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 Jihadin wrote:
GO of any branch pretty deals in politics like Col on up.

That's basically what I said... and politicians do so terribly hate to hear "No" when talking to GO types

 Jihadin wrote:


KM and Captain thinks we're all individuals in the US Army. Seriously?

I have to hand it to the NCO's for KM and Captain. They instilled pretty good Self Motivation into them. Now if we can broaden their perception or broaden their horizon into overall.

Not sure where you're getting the bolded bit.

As to the horizon, I just disagree with you. A MEU/MEF or a carrier group is a strategic tool. The 82nd Airborne, even if you roll and drop the whole division? Also a useful strategic tool, but a fragile one, They ain't gonna last long without supplies and combined arms support, my points and questions on which you never answered. That's assuming all of them make it to the ground alive. Which I doubt. There's a reason all our recent mass "combat drops" in the last two decades have been on unopposed or already captured airfields. For mass airborne assaults to function at all, everything has to go 100% perfectly. As all of us should know by now, everything going right as a concept has next to no relation to reality as makes any sense to plan for.

The mobile QRF brigades the Army's got/is working on would be a damn sight more useful, but even then it's all about how you get there. Bringing your own airfield and support bases with you does keep things simple in some regards.

@Chaos, that is not what happened at Camp Rhino, a hand off means there was actually someone there. The Marines and SEALs had to retake Rhino. (Still unopposed I believe, the Airforce Specter gunship dissuaded the original group of hadjis that came to see what the feth was going on right after TF Rhino established initial control, and I don't think any one reoccupied after they (TF Rhino) left.)

Off the top of my head the last time a MEU did a combat beach landing was Somalia. Do you know where they were not contested at the beach? Wasn't because of the news team there.

KM your stuck in this time frame. Tell me why you are better then me in regard to our selves in this time frame? Minus the amount of years I have compare to you.

Have I said I'm better'n you? I might be, I might not be. Depends on a whole passel of variables doesn't it? but we're talking about MEUs and the 82nd Airborne not each other. If that's the ball game we're playing now, then I'd suggest you listen to your own advice to Needles about taking this whole conversation too personally.

KM...... ...think of a better reply...that's a "Boot" answer Hero.....think....I want one word from you. If I don't get it....I be highly disappointed in those NCO's who influence you and trained you......think....I will aloow you 45 seconds to be embarrass and blush for pulling a bone headed answer to...now I'm off to Gig Harbor Game Workshop to hang out with my Troopers...

The problem with the MEU vice the 82nd is the time it takes to get them where they need to go. C5s and C17s are a bit quicker than even the fastest sea transport. The speed difference is quite a bit more once you hit that thing called the shoreline.

As for the Op where the Rangers (and JSOC elements) hit Rhino, it was a raid. By definition, a raid includes a withdrawal from the objective. They landed, secured their objective (and allowed the JSOC teams to hit theirs) and unassed just as they were supposed to. Again, raid =/= invade and hold. So of course if another unit from another branch was given a subsequent mission on Rhino they would have to re-secure it.

If the original op was to secure and hold as a log center, an airborne BCT would have either airlanded once the company from the 75th secured the strip or jumped in themselves.

All the discussion of the modern military is irrelevant to the topic of the military of 1945-1972.

 Frazzled wrote:
You must not get the point. Whether or not our troops are any good, our bombs and bullets are awesome and have been since 1941.

Yep.

I read an interesting excerpt from the war diary of a German officer written during Operation Cobra. The officer dismissed the Americans unwillingness to engage with a full offensive, he thought they hid behind air power and artillery,. After several days of getting hammered by artillery and having his supply chain smashed by fighter bombers, the Germans grew weaker and weaker, and so when the Americans assaulted the position the Germans offered little resistance. The German officer was still contemptuous that the Americans hadn't attempted a rapid attack in force, and thought it a sign of how weak the armies of these democratic forces are. I just sat there thinking 'well the Americans lost nothing, and you lost everything, so it worked you stupid Nazi'.

Seriously, big planes dropping big bombs, and loads of artillery support. Worked brilliantly in WWII, worked brilliantly in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq (twice) and Afghanistan (and all those other incidents as well). Just look up the US kill to casualty ratios for any of those engagements. The eventual outcome of Vietnam, probably Afghanistan and Iraq, and arguably Korea wasn't successful, but that's a point on how military effectiveness doesn't automatically give you the desired political result.


