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sebster wrote:Sort of, they are just playing the game as it’s been presented to them. People enter contracts for their own purpose, generally either profit or risk reduction, and a company looking to enter health insurance contracts for their own profit will enforce or obey their contracts to maximise their profits.

That's a reason, not an excuse. It's still wrong.

sebster wrote:I don’t think there’s any value in moral outrage when a company acts according to the system created. The answer is to change the rules of the game so that the behaviour of the insurance companies isn’t encouraged. That would likely mean a public option, or a loose equivalent such as the mandatory coverage/no precondition system that is to be put in place.

Agree to disagree, then. In the end, while I do feel moral outrage against the (in my view) murderous practices practiced by (some? all?) insurance comapnies is justified, moral outrage alone won't solve the problem. Regardless, it is pretty obvious that the system as described doesn't work. And while moral outrage isn't the answer, it does make it clear that one is needed.

sebster wrote:
I think it’s likely that the current system has well under 50% support, but every proposed system is also under 50%. I mean, people don’t like the current system, but they don’t like it for a lot of different reasons, and that reflects in their support of all kinds of other systems.

When you add in the freak out factor where new proposals will become very unpopular on the eve of their adoption and you can see where legitimacy by 50% approval becomes something of a nonsense. What is government to do when every possible option from maintaining the status quo to complete reform is less than 50% popular?

Well, the straight answer is: "Whatever it wants." The difficulty inherent in gauging popular support over a large electorate is one of the pillars of necessity supporting representative systems; we'd need a a very big pot for 231,229,580 stones.

There's a balance to be struck in which politicians are sufficiently distant from the people to exercise their own will, while being close enough to them to be sensitive to their concerns. At the moment our obsession with democracy, the availability of masses of statistical data, and the popularization of media have made it more difficult to maintain the necessary distance.

dogma wrote:
There's a balance to be struck in which politicians are sufficiently distant from the people to exercise their own will, while being close enough to them to be sensitive to their concerns.

This tenet (representative distance) has many shades of grey, depending both on the size of the body politic being represented and the function of that individual in respect to the body politic. it is further muddled by each individuals' stance on how much of their own perspective should be set aside in deference to the wishes of the body politic. Local representatives of a homogeneous population may very will simply more than a token representative expected to respond faithfully to his constituents desires. A state representative at the federal level has much less homogeneity to rely upon, and thus has to rely more upon personal biases.

Currently many representatives of heterogeneous bodies are operating under the bias that they should respond faithfully to their constituents without understanding the abstract nature of those constituents. The conjunction of readily available statistical data and 'real time' media coverage accelerates those trends, but they have been with us for a long time. The stereotype of the congressman or congresswoman relating a personal anecdote in support of a piece of legislation is legion, after all.

dogma wrote:
At the moment our obsession with democracy, the availability of masses of statistical data, and the popularization of media have made it more difficult to maintain the necessary distance.

None of these trends are necessarily bad, and are certainly accelerating instead of declining. What is more important I suspect is how we choose to deal with them. Is America to the point of needing an additional layer of political abstraction above the federal level?

IceRaptor wrote:
None of these trends are necessarily bad, and are certainly accelerating instead of declining. What is more important I suspect is how we choose to deal with them. Is America to the point of needing an additional layer of political abstraction above the federal level?

I don't think so. To me it seems as though the issue will be resolved through the evolution of sensibility within the the political class. As you say, it is our choices in reaction to popular access which will be important, and those choices seem to be easily handled via rhetoric, at least for short periods of time. Note the success of neoconservatism.

My insurer dropped me.

I punched him in the lip. Being dropped from 8 feet up hurt.

Bran Dawri wrote:That's a reason, not an excuse. It's still wrong.

My point is that judging them as personally wrong or not achieve nothing. They’re playing the game as the game has encouraged them to play it. We can tell them off, we can drag them before government to answer for what they’ve done, but they’ll do it again, and so will the rest. Economics is powerful master.

