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allied forces were already in europe by the end of 1943, the invasion of italy and germany's complete defeat in africa.

 Peregrine wrote:

 feeder wrote:
Japan's war plans always baffled me. Didn't they already know the US was a manufacturing colossus with vast resources? They must have known that the US could replace it's material losses very quickly. I don't see how the War in the Pacific could have gone any differently, even if Pearl Harbour had been successful (sank carriers too), it only would have dragged out the end result a few more years.

The plan was "the US has a lot of support for isolationist policies, if we cripple their navy and stop the immediate threat we can force them to agree to a peace treaty that gives us the territory we want without US interference". Japan (or at least some of Japanese leadership) knew that a long war would be bad, the idea was that it would be a short war where US production advantages don't matter. Unfortunately for Japan they completely misjudged US reactions to the attack on Pearl Harbor and got stuck with the long war they couldn't win.

They wanted to move fast, take as much as possible before the US could rebuild. Minus carriers they had free reign for 6-12 months to consolidate and take land and rescources. By time done they hopes to force US to tolerate it.

But...that failed badly.

There fact of keeping veteran air crew in action vs US pulling to training ment the air units lost the elite.
The US wwhere improving training, and general quality.

Lots of things like that tilted againt a a long war win for Japan.

You only need to read the production stats to realise that neither Germany nor Japan nor the two in combination could survive a long war against the combined output of the Allies. Admiral Yamamoto knew this in 1940, that is why he was pessimistic about the war.

Dickering about minor differences in quality of individual weapons, vehicles and troops is a distraction from the fact that western and Soviet industry massively outproduced the Axis with competitive equipment, and also manned these guns, planes, tanks and ships with decently trained crews.

 welshhoppo wrote:
And the Battle of Tsushima also spelt the downfall of the Japanese in WW2, it taught them a smaller force could take down a larger one with speed.

Which only goes so far once the USA starts spewing capital ships over the Pacific.

Tsushima taught lots of people lots of things. The only previous naval engagement in memory at the time was Austria-Hungary v Italy, the results of which led to a lot of senior naval commanders advocating the ram, of all things. Virtually all the heavier ships in the IJN came from British shipyards and were built from RN templates. Even the ones that weren't used British equipment (the Barr and Stroud rangefinder or Marconi wireless, for example). Naturally, everyone was desperate to see what would happen, it's why we pushed so hard to get RN observers on board.

It was the first modern fleet action, and informed naval strategy for the better part of the next two decades.

 Do_I_Not_Like_That wrote:
I don't deny the skill of the average German soldier, but for most of the latter end of the war, the Germans were on the defensive, and defence is easier than attack. The terrain in Italy and Normandy was a massive boost to the defending Germans, but when the situation was reversed, battle of the bulge, the Germans had a hell of a time trying to shift dug in American infantry, and ultimately, the delays cost them...

No argument there. The Germans in large part benefited from being on the offensive early in the war when the advantages lay with the attacker, and on the defensive late in the war when the natural advantages lay with the defender.

But none of that had anything to do with the comment you made. You said "That's another reason why German infantry had to be so good - they can't win a resource war, a war of attrition." That argument seems to rely on some kind of strange decision making process in which a country might decide their troops are good enough, they recognise that because they've got lots of them they won't bother to, you know, train them and stuff. It's very weird.

You also overlook the fact that one of the reasons why the Germans attacked France in 1940 was becuase they couldn't play the long game.

I didn't overlook it. The hell man? Here's fething me, fething posting in this fething thread;
"Probably the biggest factor before '43 was the British blockade, which gave the Germans some very acute shortages."

It wasn't raised in my response to you because it was completely irrelevant to the issues I was discussing with you.


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 welshhoppo wrote:
A lot of that comes from the fact that Germany went to war about four years too early. They were hoping no one would kick up a fuss about them invading Poland....

I'm not quite sure how they thought no one would, but hey they already had Austria and Czechoslovakia by then.

It was Hitler that left Munich furious. He expected it to give him the war he wanted, and was furious when he ended up instead getting all the stuff he wanted but no war.

Sure, Germany would be much better prepared in 4 years. But so would Britain and France, Germany had caught them on the hop, but they were playing catch up big time. Then there's Soviet Russia, who's delayed program of modernisation would have actually been in place (assuming Stalin didn't decide to kill everyone again). That would have given Russia the most modern army in the world, as well as the biggest.

It isn't so much about your own preparedness, but your preparedness relative to your enemies. 1940 was pretty much the best year for Hitler to go to war. That was the great bungle of Britain and France - they got walked in to the war, instead of realising that they should have fought earlier, before Germany's re-armament was in place, or later, when their own re-armament operations were in effect.


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 Frazzled wrote:
1. The French Char would be considered the first heavy in WWII. Its armor and firepower was substantially heavier than German armor-thus advancing driving the development of the PZIV.
2. Inversely the Soviets started the war with two heavies for their time: the T34 and the KV1. The KV1 was effectively the Tiger of 1941 and early 1942.

Read the sentence I actually wrote;
"It's reputation is really driven by it being the first heavy tank on the scene to carry a gun worthy of a heavy tank."

If I was stupid enough to think it was the first heavy tank, I would have written 'the first heavy tank'. But instead I wrote 'to carry a gun worthy of a heavy tank'... because that's the important distinction.

