Forum adverts like this one are shown to any user who is not logged in. Join us by filling out a tiny 3 field form and you will get your own, free, dakka user account which gives a good range of benefits to you: No adverts like this in the forums anymore. Times and dates in your local timezone. Full tracking of what you have read so you can skip to your first unread post, easily see what has changed since you last logged in, and easily see what is new at a glance. Email notifications for threads you want to watch closely. Being a part of the oldest wargaming community on the net. If you are already a member then feel free to login now.

Just to get this clear: instead of demonstrating the power of the US Navy in the late 30s and early 40s by numbers, tonnage, armament, or even examples of skillful fleet handling by talented Captains and Admirals, people are choosing to cite pre-dreadnought and even pre-ironclad naval battles? Whilst I'm sure that sailing ships and upturned bathtubs of armour plate with zero freeboard were used with great vigour and panache, I'm not sure that its really indicative of how well a WW2 navy might fare against another Navy of the same period.

Frazzled wrote:Plus we kicked the ass of the French in the Quasi War, but hey who hasn't?

Is that what you call, as claimed by some, the seizure of upwards of a thousand of our merchant ships?

Privateers aren't military, they're basically pirates who take a small portion of their income from the state because "Why not?" their primary sustenance came from pillage rights, which were best exercised when taking merchant ships. When fighting military, or anyone with guns really, they tended to surrender outright or flee.

ArbeitsSchu wrote:Just to get this clear: instead of demonstrating the power of the US Navy in the late 30s and early 40s by numbers, tonnage, armament, or even examples of skillful fleet handling by talented Captains and Admirals, people are choosing to cite pre-dreadnought and even pre-ironclad naval battles? Whilst I'm sure that sailing ships and upturned bathtubs of armour plate with zero freeboard were used with great vigour and panache, I'm not sure that its really indicative of how well a WW2 navy might fare against another Navy of the same period.

We don't have to. It occurred, against a better opponent. It was called the Pacific Theater.

Frazzled wrote:
We don't have to. It occurred, against a better opponent. It was called the Pacific Theater.

Yeah, you do, and it shouldn't be hard given the build-up driven by tensions with Japan.

Pacific Theater. Yes, I've heard of that. That's the one where the whole Pacific Fleet nearly got sunk in dock in a "surprise" attack halfway through a global war. So, starting well there.

ArbeitsSchu wrote:Pacific Theater. Yes, I've heard of that. That's the one where the whole Pacific Fleet nearly got sunk in dock in a "surprise" attack halfway through a global war. So, starting well there.

You're not well versed on your history are you, or is two U.S. Navy battleships, one minelayer and two destroyers the entire US fleet

youbedead wrote:You're not well versed on your history are you, or is two U.S. Navy battleships, one minelayer and two destroyers the entire US fleet

That's not the number of ships sunk at Pearl Harbor on the day. That's the number of ships not subsequently raised. Big difference.

youbedead wrote:

ArbeitsSchu wrote:Pacific Theater. Yes, I've heard of that. That's the one where the whole Pacific Fleet nearly got sunk in dock in a "surprise" attack halfway through a global war. So, starting well there.

You're not well versed on your history are you, or is two U.S. Navy battleships, one minelayer and two destroyers the entire US fleet

Funny thing is that Pearl Harbor was a disaster for the Japanese. They failed their main objective of destroying the Pacific fleet, lacked a good exit strategy, and overall just ended up making a mess of things.

Because letting your fleet get sunk en masse with virtually no retaliation is an amazing win for the US?


Automatically Appended Next Post:
No, wait. I can see where this is going. Now people are going to start selling one of the most famous of military cock-ups after the Charge of the Light Brigade as some amazing American "win".