The point is that when the game isn’t working, as it really obviously isn’t in this case, you change the rules of the game.

Agree to disagree, then. In the end, while I do feel moral outrage against the (in my view) murderous practices practiced by (some? all?) insurance comapnies is justified, moral outrage alone won't solve the problem. Regardless, it is pretty obvious that the system as described doesn't work. And while moral outrage isn't the answer, it does make it clear that one is needed.

I guess it depends on the perception we have of moral outrage to actual solutions. I’ve seen a lot of moral outrage in my time, and a whole lot less nuts and bolts reform. The reality is that moral outrage is exciting, you get out and protest, there’s pretty leftwing girls, you shout things at security dudes and policemen, and then you go home full of self satisfaction.

Actually working to improve the system isn’t fun. There’s lots of time spent learning the minutiae of law, making compromises, and government bureaucrat girls are never as pretty.

dogma wrote:I don't think so. To me it seems as though the issue will be resolved through the evolution of sensibility within the the political class. As you say, it is our choices in reaction to popular access which will be important, and those choices seem to be easily handled via rhetoric, at least for short periods of time.

Hmm, interesting point. I would hope that the lesson will be learned when politicians follow highly vocal minorities, only to be beaten in election by a more silent majority. Which has always been the way, it’ll really be about learning the tricks of new media to figure out what is a popular issue and what is a highly mobilised minority.

Note the success of neoconservatism.

Neo-conservatism originated entirely within the political class though, and was sunk by it’s almost complete failure in practice.

sebster wrote:
Hmm, interesting point. I would hope that the lesson will be learned when politicians follow highly vocal minorities, only to be beaten in election by a more silent majority. Which has always been the way, it’ll really be about learning the tricks of new media to figure out what is a popular issue and what is a highly mobilised minority.

Yeah, I expect that politics will get much louder, but that the 'trust curve' will sufficiently desensitize people to the central mass of information in the cloud.

sebster wrote:
Neo-conservatism originated entirely within the political class though, and was sunk by it’s almost complete failure in practice.

They succeeded at their initial task, which was control of the foreign policy agenda for the next 20 years; inserting us into Iraq insured that. The rest of the ideology was little more than hand waving deference for the purposes of currying favor amongst political adversaries, and reticents.

dogma wrote:Yeah, I expect that politics will get much louder, but that the 'trust curve' will sufficiently desensitize people to the central mass of information in the cloud.

I think that sounds reasonable, but I predict some big learning steps along the way.

They succeeded at their initial task, which was control of the foreign policy agenda for the next 20 years; inserting us into Iraq insured that. The rest of the ideology was little more than hand waving deference for the purposes of currying favor amongst political adversaries, and reticents.

Sure, but the insertion in Iraq was a step towards a century of US dominance in world affairs. That failed miserably at the first hurdle.

sebster wrote:
I think that sounds reasonable, but I predict some big learning steps along the way.

Certainly.

sebster wrote:
Sure, but the insertion in Iraq was a step towards a century of US dominance in world affairs. That failed miserably at the first hurdle.

Sort of. The purpose of Iraq advocacy varies based on the Neocon you speak to. Fukuyama called it a boondoggle, despite advocating it early on, and Rumsfeld et al obviously supported it. The gamut was run in between.

In general, you'll find that the reasoning behind the war varies from masculine retaliation (my position, if you're interested), to rational defense. However, the center-pieces of the PNAC agenda were, and are Central Asia, Africa, and India.

dogma wrote:Sort of. The purpose of Iraq advocacy varies based on the Neocon you speak to. Fukuyama called it a boondoggle, despite advocating it early on, and Rumsfeld et al obviously supported it. The gamut was run in between.

In general, you'll find that the reasoning behind the war varies from masculine retaliation (my position, if you're interested), to rational defense. However, the center-pieces of the PNAC agenda were, and are Central Asia, Africa, and India.

Really? All the neo-con stuff I read before and after invasion was heavily focussed on Iraq and the middle east. As well as developing control over oil, it was viewed as a region where governments could be built that matched US interests.

