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Liddell-Hart and Fuller both have a somewhat mixed reputation as the authors of tank warfare and blitzkrieg. However it should be borne in mind that Stalin killed a lot of the better educated Soviet officer corps in his purges of the late 30s. Zukhov was one of the lucky survivors. So it is possible that the Soviet army was fully aware of modern armoured warfare theory and lost the knowledge by the way of killing half the people who had it and suppressing the rest by fear.

 Kilkrazy wrote:
Liddell-Hart and Fuller both have a somewhat mixed reputation as the authors of tank warfare and blitzkrieg. However it should be borne in mind that Stalin killed a lot of the better educated Soviet officer corps in his purges of the late 30s. Zukhov was one of the lucky survivors. So it is possible that the Soviet army was fully aware of modern armoured warfare theory and lost the knowledge by the way of killing half the people who had it and suppressing the rest by fear.

Just gonna leave this here. Arguably the most brilliant military mind of the first half of the 20th century.

 Kilkrazy wrote:
Liddell-Hart and Fuller both have a somewhat mixed reputation as the authors of tank warfare and blitzkrieg. However it should be borne in mind that Stalin killed a lot of the better educated Soviet officer corps in his purges of the late 30s. Zukhov was one of the lucky survivors. So it is possible that the Soviet army was fully aware of modern armoured warfare theory and lost the knowledge by the way of killing half the people who had it and suppressing the rest by fear.

Certainly. But it's quite a stretch from claiming that certain members of the Soviet officer class were aware of it, to claiming that the Soviets had a sophisticated doctrine of armoured warfare. The use of the word 'doctrine' implies something that has been codified, or inculcated into training, or at the very least features regularly and prominently on battlefield practice.

To give an example with made up figures, let's assume there are a hundred Soviet top level officers, of which two are prime strategical/tactical theorists in armoured warfare. They communicate their ideas to their acquaintances, another eight officers. Then the purge begin, and both theorists, along with four of their confidantes, and forty four other officers are shot. The officer corps is then brought up to a strength of a hundred again through promotions/fresh recruiting.

That leaves us with four top level officers from a hundred who are aware of certain tactical/strategical aspects of armoured warfare. Naturally, they are not going to promote and disseminate the material/ideas of officers recently purged for disloyalty.

The result is that whilst there may well have been some capable theorists originally, to claim that the army three/four years later possesses a 'sophisticated doctrine' is simply untrue. There may be some officers who are aware of certain theories, but they make up a very small percentage of the Soviet officer cadre, and do not widely circulate these ideas for the consumption of the rest of the officer class.

Zhukov himself fully utilized Deep Operations. Their entire armed force was built around utilizing it and the basic concepts were communicated. Now as the war went on Stalin didn't a lot of... stalling. He engaged in a lot of the interference Hitler did and the politics of the Red Army continued to be a hindrance to the execution of Deep Battles. But it was most definitely communicated and codified and at least at the tactical level attempted. Its German Blitzkreig that wasn't a well codified doctrine but Deep Battle most certainly was.

 LordofHats wrote:
Zhukov himself fully utilized Deep Operations. Their entire armed force was built around utilizing it and the basic concepts were communicated. Now as the war went on Stalin didn't a lot of... stalling. He engaged in a lot of the interference Hitler did and the politics of the Red Army continued to be a hindrance to the execution of Deep Battles. But it was most definitely communicated and codified and at least at the tactical level attempted. Its German Blitzkreig that wasn't a well codified doctrine but Deep Battle most certainly was.

I know it's Wiki, but here's a snippet:-

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_deep_battle#Basic_principles

Deep Operations were first formally expressed as a concept in the Red Army's "Field Regulations" of 1929, and more fully developed in the 1935 Instructions on Deep Battle. The concept was finally codified by the army in 1936 in the Provisional Field Regulations of 1936. By 1937, the Soviet Union had the largest mechanized army in the world and a sophisticated operational system to operate it.