It wasn't a win, but most of the fleet was actually out to sea when Pearl Harbor occured. The Japanese attack failed their objective of knocking out the US fleet and instead just caused the rate of enlistment to increase.

navy.mil wrote:They failed to damage any American aircraft carriers, which by a stroke of luck, had been absent from the harbor. They neglected to damage the shoreside facilities at the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, which played an important role in the Allied victory in World War II. American technological skill raised and repaired all but three of the ships sunk or damaged at Pearl Harbor (the USS Arizona (BB-39) considered too badly damaged to be salvaged, the USS Oklahoma (BB-37) raised and considered too old to be worth repairing, and the obsolete USS Utah (AG-16) considered not worth the effort). Most importantly, the shock and anger caused by the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor united a divided nation and was translated into a wholehearted commitment to victory in World War II.

Compare that to the Battle of Midway where the goal was still to destroy the enemy carriers. The US sunk every single carrier in that battle while losing two I believe.

In fact the tally goes:

USA destroyed 4 carriers, the Japanese destroyed 1 carrier. The big difference, America had carriers in their fleet after the battle while the Japanese had none. Overall the Japanese failed in their goal to destroy the US Pacific Fleet due to their failure at Pearl Harbor.

"They failed to damage any American aircraft carriers, which by a stroke of luck, had been absent from the harbour"

See that bit about "luck"? That right there is one of the point of divergence I mentioned earlier. Sheer blind luck prevents the US losing its Pacific Carrier ability.

Also, slightly more relevant to where I was going, if the Japanese nearly managed to destroy the Pacific Fleet by surprise, why is it so very very unfeasible that a Germany similarly intent on attacking the US would not be able to achieve a similar surprise. After all, the US knew that the Japanese were belligerent and equipped for war and they still got caught with their collective pants down. How is it then that people believe that a US aware of a Germany equipping for Naval supremacy and intent on belligerence would be capable of predicting the same sort of attack on the Atlantic coast? Have the US Atlantic Fleet got access to RADAR that stays on all day? Are they paying more attention to their approaches than the Blue Water bluejobs did?

Because 1, by luck for the Japanese there was a flight of B-17's returning to Pearl Harbor. Had there been no scheduled return of a flight of bombers the radar signals would've been heeded.

Also, Japan had been an ally in the last world war unlike Germany so maybe an attack was deemed unlikely although probable.

Second, Japan got lucky once again. The commanding officer of the Pearl Harbor forces had the crews clump all grounded planes together out of fear of sabotage, had the planes been spread out they would've been harder targets.

ArbeitsSchu wrote:Hitler wanted a more powerful everything. And when any given arm of service failed him (in his perception), they started to get the gakky end of the stick. Well documented fact, not "nonsense"...unless you are thinking in absolutes again, where one example is all examples.To clarify..Hitlers lack of knowledge and interest in Naval affairs was a contributing factor to the waning ability of the Kriegsmarine in any area other than U-Boats. Not the ONLY factor.

No, the basic fact that Germany was locked in a land war and very much needed to prioritise other areas, and that the ships the Germans had put out to sea were entirely ineffective in threatening British shipping or gaining control of any regions of sea.

This is a basic and clear thing. Hitler came to power. Hitler made plans , and built some vessels towards that aim. The heavy capital ships and other over-water vessels were entirely ineffective in threatening British shipping, while the u-boats initially showed good results, and so the latter was given more priority. The war dragged resources away, and the Kriegsmarine dropped down in priority compared to sustaining the war in the East. In the lack of German naval strength comes from the plain, simple reality that their strategic needs were focused on land power.

Trying to explain any part of that by hyper-focusing on an entirely trivial personality trait of Hitler is a very silly way to approach history.

Never said YOU were using the "America is Best" argument. But it has been deployed several times, without any real evidence (until the last page or so, where the discussion has rightly moved to looking at Naval capabilities in a bit of detail.) So, if repeatedly asking people to go into a bit more detail about American Naval deployments in the Atlantic is "ignoring this" then you have a curious take on "ignoring".