I mean, there was plenty of stuff about resisting future Chinese dominance and being the dominant player in Africa, but Iraq and the democratic domino* stuff was seen as a part of that.



*Perhaps if there's only one lesson in history, it is that any concept with the word domino in it is almost certainly stupid.

sebster wrote:
Really? All the neo-con stuff I read before and after invasion was heavily focussed on Iraq and the middle east. As well as developing control over oil, it was viewed as a region where governments could be built that matched US interests.

I mean, there was plenty of stuff about resisting future Chinese dominance and being the dominant player in Africa, but Iraq and the democratic domino* stuff was seen as a part of that.

That was the Rumsfeld/Cheney/Wolfowitz theory. It doesn't represent all of Neocon thought, but it does represent the Bush administration. A lot of people got behind them, because they were in power, but that had more to do with having a voice than thoughtful agreement. Also, they knew Rove, and no one wanted to side against Rove.

As I understand the internal politics of the movement, the domino effect presentation was straight lifted from Vietnam for its proven record.

sebster wrote:
*Perhaps if there's only one lesson in history, it is that any concept with the word domino in it is almost certainly stupid.

I'd live by that motto.

dogma wrote:That was the Rumsfeld/Cheney/Wolfowitz theory. It doesn't represent all of Neocon thought, but it does represent the Bush administration. A lot of people got behind them, because they were in power, but that had more to do with having a voice than thoughtful agreement. Also, they knew Rove, and no one wanted to side against Rove.

Fair enough, I didn't consider a greater movement outside of Rumsfeld et al. I'd be interested in any recommendations you had for reading.

Fukuyama is probably the best person to begin with as he is, in my opinion, the best Neocon author there is:

The End of History and the Last Man
The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order.
America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy
After the Neo Cons: Where the Right went Wrong.

The neoconservative moment, The National Interest, Summer 2004

Brilliant guy, but somewhat behind the curve due to a focus on post-data.

He's a lot like his mentor, Huntington, which means you may find him too Machiavellian.

William Kristol is also a good person to read, though he is a moron. So is Zalmay Khalilzad if you can dig him up. Also, shockingly, Ellen Bork occasionally says things that are insightful. At least when she isn't on TV.

dogma wrote:Fukuyama is probably the best person to begin with as he is, in my opinion, the best Neocon author there is:

The End of History and the Last Man
The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order.
America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy
After the Neo Cons: Where the Right went Wrong.

The neoconservative moment, The National Interest, Summer 2004

Brilliant guy, but somewhat behind the curve due to a focus on post-data.

He's a lot like his mentor, Huntington, which means you may find him too Machiavellian.

I have no problem with people arguing for a Machiavellian approach, it isn't my approach but as long as it's properly considered I think there's merit in hearing it. My problem with a lot of self declared Machiavellis is that they assume they must be informed and rational because they're Machiavellian, when they have no idea what they're talking about.

I'll check out Fukuyama on Amazon tonight. Thanks.

William Kristol is also a good person to read, though he is a moron.

sebster wrote:
I have no problem with people arguing for a Machiavellian approach, it isn't my approach but as long as it's properly considered I think there's merit in hearing it. My problem with a lot of self declared Machiavellis is that they assume they must be informed and rational because they're Machiavellian, when they have no idea what they're talking about.

I'll check out Fukuyama on Amazon tonight. Thanks.

Yeah, you'll do fine with Fukuyama then. He's not a self-described Machiavellian, or even Conservative. He's a lot like me really, though I'm more plasticine than he is.

sebster wrote:
He isn't a moron, he's just always wrong. Like a lot of reasonably smart people who are always wrong, there's often a lot to be learned in why they're always wrong.

Yeah, that's a better way to put it.

sebster wrote:
Really?

She has a lot to say about East Asian minorities; particularly the Uyghurs.

sebster wrote:

Bran Dawri wrote:That's a reason, not an excuse. It's still wrong.