The KV-1 carried a 76mm gun that was very slightly modified and functionally identical to the 76mm in the T-34. The major variant carried a 152mm howitzer, which is scary if you're trying to hide in a foxhole, but it isn't a dedicated tank killer.

The French Char B1 carried a 75mm howitzer. For tank killing it had a 47mm gun.

You will notice that all of the above armaments are absolutely nothing like the 88mm gun carried by the German Tiger. You will now understand what I meant when I said "It's reputation is really driven by it being the first heavy tank on the scene to carry a gun worthy of a heavy tank."

The German shock at the T34 drove the PZVI.

The T-34 isn't a heavy tank. It weighed 26 tons. Come on.


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 A Town Called Malus wrote:
Well, Einstein wasn't actively involved in the development of the Atomic bomb. His discovery revealed the physical process which allowed for the release of the energy contained in an atom but that discovery was in 1905. His recommendation for the US to begin a nuclear weapons programme and meetings with Roosevelt probably started the Manhattan project but apart from that, his input was non-existent.

You've missed the point of the analogy. The claim was made that Americans played a part in tooling up the Soviet Union, because private Americans did things in Soviet Russia in the decades before the war.

And the point then, is if it would be very silly to claim Germany played a part in the atomic bombing of Japan (because Einstein was crucial to the theoretical framework and Einstein is German), then it is an equal stretch the claim that the US played a role in the defense of Russia because Kahn and some other gave them technical assistance before the war.


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 A Town Called Malus wrote:
Without our codebreakers and the transferal of information gained from our intelligence gathering activites to the Russians (albeit sometimes due to their spy at Bletchley), they may have been less able to prepare for German attacks, such as the previously mentioned Battle of Kursk. Whether this would have tipped the war enough to make a difference, I don't know, but it should be considered.

While the Allies did give some information, it certainly played no part in the Russians knowing about Kursk. Sure, 'Lucy" gave her tip-off, but the build up around Kursk was staggeringly, painfully obvious, everyone on both sides knew it was happening. It'd be a bit like getting a hot tip 'Apple is a profitable tech company'...


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 Mr. Burning wrote:
Could Britain side with Germany in a fight against communism?

Did you ever read about the original British and French plans to aid Finland in the Winter War? The British wanted to have 100,000 troops aiding the Finnish against the Soviets, and France was going to send another 35,000. It came scarily close to actually happening, and if it did happen it could well have produced a wholly different set of alliances. It was actually the starting point for the eventual bungled Narvik campaign.

I can't even begin to figure out how that might have played out. If the British and French had gotten 135,000 caught up in a bloody stalemate with Russia, what would it have meant for later engagements. Could it have meant, for instance, that following the Fall of France, that Britain didn't insist on staying in the war, but instead would be happy to relax the blockade and let the Nazis and Soviets duke it out?


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 feeder wrote:
Japan's war plans always baffled me. Didn't they already know the US was a manufacturing colossus with vast resources? They must have known that the US could replace it's material losses very quickly. I don't see how the War in the Pacific could have gone any differently, even if Pearl Harbour had been successful (sank carriers too), it only would have dragged out the end result a few more years.

Russia vastly outproduced Japan in 1905. But one swift tactical victory sent the Russians to the table looking for a peace treaty. The Japanese didn't underestimate the capability of the Americans, they underestimated their resolve.


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 Xenomancers wrote:
Isn't this whole thread basically moot? The allies had been taxing the Germans the whole war while Russia built up it's industry.

Sbuh? The Allies had been taxing... Russia built up its industry? Basic timeline of the war in Europe for you-
September 1939 Britain and France declare war on Germany.
May 1940 Germany invades France.
June 1940 France is done. British forces retreat from the continent.
June 1941 Germany invades the Soviet Union.
September 1943 US and UK forces return to continental Europe in Italy.
June 1944 US and British forces invade Nazi controlled France, to open a true second front.

Do you see how it actually worked? The period in which Britain and France were fighting, giving Russia a chance to build up its industry, was six weeks. It was 13 months if we pretend the continuing fighting in Africa was more than a distraction. Meanwhile, the period in which the only opposition to Nazi Germany on land in Europe is from June 1941 to September 1943, two and a half years (and the real second front didn't open until Overlord, making the difference an even three years).

Plus - if not for truly idiotic decisions in the Russian campaign by Hilter Moscow would have Fallen within the first 3 months of the campaign. By all means that is what should have happend - but alas - Hitler was a Lunatic after all.

This is one of those never dying myths of the war, that Hitler screwed everything up. It's a total fantasy. What happened is that after the war the Nazi High Command all wrote books in which they blamed every single mistake on Hitler. Hitler wasn't able to write his own version of events, on account of being dead. For lots of weird reasons, we just accepted what the German commanders told us.

Years later, not until the fall of the Soviet Union, basically, we started going back and looking at the actual memos and papers written by everyone during the war. Turns out the German High Command was flattering themselves. Their real resistance was to things like the Ardennes campaign, which turned out rather well for Germany. On Barbarossa the logistical impossibility was basically ignored by the High Command, which was completely in-line with the logistical neglect that is characteristic of German/Prussian command.

German strategic decision making during the war was a mixed bag. It is totally false that the bad bits were all down to Hitler.


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 notprop wrote:
So all in all I dont think the Poles would have had any truck with Hitler. The were making a decent fist of battling the Germans albeit on the back foot until to Soviets attacked their rear and engaged their reserves.