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 Jihadin wrote:
Eventually combined forces drove NK back up the peninsula and left like two NK regiments left before China came across and introduce us to the "human wave". So we got a taste of what the Germans experience on the Eastern front.

A lot of the first wave of Chinese troops were actually former KMT troops that were basically told that they had to go and die in Korea and your family back home can keep their honour and not be harassed. So off they went, put in to human waves and slaughtered by the thousands.


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chaos0xomega wrote:
KalashnikovMarine - American Airborne is dead, doesnt mean Airborne as a whole is. If Airborne in this country had the same support and budgeting as the Russian VDV itd be a serious force to be reckoned with. Actually ive heard that were once again looking to develop an AFV light enough to be parachuted onto the battlefield, so maybe thatll change.

Didn't they airdrop some Strykers?

And what's the value of airborne today, when you can rapid deploy so many troops by helicopter?


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 dracpanzer wrote:
he Political climate in the United States has to be the greatest factor in why its Armed Forces were unable to achieve Major Victories in either the Korean or Vietnam wars. Much like Cornwallis's campaign in the South during the American Revolution, it is completely possible for the Armed Forces of a Nation to win every battle and still lose the War. Since World War II, America has misplaced its capability to wage war in the manner required to win armed conflicts in the manner in which it won WWII. Simply put, the determination that allowed America to firebomb non military residential targets in Germany, or use the atom bomb on Japanese cities, is no longer present. It stands to reason, that since the opponents in the Korean and Vietnam wars did not suffer this handicap, they would ultimately be able to win those conflicts by outlasting the U.S. long enough for outside pressures to necessitate the U.S. bringing the conflict to a close. This is exactly what has happened in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars as well.

Dude, the US bombed the gak out of Hanoi, they put more bombs on that city than they dropped on Germany in total. Vietnam was not lost out of a lack of really big planes dropping really big bombs on cities.

Vietnam was lost because the US, for very understandable reasons, was not willing to expand the conflict by advancing in to North Vietnam. Without that option, they were left with simply killing enemy troops over and over again until the North gave up, or the South finally got a government that wasn't bunch of hateful donkey-caves. The US kept that up for years, until they eventually gave up.

By the time the US gave up, they had inflicted somewhere in the region of a million dead enemy soldiers. And this was for a war driven by a completely false political doctrine. Concluding there was a lack of US determination is just bonkers.

 Kilkrazy wrote:
All the discussion of the modern military is irrelevant to the topic of the military of 1945-1972.

Exactly what I've been trying to say!


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 Ensis Ferrae wrote:

 Do_I_Not_Like_That wrote:



Maybe it's more complicated than that? I made the point earlier that perhaps the US military just wasn't flexible enough in its doctrines during this period.

The problem here is, and there are German and Soviet officers quoted with this stuff, is that we don't follow our own doctrine. We seem to have a tendency to go in all John Wayne, guns ablazin' thinking we're gonna kick ass, take names and be home in time for dinner. Then, when that doesnt happen, we develop a rough "doctrine" and "plan" for how to beat whoever it is militarily. As I said earlier, it's in our command structure and mentality that we expect even the lowest ranking private to take charge of a situation if everyone above him is gone.

Yeah, but isn't that a good thing? If everybody is encouraged to be a 'leader' and to think of solutions to problems, surely that must be a benefit?


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 CptJake wrote:
It is pretty hard to make the case that post 1968 the Vietnam war was mostly a counter insurgency.

It is easier to make the case that the US strategic/national goals for the war were either in a state of flux or just poorly defined and that the resulting military strategies were equally confused.

Well, post '68, there were a lot of search and destroy missions conducted so you could argue that the war had switched to a counter-insurgency by then.


One thing I find fascinating (in my view) is the whole field craft area of the US military. When you consider the frontier background/heritage of the US army in various wars against the British/Native Americans, I'm surprised that the US didn't value this more. Certainly, if you compare your average US soldier to his Chinese counterpart in Korea, the US soldier lags way behind.

