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DEAR ALL,

SERIOUSLY CONSIDER FOLLOWING RULE #1.

THANKS!

ALPHARIUS

 Alpharius wrote:
DEAR ALL,

SERIOUSLY CONSIDER FOLLOWING RULE #1.

THANKS!

ALPHARIUS

Come even you have to admit Genda was looking good. He's no Adolf Galland but who is?

 Frazzled wrote:

 Alpharius wrote:
DEAR ALL,

SERIOUSLY CONSIDER FOLLOWING RULE #1.

THANKS!

ALPHARIUS

Come even you have to admit Genda was looking good. He's no Adolf Galland but who is?

Dammit Frazzie! I literally snorted my drink all over my keyboard!

And now my colleagues are looking at me!

I am more handsome than Genda currently is.

 kronk wrote:
I am more handsome than Genda currently is.

Yea but even zombie Adolf is going to outdo the great Kronk. He was Kronkl before Kronk, restoring European birthrates during the height of the Cold War. He helped make the Cold War Hot!


Ok seriously, he had extensive interviews on World at War. At one point he's smoking a cigarette with one of the stick things while talking about flying the 262. He was the Most Interesting Man alive version 1.0

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adolf_Galland

 Frazzled wrote:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adolf_Galland

Very interesting read. Thanks!

Would have loved to have coffee with unique individuals of that Era
Galland
Wittman
Hartmann
Bong
etc etc etc

 Jihadin wrote:
Would have loved to have coffee with unique individuals of that Era
Galland
Wittman
Hartmann
Bong
etc etc etc

Coffee? Come on Yeager and these guys probably drank whiskey like water.

Has to be coffee for me unless I go off my meds or Manchu finally hijacked my pharmacy account.............reminds me.......Manchu....careful with the blue ones

Either going to look at the very beautiful sky or have a raging hard on

 Frazzled wrote:


Wow now we're at the point of Blaming the Victim. Its America's fault for Japan attacking it. If only it didn't wear that short dress.

If you want to take that there with that sort of analogy, well ok... I think that's missing much of the point and appealing to an emotional reaction rather than a more "realpolitik" view, is insisting on judging things from a 21st century civilian Western social standpoint without understanding the 20th century (in some cases, 19th century remnant) mindset of an Asian military power (that had had a very...interesting relationship with Western militaries in the past) that effectively already saw itself at war before any shots were fired,

My point wasn't to excuse the excesses of the Empire of Japan in the 20th century, only to explain that it's actions weren't as capricious as it's often framed, and why the idea that "omg we never expected them to attack us it was so random and for no reason!" is...silly. They weren't even particularly unique, almost every major power acted in a similar manner for similar reasons at some point, the US quite often, just typically smaller nations (oh noes, our banana supply got nationalized/cut-off! gotta invade...).

Still scratching my head on how its rational to go to war with a major power, when you can purchase those supplies somewhere else.

It didn't even occur to them. They didn't want to buy, they wanted to conquer and own. That why the got into Manchuria in the first place.

 Frazzled wrote:
Still scratching my head on how its rational to go to war with a major power, when you can purchase those supplies somewhere else.

It didn't even occur to them. They didn't want to buy, they wanted to conquer and own. That why the got into Manchuria in the first place.

Two reasons. First, they couldn't just buy oil, most other oil producing nations either didn't have any left to sell, no way to get it to Japan, or wouldn't trade it with Japan. The Soviet Union wasn't going to sell her any and didn't have any to spare. The western nations weren't going to sell her any (and that included the middle eastern oil). Her Axis allies didn't have any to spare and no way to transport it. Who would Japan buy from, and would they be able to supply sufficient quantities for her goals?

Second, this was the great age of "self sufficiency", where it was a matter of pride and national security for many nations that they be self sufficient in certain things, particularly after seeing how Colonial powers were able to use their empires to leverage victory in previous wars. And to some extent, they had a point, lack of domestic oil production was a major critical strategic weakness for both Japan and Germany during WW2.

Alternatively they could have stopped and negotiated a withdrawal from China. They were looking for a way out of there anyway, and could have created a face saving way of doing so. (agreeing to leave with an agreed upon interim gov etc.)

So in other words, they had options, but they would rather kill a whole lot of people instead.

 Frazzled wrote:
Still scratching my head on how its rational to go to war with a major power, when you can purchase those supplies somewhere else.

It didn't even occur to them. They didn't want to buy, they wanted to conquer and own. That why the got into Manchuria in the first place.

They misunderestimated the American's will to fight, and miscalculated the time of the attack; they bombed Pearl Harbor when the Aircraft Carriers, their primary targets, were elsewhere, and instead of being cowed by having their fleet destroyed, all that did was piss the Americans off.