Yeah, I never did. But you just complained about those people, and then set about ignoring the figures I gave you for relative German and US naval strength, and showed that even the most ambitious plan for German naval strength in their history (whether or not Hitler disliked ships) didn't match US strength in 1938, never mind coming close to the scale of the US naval build up during the war.

So there was an actual substantial argument, that showed your initial premise to be wrong. And you're ignoring it.


Automatically Appended Next Post:

ArbeitsSchu wrote:Just to get this clear: instead of demonstrating the power of the US Navy in the late 30s and early 40s by numbers, tonnage, armament, or even examples of skillful fleet handling by talented Captains and Admirals, people are choosing to cite pre-dreadnought and even pre-ironclad naval battles?

I gave you the number of military ships, with capital ships listed seperately. You're still ignoring it.


Automatically Appended Next Post:

ArbeitsSchu wrote:Pacific Theater. Yes, I've heard of that. That's the one where the whole Pacific Fleet nearly got sunk in dock in a "surprise" attack halfway through a global war. So, starting well there.

Yeah, they got outsmarted and beaten, and suffered a setback right there at the start of the war.

Despite it, they went on to defeat the Japanese in the Coral Sea just six months later, and then inflicted a decisive defeat on the Japanese just another month later.

That the US enetered the war in the wake of a crippling defeat at Pearl Harbour, and had turned the tables utterly just seven months later is an immense credit to the quality of their naval power.

ArbeitsSchu wrote:Because letting your fleet get sunk en masse with virtually no retaliation is an amazing win for the US?


Automatically Appended Next Post:
No, wait. I can see where this is going. Now people are going to start selling one of the most famous of military cock-ups after the Charge of the Light Brigade as some amazing American "win".

Say you're now thinking like the Japanese. If the Germans thought like that in your operation Boondoggle, they'd end up in a world of hurt.

-The Japanese attacked before war was declared.
-The Japanese mistook a single major battle as how to do it. Even the promogenitor of the plan thought it was stupid and would lead to the USA just going apeshit.
-Single battles are so 18th century. The USA turned naval conflict into a matter of industrial production, combined with superior technology, and superior skillsets.





Automatically Appended Next Post:

ArbeitsSchu wrote:"They failed to damage any American aircraft carriers, which by a stroke of luck, had been absent from the harbour"

See that bit about "luck"? That right there is one of the point of divergence I mentioned earlier. Sheer blind luck prevents the US losing its Pacific Carrier ability.

Also, slightly more relevant to where I was going, if the Japanese nearly managed to destroy the Pacific Fleet by surprise, why is it so very very unfeasible that a Germany similarly intent on attacking the US would not be able to achieve a similar surprise. After all, the US knew that the Japanese were belligerent and equipped for war and they still got caught with their collective pants down. How is it then that people believe that a US aware of a Germany equipping for Naval supremacy and intent on belligerence would be capable of predicting the same sort of attack on the Atlantic coast? Have the US Atlantic Fleet got access to RADAR that stays on all day? Are they paying more attention to their approaches than the Blue Water bluejobs did?

Some of the major US victories in the Pacific
-Coral Sea - draw
-Iron Bottom Sound Campaign (Guadalcanal campaign)
-Midway
-Marianas Turkey Shoot
-Leyte Gulf



I'm sorry, as you're the proponenht of Operation Hogan's Heroes, where exactly have the Germans demonstrated naval capacity in any form? Its incumbent on you to prove they could do something, not the us. You haven't proven the Germans could even take the British Navy, much less the US Navy, much less build the capacity to invade cross ocean-something never done.

Am new to the topic, have skimmed it, but nevertheless, if I repeat something that's already been said, sorry.
__________________________________________
@Frazzled: So what if the Japanese didn't bother declaring war? [insert sarcasm here]Its not as if an attack on a habour is friendly, now, is it? [/insert sarcasm here] You are correct, however, on their "style".


Anyway, the Third Reich wouldn't have won, as hitler was an imbecilic and inexperienced commander, but still insisted that he was not.

