pensions, and unemployment insurance and nationalisation of the economy’s large industries and utilities. This all placed a fresh set of demands on an Exchequer already burdened by overseas commitments. In addition to Britain’s new domestic responsibilities, there is also the American problem to consider. Ferguson believes that without American assistance Britain’s war effort would have collapsed. Their lend lease was worth $26 billion, around double what could be borrowed from the colonies, Britain was totally dependent and an America with a very dim view of Empire. Politicians on both sides were reluctant to let go of Empire, Churchill declared that he had not become Prime Minister “in order to preside over the liquidation of the British empire” and Labour Home Secretary Herbert Morrison compared giving some colonies independence with “giving a child of ten a latch-key, a bank account and a shotgun.” However, the economic situation, combined with the changes in attitude had made keeping Empire, and the Raj, impossible. Exhausted by the cost of victory and unable to restart, as Japan and Germany could, Britain simply could not bear the costs of Empire. In the nineteenth century Britain had financed the chronic trade deficit with the income from its vast Empire. After the war Britain was in $40 billion debt to foreign accreditors. The foundations of the empire had been economic, and those foundations had been destroyed by the cost of the war. Another, though less important foundation stone of Empire was the idea of the White Man’s superiority over the Asiatic peoples. Ferguson argues that this was shattered by the early dominance of the Japanese in the war. The capture of Singapore, one of the Empire’s most prized possessions, and the treatment of White prisoners of war by the Japanese in front of the local population in Burma spread throughout India. As already mentioned, stories of Japanese atrocities helped the fighting spirit of the Indian Army volunteers, but that did not mean the image of the superior white man was not shattered. Additionally, the alliance with the Chinese, who were treated as equals, helped contribute to the desire for proper treatment of Indians. This grew if not traditional nationalist sentiment, it made it much harder to rule over India at a time when the British had no money to rule with.

At the end of 1946 the cabinet ruled out any attempts at holding onto India. In a letter written by Attlee to Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, Attlee sets out the main problems facing the Empire, firstly that “in the event of communal strife breaking out on a large scale, the Army would be split. This is admitted with regret by Indian officers who themselves are on the best of terms with their fellow officers of other communities.” Britain had lost the military control that had secured its position against nationalism before. Atlee goes on to explain that the changes in government that had occurred since WWI had left the British with no choice now, “Without the tens of thousands of lesser functionaries we could not carry on. In a typical district of one or two million population it is quite common for there to be only one or two white officials. Under the regime of constitutional governments, which have now been in existence with some intervals for a number of years, the loyalty of Indian officials is increasingly directed towards the Indian Governments and not to the British Raj. With the knowledge that the termination of British rule in India is not far off, how can you expect them not to look to the future?” He goes on to say, “You suggest that we are knuckling under at the first blow, but this entirely ignores the history of the past twenty-five years. I must ask you if you are prepared to take the strong hand in India, to announced that we intend to stay there and to put in enough troops to enforce our rule? This is to go back on the pledges that have been given by Governments of every political colour.” Atlee himself recognised that Empire simply was not sustainable. Britain could not turn back the clock from Montague’s reforms and the road of political enfranchisement ever since, and now that Britain had been shattered by WWII, it could not do anything but decolonise. Instead of the nationalists creating a situation that forced decolonisation, the situation meant nationalism could not be supressed as before, and decolonisation had to occur.

In February 1947 with rising violence and the refusal of the Muslim League to participate in constitution making, Atlee announced June 48 as the date for British withdrawal regardless of any League or INC agreement. Following another failed attempt at compromise, Mountbatten accepted partition, as did Atlee’s cabinet in 1947. India was not decolonised primarily because of Indian nationalism, it was decolonised because two world wars, and the economic dependence on America had created an economic situation where the British could not hold on, and whilst there were many in government during and immediately after WWII who did not want to leave the empire, there had also been an undermining of the ideological basis for empire both in the way WWII panned out and the policy decisions of previous British governments and colonial administrations. Indian Nationalism meant that Britain could not hold on in its weakened state, however, as this essay has shown, when ideologically and economically able, and even when not as able as the British would have liked, nationalism did not cause decolonisation in India.