Jihadin wrote:
Air Field seizure KM. Combat drops are at 500 ft. Anyway in the world in 8 hrs are something silly like that. The "Ready" BDE is dropped with follow on BDE's from the 82nd landing and expanding the "bridge head". You have like 11K pissed off troopers who were hauled in over a four day weekend of drinking a bit irritated. Now can a MEU secure a bridgehead in a land lock land? Thinking to in the box KM. Broaden out and think strategic. Can the US Army conduct Amphib landing? Who does? Who's best to support a beach landing and who best expanding it. Can a MEU go into a land lock country and seize an airfield and expand from it? Can a MEU design to do what the 82nd can do? Can the 82nd do what a EU can do?

 Jihadin wrote:
What happen at Leatherneck in Afghanistan that got two USMC GO relieved of their command?

Jihadin wrote:snip.

Marine Unit Is Told To Leave Afghanistan

A new elite Marine Corps unit that allegedly killed at least eight civilians in the aftermath of an ambush in eastern Afghanistan this month is under investigation by the U.S. military and has been ordered to leave the country months earlier than scheduled, officials said yesterday.


In an unusual move, Maj. Gen. Francis H. Kearney III, who commands U.S. Special Operations forces in the Middle East and Central Asia, ordered the 120-strong Marine Corps Special Operations Company to leave Afghanistan because the incident so damaged the unit's relations with the local Afghan population that it could not carry out its mission, the officials said.

"General Kearney decided they could no longer effectively conduct counterinsurgency operations, and so that's why he decided to move them out of there," said Lt. Col. Lou Leto, a spokesman at Kearney's command headquarters in Tampa. The unit arrived in Afghanistan about two months ago for a six-month tour and is now preparing to redeploy, Leto said.

In the March 4 ambush, the Marines were traveling in a convoy on a highway in Nangarhar province when they were hit with a car bomb followed by small-arms fire, and fired back in self-defense, according to U.S. military accounts. Afghan witnesses said the Marines fired recklessly at passing vehicles and pedestrians along the crowded road flanked by shops.

The U.S. military initially said 16 civilians were killed but later changed that estimate to eight. An official at a local hospital said 14 people had died. The military said 35 people were wounded, among them a coalition service member.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai criticized the U.S. military reaction, and the incident sparked large anti-American protests.

Kearney ordered an Article 15-6 investigation, in which an investigating officer conducts an inquiry and reports back to the commander, to begin soon afterward, Leto said.

The investigation and abrupt removal of the unit, known as MSOC-F, is doubly significant because the company was composed of some of the most experienced, highly trained Marines -- including many experts in reconnaissance and marksmanship. Their focus, however, is on killing and capturing targets, in contrast to that of other elite troops who specialize in working with indigenous forces.

The company was the first of nine that are planned to deploy under the Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, established in February 2006 to incorporate Marines into U.S. Special Operations forces, which include Army Special Forces, Rangers, Navy SEALs and others.

The Marines in the companies are trained to a standard that is "quite a bit higher" than other Marines, Maj. Gen. Dennis Hejlik, head of the new command, said in testimony in January.

The Marine Corps had initially resisted creating the new command, which is assigned about 2,600 Marines and sailors and has consumed much of the Marines' specialized reconnaissance forces.

is a fully supported battalion with organic air assets that can get any where in the world in under 24 hours or you money back. We can do a lot more then just light infantry with some paradropped support elements when we get there too.

your precious Rangers

 KalashnikovMarine wrote:

 Jihadin wrote:
Air Field seizure KM. Combat drops are at 500 ft. Anyway in the world in 8 hrs are something silly like that. The "Ready" BDE is dropped with follow on BDE's from the 82nd landing and expanding the "bridge head". You have like 11K pissed off troopers who were hauled in over a four day weekend of drinking a bit irritated. Now can a MEU secure a bridgehead in a land lock land? Thinking to in the box KM. Broaden out and think strategic. Can the US Army conduct Amphib landing? Who does? Who's best to support a beach landing and who best expanding it. Can a MEU go into a land lock country and seize an airfield and expand from it? Can a MEU design to do what the 82nd can do? Can the 82nd do what a EU can do?

