djones520 wrote:
Ketara wrote:The problem with Iraq is that there's essentially a single port in the entire country, meaning that most of our naval/amphibious transport assets can't be utilised for a landing. We've never had the sort of airlift capacity America has.
On top of that, most of the gear our troops had was adapted for the complete opposite climate, which didn't help.
For the initial run up, we weren't exactly using Basra to off load our equipment. We were using port facilities in Kuwait, Qatar, etc...
Precisely. Which means that our gear and supplies then has to be transported cross-country in a nation where we have no prepared staging points, supply dumps, command and control posts and so forth. When you're doing an amphibious landing, your ships can function in that sort of capacity until you've set up local facilities. When you're operating in an allied NATO country, that sort of stuff is prepared in advance. When you're at home, you can work off your own ones and comandeer whatever you need locally.
Whereas for Iraq, everything was sort of thrown together on the fly. There were some Gulf War leftovers that helped out (we knew the geography and suchlike), but we were essentially trying to move our men and supplies cross-country without adequate mechanisation or air transport for that sort of deployment. When your supply dumps are a short drive away from your port, stuff can be shipped in, sorted, and distributed with reasonable efficiency. When it has to cross another country first, it all starts getting horribly complicated, and you need a much greater logistical strength to carry the same amount of supplies and troops (more trucks, more fuel and parts for those trucks, etc).
If we'd had a year to plan it, I don't doubt it would have been easily managed, but with the resources to hand at the time, it was a strain. Unlike America, our default transport and logistical capacities are maintained at a much lower tempo, and centred primarily around what the fleet can carry/provide or local NATO facilities, as opposed to on the principle of fighting ground wars at a distance from the fleet. If we'd been fighting against the Russkis in Northern Europe, our troops would have been perfectly provided for. Even another Falklands would have been easier in an immediate logistical sense (if not in the longer term).