Exactly.

 Frazzled wrote:
Alternatively they could have stopped and negotiated a withdrawal from China. They were looking for a way out of there anyway, and could have created a face saving way of doing so. (agreeing to leave with an agreed upon interim gov etc.)

So in other words, they had options, but they would rather kill a whole lot of people instead.

Sure, in theory. In practical terms of what was realistically possible, they weren't going to withdraw in the face of that sort of threat, it just would not have been culturally acceptable, particularly when they felt that in previous instances of foreign negotiation they'd been cheated in many ways, particularly following the first Sino-Japanese war and the Russo-Japanese war after foreign mediators and pressure had resulted in significantly fewer gains than they'd set out to achieve, largely for the benefit of non-combatant powers.

There's a good deal of history feeding the decisions that has to be taken into account.

And, as noted before, the Japanese had a reasonable chance at "victory", had the US carriers been in port, and that 3rd wave of bombers gone in to attack the US oil reserves, it's very likely that the US simply would not have been able fight that war, particularly if it also wanted to contribute to fighting Germany. From a "Game of Empire" standpoint, and with the history they had, it wasn't an irrational or unexpected move, and nobody expected it to be taken to the "unconditional surrender" level it was, in either the Pacific or European conflicts.

 Vaktathi wrote:

 Frazzled wrote:
Alternatively they could have stopped and negotiated a withdrawal from China. They were looking for a way out of there anyway, and could have created a face saving way of doing so. (agreeing to leave with an agreed upon interim gov etc.)

So in other words, they had options, but they would rather kill a whole lot of people instead.

Sure, in theory. In practical terms of what was realistically possible, they weren't going to withdraw in the face of that sort of threat, it just would not have been culturally acceptable, particularly when they felt that in previous instances of foreign negotiation they'd been cheated in many ways, particularly following the first Sino-Japanese war and the Russo-Japanese war after foreign mediators and pressure had resulted in significantly fewer gains than they'd set out to achieve, largely for the benefit of non-combatant powers.

There's a good deal of history feeding the decisions that has to be taken into account.

And, as noted before, the Japanese had a reasonable chance at "victory", had the US carriers been in port, and that 3rd wave of bombers gone in to attack the US oil reserves, it's very likely that the US simply would not have been able fight that war, particularly if it also wanted to contribute to fighting Germany. From a "Game of Empire" standpoint, and with the history they had, it wasn't an irrational or unexpected move, and nobody expected it to be taken to the "unconditional surrender" level it was, in either the Pacific or European conflicts.

You know, the US was incredibly isolationist at that time. It likely would've been incredibly easy to get the US to ignore Japanese expansionism, had the Japanese not shot the bear with a .22 and hoped that the bear would die.

 dusara217 wrote:

 Vaktathi wrote:

 Frazzled wrote:
Alternatively they could have stopped and negotiated a withdrawal from China. They were looking for a way out of there anyway, and could have created a face saving way of doing so. (agreeing to leave with an agreed upon interim gov etc.)

So in other words, they had options, but they would rather kill a whole lot of people instead.

Sure, in theory. In practical terms of what was realistically possible, they weren't going to withdraw in the face of that sort of threat, it just would not have been culturally acceptable, particularly when they felt that in previous instances of foreign negotiation they'd been cheated in many ways, particularly following the first Sino-Japanese war and the Russo-Japanese war after foreign mediators and pressure had resulted in significantly fewer gains than they'd set out to achieve, largely for the benefit of non-combatant powers.

There's a good deal of history feeding the decisions that has to be taken into account.

And, as noted before, the Japanese had a reasonable chance at "victory", had the US carriers been in port, and that 3rd wave of bombers gone in to attack the US oil reserves, it's very likely that the US simply would not have been able fight that war, particularly if it also wanted to contribute to fighting Germany. From a "Game of Empire" standpoint, and with the history they had, it wasn't an irrational or unexpected move, and nobody expected it to be taken to the "unconditional surrender" level it was, in either the Pacific or European conflicts.

You know, the US was incredibly isolationist at that time. It likely would've been incredibly easy to get the US to ignore Japanese expansionism, had the Japanese not shot the bear with a .22 and hoped that the bear would die.

Yeah, but the Japanese commanders probably didn't realise that. They just saw a big western power and their base in Hawaii and got scared.
Captain Matthew Perry may have had something to do with it.

And the US trade embargo on Japan already showed that the US was hardly impartial to its designs.