Nah, they were totally fethed before Stalin turned up. They'd basically been completely encircled.

 sebster wrote:


Russia vastly outproduced Japan in 1905. But one swift tactical victory sent the Russians to the table looking for a peace treaty. The Japanese didn't underestimate the capability of the Americans, they underestimated their resolve.

I'd take issue with this, actually. The Japanese launched a surprise attack initially at the start of the war, which damaged the local Russian fleet, followed by the first Russian naval Commander, Makarov being killed by a mine early on. His subordinates were overcome with fear at the mines and torpedoes launched thus far (not insensible, see Jellicoe's response to the first submarine-battleship sinking) and kept the fleet bottled up in Port Arthur until Makarov's replacement, Vitgeft arrived.

You then had the Battle of the Yellow Sea when the Russians sallied out. They could be plausibly described as winning the encounter until Vitgeft got hit in the face personally with a battleship salvo and killed, resulting in the chain of command breaking down (Russian WT was not very good). The IJN pushed their advantage home, and only half the (damaged) Russian fleet made it back to Port Arthur.

You then had a pause in naval hostilities whilst the Russian fleet from the opposite side of Russia had to sail halfway around the world to engage, which was then followed in turn by the Battle of Tsushima. After the destruction of that fleet, the Russians had no fleet capable of challenging the IJN. Their home shipbuilding industry wasn't capable of replenishing their losses (seriously, Russia naval procurement pre WW1 was a total mess), and Britain, allied to Japan, wasn't going to sell them the ships. It would have taken the Russians two years at a minimum to try and construct and man a second fleet, and the Japanese Army was still undertaking operations (see the occupation of Sakhalin).

So in short, it wasn't so much a question of 'willpower', and it wasn't /one swift victory that sent them to the negotiating table. It was a fairly continued set of hostilities, followed by the destruction of their mobile assets. Their army had taken huge losses at Mukden leaving their defence incoherent and incapable on land (they'd lost access to the local railroad), and the loss of the fleet meant they had no way of retaliating against Japanese supply lines and home bases even if that wasn't the case. Without the industry required to build a new fleet and the difficulty and expense in trying to source one from three other countries (they'd have needed private industry from France, Germany and the US working in concert and would have had massive training problems), it was more of a fait accompli. They could have continued hostilities, but they'd have spent the next two years getting steadily pushed out by the Japanese on land, and the IJN would have heard of their production programme and outnumbered any new Russian fleet by two to one. This is without even contemplating the effect this would have had on the Russian economy, and whether it was capable of affording all this.

Resolve had nothing to do with it. The USA was in an infinitely stronger position than Russia, in munitions, men, and money. Russia quite simply lacked all three, and therefore the means to fight Japan after Tsushima, and folded accordingly.

 Ketara wrote:


Resolve had nothing to do with it. The USA was in an infinitely stronger position than Russia, in munitions, men, and money. Russia quite simply lacked all three, and therefore the means to fight Japan after Tsushima, and folded accordingly.

Actually the position on land had stagnated to a bloody stalemate. The early Japanese successes had long faded and there was nothing to stop the Russians continuing that situation indefinitely.

They had no means of victory of their own, but firmly establishing a stalemate is a means in itself - the longer the time from your decisive defeat the better your negotiating position.

But the Russians chose a rapid conclusion instead.

 Kilkrazy wrote:
You only need to read the production stats to realise that neither Germany nor Japan nor the two in combination could survive a long war against the combined output of the Allies. Admiral Yamamoto knew this in 1940, that is why he was pessimistic about the war.

Dickering about minor differences in quality of individual weapons, vehicles and troops is a distraction from the fact that western and Soviet industry massively outproduced the Axis with competitive equipment, and also manned these guns, planes, tanks and ships with decently trained crews.

Indeed. Just M4 and T34 production alone amounted to over 100,000 tanks. Total German production of all armored vehicles was 50,000.

 sebster wrote:

Actually the position on land had stagnated to a bloody stalemate. The early Japanese successes had long faded and there was nothing to stop the Russians continuing that situation indefinitely.

They had no means of victory of their own, but firmly establishing a stalemate is a means in itself - the longer the time from your decisive defeat the better your negotiating position.

But the Russians chose a rapid conclusion instead.

Yes. It was something of a stalemate, at that precise moment peace was signed on account of the fact the Russians had fallen back to a defensive posture after losing control of the (incomplete) Trans-siberian railroad.

Had the conflict continued, the Russians would have had vast difficulties in bringing up more men and material to replace losses and usage. The conflict was taking place a very long way away from the capital, and rail links weren't exactly good. The Japanese, on the other hand, had ample resupply by sea and could buy from abroad. Had the war carried on, the Russians would have found land supply unreliable and minimal (the IJN was stopping any sort of reliable shipping), and all their manufacturing apparatus was an exceedingly long way away. It's all very well and good to outproduce a foe, but if you can't get it to where it's needed, it's meaningless.

It wasn't 'one swift tactical victory' won by 'resolve'. It was a series of bloody engagements won because the Russian logistical position became untenable.

EDIT:-I feel I should point out quickly here that I'm not asserting the Japanese were in an amazing position financially (they'd already had difficulty paying their loans and incurred substantial losses in manpower). But Russia was no better off in either respect, and had the logistical issues on top that rendered further resistance difficult, to say the least.