Factually? Yes we can, because WE seized and held Camp Rhino. Not the Airborne. Grabbing an unoccupied airfield for a little bit then leaving? Not gonna do anything.Honestly that full para-assaults even worked in Panama's a bloody miracle, which is why the ONLY mass drops since have been unoccupied airfields and airfields already in friendly hands so some red beanies could get their mustard stains on their jump wings. The only benefit of Airborne school is developing a motivated corps of light infantry for the Army, and providing basic jump training to Marines, sailors, soldiers and airmen who will actually use it, usually by going to follow up advanced jump schools.

Modernly, the USMC is a rapid reaction and assault force, and the MEU is a fully supported battalion with organic air assets that can get any where in the world in under 24 hours or you money back. We can do a lot more then just light infantry with some paradropped support elements when we get there too. Securing anything in a landlocked country? Yep can do will do, TRAP in hostile areas? Yep, just did it in Libya pilot and RIO recovered in under three hours, can the Airborne do that? Especially with a single unified command and pre-made strike package?

The Army's very good at what was stated earlier, the steam roller. Heavy mechanized forces crushing resistance and occupying vast swaths of territory*. As far as QRF goes, you guys don't have the gear and mobility to do what we can do in as many places as we can do it, and that's okay too. Different services, different purposes. We set'em up, you knock em down, while SOCOM is sneaking behind them and sticking a knife in their kidneys and the squids and wing wipers are taking out their friends before they make it around the corner. One team one fight.

 Jihadin wrote:
What happen at Leatherneck in Afghanistan that got two USMC GO relieved of their command?

As I understand it that was a British failure more then anything else, and a massive clusterfeth that proves coalition operations and joint commands tend to work poorly. The Generals were relieved of their commands for their failure to take a glaring failure like that and fix it, which resulted in destroyed aircraft and dead Marines. Letting someone else handle our own security, especially when we know there are issues with that security is the worst form of negligence. (Also that was more specifically at Camp Bastion, the British controlled airbase adjoining Leatherneck)

As to MARSOC's first mass trip downrange, I hear it went pretty well from guys in and out of the community.
http://www.marsoc.marines.mil/News/tabid/1204/Article/134904/sotf-west-returns-from-deployment.aspx

All my experience with the army has led me to believe that it is a force that exists simply for the fact that it's too hard to get rid of. There are simply too many redundant assets that have no discernible function or practical application.

 KalashnikovMarine wrote:

As I understand it that was a British failure more then anything else,

 Palindrome wrote:

 KalashnikovMarine wrote:

As I understand it that was a British failure more then anything else,

It was a bit of both really. The sangar nearest to the Taliban's entry point was unmanned at the time due to manpower issues (although manned and unmanned sangars were rotated), which was a British failing, while the Marines had a patchwork of security arrangements that left significant gaps which was a US failing.

Why has this thread devolved into an interservice pissing contest?

 NeedleOfInquiry wrote:

List a single General officer appointed in the last 10 years that you would trust with your life?

 djones520 wrote:

 Palindrome wrote:
Why has this thread devolved into an interservice pissing contest?

Because that's what we do. I'm just sitting back and waiting for someone to draw the Air Force into it.

 dracpanzer wrote:

 CptJake wrote:

Marine and Army recruiting standards are stunningly similar. Direct MOS to MOS comparisons make it even more so. 11B (Army Infantry) training really isn't too different from USMC infantry training. OUST (boot camp and MOS specific advanced training) is also no joke. You are really talking as a guy who watches TV shows vice a guy who knows anything about the topic.

If only recruiting "standards" were all that went into making soldiers or Marines, then this would be relevant. If EITHER branch of service were somehow capable of creating a combat infantrymen from an eight week basic school, then this would be relevant. If the culture within which EITHER service cultivated their infantrymen were somehow equal, then this would be relevant. Trust me, they are not.