However, the death of Triandafillov in an airplane crash and the 'Great Purges' of 1937 to 1939 removed many of the leading officers of the Red Army, including Svechin, Varfolomeev and Tukhachevsky.[29] The purge of the Soviet military liquidated the generation of officers who had given the Red Army the deep battle strategy, operations and tactics and who also had rebuilt the Soviet armed forces. Along with these personalities, their ideas were also dispensed with.[30]

Some 35,000 personnel, about 50 percent of the Officer Corps, three out of five Marshals; 13 out of 15 Army Group commanders; 57 out of 85 Corps Commanders; 110 out of 195 Division commanders; 220 out of 406 Brigade commanders were murdered, imprisoned or "discharged". Without the personnel and strategy, Stalin destroyed the cream of the personnel with operational and tactical competence in the Red Army.[31] Other sources identify 60 out of 67 Corps Commanders, 221 out of 397 Brigade Commanders, 79 percent of regimental commanders, 88 percent of regimental chiefs of staff, and 87 percent of all battalion commanders.[32]

Soviet sources admitted in 1988:
In 1937–1938....all commanders of the armed forces, members of the military councils, and chiefs of the political departments of the military districts, the majority of the chiefs of the central administrations of the People's Commissariat of Defense, all Corps commanders, almost all division and brigade commanders, about one-third of the regimental commissars, many teachers of higher of middle military and military-political schools were judged and destroyed.[33]
The deep operation concept was thrown out of Soviet military strategy as it was associated with the denounced figures that created it.

On top of that, 'Deep operations' is more of a grand strategical concept. It's all very well and good to say, 'My strategy is about penetrating the enemy's front, and then to set about attacking the rear, cutting off supplies, and encircling the frontline'. But that is not armoured warfare doctrine. It's a general strategy/plan. Hence me taking issue with the claim that the Soviets had a 'sophisticated doctrine' of armoured warfare.

Ignoring entirely the fact that deep operations fell into disfavour, the fact remains that when it came to the usage of tanks, Soviet tactical and strategical knowledge of how to utilise these tools initially was poor at best. And that is borne out by examining how tanks were indeed, actually deployed in that first year. You see tanks being attached to infantry units in supporting roles(WW1 style), penny packeted out to the artillery, gathered for light mobile operations and reconnaissance, and so on.

Simply put, the average Soviet Commander post-purge did not know how to utilise tanks, from the local level on upwards. Those who might have done were shot in the purges, and those who followed them had no cohesive unified strategy, vision, doctrine, training, or manual to help guide them. You will find exceptions in those in the higher ranks who escaped the purges, but there was no real central concept of armoured strategy or tactics by which the Soviets waged warfare using tanks initially. It took experience and a sound thrashing by the Germans to force them to evolve it.

You should read the next section of the Wiki which goes on to explain the readoption of Deep Operations during WWII and lists several operations wholly built on the concept and lists the success and failures of the Red Army to carry out the doctrine.

 LordofHats wrote:
You should read the next section of the Wiki which goes on to explain the readoption of Deep Operations during WWII and lists several operations wholly built on the concept and lists the success and failures of the Red Army to carry out the doctrine.

I have. I recommend you look closer.

I'm not saying that later on in the war the Soviets did not acquire(or re-acquire) knowledge of tank operations. Simply that their understanding was, as a result of the purges, behind that of other nations, and took a while to catch up. And as such, on average, they had an obsolete doctrine of armoured warfare when the war started, an inferior grasp of it a year later, and a competent grasp a year after that.

Note closely, that I am referring to armoured warfare doctrine specifically (which includes both tactical and strategical considerations). Not that of deep operations.

If you want further proof in support of my point above, I recommend you look at the makeup of the armoured brigades utilised by the Soviets until March 1942. You'll see tanks penny-packeted out all over the place in the support of infantry.