Amontadillo wrote:Am new to the topic, have skimmed it, but nevertheless, if I repeat something that's already been said, sorry.
__________________________________________
@Frazzled: So what if the Japanese didn't bother declaring war? [insert sarcasm here]Its not as if an attack on a habour is friendly, now, is it? [/insert sarcasm here] You are correct, however, on their "style".


Anyway, the Third Reich wouldn't have won, as hitler was an imbecilic and inexperienced commander, but still insisted that he was not.

By not declaring war you're attacking someon who's not aware there's a war on, essentually you're mugging that person. I'd proffer the Germans would not have had the same advantage, as US ships were already killing German sailors in 1941. Our destroyer and cruiser nets were screening convoys out to the middle of the Atlantic. Now you can change events to where that wasn't occurring, but frankly you can change events to where the US doesn't exist, but it doesn't help the claim.

Frazzled wrote:
By not declaring war you're attacking someon who's not aware there's a war on, essentually you're mugging that person.

Really? Does that mean the US mugged Iraq and Afghanistan? No declaration of hostilities was sent to either state.

sebster wrote:

ArbeitsSchu wrote:Hitler wanted a more powerful everything. And when any given arm of service failed him (in his perception), they started to get the gakky end of the stick. Well documented fact, not "nonsense"...unless you are thinking in absolutes again, where one example is all examples.To clarify..Hitlers lack of knowledge and interest in Naval affairs was a contributing factor to the waning ability of the Kriegsmarine in any area other than U-Boats. Not the ONLY factor.

No, the basic fact that Germany was locked in a land war and very much needed to prioritise other areas, and that the ships the Germans had put out to sea were entirely ineffective in threatening British shipping or gaining control of any regions of sea.

This is a basic and clear thing. Hitler came to power. Hitler made plans , and built some vessels towards that aim. The heavy capital ships and other over-water vessels were entirely ineffective in threatening British shipping, while the u-boats initially showed good results, and so the latter was given more priority. The war dragged resources away, and the Kriegsmarine dropped down in priority compared to sustaining the war in the East. In the lack of German naval strength comes from the plain, simple reality that their strategic needs were focused on land power.

Trying to explain any part of that by hyper-focusing on an entirely trivial personality trait of Hitler is a very silly way to approach history.

Never said YOU were using the "America is Best" argument. But it has been deployed several times, without any real evidence (until the last page or so, where the discussion has rightly moved to looking at Naval capabilities in a bit of detail.) So, if repeatedly asking people to go into a bit more detail about American Naval deployments in the Atlantic is "ignoring this" then you have a curious take on "ignoring".

Yeah, I never did. But you just complained about those people, and then set about ignoring the figures I gave you for relative German and US naval strength, and showed that even the most ambitious plan for German naval strength in their history (whether or not Hitler disliked ships) didn't match US strength in 1938, never mind coming close to the scale of the US naval build up during the war.

So there was an actual substantial argument, that showed your initial premise to be wrong. And you're ignoring it.


Automatically Appended Next Post:

ArbeitsSchu wrote:Just to get this clear: instead of demonstrating the power of the US Navy in the late 30s and early 40s by numbers, tonnage, armament, or even examples of skillful fleet handling by talented Captains and Admirals, people are choosing to cite pre-dreadnought and even pre-ironclad naval battles?

I gave you the number of military ships, with capital ships listed seperately. You're still ignoring it.


Automatically Appended Next Post:

ArbeitsSchu wrote:Pacific Theater. Yes, I've heard of that. That's the one where the whole Pacific Fleet nearly got sunk in dock in a "surprise" attack halfway through a global war. So, starting well there.

Yeah, they got outsmarted and beaten, and suffered a setback right there at the start of the war.

Despite it, they went on to defeat the Japanese in the Coral Sea just six months later, and then inflicted a decisive defeat on the Japanese just another month later.

That the US enetered the war in the wake of a crippling defeat at Pearl Harbour, and had turned the tables utterly just seven months later is an immense credit to the quality of their naval power.