 CptJake wrote:

By the way, did you know the USMC sends their guys to Ft Benning for Airborne School? And the USMC uses Army training for their tankers? And some of their signal and intel? And other things where they don't have the MOS density to justify their own training?

Tell me again why Marines need to learn how to jump out of perfectly good airplanes? You forgot that Marines go to Ft. Sills(sp?) for Artillery training. I think its safe to say that the Army has the best Armor and Artillery units in the world, why wouldn't you want them to teach you everything they know? The Marines are forced to maintain a much higher percentage of combat troops to support than the other branches, they cannot do that AND maintain their own schools for all the various MOS's.

 CptJake wrote:

You need 10 points higher on the ASVAB to be an Army infantryman than you do a USMC rifleman.

There is some insight that can be found from a common slang term for Marines, Jarhead. A jar is an empty vessel. The Corps fully accepts that the recruit who shows up on the yellow footprints has a lot of unnecessary contraband rolling around in his brain pan. That's okay, they fully intend to wash it out and put only what they need back in. When I enlisted, Marines were required to get a 61 on the ASVAB to join, I was never aware that 03's were an MOS that required anything higher than that. I find it hard to believe you'd need a 71 on the ASVAB to become an 11BangBang. At any rate, I'm quite certain that no matter how much you paid attention in high school, both services intend to teach you a great deal before they send you to the battlefield.

To the OP's questions.

The Political climate in the United States has to be the greatest factor in why its Armed Forces were unable to achieve Major Victories in either the Korean or Vietnam wars. Much like Cornwallis's campaign in the South during the American Revolution, it is completely possible for the Armed Forces of a Nation to win every battle and still lose the War. Since World War II, America has misplaced its capability to wage war in the manner required to win armed conflicts in the manner in which it won WWII. Simply put, the determination that allowed America to firebomb non military residential targets in Germany, or use the atom bomb on Japanese cities, is no longer present. It stands to reason, that since the opponents in the Korean and Vietnam wars did not suffer this handicap, they would ultimately be able to win those conflicts by outlasting the U.S. long enough for outside pressures to necessitate the U.S. bringing the conflict to a close. This is exactly what has happened in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars as well.

As to jungle warfare.

Spoiler:

I would argue that while the jungle is certainly not a natural environment for your average American, assuming that they could only lose in Vietnam because they were "incapable" of fighting there is a mistake. Yes, the NVA were fighting in their natural environment with a certain "home field" advantage. But, you cannot assume that the Americans somehow "forgetting" the lessons learned against the Japanese in WWII is the reason the Vietnamese were able to outlast them. The NVA were an extremely capable, and determined enemy who were employed in a manner that allowed them to win. It's a testament to the fighting abilities of both sides that while the Americans were able to win the battles, which were extremely hard fought on both sides. The Vietnamese were able to absorb their losses and stay in the fight long enough to kill enough Americans to give weight to the Peace movement back in the U.S. With the roles reversed, this is exactly what happened in the American War of Independence.

As far as the quality of recruits is concerned.

Spoiler:

If there is any advantage held by any of the Armed Forces, it must be within the dynamic of a volunteer versus a draftee. While all have at times needed draftee's to fill their requirements. Traditionally the volunteers will go one of two ways, into the branch that will keep them away from the blood and guts, mud and muck (Navy and Air Force) or into the branch that will make sure that they see those very things. For whatever reason, the latter type has at least since WWI traditionally been largely drawn to the Marines. At least in so much that the smaller size of the Corps lends to a much higher percentage of volunteers within their ranks. If the Marines were forced to maintain the numbers the Army must, they would invariably have the same volunteer/draftee issues.

As to the Cold War.