To pull some more wiki-fu:-

.....the experiences from the Spanish Civil War, led the Red Army command to the conclusion that the mechanised corps formations were too cumbersome, and a decision was taken to disband them in November 1939, and to distribute their units among infantry. This was a mistake, as the success of German panzer divisions in France had shown, and in late 1940 the decision was reversed. However, there was not enough time before the German attack in June 1941 to reform the mechanised corps units fully and for them to reach their former efficiency [1] [2].

Besides the operational armoured and mechanised formations, there were independent tank battalions within rifle divisions. These were meant to reinforce rifle units for the purpose of breaching enemy defences. They had to act in cooperation with the infantry without breaking away from it and were called tanks for immediate infantry support (tanki neposredstvennoy podderzhki pekhoty)....

In June 1941 there were twenty-nine[1] mechanised corps in various stages of formation. The plan was for each of them to have about 36,000 men and 1,000 tanks, and a few approached that strength level by the time war with Germany broke out [3]. ...

In September 1942, the General Headquarters (Stavka) authorized the formation of a new type of mechanised corps which was to become the main operational mechanised formation for the remainder of the war. They were about the same size as a German panzer division, and designed as a true combined-arms formation with a good balance of armor, infantry, and artillery. Mechanised corps were not to be used in breakthrough battles, but only in the exploitation phase of an operation. They shared with the new Tank Corps a four manouvre brigade structure – three mechanised brigades and one tank brigade, plus an anti-tank regiment, artillery, and other support units. The new tank corps had three tank brigades and one mechanised brigade.[4]

On the declaration of war, those 36,000 men attached to each mechanised corps were primarily riflemen. On foot. So you end up with a rather obsolete WW1 style of small groups of tanks trundling around after infantry, guarding artillery, and so on. But due to a lack of co-operative exercises, tactical manuals, or radio contact, the tanks were rarely actually utilised effectively in breakthrough tactics, and definitely nothing on the scale of the German Panzer armies.

That takes until 1942. The tank corps are reformed en masse, given mechanised infantry and cut loose from the groundpounders to an extent, start having radios fitted, have their first manual on tactical/strategical tank use distributed to commanders and so on. And from then, it turns into a grind with the Soviets gradually getting to grips with and mastering armoured warfare technique.

Sebster, reading a little closer, if you were to adjust what you said to, 'they had a sophisticated doctrine of armoured warfare by the end of the war', I'd have no quarrel with that. I just believe that generalising them as having one over the course of the entire war is something of a fallacy.

Simply that their understanding was, as a result of the purges, behind that of other nations, and took a while to catch up. And as such, on average, they had an obsolete doctrine of armoured warfare when the war started, an inferior grasp of it a year later, and a competent grasp a year after that.

I don't think anyone argues they were behind at the start of the war. Rather the argument is that unlike the Germans who didn't so much have a doctrine of warfare as much as a general idea they all sort of shared, the Russians did have one. They just weren't using it when the war started for political reasons but once they did it starts to show in numerous battles how much more effective they were at an operational level than the Germans were. The Germans excelled in WWII tactically. Arguably the best of any country in the war. The US beat the crap out of everyone in strategy but I think it's hard to argue that coming out of WWII Russia didn't have the most operationally capable armed forces in the world.

Note closely, that I am referring to armoured warfare doctrine specifically (which includes both tactical and strategical considerations). Not that of deep operations.

Then we're kind of arguing different points XD Though I'd stand by the analysis that Germany kicked pants tactically but really fell behind at the strategic and operational levels. Operationally the T34 (and I'd argue the Sherman and Cromwell as well) is the perfect tank.

 LordofHats wrote:

I don't think anyone argues they were behind at the start of the war. Rather the argument is that unlike the Germans who didn't so much have a doctrine of warfare as much as a general idea they all sort of shared, the Russians did have one.