Read the sentence I actually wrote;
"It's reputation is really driven by it being the first heavy tank on the scene to carry a gun worthy of a heavy tank."

If I was stupid enough to think it was the first heavy tank, I would have written 'the first heavy tank'. But instead I wrote 'to carry a gun worthy of a heavy tank'... because that's the important distinction.

The KV-1 carried a 76mm gun that was very slightly modified and functionally identical to the 76mm in the T-34.

Both of which were more than effective to handle German armor at range in 1941.

The major variant carried a 152mm howitzer, which is scary if you're trying to hide in a foxhole, but it isn't a dedicated tank killer.

The SU-152 was called “beast killer” because it had the ability to blow the turrent right off a PZV. It wasn’t its intended purpose but hey when in Russia blow crap up.

The French Char B1 carried a 75mm howitzer. For tank killing it had a 47mm gun.

Which was viciously effective against PZIs, PZIIs and PZIIIs.

You will notice that all of the above armaments are absolutely nothing like the 88mm gun carried by the German Tiger. You will now understand what I meant when I said "It's reputation is really driven by it being the first heavy tank on the scene to carry a gun worthy of a heavy tank."

As noted above you’re incorrect in that.

The German shock at the T34 drove the PZVI.


The T-34 isn't a heavy tank. It weighed 26 tons. Come on.

Never said it was. The T34’s armor (thickness and angle), good gun and speed made it a real shock in 1941 and early 1942. The Germans themselves said they designed the panther to counter it specifically

"According to Henschel designer Erwin Aders(Tiger I manufacturer): "There was great consternation when it was discovered that the Soviet tanks were superior to anything available to the Heer."[12] The T-34 was almost immune from the front to every gun in German service except the 88 mm Flak gun. Panzer IIIs with the 5 cm KwK 38 L/42 main armament could penetrate the sides of a T-34, but only at short range. The KV-1 was immune to all but the 88 mm Flak gun."

http://tankarchives.blogspot.co.uk/2013/03/suisu-152-vs-german-big-cats.html

thats what the 152mm "beast kliller" could do.

it does not penetrate as much as pummels the utter hell out of whatever it hits. the shell was heavy and had massive amouts of HE vs the norm. it won by shear weight and power.

though a true "beast killer" would be if the took the 203mm B4 and made that a SPG...
8 inchs of tank gun of a claibre normaly reserved for larger cruisers.

ant to show what sheer explosive can do.
Thats a German Ferdiand, a 70ton tank destroyer on a tiger chasias/

http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-6q8-r4fEpJg/UZA1BMvJCXI/AAAAAAAAAuE/uj23wOhFi2A/s1600/direct+hit+from+a+B-4.jpg

hit by a B4 203 mmm HE round.

 Frazzled wrote:

The KV-1 carried a 76mm gun that was very slightly modified and functionally identical to the 76mm in the T-34.

And to be OT, the Panther itself in its original proposed design was *very* similar to the T-34. They changed the layout because of recognition issues/ it was a right cop out of a design (not good enough for Hitler).

 sebster wrote:

 feeder wrote:
Japan's war plans always baffled me. Didn't they already know the US was a manufacturing colossus with vast resources? They must have known that the US could replace it's material losses very quickly. I don't see how the War in the Pacific could have gone any differently, even if Pearl Harbour had been successful (sank carriers too), it only would have dragged out the end result a few more years.

Russia vastly outproduced Japan in 1905. But one swift tactical victory sent the Russians to the table looking for a peace treaty. The Japanese didn't underestimate the capability of the Americans, they underestimated their resolve.

Yes, as a result of this thread I read up on the Battle of Tsushima. Wrecked nearly the entirety of the Russian fleet at the cost of three torpedo boats!

I guess I can see the IJ Command expecting a repeat of events.

 feeder wrote:

 sebster wrote:

 feeder wrote:
Japan's war plans always baffled me. Didn't they already know the US was a manufacturing colossus with vast resources? They must have known that the US could replace it's material losses very quickly. I don't see how the War in the Pacific could have gone any differently, even if Pearl Harbour had been successful (sank carriers too), it only would have dragged out the end result a few more years.

Russia vastly outproduced Japan in 1905. But one swift tactical victory sent the Russians to the table looking for a peace treaty. The Japanese didn't underestimate the capability of the Americans, they underestimated their resolve.

Yes, as a result of this thread I read up on the Battle of Tsushima. Wrecked nearly the entirety of the Russian fleet at the cost of three torpedo boats!

I guess I can see the IJ Command expecting a repeat of events.

A big difference that should have been considered though, Russia and Japan had been in an open state of hostilities for a while. Compare it to Mogadishu, and 9/11.

Our troops had been in Somalia for some time. While it wasn't exactly mainstream media fare at the time, when the Battle of Mogadishu took place, it wasn't a sucker punch for us. Despite the battle being a "victory" for us, the US population still wanted nothing more to do with it, and demanded a withdrawal. In comparison, 9/11. A swing out of no where, a massive blow none of us were expecting. We got straight sucker punched. That got our blood boiling.

