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 Noble713 wrote:

The Okinawans don't hate us. That is a fabrication. I don't know how you would get that impression if you've ever visited here.

I've been here on Oki for 2 1/2 years, most of it stationed at Futenma. Some of my friends have been here (8, 11, and two guys @ 20+) years. Try getting into all but a handful of nightclubs in Okinawa City or Naha with a US ID card. Not happening. As soon as you approach "Sorry, Japanese only." Now that I'm a civilian and able to bust out a "gaijin card" they do an about-face and let you in almost like you're a valued customer. When I tell girls from Sapporo, Tokyo, or Osaka about this they are usually shocked and horrified. Hell just driving around in a Y-plate car garners extra harassment from the police, and if you get in an accident with a local vehicle the joke is "Y-plate stands for 'Your Fault' ". How about when that 17yo American kid was murdered two years ago by a local and hardly anyone heard a peep about it. Not to mention other discrimination like a guy (I think ex military) who got kicked out of his apartment when the agency found out his Japanese wife wasn't living there anymore. Granted stuff like housing and insurance discrimination happens to gaijin all across the mainland too, but it's definitely worse down here. The economy of the north part of the island probably benefits more from the US military presence (comparatively) than down here, where the land value and tourist industry is hampered by Camp Kinser and Camp Foster eating up prime real estate along Route (or whatever it is in Japanese) 58. Supposedly the US military only accounts for 5% of Oki's economy but I find that hard to believe given things like BAH (the difference between the rent they charge someone with BAH and normal Japanese rent is damn-near extortionate). At the end of the day it's a love-hate relationship. Business owners near the bases love our disposable income, some people see working on-base as good jobs, but they hate all the other stuff that comes with being overrun with 30-50,000 Americans in a population of only ~1.3 million.

I'm going to concede here that my experience is a lot more limited than yours, so I'm basing my opinions off the relatively sheltered experience I have being junior enlisted. You make some good points that I can't really disagree with at all. I still think that the farther north you go, the less people tend to care about the fact that you're a foreigner. People down south see the 7-Tons and up-armored humvees in the streets, and the gates on the streets. It's a constant reminder. It makes them bitter, and inherently rude to us, I guess.

After WWII, the area that is now Futenma was nothing. It was just a plot of empty land. After the base was built, the Japanese built around it and built infrastructure to support the massive amount of servicemembers that were there for Vietnam. The fact that they complain about the noise and hustle of the base is pretty hilarious, since the only reason there is housing and business there is because of the base. Futenma is apparently a ghost town. I've never even been, because there's absolutely no reason to, but every Motor T operator I've met has said the base is virtually lifeless.

 Jihadin wrote:
Putin taking over the Middle East.....
1. No more Iran...
2. Putin milking the cash cow of oil
3. US is down sizing our military so why build up again to deal with the Soviets.
*Budget cut
*Sequester
*Very few units combat effective
*Do we really want another stupid "Red Line" comment to be made by Obama
4. Europe closer to the area
5. I actually think Israel get along quite well with Putin.
6. I can see the fee for the Suez Canal going much higher.
7. NATO will not interfere unless Turkey is attacked.
8. ME country requesting UN for help
9. UN asking the US to lead....not a ice cube chance in Hell...
10. Not our issue since the US really isn't all that dependent on oil.
11. Putin get smart and lease the land US military bases on newly acquired property.
12. If France wants to be in charge of the shindig?
13. US stays out and not adding extra to 17 billion and counting

I Was referring to the cold war area when Russia was soviet I believe Brezhnev was in charge then.

 Seaward wrote:

Such as?

I honestly don't remember the name of it. I read it when my brother in law got a copy when he enlisted, and the account of Taffy 3 was..... incomplete to say the least, and while it trumpeted the fact they heroically gave their lives, it left out that many died because of exposure due to being left adrift for several days due to poorly thought out orders and miscommunications. My grandfather hated Halsey to his dying day because the seaplane tender he served on had orders to not rescue them, and he felt that the Navy had abandoned those men to die for no reason, since they were standing by, prepared for search and rescue, rather near at hand.

 Seaward wrote:

Such as?

 Jihadin wrote:

Baron take my advice....step back, regroup, and try a new shot group.