One must question whether a theory is a doctrine if it is not widely known, disseminated, enforced, made use of, or otherwise utilised? I mean, I'd agree that that the deep operations was definitely an idea/theory that some Soviet commanders had knowledge of, but again, I'd query whether or not it really qualifies for the word 'doctrine'.

Note closely, that I am referring to armoured warfare doctrine specifically (which includes both tactical and strategical considerations). Not that of deep operations.

Then we're kind of arguing different points XD

Somewhat.

Hence me taking great pains in my last post to nail down exactly what it is that I'm claiming/saying. Armoured warfare is in a nutshell, the deployment, usage, and capacities of tanks in both a tactical and strategical sense, with the doctrine being the standard orthodox way of doing it across the service (usually laid out in training and manuals). So infantry doctrine would be the accepted way of utilising and deploying infantry on all scales, and so on.

Once you get all those doctrines together, you inject a healthy dose of politics, intelligence, knowledge of economics, stick a general target/vision on the top to work towards, and voila. You have grand strategy in a nutshell. And that's where deep operations is. So whilst you need a working knowledge of armoured warfare doctrine to execute your strategy, as it is a functional part of it that defines your limitations and capabilities,, the two are separate and distinctive things.

 Ketara wrote:


One must question whether a theory is a doctrine if it is not widely known, disseminated, enforced, made use of, or otherwise utilised? I mean, I'd agree that that the deep operations was definitely an idea/theory that some Soviet commanders had knowledge of, but again, I'd query whether or not it really qualifies for the word 'doctrine'.

The US is renowned for not adhering to its doctrines in WWII, especially the Army.

The Tank Destroyer Doctrine is the one I know really well but the Tank Destroyers pretty much did everything but what they're doctrine called on them to do XD

 Kilkrazy wrote:
The relevant tangent is that Soviet arms were heavily supported by western supplies brought in through Murmansk. The UK and US supplied large numbers of vehicles as well as food, which allowed the Soviets to concentrate their productive capability on churning out T34s and so on.

This would hardly have been possible without the west, particularly the USA, having the industry to re-arm itself and produce enough surplus to give to allies.

Due to the danger of u-boats Murmansk was actually the least important of the three corridors - most goods were brought in through Iran or across Siberia. These latter two ports were only available relatively late, Iran by mid-1942 and Siberia by late 1941. By the time either delivered serious quantities of supplies Stalingrad had already happened.

Don't get me wrong, the trucks and rolling stock given by the US allowed the Soviets to form a genuinely modern, mobilised army that could support its offensives in a way the Nazis could only ever have dreamed of, but the aid really helped in ending the war, not in turning the tide.

 creeping-deth87 wrote:
Less ambitious was exactly what I was thinking. By insisting on taking Stalingrad AND the Caucasus, after the Wehrmacht was considerably weakened the previous year, Hitler destroyed any chance for a successful summer offensive in 1942.

I certainly wont go so far as to say that if they did this, victory would have been assured, I just have a lot of fun with what if questions

The problem I have with the nature of these kinds of what-if questions is that the Germans had already had the most incredible run of luck. France simply should not have fallen as it did, and the Soviets should not have been anywhere near as unprepared as they were, and the Winter Offensives shouldn't have wasted so many Soviet troops. So I'm a little less inclined to think that with one more thing going right for the Germans maybe it would have been the tipping point... if you get what I mean.

 Grey Templar wrote:
He could have afforded to listen to ANY of his military leaders. They were pretty much all brilliant to some degree. Unfortunately for them, Hitler was far too paranoid.

Interference was only that strong in the late war period. Before then interference certainly occurred, but in many cases Hitler was actually right. It was Hitler and his political staff that insisted on lightning war (more out of desperation than anything, as they knew the standard assumption of attritional war would certainly result in another German defeat), and it was Hitler that insisted his troops hold firm against the Soviet Winter Offensive, which almost certainly prevented a route and drained the Soviet reserves to enable the success they did have in the following year. Of course, Hitler then insisted on other commands that were disastrous, and in the latter war his increasing paranoia basically destroyed the effective functioning of the Wehrmacht, but it's way too simplistic to fall back on the old myth of super-capable officers hamstrung by Hitler.