Spoiler:

Until the U.S. starts putting untrained citizens on the battlefield the advantage of the AK-47 being usable by anyone and their grandmother is unimportant. The U.S. did not lose the Vietnam War because it started it fielding the M1 and M14. A perfectly fine weapon that defeated the Germans who wielded the weapon that inspired the AK-47. The U.S. has not lost a single war fought with the M16 or its variants BECAUSE of the bugs in the weapon system when first rolled into service or its complexity as a weapon system over all. I would point out that the M16 and its variants actually have a great Win % when it comes to battles fought with the two on opposing sides. As to the wars fought using them, I blame the aforementioned American determination to prosecute any War since WWII.

As far as comparing the U.S. Armed Forces with those of the Soviets.

Spoiler:

Since there was no direct conflict fought, we simply cannot know, hopefully we never will know, who would ultimately win a conflict between the U.S. and the Soviets or modern day Russia. I'm sorry, but pictures are a ridiculous way of attempting to measure such a thing. With there not having been an actual armed conflict, we can only theorize whether Russian/Soviet fatalism would have gotten the better of American fighting spirit and improvisation. Or whether or not an advance through the Gap would have awoken the "Sleeping Giant" the way the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor did. All we do know is that the American ramp up of its military in the 80's under Reagan drove the Soviet Union into collapse trying to keep up.

Last, when comparing the Army to the Marines.

Spoiler:

Thankfully their wars are limited to E-clubs the world over and various skirmishes over the supplies of the Army, and reputation of the Corps. Having been a Marine infantrymen in two Wars. I would argue that while individually they are near enough to equal, it is when taken in numbers that Marines begin to exert their supremacy. Marines do no fight as individuals, be it In a bar or on the battlefield, they fight in packs. Marines of the Grunt variety are possessed with an extreme "us" versus "everyone" mentality. For both, these are amazingly fast calculations that are instilled at birth and honed through the culture they live in. The Army may call it stupid, and yes, Marines do amazingly stupid and often cruel things to themselves and each other. But the results are undeniably effective and as many have found, terribly destructive.

Going back to the "recruiting" of the two branches. I believe the difference can be best summed up by the recruiting slogans the two branches use to entice enlistments. While simplistic, and obviously propaganda, they do speak volumes about the culture of the two branches. The Army has used "Be all you can Be" a promise to better yourself. "An army of One" a call to the individual within. "Army Strong" once again, a call to better yourself. The Corps does not make such promises, They simply point out what it is to be a Marine, and ask whether the individual has the strength of character to become one of them. As the Marines understand it, the volunteer is seeking to give up his individuality, hoping to be remade into a Marine.

You can see the difference, subtle though it is, even in the nightly news. Active and former Army/Navy/Air Force are often referred to as "servicemen" or "veterans". When a Marine gets in the news (often for doing something stupid) they'll be sure to point out that they're Marines. The Army has begun to focus more on the term "Soldier" in its recruiting campaigns. I think its a step in the right direction, but we'll have to wait and see if its effective. We do know that the Marines have a 238 year head start on them...

Semper Fi!








Automatically Appended Next Post:

chaos0xomega wrote:
KalashnikovMarine - American Airborne is dead, doesnt mean Airborne as a whole is. If Airborne in this country had the same support and budgeting as the Russian VDV itd be a serious force to be reckoned with. Actually ive heard that were once again looking to develop an AFV light enough to be parachuted onto the battlefield, so maybe thatll change.

So going by the triumvirate of Tanks, Armor/Firepower/Speed, the Army is once again looking to dump out all its protection and firepower to shoehorn in a vehicle light enough to fall out of the sky that as a consequence won't be able to perform any of the functions you'd require an AFV for? Soldiers and jumping out of perfectly good Airplanes, I'll never understand it. It's like German Artillerymen and the StuG, only way they thought they could win the Knights Cross so they fought like hell to keep the Panzer Crews out of them.

 Kilkrazy wrote:
In WW2 the Western forces had a considerable material advantage which worked well in the conventional warfare that most of the campaigns involved from 1942 onwards.

In Korea, after the end of the Pusan campaign, the UN forces had the potential for a considerable material advantage but it was greatly reduced by the difficult terrain. Most of Korea is mountains or rice paddies.