Same thing with Pearl Harbor. There wasn't a conflict going on that we were weary of, or maybe questioning the value of. It was just happy go lucky, and then all of a sudden thousands of dead Soldiers and Sailors to an unprovoked attack. The Japanese failed to account for the anger that such an event would cause, so if they were trying to draw correlations with Tsushima, they were drastically wrong in the results they were expecting.

 Ketara wrote:
Yes. It was something of a stalemate, at that precise moment peace was signed on account of the fact the Russians had fallen back to a defensive posture after losing control of the (incomplete) Trans-siberian railroad.

Had the conflict continued, the Russians would have had vast difficulties in bringing up more men and material to replace losses and usage. The conflict was taking place a very long way away from the capital, and rail links weren't exactly good. The Japanese, on the other hand, had ample resupply by sea and could buy from abroad. Had the war carried on, the Russians would have found land supply unreliable and minimal (the IJN was stopping any sort of reliable shipping), and all their manufacturing apparatus was an exceedingly long way away. It's all very well and good to outproduce a foe, but if you can't get it to where it's needed, it's meaningless.

Of course, but it wasn't the first time the Russians fought with chronic supply problems, and it was certainly nowhere near the last. For an instance before then look at the impossible position that the troops in the Crimea were left in? And then look at the Winter War, which had a nightmarish line of supply that already caused one disastrous counter punch, and yet the Russians carried on. The point is if the overall cause matters you accept the price and feed whatever men and material in to the grinder that you must.

And it isn't as though the US wasn't faced with an incredible challenge to actually impact Japanese operations in the Pacific and Asia, but they set about building the ships to meet that requirement.

It wasn't 'one swift tactical victory' won by 'resolve'.

I think you need to go back and read my comment again. What you've written there is miles away from what I actually said.

 sebster wrote:

 Ketara wrote:
Yes. It was something of a stalemate, at that precise moment peace was signed on account of the fact the Russians had fallen back to a defensive posture after losing control of the (incomplete) Trans-siberian railroad.

Had the conflict continued, the Russians would have had vast difficulties in bringing up more men and material to replace losses and usage. The conflict was taking place a very long way away from the capital, and rail links weren't exactly good. The Japanese, on the other hand, had ample resupply by sea and could buy from abroad. Had the war carried on, the Russians would have found land supply unreliable and minimal (the IJN was stopping any sort of reliable shipping), and all their manufacturing apparatus was an exceedingly long way away. It's all very well and good to outproduce a foe, but if you can't get it to where it's needed, it's meaningless.

Of course, but it wasn't the first time the Russians fought with chronic supply problems, and it was certainly nowhere near the last. For an instance before then look at the impossible position that the troops in the Crimea were left in? And then look at the Winter War, which had a nightmarish line of supply that already caused one disastrous counter punch, and yet the Russians carried on. The point is if the overall cause matters you accept the price and feed whatever men and material in to the grinder that you must.

And it isn't as though the US wasn't faced with an incredible challenge to actually impact Japanese operations in the Pacific and Asia, but they set about building the ships to meet that requirement.

It wasn't 'one swift tactical victory' won by 'resolve'.

I think you need to go back and read my comment again. What you've written there is miles away from what I actually said.

USA had a enormous challenge.
However the anger and drive was such that it lit what was a giant furnace of industrial power to direct one of at the time one of largest industrial powers on earth to full war mode.

it took time to build up steam and to engage to full speed but once it gained its momentom there was no stopping it.

Japn, when it built Yamaoto was taxed and tested.

America had 4 -5 such Battleships alone built.
it has carriers coming out by the dozen and hundreds of escorts, thousands of cargo haulers.

it took time but once enraged, its industy stepped up meet the demand.

 Frazzled wrote:
Both of which were more than effective to handle German armor at range in 1941.

Yeah, effective enough, which is a million miles away from being a seriously deadly AT gun that would truly justify a heavy tank.

The SU-152 was called “beast killer” because it had the ability to blow the turrent right off a PZV. It wasn’t its intended purpose but hey when in Russia blow crap up.

You're getting the KV-152 and the SU-152 confused. Same starting chassis, same gun, but the latter had a fixed casemate and therefore lots more armour. It is also utterly irrelevant to this conversation, as it was first built in 1943.

Which was viciously effective against PZIs, PZIIs and PZIIIs.

Viciously effective is just making things up. It was a small step up in range and penetration from the 2 pounder carried by British 10 ton tanks.

As noted above you’re incorrect in that.

Your answer involves claiming a 47mm gun is the same as a high velocity 88mm. It is very silly. You don't have to do this. You misread my post, didn't see I was making a point about the 88mm on the Tiger being its transformative element, and now you're posting some silly stuff to try and avoid just saying you misread. Please stop.

Never said it was.

You fething did. "Inversely the Soviets started the war with two heavies for their time: the T34 and the KV"


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 Wyrmalla wrote:
And to be OT, the Panther itself in its original proposed design was *very* similar to the T-34. They changed the layout because of recognition issues/ it was a right cop out of a design (not good enough for Hitler).

And they pushed the weight up so it was touching on the heavy class. And they gave it a gun that was an amazing AT weapon, but only on average quality against other targets. And then they refined the machine so that it took many workhours, and then did nothing to improve factory processes (really workshop practices).