My point is that judging them as personally wrong or not achieve nothing. They’re playing the game as the game has encouraged them to play it. We can tell them off, we can drag them before government to answer for what they’ve done, but they’ll do it again, and so will the rest. Economics is powerful master.

My point is that it's still wrong. Judging it as wrong (and with enough people) means you'll speak up about it. Enough people so that, and those in power should take note and change the rules. (That they should, doesn't mean they will.)

sebster wrote:The point is that when the game isn’t working, as it really obviously isn’t in this case, you change the rules of the game.

That I quite agree with. Before those in power actually get off their collective arses and change them, however, they need to be made aware that there's a problem. How are they gonna find out if no one tells them? Whether through protest or some more (or less) radical means?

Agree to disagree, then. In the end, while I do feel moral outrage against the (in my view) murderous practices practiced by (some? all?) insurance comapnies is justified, moral outrage alone won't solve the problem. Regardless, it is pretty obvious that the system as described doesn't work. And while moral outrage isn't the answer, it does make it clear that one is needed.

sebster wrote:I guess it depends on the perception we have of moral outrage to actual solutions. I’ve seen a lot of moral outrage in my time, and a whole lot less nuts and bolts reform. The reality is that moral outrage is exciting, you get out and protest, there’s pretty leftwing girls, you shout things at security dudes and policemen, and then you go home full of self satisfaction.

Actually working to improve the system isn’t fun. There’s lots of time spent learning the minutiae of law, making compromises, and government bureaucrat girls are never as pretty.

eh, I'm not american, and not big on protesting in any case. I use the term moral outrage to describe a negative emotion I get when confronted with morally wrong actions, not as going out there and sticking it to the Man.
Even so, going out there and protesting doesn't solve anything by itself - I most certainly agree with that. It does, however (when done by enough people, or supported by enough people who don't actually have the stones to do it, make it clear that something needs to change.

dogma wrote:
In general, you'll find that the reasoning behind the war varies from masculine retaliation (my position, if you're interested), to rational defense.

Why discard the economic motivations as the primary motivator? Not only did a war ensure a steady stream of support for war-related industries (since it's politically inexpedient to 'cut support for the troops'), but also opened a relatively green-field market for service providers. Those are all short term gains, but it's rather reminiscent of typical power grabs by merchants throughout history.

It would be easy to couch such motives in terms of 'national security' and 'economic stability' as an psychological appeal. Furthering the dominance of the American dollar as the fundamental unit of wealth in oil trading would be especially appealing to a nationalist mindset as well.

I think that the Bush ego had some role in the war, but I'm not sure it was the primary motivator.

IceRaptor wrote:
Why discard the economic motivations as the primary motivator? Not only did a war ensure a steady stream of support for war-related industries (since it's politically inexpedient to 'cut support for the troops'), but also opened a relatively green-field market for service providers. Those are all short term gains, but it's rather reminiscent of typical power grabs by merchants throughout history.

I see those things as the sort peripheral benefits that people bring up in the wake of theory they approve of; particularly because there are more direct means of addressing both concerns vis a vis 9/11 and Afghanistan. Iraq was unnecessary on the economic front, maybe even risky if you consider the potential risk to the oil supply.

IceRaptor wrote:
It would be easy to couch such motives in terms of 'national security' and 'economic stability' as an psychological appeal. Furthering the dominance of the American dollar as the fundamental unit of wealth in oil trading would be especially appealing to a nationalist mindset as well.

Yes, those were the theoretical ideals that initially lead neoconservatives to advocate an imperialist solution for the Iraqi problem.

IceRaptor wrote:
I think that the Bush ego had some role in the war, but I'm not sure it was the primary motivator.

It wasn't only the Bush ego, in fact Bush probably had the least influence on the decision, and may not have cared at all. Cheney, Wolfowitz, and Rumsfeld had linked their careers to direct control of the Middle East during the Cold War, and the restraint exercised during Desert Storm was a huge slap in the face for all of them.