Now, obviously, a lot of these Chinese soldiers were veterans from the Chinese civil war, and being masters of camouflage was a necessity (due to overwhelming US air power) but it seems to me (from reading the books on Korea) that the US fighting man was lacking even in the basics. Surprising, given the US frontier heritage.

 Do_I_Not_Like_That wrote:

Yeah, but isn't that a good thing? If everybody is encouraged to be a 'leader' and to think of solutions to problems, surely that must be a benefit?

Yes, It's very good for us. But as you had asked if it made us inflexible, etc. that's what I was trying to point out.


For those not getting what I'm saying, a good Hollywood scene to illustrate what I'm talking about is the Captain's "sticky bomb" lines from the movie, "Saving Private Ryan"

IDK if the WW2 US soldier was trained to be flexible and adaptable, but some operational studies show he was about 50% as effective, man for man, as German troops.

To be fair, the US Army had to expand very rapidly to an enormous size, and did not have the excellent cadre that existed in Germany. It was also a matter of training and organisation methods, though, not the individual men.

This topic was covered in one of Van Creveld's books.

 sebster wrote:

 dracpanzer wrote:
The Political climate in the United States has to be the greatest factor in why its Armed Forces were unable to achieve Major Victories in either the Korean or Vietnam wars. Much like Cornwallis's campaign in the South during the American Revolution, it is completely possible for the Armed Forces of a Nation to win every battle and still lose the War. Since World War II, America has misplaced its capability to wage war in the manner required to win armed conflicts in the manner in which it won WWII. Simply put, the determination that allowed America to firebomb non military residential targets in Germany, or use the atom bomb on Japanese cities, is no longer present. It stands to reason, that since the opponents in the Korean and Vietnam wars did not suffer this handicap, they would ultimately be able to win those conflicts by outlasting the U.S. long enough for outside pressures to necessitate the U.S. bringing the conflict to a close. This is exactly what has happened in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars as well.

Dude, the US bombed the gak out of Hanoi, they put more bombs on that city than they dropped on Germany in total. Vietnam was not lost out of a lack of really big planes dropping really big bombs on cities.

Vietnam was lost because the US, for very understandable reasons, was not willing to expand the conflict by advancing in to North Vietnam. Without that option, they were left with simply killing enemy troops over and over again until the North gave up, or the South finally got a government that wasn't bunch of hateful donkey-caves. The US kept that up for years, until they eventually gave up.

By the time the US gave up, they had inflicted somewhere in the region of a million dead enemy soldiers. And this was for a war driven by a completely false political doctrine. Concluding there was a lack of US determination is just bonkers.

I think you misunderstood my point. Your example of America's unwillingness to expand the conflict just to win is MY point. We have misplaced our ability to wage wars to win them in the manner we have in the past.

 dracpanzer wrote:
Simply put, the determination that allowed America to firebomb non military residential targets in Germany, or use the atom bomb on Japanese cities, is no longer present.

It has nothing to do with how many bombs were dropped on a city, everything to do with how far America is willing to go to win an armed conflict. The fact that the War in Vietnam came to an end ultimately due to a lack of approval for the war back in the States. Is IMO a clear indication of there being less determination to win in the U.S. during the Vietnam War than during the AWI/Civil War/WWI/WWII. Going by the record, certainly not enough to win, despite the efforts of the American Military.

 dracpanzer wrote:
It has nothing to do with how many bombs were dropped on a city, everything to do with how far America is willing to go to win an armed conflict. The fact that the War in Vietnam came to an end ultimately due to a lack of approval for the war back in the States. Is IMO a clear indication of there being less determination to win in the U.S. during the Vietnam War than during the AWI/Civil War/WWI/WWII. Going by the record, certainly not enough to win, despite the efforts of the American Military.

Which is why many people out there say that the Vietnam War was won militarily but lost politically.

 dracpanzer wrote:
Simply put, the determination that allowed America to firebomb non military residential targets in Germany, or use the atom bomb on Japanese cities, is no longer present.

It has nothing to do with how many bombs were dropped on a city, everything to do with how far America is willing to go to win an armed conflict. The fact that the War in Vietnam came to an end ultimately due to a lack of approval for the war back in the States. Is IMO a clear indication of there being less determination to win in the U.S. during the Vietnam War than during the AWI/Civil War/WWI/WWII. Going by the record, certainly not enough to win, despite the efforts of the American Military.