Hyper-focusing? The only person with a problem hyper-focusing appears to be you. The very act of stating that something is a part of, but not the whole reason for an event or happening is the opposite of hyper-focusing. As for not threatening shipping.. I seem to recall a boat called Tirpitz that caused a hell of a lot of effort to be expended against her without ever leaving dock. There is a substantial list of hardware used to chase its sister craft as well. Gaining control of oceans, no, but disrupting life for other people? Plenty of that.

As for the rest: Yes, you did, and very interesting your contribution is too. Maybe when we put some of the utterly stupid suggestions to rest, I might get half a chance to actually go through what you posted in detail. And as part of my original premise is based on the possibility of a German "Pearl", I'd quite like to start at the top, and get a feasible answer for why the Atlantic Fleet is quicker on the uptake than the Pacific one.

Frazzled wrote:

ArbeitsSchu wrote:Because letting your fleet get sunk en masse with virtually no retaliation is an amazing win for the US?


Automatically Appended Next Post:
No, wait. I can see where this is going. Now people are going to start selling one of the most famous of military cock-ups after the Charge of the Light Brigade as some amazing American "win".

Say you're now thinking like the Japanese. If the Germans thought like that in your operation Boondoggle, they'd end up in a world of hurt.

-The Japanese attacked before war was declared.
-The Japanese mistook a single major battle as how to do it. Even the promogenitor of the plan thought it was stupid and would lead to the USA just going apeshit.
-Single battles are so 18th century. The USA turned naval conflict into a matter of industrial production, combined with superior technology, and superior skillsets.





Automatically Appended Next Post:

ArbeitsSchu wrote:"They failed to damage any American aircraft carriers, which by a stroke of luck, had been absent from the harbour"

See that bit about "luck"? That right there is one of the point of divergence I mentioned earlier. Sheer blind luck prevents the US losing its Pacific Carrier ability.

Also, slightly more relevant to where I was going, if the Japanese nearly managed to destroy the Pacific Fleet by surprise, why is it so very very unfeasible that a Germany similarly intent on attacking the US would not be able to achieve a similar surprise. After all, the US knew that the Japanese were belligerent and equipped for war and they still got caught with their collective pants down. How is it then that people believe that a US aware of a Germany equipping for Naval supremacy and intent on belligerence would be capable of predicting the same sort of attack on the Atlantic coast? Have the US Atlantic Fleet got access to RADAR that stays on all day? Are they paying more attention to their approaches than the Blue Water bluejobs did?

Some of the major US victories in the Pacific
-Coral Sea - draw
-Iron Bottom Sound Campaign (Guadalcanal campaign)
-Midway
-Marianas Turkey Shoot
-Leyte Gulf



I'm sorry, as you're the proponenht of Operation Hogan's Heroes, where exactly have the Germans demonstrated naval capacity in any form? Its incumbent on you to prove they could do something, not the us. You haven't proven the Germans could even take the British Navy, much less the US Navy, much less build the capacity to invade cross ocean-something never done.

Attacking before war is declared is called "a surprise". So a German Pearl is one that happens without a declaration of war. Thus "a surprise". But you're still not giving up an answer as to why exactly an attack in the atlantic "by surprise" would not create at least the same result? The Japanese got a hit in first and it caught the Americans unawares. But Germany could make the same attempt and America would magically know about it and be able to stop it, despite using the same equipment, training, ship classes and so on?

