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I am (for some unknown reason) taken with this force as a Challenge to myself.... I am aware of the books about to be released, so am gearing up for Jeep driven Para Madness..

My current thoughts are:-

HQ 2 x Piat 2 x Mortar 6 Jeeps
Combat 3x Jeep Platoons 21 Jeeps
Support Platoons 6drs 4 jeeps
Support Platoons 4 x 17drs 4 x cwt 15 truck
Support Platoons 2 x 17drs 2 x cwt 15 truck

31 Jeeps, 6 Cwt's, 4 x 6pdrs, 6 x 17pdrs. = 1490pts

I am taking the CWT's and 17lbs to make these more competitive, as I don't think Freddie Gough had these in reality. I will look again at this when the new book hits the streets. Oh and If anyone has a "Truck load of 15mm Jeeps they want rid off" drop me a PM!!!

Out of interest does anyone own/ know the name of the book he wrote? I hear it was a corker with some excellent anedotes . I was told years ago by my grandfather but the name escapes me.

What book is this list from? Because the list from AbtF only has one option for 6/17 pdrs, and the new 6thAAR list doesn't have jeeps as troops!

I think even if you hope the new MG book has this list, you'll be lucky for it to have three anti tank options!

Also if the jeep list gets recon it'll be great, if they stay as they are the 5+ save will crucify you

Yeah whoops, forgot to mention my Wargames club is doing an Arnhem Custom Campaign, so our Force lists are modified as are the 9th & 10th SS, as well as other hodge podge forces .

The Frost Battalion can have a normal Para List, except no 75mm Arty, 17lb's or artillery , just 6lb's, HMG's, PIAT, 3" MORTAR. With Gough Providing extra if he can get to the Bridge. Hicks, Lathbury and Hackett all have modified lists too based on Cornelius Ryans book. We are using a BF's a Bridge too far, as the basis of the lists but will update them when the new book comes out..

Ah makes sense! Personally I would go for more 6pdrs over the 6 17pdrs. They fit better as they are more mobile, and would be great for close defence - the 17 PDFs are designed to sit on a hill and shoot

 Reaver83 wrote:
Ah makes sense! Personally I would go for more 6pdrs over the 6 17pdrs. They fit better

17-Pounders were at Arnhem;



This is probally the rarest of all Arnhem pics - C.8/AT MkIII towing a 17 Pdr into position.

As for sitting on hills, not many at Arnhem. Here are two guns, and their deployment;








This gun in this pic is now on display at the Hartenstien Museum in Arnhem;





Finally this specific Flammpanzer B2 (f) was destroyed on 20 September in Sonnenberglaan by a 17 Pdr AT gun of 'X' Troop, 2nd (Oban) Anti-Tank Battery:




Good luck with the project, Arnhem is something I have long studied over many years.

WOW, I've never seen a picture of a 17lb at Arnhem !!! That is some archive material you've got.

Big P I know he wrote some, but do you know what is the name of Freddie Goughs Memoires? It was something like Ticket to Arnhem i think?

I've got this one...
Reconnaissance Squadron at Arnhem by John Fairley ISBN 095155090X

I never doubted 17 PDFs were there, I was at the airborne museum myself over the summer!
http://breakthroughassault.blogspot.co.uk/2012/11/airborne-museum-hartenstein.html?m=1


I think that for a more mobile force you'd have 6 instead of 17 pdrs.

Lorries infantry had primarily 6pdrs iirc

As for 17pdrs on hills, I refered to the I game mechanics. Unless they have great Los they're easy to hide from

I see what you are saying Reaver, it's about denying movement of enemy forces and funnelling them into Kill-zones.

The old Lose-Lose Flow diagram, e.g force them to run the gauntlet of fire by skirting around your guns, or hit your Guns head on to try and neutralise them, or else just sit there and do nothing.

I honestly didn't realise they had Airborne 17lbers, it was just in the Options of the Market Garden Book, so I was in two minds as to whether BF inserted them to give Para's a fighting chance against Heavy Tanks at Range, or they were possibly historically accurate. Piers has cleared that up, so it looks okay, but I might as you say shift it around to be more 6lber's as this is more representative of the bulk of the AT guns at Arnhem.