It really left them with an excellent tank killer that had the sloping armour of the T-34 and absolutely none of its other design principles.

 sebster wrote:

Of course, but it wasn't the first time the Russians fought with chronic supply problems, and it was certainly nowhere near the last. For an instance before then look at the impossible position that the troops in the Crimea were left in? And then look at the Winter War, which had a nightmarish line of supply that already caused one disastrous counter punch, and yet the Russians carried on. The point is if the overall cause matters you accept the price and feed whatever men and material in to the grinder that you must.

No. Sorry, but no. You can talk about 'accepting the price and feeding men into the grinder' and 'chronic supply problems', but you're missing the point. You can have all the men in the world to feed into the grinder, but if the grinder is at point A and the troops at point B, and there's no way of getting from them from B to A (or the way is so limited as to be useless), you can be as resolved as you like. It has nothing to do with anything. If Putin decides tomorrow to accept the price of sending his soldiers to attack America by flapping their arms and levitating, he'll get about as far as they will.

At this stage, the Chinese Eastern Railway was single tracked, and the Japanese had effectively captured it as far as Harbin once the Russians finished retreating from the region after the Battle of Mukden.



The Russians lost the large majority of their combat supplies, machine guns and artillery in Mukden. With the rate modern weaponry burns through ammunition (remember the shell scandal in the UK anyone?), if hostilities had continued, the Russians would have been down to rocks and harsh language before much longer. With the IJN free to menace shipping and Vladivostock, there would have been no resupply by sea, meaning everything would have had to come through a single rail line (not even double tracked). Russia also certainly didn't have the spare train stock required to handle that level of resupply.

And it isn't as though the US wasn't faced with an incredible challenge to actually impact Japanese operations in the Pacific and Asia, but they set about building the ships to meet that requirement.

You can 'set about' all you like, but if you have to erect the shipyards, train the workers, import the construction gear and materials and do it en masse before you can even start building the ships, you have problems. The US benefited from the fact that there was already a substantial level of industry that could either transfer directly across to munitions production, or could do it with the minimum of effort.

Russia had neither of those things. Putilov and the backwards nature of Russian munitions production was a joke amongst the West. It didn't have the shipyards to build a fleet in two years, it barely had a functioning ammunition factory. The only way Russia could even begun to have scrape together the munitions would have been to buy abroad. And as mentioned, no matter how much they bought, if you can't get it there, it's pointless. If hostilities hadn't ceased, we'd have been looking at the Japanese sweeping up all remaining local Russian forces in China long before any real Russian resupply or reinforcement could get there, followed by Russia having to launch a massive invasion two years later after they'd scraped the men and material together. They couldn't have done it sooner.

It wasn't 'one swift tactical victory' won by 'resolve'.

I think you need to go back and read my comment again. What you've written there is miles away from what I actually said.

Sure.

Russia vastly outproduced Japan in 1905. But one swift tactical victory sent the Russians to the table looking for a peace treaty. The Japanese didn't underestimate the capability of the Americans, they underestimated their resolve.

The implication in the statement above is that the reason the Russians came to the table after 'one swift tactical victory' of the Japanese, is because of a lack of resolve.

I am pointing out that wasn't 'one swift tactical victory' that sent Russia to the negotiating table. Why? The Russo-Japanese War was a series of conflicts. And it was the complete inability to continue waging warfare that brought them to the negotiating table, as opposed to any individual conflict, or any lack of resolve.

You also said:-

Actually the position on land had stagnated to a bloody stalemate. The early Japanese successes had long faded and there was nothing to stop the Russians continuing that situation indefinitely.

In order to have a stalemate on a field of battle, you need to have two sides unable to defeat each other. Assuming we're looking at this purely from a local ground perspective, the Japanese would have finished the local Russian forces off long before they could rally and resupply. They were out of most weaponry above rifles, low on ammunition for those rifles, and had little hope of resupply. Whilst their supply lines were stretched, the Japanese did not have that issue, and controlled the sea to boot.

Unless the stalemate you are referring to is the inability of Russia to invade Japan, and vice versa? If so, please clarify in that direction.

The Russians were also fearful of England being brought into the war due to "incidents" between the two.

 Ketara wrote:
No. Sorry, but no. You can talk about 'accepting the price and feeding men into the grinder' and 'chronic supply problems', but you're missing the point. You can have all the men in the world to feed into the grinder, but if the grinder is at point A and the troops at point B, and there's no way of getting from them from B to A (or the way is so limited as to be useless), you can be as resolved as you like. It has nothing to do with anything. If Putin decides tomorrow to accept the price of sending his soldiers to attack America by flapping their arms and levitating, he'll get about as far as they will.

Ok, fair enough. I didn't understand this conflict that well, and I thank you for the additional information. Russia's position was a lot more hopeless than I had realised. Thanks for the extra information.

That then opens up a few new lines of though on Japan's plans in 1941. Interesting stuff.

 sebster wrote:

 A Town Called Malus wrote:
Without our codebreakers and the transferal of information gained from our intelligence gathering activites to the Russians (albeit sometimes due to their spy at Bletchley), they may have been less able to prepare for German attacks, such as the previously mentioned Battle of Kursk. Whether this would have tipped the war enough to make a difference, I don't know, but it should be considered.

While the Allies did give some information, it certainly played no part in the Russians knowing about Kursk. Sure, 'Lucy" gave her tip-off, but the build up around Kursk was staggeringly, painfully obvious, everyone on both sides knew it was happening. It'd be a bit like getting a hot tip 'Apple is a profitable tech company'...