Perhaps the best example is von Paulus - who was ordered by Hitler to hold his Sixth army in position in the second battle of Karkhov, and rely on air drops for encircled positions, and just trust that a counter offensive would arrive. von Paulus did as instructed, minimised the effect of the Russian offensive, which then over-extended and was hammered when relieving German divisions arrived. von Paulus would then rely on basically the same promises from Hitler when he found his Sixth Army surrounded at Stalingrad....

 Ketara wrote:
To summarise, there was a doctrinal void with regards to armoured warfare in the Red Army during the first part of the war. So I'm really quite unsure as to why you consider them to possess 'sophisticated doctrine'.

Thanks for the post, the detail and clarity were excellent. But I'm still not sure where we're disagreeing. I've mentioned several times the poor use of tanks by the Soviets in the early stages of the war, but that pre-war design concepts meant that when proper strategies were again put in to practice they had machines with the right characteristics.

The fact that they had a spot for a kettle in the British ones thoroughly enchanted them.

Automatically Appended Next Post:

Hivefleet Oblivion wrote:
Without banging on too much about Monty and British tank design; at Bovington there is a perfectly preserved Tiger which the Brits captured early in 1943, due to a lucky shot which jammed the turret. Monty knew of that beast, and even a year later reckoned Cromwells were fine. Indeed the Panther was an all round better vehicle, but that Tiger was an early indicatin the Brits were falling well behind, well before D-Day, about which they did nothing bar the stopgap Firefly.

Huh? The stop gap Firefly was produced while the Cromwell was being adapted for the 17pdr (which required enough modification as to justify a new designation - the Challenger).


Automatically Appended Next Post:

 Kilkrazy wrote:
Liddell-Hart and Fuller both have a somewhat mixed reputation as the authors of tank warfare and blitzkrieg. However it should be borne in mind that Stalin killed a lot of the better educated Soviet officer corps in his purges of the late 30s. Zukhov was one of the lucky survivors.

When summoned to command the Soviet forces at Khalkin Gol, he thought he was being summoned for execution.


Automatically Appended Next Post:

 Ketara wrote:
On top of that, 'Deep operations' is more of a grand strategical concept.

It sits between the strategic and operational level, doesn't it? It's operational level?

It's all very well and good to say, 'My strategy is about penetrating the enemy's front, and then to set about attacking the rear, cutting off supplies, and encircling the frontline'. But that is not armoured warfare doctrine. It's a general strategy/plan. Hence me taking issue with the claim that the Soviets had a 'sophisticated doctrine' of armoured warfare.

But it's what tanks are good for, and a strategy that's only really possible when you have effective tank forces.

Ignoring entirely the fact that deep operations fell into disfavour, the fact remains that when it came to the usage of tanks, Soviet tactical and strategical knowledge of how to utilise these tools initially was poor at best. And that is borne out by examining how tanks were indeed, actually deployed in that first year.

Yes, but you also can't ignore how quickly those methods came back in to use, how effectively they were then used, and how well they were supported by the weapon platforms already deployed.


Automatically Appended Next Post:

 Ketara wrote:
Sebster, reading a little closer, if you were to adjust what you said to, 'they had a sophisticated doctrine of armoured warfare by the end of the war', I'd have no quarrel with that. I just believe that generalising them as having one over the course of the entire war is something of a fallacy.

Yeah, perhaps my wording wasn't precise enough, I thought commenting on the poor use of tanks in Barbarossa did that, but thinking about it, I can see how that leaves out a lot of the detail of rebuilding that doctrine... which I had just assumed people would make for themselves. I wasn't clear enough.