In Vietnam, the Allies had a massive material advantage but they were fighting an enemy who used Maoist guerilla warfare tactics that are very difficult to counter with conventional tactics.

We see the same problem in Iraq and Afghanistan. To the extent that Saddam or the Taleban used conventional tactics, they were pretty easily crushed. The campaigns then became asymmetric, and ground on for years without a favourable resolution. Eventually, the Allies would have to give up and go home, which has happened in Iraq, and is happening in Afghanistan.

The training and organisation methods used by the Allies were the same in WW2, Korea and Vietnam. Therefore the supposed relative failures in Korea and Vietnam are due to the changing nature of warfare, rather than decline of fighting quality of the troops.

 Do_I_Not_Like_That wrote:
Maybe too general a question, but was/is the US military of that period a 'thinking' force or was the primary reliance on overwhelming firepower to win? Like a 20th century version of the imperial guard!

Marines do no fight as individuals, be it In a bar or on the battlefield, they fight in packs. Marines of the Grunt variety are possessed with an extreme "us" versus "everyone" mentality. For both, these are amazingly fast calculations that are instilled at birth and honed through the culture they live in. The Army may call it stupid, and yes, Marines do amazingly stupid and often cruel things to themselves and each other. But the results are undeniably effective and as many have found, terribly destructive.

 Seaward wrote:

 Do_I_Not_Like_That wrote:
Maybe too general a question, but was/is the US military of that period a 'thinking' force or was the primary reliance on overwhelming firepower to win? Like a 20th century version of the imperial guard!

Are you actually serious with these questions?

 Do_I_Not_Like_That wrote:



Maybe it's more complicated than that? I made the point earlier that perhaps the US military just wasn't flexible enough in its doctrines during this period.

 Do_I_Not_Like_That wrote:
Yeah, I am!

I made the point that as they were expecting/planning for a conventional war against the Warsaw pact, the doctrine/training of the US military would have been focused on this, but with the Vietnam war being mostly a counter-insurgency (with the odd set piece battle) maybe they weren't flexible enough to adapt to the conditions of the war. It's up for debate.

 Ensis Ferrae wrote:

 NeedleOfInquiry wrote:

List a single General officer appointed in the last 10 years that you would trust with your life?

H.R. McMaster. Look him up if you'd like. But, in 05-06 I DID put my life in his trust, as at that time he was the Regimental Commander of the unit I was assigned to in Iraq. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/H._R._McMaster if you want to look him up a bit.

 Palindrome wrote:

 KalashnikovMarine wrote:

As I understand it that was a British failure more then anything else,

It was a bit of both really. The sangar nearest to the Taliban's entry point was unmanned at the time due to manpower issues (although manned and unmanned sangars were rotated), which was a British failing, while the Marines had a patchwork of security arrangements that left significant gaps which was a US failing. At the end of the day Bastion and Leatherneck have a massive perimeter, the only real surprise is that the battle of Bastion didn't happen sooner.

Why has this thread devolved into an interservice pissing contest?

Manchu wrote:
My father joined the USMC when he graduated high school because he had no other prospects whatsoever. He left as soon as his first hitch was up. When I talked to him about going OCS and JAG, he said "son, don't waste your life." Despite this, he is immensely proud of the USMC and of having been a Marine and that his father was a Marine during WW2, serving in the Pacific.

I have know a few scummers who wound up in the USMC and came out no better for it. I also know some ex-Marines who are well and truly good men. I've known people from both categories from all the service branches, except Coast Guard. To my knowledge (accounting for memory), I have never met anyone who had been in the Coast Guard.

All I mean is, none of the branches only take good people. None of the branches can guarantee to take a douche bag and turn him into a stand up guy.

 NeedleOfInquiry wrote:

Pick one, there is not an option c....if there is please explain... I do not personally know this General but if there is nothing wrong with the current crop of General officers explain it took what it did to get McMaster past his coming third strike....