Add in that Japan wanted the Philippines, which were an American territory, and Japan was faced with two choices:

1) Take the Philippines and use its forces to attempt to create a very strong defence against US counterattack.

or

2) Pre-emptively strike at the US and attempt to remove their ability to fight, at least for a time, during which Japan could continue to gain strength.

It chose to go with option 2, which I think was the sounder strategic decision. Option 1 is risky as if it fails then Japan will be very much exposed as the full might of the US is brought to bear, whereas option 2 allows them to dictate the first blow. If all of the objectives of the attack on Pearl Harbour had been met (destruction of aircraft carriers and oil reserves) then it may have been successful.

 dusara217 wrote:

 Vaktathi wrote:

 Frazzled wrote:
Alternatively they could have stopped and negotiated a withdrawal from China. They were looking for a way out of there anyway, and could have created a face saving way of doing so. (agreeing to leave with an agreed upon interim gov etc.)

So in other words, they had options, but they would rather kill a whole lot of people instead.

Sure, in theory. In practical terms of what was realistically possible, they weren't going to withdraw in the face of that sort of threat, it just would not have been culturally acceptable, particularly when they felt that in previous instances of foreign negotiation they'd been cheated in many ways, particularly following the first Sino-Japanese war and the Russo-Japanese war after foreign mediators and pressure had resulted in significantly fewer gains than they'd set out to achieve, largely for the benefit of non-combatant powers.

There's a good deal of history feeding the decisions that has to be taken into account.

And, as noted before, the Japanese had a reasonable chance at "victory", had the US carriers been in port, and that 3rd wave of bombers gone in to attack the US oil reserves, it's very likely that the US simply would not have been able fight that war, particularly if it also wanted to contribute to fighting Germany. From a "Game of Empire" standpoint, and with the history they had, it wasn't an irrational or unexpected move, and nobody expected it to be taken to the "unconditional surrender" level it was, in either the Pacific or European conflicts.

You know, the US was incredibly isolationist at that time. It likely would've been incredibly easy to get the US to ignore Japanese expansionism, had the Japanese not shot the bear with a .22 and hoped that the bear would die.

US isolationism extended only so far, and for Japan to get to the oil fields and other resources she needed to in the south Pacific (and do so with secure supply lines), would have inevitably involved war as the US had its own nascent imperial holdings in the area. Also, again, it's not that she "shot a bear with a 22", Japan's opening salvo had a good chance to inflict enough damage that the US simply wouldn't be able to pursue a conflict no matter how pissed off we were, but they missed a couple of key targets and the very operation they executed changed naval warfare in ways nobody expected (and, as such, the battleships they sunk weren't as crippling as anyone expected). A better analogy would be they shot the bear with a 30.06, but managed to miss all the vital organs and blood vessels (being the carriers and oil reserves).

It was a gamble that very obviously didn't pay off, but with the information available at the time, the mindsets and worldviews of the parties at the time, and the geopolitical realities of the time, it was neither a gamble that didn't have a realistic chance of paying off, nor were hostilities something people weren't expecting and preparing for. Also, nobody expected any conflict to be taken to an "unconditional surrender" end, and that policy didn't come about until 1943 (and was contentious behind closed doors between the US and UK).

 Vaktathi wrote:
Also, nobody expected any conflict to be taken to an "unconditional surrender" end, and that policy didn't come about until 1943 (and was contentious behind closed doors between the US and UK).

This. Japan's plan was never really to defeat the US in the sense of the allies defeating Nazi Germany. Japan knew it would not be able to conquer mainland US. The objective of Japan was to inflict enough losses on the US to make the war untenable and then negotiate a peace which allowed it to keep hold of the gains it had made. Not even all of them, necessarily, but the majority and certainly the strategic ones. If that meant grabbing some less important areas in order to bargain them back, then so be it.

If Japan did not lose four of six heavy carriers at the Battle of Midway we might have a way different development and conclusion of WWII in the Pacific
If US carriers were caught in Pearl another factor

 Frazzled wrote:
Alternatively they could have stopped and negotiated a withdrawal from China. They were looking for a way out of there anyway, and could have created a face saving way of doing so. (agreeing to leave with an agreed upon interim gov etc.)

So in other words, they had options, but they would rather kill a whole lot of people instead.

Pretty much. Japan was never realistically going to withdraw from China. They literally faked an international incident twice, to start conflicts with China. In Japan's mind the conquest of China was integral to the formation of the great Pan-Asian alliance that would oppose Western Empires. Japan's political views were too ideologically saturated to realize the hole they were digging for themselves.

I reckon even if Pearl Harbour or Midway had been more succesful results for the Japanese, the war would have eventually gone against them. It would have been more prolonged and unpleasant.