That is true, however it fails to address the issue of whether the Vietnam War was winnable at all until the Republic of South Vietnam government stopped being a bunch of horrible corrupt useless clowns.

The CotW "won" both Gulf Wars and Afghanistan, but we are still slinking away with our tails between our legs and nothing properly resolved in favour of justice and human rights. The Balkans weren't exactly a triumph either, and let's not get started on Somalia.

 Kilkrazy wrote:
That is true, however it fails to address the issue of whether the Vietnam War was winnable at all until the Republic of South Vietnam government stopped being a bunch of horrible corrupt useless clowns.

The CotW "won" both Gulf Wars and Afghanistan, but we are still slinking away with our tails between our legs and nothing properly resolved in favour of justice and human rights. The Balkans weren't exactly a triumph either, and let's not get started on Somalia.

If the people aren't willing to save themselves, what can you do? All we can do is offer them the chance.

 Kilkrazy wrote:
IDK if the WW2 US soldier was trained to be flexible and adaptable, but some operational studies show he was about 50% as effective, man for man, as German troops.

To be fair, the US Army had to expand very rapidly to an enormous size, and did not have the excellent cadre that existed in Germany. It was also a matter of training and organisation methods, though, not the individual men.

This topic was covered in one of Van Creveld's books.

The modern American way of war is victory through superior firepower facilitated by superior logistics. As a 12 year veteran of the U.S. Army, I have amazing respect for the pointy end of the spear warriors in all the services (MEDEVAC pilot myself), but there are many nations with equal or perhaps even superior soldiers in certain areas when it comes to close combat. Many of our allies are certainly equal in the tactical field craft of closing with and engaging the enemy.

America has excelled in the last 75 years at being able to mass enough force to overwhelm any opposition, no matter how well entrenched. In the last 30 years, we also have had the advantage of simply being more technologically advanced. This is why the United States hasn't truly lost a major battle since World War 2 - arguably the Korean War. Only with the realization that not all future wars would be total wars and that the political will of the civilian leadership/populace could quickly tire in these wars did the US military begin to place greater importance in the tactical training of its troops.

Throughout the 50-70s the military was almost solely focused on the theoretical invasion of Western Europe by the Warsaw Pact - total war using weapons of mass destruction and consuming divisions and whole armies in hours. There is little incentive to spend dollars and training time on a rifleman that - at least according to theory - would likely fall victim to weapons which there is almost no defense against. Only post-Vietnam did the military realize the need for increased training at the individual through battalion level. Only post-Grenada did the military realize that need for joint operations. If you are interested in the transition from the large, cold war, draft military of the 40s-70s to the professional force of today, I highly recommend studying Operation Urgent Fury the invasion of Grenada and the finding of the Goldwater-Nichols act of 1986 that laid the foundation for today's US military.

 djones520 wrote:

 Kilkrazy wrote:
That is true, however it fails to address the issue of whether the Vietnam War was winnable at all until the Republic of South Vietnam government stopped being a bunch of horrible corrupt useless clowns.

The CotW "won" both Gulf Wars and Afghanistan, but we are still slinking away with our tails between our legs and nothing properly resolved in favour of justice and human rights. The Balkans weren't exactly a triumph either, and let's not get started on Somalia.

If the people aren't willing to save themselves, what can you do? All we can do is offer them the chance.

As I've said in other topics, you cannot force people to become free. It illustrates the limits of military power as an effective tool of policy. The CotW
wants the Afghanis to abandon their tribal ways and become a modern liberal democracy, but that won't happen unless they want to, and we can't drone missile them into wanting it.

 Easy E wrote:
So, what exactly were we "winning" in Vietnam compared to AWI/Civil War/WWI/and WWII? That may answer your question about why the will was not there.

I really didn't think we were discussing WHY the U.S. has lost it's will to win, no matter the cost. I was simply stating that since the end of WWII, it hasn't been able to manifest anything like that scale of commitment. Which I think goes to the OP's question about the military skills of our soldiers and Marines in the period ('45-'72), where IMO, we didn't lose those wars due to a lack of skill on their part.

 dracpanzer wrote:
[I think you misunderstood my point. Your example of America's unwillingness to expand the conflict just to win is MY point. We have misplaced our ability to wage wars to win them in the manner we have in the past.