Being told exactly where the main offensive pushes were aiming for certainly had an effect on the planning of the defences. Knowing that the Germans were planning something in that area and knowing exactly what their plan is and their estimations of your strength are very different scenarios.


Automatically Appended Next Post:

 notprop wrote:

So all in all I dont think the Poles would have had any truck with Hitler. The were making a decent fist of battling the Germans albeit on the back foot until to Soviets attacked their rear and engaged their reserves.

Also remember that the Poles had already cracked the Enigma machine in use at the time. They knew Germany planned to invade and when they were planning to do it.

Any time spent "playing nice" with the Germans would have just been time to bolster their own forces, such as the mass production of their self loading rifle which would have given their infantry a firepower edge over those of the Germans. Meanwhile the Poles keep listening to German secrets so when the inevitable German betrayal comes, they already know.

 sebster wrote:

 Ketara wrote:
No. Sorry, but no. You can talk about 'accepting the price and feeding men into the grinder' and 'chronic supply problems', but you're missing the point. You can have all the men in the world to feed into the grinder, but if the grinder is at point A and the troops at point B, and there's no way of getting from them from B to A (or the way is so limited as to be useless), you can be as resolved as you like. It has nothing to do with anything. If Putin decides tomorrow to accept the price of sending his soldiers to attack America by flapping their arms and levitating, he'll get about as far as they will.

Ok, fair enough. I didn't understand this conflict that well, and I thank you for the additional information. Russia's position was a lot more hopeless than I had realised. Thanks for the extra information.

That then opens up a few new lines of though on Japan's plans in 1941. Interesting stuff.

My last line there was a little sarky, so I apologise for that. I think I was having a bad morning that day.

Russia's position with regards to munitions production pre-war was actually pretty bad. Throughout the 1800's, Russian production was mostly centred upon state owned facilities (the British parallel would be Woolwich Arsenal or Chatham Dockyard). Russia had little in the way of a domestic private arms industry, if you look at the great arms producers and technological innovators of the time (Vickers, Schneider, Armstrong-Whitworth & Krupp) or even the second ranking ones (Cammell-Laird, Skoda, Bethlehem, John Brown, Schichau, Yarrow and so on) there isn't a single Russian company amongst them.

State facilities began to run into considerable trouble in the last few decades of the nineteenth century, on account of the fact that they didn't retain sufficient production apparatus to supply the armed forces on a wartime footing, and committed little to no funds towards R&D (government purse strings are always tight on seemingly frivolous expenditure). Private companies on the other hand, actuallyneeded to undertake research in order to successfully promote their wares above that of the competitions and force governments to buy the latest version of a piece of kit.

The result was that in most cases, the private sector began to supplant the state owned ones in every regard. Russia's lack of domestic industry however, meant that for the most part pre Russo-Japanese war, they'd bought in a large amount of their armaments over a period of time. If you look through the builders of their ships, there are German and American coimpanies listed, and the Russians were always one of the Cannon King's favorite customers for land artillery.

After the crushing defeat of the Russo-Japanese war, there was a real impetus for the Russians to overhaul their domestic arms industry, and they poured vast sums into new artillery works and shipyards (they went so far as to try and rope Vickers into operating a subsidiary in Russia) because they realised how vulnerable this lack of domestic supply had made them. And even with no war ongoing and that sort of funding available, Russian munitions production was still an ongoing saga of delays, screwups, arbitrary government decisions and suchlike (there was one warship ordered in 1906 that wasn't delivered until 1910 for example; in Britain it would have been on the waves mid-1907).

You also have to look at things in context, there was a failed revolution in Russia the same year the war ended. Had the Russians somehow been able to transport all the men and machinery across to China that had been stationed on their European side, the corollary question must be asked; would that revolution have succeeded in the absence of all that military force? And even if not, would that revolution have crippled any further Russian supply of a war effort? The Putilov works had a particularly vicious strike going on towards the end of 1904, and were famous for their revolutionary sentiment, and the Trans-Baikal railroad fell into revolutionary hands temporarily towards the end of 1905.

 Ketara wrote:
My last line there was a little sarky, so I apologise for that. I think I was having a bad morning that day.

Nah, it was all on me mate. I was being obstinate.

Thanks for you contribution to this thread, it's been really interesting to read. I thought Vickers did produce arms in Russia, the Maxim machine gun. But that might have been production under license?

 sebster wrote:

 Ketara wrote:
My last line there was a little sarky, so I apologise for that. I think I was having a bad morning that day.

Nah, it was all on me mate. I was being obstinate.

Thanks for you contribution to this thread, it's been really interesting to read. I thought Vickers did produce arms in Russia, the Maxim machine gun. But that might have been production under license?

The Tsar's government invited Vickers in to set up/collaborate on a limited basis with a number of state owned/pseudo-private companies to a varying extent in the 1907-1914 period. In 1913, they won a contract from the Russian government to help erect a new artillery works, and agreed that the Russians could utilise Vickers' patents, plans and so forth domestically (with their express restricted limitation to Russia, Serbia & Montengro, so no exports). The Russian Artillery Works company (as it was called) turned into something of a clusterfeth however, and was nationalised in 1915.