The Japanese never had the capability to invade the continent of North America, which would have been able to continue as the arsenal of democracy, build more carriers, and so on.

Well, in keeping with the spirit of the Japanese, I'm going to go ahead and deny that the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki ever happened. We invested in both cities, starting with an extensive remodeling. There were some isolated incidents of bombing in Japan (The Doolittle Raid), but really we were extending our hand of friendship from 35,000 feet.

All the photos are obviously faked by the insidious forces of Dolphin and Whale.

 Kilkrazy wrote:
I reckon even if Pearl Harbour or Midway had been more succesful results for the Japanese, the war would have eventually gone against them. It would have been more prolonged and unpleasant.

The Japanese never had the capability to invade the continent of North America, which would have been able to continue as the arsenal of democracy, build more carriers, and so on.

Indeed. Naval force escorting landing forces for Tarawa. November 1943
The American invasion force to the Gilberts was the largest yet assembled for a single operation in the Pacific, consisting of 17 aircraft carriers (6 CVs, 5 CVLs, and 6 CVEs), 12 battleships, 8 heavy cruisers, 4 light cruisers, 66 destroyers, and 36 transport ships.

Forces that engaged the Japanese reconstsituted at the Marianas -Battle of the Phillipine Sea. Known as the Marianas Turkey Shoot.
7 fleet carriers
8 light fleet carriers
7 battleships
8 heavy cruisers
13 light cruisers
58 destroyers
28 submarines
956 carrier aircraft

Forces at Okinawa
Central Pacific Task Forces (Fifth Fleet) under Admiral Raymond Spruance:

Covering Forces and Special Groups (Task Force 50) directly under Spruance:
Fast Carrier Force (TF 58) under Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher with 88 ships (including 11 fleet carriers, 6 light carriers, 7 battleships and 18 cruisers);[25]
British Carrier Force (TF 57) under Vice Admiral Sir Bernard Rawlings with 4 carriers, 2 battleships, 5 cruisers, 14 destroyers and fleet train;[25]
Joint Expeditionary Force (TF 51) under Vice Admiral Richmond K. Turner (who was holding position of Commander, Amphibious Forces, Pacific):[26]
Amphibious Support Force (TF 52) under Rear Admiral William H. P. Blandy:[26]
TG 52.1: 18 escort carriers with 450 aircraft;[26]
Sl Escort Carrier Group: 4 escort carriers with Marine Aircraft Group 31 and 33;[26]
Mine Flotilla (TG 52.2)
Underwater Demolition Flotilla (TG 52.11): ten 100-men UDT aboard destroyer escorts[26]
170 fire support landing craft
Western Islands Attack Group (TG 51.1) under Rear Admiral Ingolf N. Kiland with 77th Infantry Division, 17 attack and attack cargo transporters, 56 LSTs and support vessels;[26]
Northern Attack Force (TF 53) under Rear Admiral Lawrence F. Reifsnider, Commander Amphibious Group 4, aboard USS Panamint (AGC-13) with III Amphibious Corps (Major General Roy Geiger) on 40+ attack and attack cargo transporters, 67 LSTs and support vessels;[26]
Southern Attack Force (TF 55) under Rear Admiral John L. Hall with XXIV Corps (Major General John R. Hodge);[26]
Demonstration Group (TG 51.2) with 2nd Marine Division;[26]
Gunfire and Covering Support Group (TF 54) under Rear Admiral Morton L. Deyo with 10 old battleships, 11 cruisers and 30 destroyers.[27]
Expeditionary Troops (TF 56) under Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr. with Tenth Army.[26]

 Jihadin wrote:
If Japan did not lose four of six heavy carriers at the Battle of Midway we might have a way different development and conclusion of WWII in the Pacific
If US carriers were caught in Pearl another factor

OFF TOPIC...Lets say worst case scenario happens... Enterprise, Saratoga, and Lexington are sunk at pearl harbor + they take out the secondary targets of the submarine base, and the oil fields.
This certainly is a big blow to the US Pacific fleet, because they then would have to move to San Diego.

The consequences of moving to San Diego would be thus..
1)Unable to defend Guadalcanal, and no battle of Coral Sea..and thus leaves Australia/NZ open for invasion..which probably would have happened.
2)Yorktown, Wasp, Ranger(old as dirt), would have to transfer from Atlantic to Pacific, to meet up with Hornet, thus giving the USA only 4 carriers..all based in the Pacific.
3) Hawaii, is vulnerable to invasion
4)Probably no battle of Midway?
5) USA had an emergency plan to convert ships to carriers, but this would take at least 6 months to complete, start rolling out mid 42', and the ramp up of essex carriers wouldn't start to kick until late 42.