That isn't a product of some vague cultural change in willingness, it's a product of the actual political importance of Vietnam relative to WWII. The US lurched in to Vietnam largely by mistake, domino theory and some overly imaginative reports from the foreign office led to aid, then troops, and finally a full blown military operation... all for a conflict that really meant not one damn thing to the politcal and economic well being of the USA. In that instance it is only basic common sense to resist expanding that conflict any further - there is no point risking a greater war with China or the USSR when all that at's stake is some minor Asian nation.

On the other hand, WWII was a war with a genuine existential threat. Lose that one and you stop being a nation. So of course the concern about exterior political consequences drops away.

It has nothing to do with how many bombs were dropped on a city, everything to do with how far America is willing to go to win an armed conflict. The fact that the War in Vietnam came to an end ultimately due to a lack of approval for the war back in the States. Is IMO a clear indication of there being less determination to win in the U.S. during the Vietnam War than during the AWI/Civil War/WWI/WWII. Going by the record, certainly not enough to win, despite the efforts of the American Military.

It's an indication that it was a stupid conflict that the US shouldn't have involved itself in in the first place. Nothing more than that.


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 dracpanzer wrote:
I really didn't think we were discussing WHY the U.S. has lost it's will to win, no matter the cost. I was simply stating that since the end of WWII, it hasn't been able to manifest anything like that scale of commitment. Which I think goes to the OP's question about the military skills of our soldiers and Marines in the period ('45-'72), where IMO, we didn't lose those wars due to a lack of skill on their part.

What you are missing is that the will to win is a product of what you stand to win.

If I have to paint 15 mini's before the tournament starts on the weekend, and there's a real good chance I'll find the time. If there's a chance I might actually win best painted, then you can guarantee I'll find the time. But if it's just because it'd be nice to play a fully painted force against a mate in a friendly game, then its really unlikely I'll get it done - other things will take priority.

In the latter case I'm a lot less willing to sacrifice, but this isn't because I'm softer or anything silly like that, it's because getting the result simply isn't as important.

I think we should have been involved in Vietnam. We were just on the wrong side. Uncle Ho came to the U.S. for assistance first.

 sebster wrote:
What you are missing is that the will to win is a product of what you stand to win.

I'm not missing that at all, it just has nothing to do with the thread. I only pointed out America's lack of a will to win in Korea or Vietnam (or Iraq, Afghanistan) to illustrate that we lost those Wars because of that lack of will, the reason doesn't matter. It had nothing to do with a supposed decline in the skills of our ground forces, either soldiers or Marines. Since we weren't talking about whether or not we should have been in those Wars, I didn't feel the need to elaborate. Quite frankly, its not a discussion I want to engage in, so unless you feel I'm wrong to say that we did not lose those wars because the soldiers and Marines were somehow ineffectual, I think we are in agreement.

Is it too simplistic to say then that the US military was over confident in its technological/firepower supremacy, then it simply couldn't cope when the fighting switched to a more 'traditional' war of attrition as in Korea and Vietnam?

And as a result of this, the US soldier/marine either through lack of flexible doctrines/training just couldn't cope at first?

Going slightly OT here, but if you look at the Iraq invasion, then the conventional war was over in a matter of hours, but when it switched too counter-insurgency, the US (and Britain as well) struggled to cope.

In my view, the parallels with Korea and Vietnam are still there to this day. Nobody would expect to survive a conventional war with the USA, but a guerrilla/insurgency conflict would be anybody's game.

Yes it is too simplistic to say that.

 Do_I_Not_Like_That wrote:
Is it too simplistic to say then that the US military was over confident in its technological/firepower supremacy, then it simply couldn't cope when the fighting switched to a more 'traditional' war of attrition as in Korea and Vietnam?

And as a result of this, the US soldier/marine either through lack of flexible doctrines/training just couldn't cope at first?

Going slightly OT here, but if you look at the Iraq invasion, then the conventional war was over in a matter of hours, but when it switched too counter-insurgency, the US (and Britain as well) struggled to cope.

In my view, the parallels with Korea and Vietnam are still there to this day. Nobody would expect to survive a conventional war with the USA, but a guerrilla/insurgency conflict would be anybody's game.