Ok, let me try it this way:

The best officers have a tendency to leave the service rather than stay in. Now, an argument can be made that they have better opportunities in the civilian market, where success is rewarded, but overall this is bad for the military. In the Army, and this is speaking in general, and I am aware that exceptions exist, success might get you medals and the respect of the men who serve under you, but it doesn't mean you get promoted. Further, the higher you go in rank, the more spectacularly you have to screw up before something is done about it. The system inside the Army is, while not entirely blind to merit, tends to reward conformity and mediocrity with promotion, and leads to a 'risk averse' mentality. I'm told that this is true in other branches as well. While being cautious can be a good trait in an officer, so is knowing when to seize the initiative. Franks is a good example of this. A rather startling report came out from the Army War Collage reviewing AARs from Afghanistan that was.... very critical of his approach. “The lack of a war plan or theater campaign plan has hindered operations and led to a tactical focus that ignores long-term objectives.”

And Sanchez was even worse. Despite a performance review that was... frankly horrific, he was not relived of command. His ignoring the units that were enjoying success to the degree that he had to be ordered by his CO to go to various areas where the effort was succeeding and see what they were doing differently speaks volumes. Good officers listen to the men under their command, Sanchez seemed take offense to it. This and his failure to create an overall plan lead to a situation where individual commanders were in effect running their own little wars around Iraq, with predictable results.

And the list goes on.

Factor in that defense contractors frequently headhunt before men leave the military, and you have a situation ripe for mismanagement and flat out bribery to push things like supply contracts to people based on the promised rewards rather than providing the best materials for the military. If you doubt this, take a look at the emerging 'Fat Leonard' scandal in San Diego. So far, three officers are awaiting trial and three more, including an admiral, are on leave pending investigation for bribery and corruption.

The men on the ground are quite adaptable, and I agree with Ensis about the men teaching the fresh fish how to best avoid getting killed. Surviving a war isn't winning one though. Before I can say I would feel comfortable about the US winning wars in Asia, I think that a long, hard look needs to be taken at the system that does not favor merit over conformity.

The best officers tend to leave the military not because they have better opportunities in the civilian market, but often because they are fed up with the bs that comes with being a military officer and its associated bureaucracy. If you want to get a sense of what I mean, just look up a USAF 'Dear Boss' letter.

In any case, what does this have to do with Fallujah?

chaos0xomega wrote:

In any case, what does this have to do with Fallujah?

Directly, a little, but indirectly a lot. A lot of the mismanagement of Iraq I was talking about in the specific examples has led to the current situation.

 BaronIveagh wrote:
I honestly don't remember the name of it.

Uh huh.

Ok, let me try it this way:

The best officers have a tendency to leave the service rather than stay in.

Such as?

Now, an argument can be made that they have better opportunities in the civilian market, where success is rewarded, but overall this is bad for the military. In the Army, and this is speaking in general, and I am aware that exceptions exist, success might get you medals and the respect of the men who serve under you, but it doesn't mean you get promoted. Further, the higher you go in rank, the more spectacularly you have to screw up before something is done about it. The system inside the Army is, while not entirely blind to merit, tends to reward conformity and mediocrity with promotion, and leads to a 'risk averse' mentality. I'm told that this is true in other branches as well. While being cautious can be a good trait in an officer, so is knowing when to seize the initiative. Franks is a good example of this. A rather startling report came out from the Army War Collage reviewing AARs from Afghanistan that was.... very critical of his approach. “The lack of a war plan or theater campaign plan has hindered operations and led to a tactical focus that ignores long-term objectives.”

This is amazing insight. Hardly any facts, a lot of omission, and the wrong conclusion drawn. Absolutely amazing.

And the list goes on.

Such as?

Factor in that defense contractors frequently headhunt before men leave the military, and you have a situation ripe for mismanagement and flat out bribery to push things like supply contracts to people based on the promised rewards rather than providing the best materials for the military. If you doubt this, take a look at the emerging 'Fat Leonard' scandal in San Diego. So far, three officers are awaiting trial and three more, including an admiral, are on leave pending investigation for bribery and corruption.

Which is why your claims that this is business as usual - as someone neither in the military nor in the defense industry - ring hollow. Because those guys are going to jail.

The men on the ground are quite adaptable, and I agree with Ensis about the men teaching the fresh fish how to best avoid getting killed. Surviving a war isn't winning one though. Before I can say I would feel comfortable about the US winning wars in Asia, I think that a long, hard look needs to be taken at the system that does not favor merit over conformity.

Oh, shut the feth up, seriously. You have no idea what you're talking about.

 Captain Fantastic wrote:

 Noble713 wrote:

The Okinawans don't hate us. That is a fabrication. I don't know how you would get that impression if you've ever visited here.