If the extent of Vickers' dealings with Russia is of particular interest to you, you should consult 'Vickers Limited and the Tsarist Regime' by Edward Goldstein in The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol.58, No.4 (1980) pp.561-571

Ketara, if you're not going to take this seriously and use God's own referencing system (APA 5th, if you're curious) then just don't bother

All kidding aside, this has been quite the informative thread so far

 Ketara wrote:
If the extent of Vickers' dealings with Russia is of particular interest to you...

I wouldn't go that far, but what you posted was very interesting. Thanks

Xenomancers wrote:
Isn't this whole thread basically moot? The allies had been taxing the Germans the whole war while Russia built up it's industry.

sebster wrote:
Sbuh? The Allies had been taxing... Russia built up its industry? Basic timeline of the war in Europe for you-
September 1939 Britain and France declare war on Germany.
May 1940 Germany invades France.
June 1940 France is done. British forces retreat from the continent.
June 1941 Germany invades the Soviet Union.
September 1943 US and UK forces return to continental Europe in Italy.
June 1944 US and British forces invade Nazi controlled France, to open a true second front.

Do you see how it actually worked? The period in which Britain and France were fighting, giving Russia a chance to build up its industry, was six weeks. It was 13 months if we pretend the continuing fighting in Africa was more than a distraction. Meanwhile, the period in which the only opposition to Nazi Germany on land in Europe is from June 1941 to September 1943, two and a half years (and the real second front didn't open until Overlord, making the difference an even three years).

Sebster - you conveniently leave out all the actual taxing that occurred.

You leave out the battle of Brittian which severely depleted the Luftwaffe.

You leave out allied bombing which severely depleted supplies to the Russian front. Not to mention forces that needed to be held at home to prevent allied invasion.

You discount the loss off over 400k Axis soliders 8000 aircraft and 2500 tanks as being a "distraction" in Africa. Without allied intervention where do you think these forces would be going? Not up through turkey breaking the Russians back in Stalingrad?

Come on man. It was a combined effort of all the allies to bring Germany to the point they were on D-Day. Sure the "second" (at this point it's really a 3rd front) front wasn't really essential to victory at that point - but there is no way Russia could have repelled Germany without Allied assistance through out the war. It's pretty safe to say Germany should have taken Moscow anyways - simple tactical blunders by Hitler allowed that to happen.

This is not to say the Russians did not sacrifice - they did more than anyone. It's just that to say the Russians could have defeated Germany on it's own - which is the tone I get from the OP's post...I just have to laugh at that one.

 Xenomancers wrote:



This is not to say the Russians did not sacrifice - they did more than anyone. It's just that to say the Russians could have defeated Germany on it's own - which is the tone I get from the OP's post...I just have to laugh at that one.

No, I specifically said Operation Overlord (D-Day). It's right there in the title. By 1944 Nazi Germany's fate was sealed (in hindsight), and the Allied landings in Normandy, while helpful, were not required to defeat Nazi Germany.

 Xenomancers wrote:
Sebster - you conveniently leave out all the actual taxing that occurred.

You leave out the battle of Brittian which severely depleted the Luftwaffe.

The Germans lost around 2,000 planes in the Battle of Britain. It was a fair defeat, but when you note they produced 8,000 planes in the year it gives you a context that makes any claim of the losses being strategically significant as quite silly.

You leave out allied bombing which severely depleted supplies to the Russian front. Not to mention forces that needed to be held at home to prevent allied invasion.

As has already been pointed out in this thread several times, the allied bombing only really went in to gear in 1943, and only became really effective in 1944. After Kursk.

You discount the loss off over 400k Axis soliders 8000 aircraft and 2500 tanks as being a "distraction" in Africa.

You're playing a fun game by rolling German and Italian casualties together. The German casualties were just 130,000. That's a lot of people of course, but when you compare it to the 4 million dead Germans and 4 million more Germans captured by the Soviets it is pretty obviously a side theatre.

but there is no way Russia could have repelled Germany without Allied assistance through out the war.

No, you're totally wrong. Once Germany failed to capture Moscow they were logistically fethed. Their troops were now miles from their bases of production, with a hopelessly inadequate system of supply. Their next big offensive was Case Blue, which they could only launch in a single theatre, along a single line of attack. They were lucky that the Soviets had stupidly thrown so many troops away in their own counter offensives, but even with that Case Blue ended in hopeless defeat when the Soviets did the fairly obvious thing of holding then taking the hingepoint in Stalingrad. The year after that the Germans tried for a new offensive, this time it was even in a single theatre, it was just one battle, at Kursk. Big battle, but as far as the Germans being able to mobilise for large scale offensives its a shadow of their former efforts.

And all that was before the western allies really kicked in to high gear.

So I'll repeat my earlier point - the British blockade played a major role. I don't know what German oil supply might have been like if the Brits had struck some kind of deal (it would depend on the nature of that deal). But that would have made a difference. Everything else... just look at the numbers, the Russians had the Germans beat before the rest turned up to fight.

It's pretty safe to say Germany should have taken Moscow anyways - simple tactical blunders by Hitler allowed that to happen.

That's a very bizarre argument, because it took many, many Soviet blunders to let the Germans get as close as they did. Why do people on ever consider what the Germans could have done differently, and treat everyone else as set in stone?

Because we're talking about tactical decisions that cost Hitler an early victory, when it was strategic decisions made long before by the Soviet's that set up the scenario.

If you want to what if about how the Soviets could have changed things, you're going to have to go back to 1930, or even earlier.