32 6-pounders and 16 17-pounders in 1st Airborne.

Of the 8 17-pounders in the 1st wave, four were lost (two in en-route and two on landing - one a total write-off when it came loose on landing and the other other with a damaged recoil buffer system).

The second lift result wasnt much better, adding only one more gun to the force. However the bulk ammunition gliders arrived safely so ammo for the 17-pounder was not a problem.

As ever, your knowledge is impressive.

Makes you wonder, if they'd got more of the 17-lbs down, would they have had more of a chance against Heavy Armour? That said, the town was being hammered by Artillery so it probably wouldn't have made that much of a difference.

Still would Radio's have even made a difference? The Germans split the force and even with co-ordinated action would more Para's have got through to the Bridge? Would it have made a difference anyway? Why the hell did Urquhart change the succession of command and not bloody tell anyone but his Chief of Staff, the ignoring of the Driel ferry, and a thousand other details, the whole thing is an example of planning on the hoof. It reminds me of Gallipoli, in that blind faith, positivity and a lack of intelligence meant it had a good chance of failing before it even got off the ground.

Actually they had tons of intel from Dutch resistance sources.

Unfortunately, this was tainted as the Dutch Resistance had been heavily penetrated by the Gestapo in previous years and so, the sources were not viewed as trustworthy. To put this into context, and the level of concern, over 200 SOE agents dropped into Holland went straight into the clutches of the Gestapo due to how compromised Dutch Resistance was.

With that caveat, its not quite so easy to lay the blame solely at the door of poor intel. Like most things, there was a reason behind it.

Radios? Not much difference. The limitations of the sets in use were well known. What was an issue was the loss of the TACair radar sets on landing that could have provided local direction of close air support.

As for planning... Well it wasnt that off the hoof. Market-Garden was based upon Operation Comet, which in turn was based on another cancelled operation. In fact the Germans had just been running away too damn fast for any scheduled airborne drop to happen. Aid that confidence that the German is broken and you have another problem - Overconfidence, and is this case it really did seem to be born out by what was going on on the ground.

Then add in an Allied Airborne Army command desperate to get into the action when it looked like the war was over. Yes corners were cut, but the real problems that caused the greatest problems could have been solved.

Firstly the air-lifts. The split lift was a horrid mistake. People go on about the drop zones being too far away and the like, well thats nonsense. The drop zones nearer the bridge were not suitable for landing, and the only area suitable for a coup de main assault was actually the staging point for an SS Alarmheit Kompanie. Also, zones nearer the bridge took aircraft neaer to the flak defences of Deelen airfield (which ironically turned out to be largely dummy positions).

What should have happened was that two drops were conducted on day one. There would have been losses due to pilot error and fatigue, but all of 1st AB could have been on the ground on Day one. That would allowed a mass advance and no need to hold the landing zones. The blame for that lies with Brereton.

The other thing that may have helped, even if they still went for two lifts, was for Browning to stay and go on the second lift, instead of using up 36 gliders to deliver a somewhat ineffectual army command formation to the battle zone. One must wonder if 36 gliders could have been better spent in Arnhem.

It was a tragedy of errors, but there was a sound reason for going based on what they knew, or rather believed at the time. A few changes could have made all the difference. Its easy to aportion blame with hindsight, but at that moment, at that time, the call had to be made.

As Frost said, when asked after the war, if he knew then what he knew now of the defenders at Arnhem would he have gone, he replied "Of course, I just would have taken more PIATs..."

I'm highly critical of the whole strategy, the entire Allied push from the West from supplied from the Beaches in Normandy, this wasn't hindsight this was blatantly obvious to everyone at the time. The failure to secure antwerp before the Wehrmacht destroyed all the port Facilties compounded the problem, and then the allies were forced into a One or two thrust strategy as they believed they didn't have the resources to advance across a broad front.

I think my biggest criticism, is why the Airlift was so late in the day? Why didn't the Air armada go at first light, and then have a second airlift in the afternoon?