I seem to recall so many days ago that one of the suggested premises for Germany to attempt an invasion of the US was predicated on two events. The first is the US not entering into the "Lend-Lease" agreement, and instead simply peddling arms at standard prices, and for Germany to have defeated the UK by controlling access to the Suez canal and the surrounding areas (to simplify it a very great deal.) which doesn't require "taking" the Royal Navy as such. It requires only a relatively small increase in tonnage of supplies to Africa to tilt the balance. In reality, this never happened, and the DAK operated on a shoestring, and missed out on perfectly adequate opportunities. (Hitler and the OKW thought Africa was a sideshow and not worth the effort, but according to Sebster the whims of Hitler are apparently not important to the progress of the war historically.) But the alternative is that the Germans do in fact take Egypt and Suez, forcing the UK to supply itself around the cape, or become utterly reliant on lend-lease or its predecessor, or the capabilities of Canada. Germany obtains control of yet another oil-rich area of the world, and very nearly a direct link to their allies to boot. With British influence in the Med reduced to Gibraltar, Crete and Malta (and we know what happened to Crete) the Italians have a much freer hand expanding their own empire across Africa. Such overwhelming axis power there could easily lead to a domino effect in the middle east, which could see Turkey actually taking a side in favour of the Axis. Certainly this puts extra pressure on Russia and the Balkans, freeing up German military forces otherwise occupied there. (And in the course of things allowing Germany to obtain Moscow.)

India, cut off from the UK, is even less well supplied than it actually was. Pressured on one side by Japan, and facing increasing overtures of possible liberation and independence from the UK with German help, India enjoy another mutiny.

Back to the UK. Now effectively cut off from the greater part of the Dominion, the UK must then decide whether it is capable of opposing the Reich in Europe at all. At this juncture, with its armed forces greatly reduced by the loss of Indian troops and its huge losses in Africa, and no free gear from the states to support it, is it really so unfeasible that Parliament might decide against continuing the war?

The next phase rather depends on Parliament, and what demands are made for a surrender, peace or armistice. In some scenarios, the Royal Navy ends up holed up in Scapa being shelled like the French at Dakar. In others it ends up neatly neutralized by terms. Either way, it ends up "defeated"...

Lets assume that the surrender terms lead to a German occupation of the UK. We roll around to where I started days ago, with Germany in control of most of Europe, and well on the way to nailing Russia completely, with substantial access to "floating stock", industry, facilities and what-have you. So the US is faced with a substantial potentially belligerent western neighbour, busy successfully empire building, but not yet at war with the US of A. Just like it was by Japan on the other front. Now explain to me why a surprise attack from the west is any less likely to catch America by surprise?

(None of what I have listed is unfeasible or unlikely or outside the realms of likelihood. In many cases what I have postulated is what would have occurred if certain battles or campaigns had gone the other way. In most cases prevention of the possible events are a great part why the UK was engaged in the damn war with Germany to start with. (Yes Sebs, there were other reasons. Try not to hyper-focus.))

Because Russia had the ability to smash the Germans on their own. If the germans managed to fight their way across the European and then Asian continet they now have a lot of land under their control, land that is still hostile to them and must be policed. So not only do you need more forces to invade you also need more forces to police the conquered territory.

ArbeitsSchu wrote:Hyper-focusing? The only person with a problem hyper-focusing appears to be you. The very act of stating that something is a part of, but not the whole reason for an event or happening is the opposite of hyper-focusing.

Not if you mention that one detail alone, and ignore the vast wealth of evidence that directly contradicts it. Hitler planned for Germany to have a vastly greater fleet than it was practical or useful for it to build. That's the exact opposite of not liking ships.

As for not threatening shipping.. I seem to recall a boat called Tirpitz that caused a hell of a lot of effort to be expended against her without ever leaving dock. There is a substantial list of hardware used to chase its sister craft as well. Gaining control of oceans, no, but disrupting life for other people? Plenty of that.

Are you going to claim the Bismarck or the Tirpitz produced results for Germany that justified the vast resources put into them? Despite the Bismarck sinking the Hood, it achieved little to actually disrupt shipping, and spent the time after the battle with the Hood and Prince of Wales fleeing from British ships. Despite more success against the British ships than one could ever hope for, they were still incapable of completing the main objective of disrupting shipping convoys in the Atlantic.