Why do you keep ignoring what people are telling you?

 Seaward wrote:

 Do_I_Not_Like_That wrote:
Is it too simplistic to say then that the US military was over confident in its technological/firepower supremacy, then it simply couldn't cope when the fighting switched to a more 'traditional' war of attrition as in Korea and Vietnam?

And as a result of this, the US soldier/marine either through lack of flexible doctrines/training just couldn't cope at first?

Going slightly OT here, but if you look at the Iraq invasion, then the conventional war was over in a matter of hours, but when it switched too counter-insurgency, the US (and Britain as well) struggled to cope.

In my view, the parallels with Korea and Vietnam are still there to this day. Nobody would expect to survive a conventional war with the USA, but a guerrilla/insurgency conflict would be anybody's game.

Why do you keep ignoring what people are telling you?

I'm not sure if people are telling me anything!

We have people discussing Operation Iraq freedom, which tells me nothing about the US military from 1945-1972, and we have people telling me things that I already know: the US public weren't happy with Vietnam war. Most posters have provided comments and I'm grateful for that, but on other key questions, there have been inconclusive answers.

For example, I've asked about military philosophy/doctrines of the basic US soldier (training, flexibility, fieldcraft, basic soldiering etc ) and there's been nothing back. I'll stick to my books. This discussion is over!

 sebster wrote:
Didn't they airdrop some Strykers?

And what's the value of airborne today, when you can rapid deploy so many troops by helicopter?

As my dad once put it... helicopters are huge, easy targets. The US lost over 5000 helicopters in 'Nam, and then theres this: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_Attack_on_Karbala

As for the Stryker, that I know nothing about.

 Do_I_Not_Like_That wrote:

 Seaward wrote:

 Do_I_Not_Like_That wrote:
Is it too simplistic to say then that the US military was over confident in its technological/firepower supremacy, then it simply couldn't cope when the fighting switched to a more 'traditional' war of attrition as in Korea and Vietnam?

And as a result of this, the US soldier/marine either through lack of flexible doctrines/training just couldn't cope at first?

Going slightly OT here, but if you look at the Iraq invasion, then the conventional war was over in a matter of hours, but when it switched too counter-insurgency, the US (and Britain as well) struggled to cope.

In my view, the parallels with Korea and Vietnam are still there to this day. Nobody would expect to survive a conventional war with the USA, but a guerrilla/insurgency conflict would be anybody's game.

Why do you keep ignoring what people are telling you?

I'm not sure if people are telling me anything!

We have people discussing Operation Iraq freedom, which tells me nothing about the US military from 1945-1972, and we have people telling me things that I already know: the US public weren't happy with Vietnam war. Most posters have provided comments and I'm grateful for that, but on other key questions, there have been inconclusive answers.

For example, I've asked about military philosophy/doctrines of the basic US soldier (training, flexibility, fieldcraft, basic soldiering etc ) and there's been nothing back. I'll stick to my books. This discussion is over!

An underequipped US fought off 300,000 Chinese troops and caused massive casualties in Korea. Its hard to find a battle or even minor engagement where the US lost from 1944-now. I'm not sure what you're really asking for. Man for man worse then others? depends when. Depends on who. But youy have to assign factors youy're discussing first and actual actions where the US lost.

 dracpanzer wrote:

 Easy E wrote:
So, what exactly were we "winning" in Vietnam compared to AWI/Civil War/WWI/and WWII? That may answer your question about why the will was not there.

I really didn't think we were discussing WHY the U.S. has lost it's will to win, no matter the cost. I was simply stating that since the end of WWII, it hasn't been able to manifest anything like that scale of commitment. Which I think goes to the OP's question about the military skills of our soldiers and Marines in the period ('45-'72), where IMO, we didn't lose those wars due to a lack of skill on their part.

Right. It sounded like you were saying we didn't win in these engagements because of the skill of the soldiers. I wanted to make sure that the skill of soldiers had nothing to do with the losses.

Overall, I beleive the kill ratio is 6 to 1 with artillery and air support for US troops. However, I culdn't find a quick breakdown by conflict for Kill Ratios with a simple Google search. It would be intersting to see if this Kill Ratio changes over the course fo the conflicts.

No, the Stryker family of vehicles is NOT air drop-able.