So even if the pearl harbor attack resulted in the worst case scenario...all it really would have done is delay the inevitable by maybe 1 or 2 years.

The only victory that Japan could have hoped to achieve was to create war weariness in the USA, so that they would sue for peace..The japanese situation was very similar to the situation of the confederacy, in that Lee knew that the south could never beat the north, militarily or economically, that's why Gettysburg, and Antietam happened, he was trying to get a victory in the north, so that the northern civilians would over overwhelmingly pressure Lincoln to sue for peace.



ONTOPIC... was either atomic bomb "necessary"? I think from a strategic standpoint in hindsight, probably not. However, it's Monday morning quarterbacking to decry the use of them as a warcrime. After okinawa, the USA wasn't going to go through another bloodbath, if they could avoid it. And the mass bombing of cities, had already been an established doctrine in ww2, so.. to the planners of the time, it wouldn't be any different than the firebombing of Tokyo, or the bombing of Dresden or London.

GG

To expand;

1)Unable to defend Guadalcanal, and no battle of Coral Sea..and thus leaves Australia/NZ open for invasion..which probably would have happened.

Despite the ever present fear, post war documents reveal that the invasion of Australia and New Zealand were never given serious consideration. The Navy toyed with the idea, but top Army planners (Tojo namely) decided early on that it was not feasible to take and hold either, and would cost more resources than they'd gain, as well as risk making their end game strategy unworkable.

2)Yorktown, Wasp, Ranger(old as dirt), would have to transfer from Atlantic to Pacific, to meet up with Hornet, thus giving the USA only 4 carriers..all based in the Pacific.

To be fair, they weren't doing much in the Atlantic. Barring the U-boat war, the Atlantic war was pretty stale. British and cruiser carried planes could have handled it themselves until more carriers were built.

3) Hawaii, is vulnerable to invasion

Yeah, but the Japanese would have never invaded it. The declaration of war being delivered late was a galvanizing error for their war strategy, and taking a major US territory by force would have further galvanized US leadership and the population. Japan wanted to either crush US moral with casualties, or crush the US navy in a decisive battle. Taking Hawaii would have rendered either of those options moot.

However the threat of invasion would likely be taken seriously by the US and presented a constraint on military planning. Which plays into the next bit;

4)Probably no battle of Midway?

Well there'd have been a battle, but it would likely have been poor little Midway getting rolled over by the Imperial Navy. Midway was critical to Yamomoto's plan, as holding it would allow the Japanese fleet to hold a forward position and engage the US fleet more favorably. It also would force the US fleet to move against them, as a fleet stationed in Midway was withing striking distance of any harbor the US navy might birth at. Thus holding Midway, and being able to threaten Hawaii, and strike at the west coast, opened the door to force the decisive conflict Japan wanted.

However, within our ability to guess, Japan would have still lost that battle. US industry far outstripped Japanese capability and the US navy was bigger and more technologically advanced in the areas that ultimately mattered in the war (carriers and naval aviation, once we got better planes that is).

So even if the pearl harbor attack resulted in the worst case scenario...all it really would have done is delay the inevitable by maybe 1 or 2 years.

Indeed.

ONTOPIC... was either atomic bomb "necessary"?

General bombing might very well have had the same end result, or the continued Soviet push into China. Like I said earlier, Hirohito through his life always credited the Atomic bomb as his chief reason in his decision, but Japan would lose eventually anyway and probably have accepted unconditional surrender without a full on invasion of Kyushu.

Really, the big question is how different would the post war period be without the bomb having ever been dropped? Would the US have been more aggressive towards Russia? Would Russia have been more aggressive with the west? Would we have actually used it Korea? It's completely unknowable how the rest of the century would have gone, but it would probably be way different.

Yamamoto's strategic objective in the Midway camaign was to draw the remaining US carriers into a battle where they would be destroyed.

This obviously would not have been necessary if they had been destroyed at Pearl Harbour.

However it's worth noting that two of the damaged battleships were returned to service within a few months. If they had been carriers, together with some carriers diverted from the Atlantic, the battle of Midway might actually have occurred in some form, later in the year.

I"m referring to the war planned in mid-1942. Midway was always an objective, but Japan rapidly realized that Pearl Harbor was not the gut punch they really wanted it to be, and were forced to alter their war goals (Yamomoto originally backed a much more aggressive Pacific War, but with the US carriers still roaming the high seas, he ended up backing the Army's preferred defensive stance and the Imperial Navy became much more cautious).