That's the plain and simple fact of the state of naval power in the Atlantic. Despite being excellent ships, the likes of the Bismarck and the Tirpitz were incapable of threatening British shipping in any serious, sustained fashion. They could win skirmishes here and there, and the threat of a suicide run by the Tirpitz into the midst of the D-day landings was enough of a threat to justify bombing the thing, but none of that was ever worth the cost of all those resources used to build it in the first place. As such, the Nazis made the simple and obvious decision to abandon the silliness of raids of surface ships and instead restrict raiding to submarines. They ceded the surface of the water to the US and the UK.

As for the rest: Yes, you did, and very interesting your contribution is too.

It isn't just interesting. It is the plain and simple answer to your hypothetical. The Germans lacked the seapower, even at maximum theoretical construction, to match the scale of the US navy in 1938. Let alone the US navy under wartime production. Let alone the US navy if the US was actually under threat of seaborne invasion.

You haven't tried to argue against that, your statement above is the closest we've got to you actually recognising I made the point at all. I think this is because you haven't been able to argue against it, but haven't been honest enough to admit the facts I presented sink your hypothetical entirely.

Look, it is okay to accept that your hypothetical wasn't really possible. I assumed my original position on the difficulty of seaborne invasion over an ocean and it wasn't until I looked up the numbers on surface ships that the difference in capability of the two nations became so clear. Basically, there's nothing wrong with having started this conversation on the wrong side, but there's a whole lot wrong with continuing to insist you have a reasonable case, when plainly you do not.

And as part of my original premise is based on the possibility of a German "Pearl", I'd quite like to start at the top, and get a feasible answer for why the Atlantic Fleet is quicker on the uptake than the Pacific one.

You can give them their own version of Pearl Harbour. In the war Pearl Harbour gave the Japanese some measure of free reign for seven months, at the end of which they were utterly defeated and never able to counter US ships moving where they wanted, when they wanted, building to their own invasion. In your example, you'd be taking the Japanese fleet, which itself was more capable than the German fleet, and you'd be tasking them not with the far simpler job of preventing US operations, but the far more difficult task of mouting a seaborne invasion across the Atlantic.

Frazzled wrote:
By not declaring war you're attacking someon who's not aware there's a war on, essentually you're mugging that person.

So? War is war.

Amontadillo wrote:

Frazzled wrote:
By not declaring war you're attacking someon who's not aware there's a war on, essentually you're mugging that person.

So? War is war.

Except of course we had our fleet actually killing Germans at the time, and not in port having no clue that the Japanese government was sadly in need of anger management classes. Its much harder to surprise us when there are ships and planes actively trying to kill the other side already.

Frazzled wrote:By not declaring war you're attacking someon who's not aware there's a war on, essentually you're mugging that person. I'd proffer the Germans would not have had the same advantage, as US ships were already killing German sailors in 1941. Our destroyer and cruiser nets were screening convoys out to the middle of the Atlantic. Now you can change events to where that wasn't occurring, but frankly you can change events to where the US doesn't exist, but it doesn't help the claim.

We've had this conversation before, this doesn't happen until April '42.

Frazzled wrote:Except of course we had our fleet actually killing Germans at the time, and not in port having no clue that the Japanese government was sadly in need of anger management classes. Its much harder to surprise us when there are ships and planes actively trying to kill the other side already.

I'm confused, if this is the case why this the documentary film by Michael Baysplosion called 'Pearl Harbor' and not 'In the Middle of the Atlantic Ocean'?

George Spiggott wrote:

Frazzled wrote:By not declaring war you're attacking someon who's not aware there's a war on, essentually you're mugging that person. I'd proffer the Germans would not have had the same advantage, as US ships were already killing German sailors in 1941. Our destroyer and cruiser nets were screening convoys out to the middle of the Atlantic. Now you can change events to where that wasn't occurring, but frankly you can change events to where the US doesn't exist, but it doesn't help the claim.

We've had this conversation before, this doesn't happen until April '42.

Except of course, you're wrong.

Either the casualties inflicted on USS Kearny by U-boat U-568 on October 17, 1941, or the sinking of the USS Reuben James by U-552 on October 31, 1941 might be considered the first American naval losses of World War II. The United States was neither officially involved in the war at the time nor did the incidents cause them to declare war. By coincidence, the Niblack was in the same convoy as the Reuben James when the Reuben James was sunk and picked up survivors from the Reuben James.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_American_shots_fired_in_World_War_II

Neutrality PatrolFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search

U.S. Navy Vought SBU-1 dive bombers of scouting squadron VS-42 flying the Neutrality Patrol in 1940At the beginning of World War II, when Nazi Germany's invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939 started the hostilities in Europe, President Franklin D. Roosevelt immediately declared the United States’ neutrality.

The Neutrality Patrol, organized on September 4, 1939 as a response to the war in Europe, was ordered to track and report the movements of any warlike operations of belligerents in the waters of the western hemisphere. To augment the fleet units already engaged in the Neutrality Patrol which President Roosevelt had placed around the eastern seaboard and Gulf ports, the United States Navy recommissioned 77 destroyers and light minelayers which had lain in reserve at either Philadelphia or San Diego.

The Neutrality Patrol led to U.S. warships assisting British Royal Navy vessels in convoying merchant shipping across the Atlantic Ocean. This placed U.S. naval personnel at considerable risk, as shown by the sinking of the destroyer USS Reuben James from Convoy HX-156 by U-552 on 31 October 1941.

Frazzled wrote:Except of course, you're wrong.

Either the casualties inflicted on USS Kearny by U-boat U-568 on October 17, 1941, or the sinking of the USS Reuben James by U-552 on October 31, 1941 might be considered the first American naval losses of World War II. The United States was neither officially involved in the war at the time nor did the incidents cause them to declare war. By coincidence, the Niblack was in the same convoy as the Reuben James when the Reuben James was sunk and picked up survivors from the Reuben James.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_American_shots_fired_in_World_War_II

And this is evidence of US ships killing German sailors how?

77 Destroyers is a pittance for the huge USN (The British home fleet alone contains almost a hundred by comparison) Hardly a major distraction for the (also huge) Pacific fleet.

Sinking of Uboats, declaration that there was a US exclusion zone halfway to GB against "pirates" including Uboats. Yes, thats wuite ehlpful against a sneak attack but the incredibly stealthy German surface fleet.

Frazzled wrote:Sinking of Uboats, declaration that there was a US exclusion zone halfway to GB against "pirates" including Uboats. Yes, thats wuite ehlpful against a sneak attack but the incredibly stealthy German surface fleet.

Again sinkings of U-boats start in April '42. Surface fleet attack? My dog's not in that fight.

George Spiggott wrote:

Frazzled wrote:Sinking of Uboats, declaration that there was a US exclusion zone halfway to GB against "pirates" including Uboats. Yes, thats wuite ehlpful against a sneak attack but the incredibly stealthy German surface fleet.

Again sinkings of U-boats start in April '42. Surface fleet attack? My dog's not in that fight.

I didn't say they were particularly good at it until later. But they were dropping charges on them prior to December 1941.
Again for purposes of this actual discussion there ere wide ranging ships and aircraft in the Atlantic due to the convoy situation. It would be much more difficult to launch a suprise attack in those environs. AS the Germans had no aircraft carriers, they'd hadve to get into artillery range to do so. Thats suicide when the other side has aircraft, including land based aircraft.

Frazzled wrote:

Amontadillo wrote:

Frazzled wrote:
By not declaring war you're attacking someon who's not aware there's a war on, essentually you're mugging that person.

So? War is war.

Except of course we had our fleet actually killing Germans at the time, and not in port having no clue that the Japanese government was sadly in need of anger management classes. Its much harder to surprise us when there are ships and planes actively trying to kill the other side already.

Yes, but that's the american's fault, not the Japanese. How are they supposed to know you're not ready for them? OH WAIT, that was the whole point of the attack. Oops, my bad.