I've been here on Oki for 2 1/2 years, most of it stationed at Futenma. Some of my friends have been here (8, 11, and two guys @ 20+) years. Try getting into all but a handful of nightclubs in Okinawa City or Naha with a US ID card. Not happening. As soon as you approach "Sorry, Japanese only." Now that I'm a civilian and able to bust out a "gaijin card" they do an about-face and let you in almost like you're a valued customer. When I tell girls from Sapporo, Tokyo, or Osaka about this they are usually shocked and horrified. Hell just driving around in a Y-plate car garners extra harassment from the police, and if you get in an accident with a local vehicle the joke is "Y-plate stands for 'Your Fault' ". How about when that 17yo American kid was murdered two years ago by a local and hardly anyone heard a peep about it. Not to mention other discrimination like a guy (I think ex military) who got kicked out of his apartment when the agency found out his Japanese wife wasn't living there anymore. Granted stuff like housing and insurance discrimination happens to gaijin all across the mainland too, but it's definitely worse down here. The economy of the north part of the island probably benefits more from the US military presence (comparatively) than down here, where the land value and tourist industry is hampered by Camp Kinser and Camp Foster eating up prime real estate along Route (or whatever it is in Japanese) 58. Supposedly the US military only accounts for 5% of Oki's economy but I find that hard to believe given things like BAH (the difference between the rent they charge someone with BAH and normal Japanese rent is damn-near extortionate). At the end of the day it's a love-hate relationship. Business owners near the bases love our disposable income, some people see working on-base as good jobs, but they hate all the other stuff that comes with being overrun with 30-50,000 Americans in a population of only ~1.3 million.

I'm going to concede here that my experience is a lot more limited than yours, so I'm basing my opinions off the relatively sheltered experience I have being junior enlisted. You make some good points that I can't really disagree with at all. I still think that the farther north you go, the less people tend to care about the fact that you're a foreigner. People down south see the 7-Tons and up-armored humvees in the streets, and the gates on the streets. It's a constant reminder. It makes them bitter, and inherently rude to us, I guess.

After WWII, the area that is now Futenma was nothing. It was just a plot of empty land. After the base was built, the Japanese built around it and built infrastructure to support the massive amount of servicemembers that were there for Vietnam. The fact that they complain about the noise and hustle of the base is pretty hilarious, since the only reason there is housing and business there is because of the base. Futenma is apparently a ghost town. I've never even been, because there's absolutely no reason to, but every Motor T operator I've met has said the base is virtually lifeless.

The US Forces (Marines in particular) have really done a lot to damage our relationship with Japan, especially in Okinawa. There were two instances in the last time I was stationed in Japan where the USFJ commander had to put all USFJ personnel (sans Misawa, cause we were awesome) on base lock downs, to give the Japanese a break from our idiocy. The Okinawans would like us out of there, they've made it clear many times.

http://www.uchinanchu.org/history/list_of_crimes.htm
http://english.ryukyushimpo.jp/category/u-s-military-crimes-and-incidents/
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/feb/28/japan.usa
http://closethebase.org/us-military-bases/incidents-involving-us-military-in-okinawa/

The list just goes on and on and on and on. Honestly, our conduct on that island is shameful.

 Seaward wrote:

Uh huh.

And I'm sure you can remember the title of every single book you've read in the last ten years.

 Seaward wrote:

Such as?

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/fp_uploaded_documents/Falk-Rogers%20PAE%2003-11%20vF.pdf

This is a 2011 report from Harvard. Of those polled, 80% responded that the most competent officers they knew of left the military before retirement age.

Former SecDef Robert Gates also admitted it was a serious issue:
"A few years ago a brigade commander in Baghdad – Colonel, now Brigadier General, J.B. Burton – wrote a memo reflecting on the feedback he was getting from some of his officers about the factors that influenced them to stay in or leave. They talked about finding respite from the deployment treadmill, getting an opportunity to start or re-acquaint themselves with their families, to develop themselves intellectually through graduate education or other non-conventional assignments. One of the chief complaints was that the personnel system was, “Numb to individual performance and [had] begun to see every officer as equal." (Addressing the West Point class of 2011)

 Seaward wrote:

This is amazing insight. Hardly any facts, a lot of omission, and the wrong conclusion drawn. Absolutely amazing.

You're really milking the fact I'm not allowed to post any more text walls, aren't you? I'm sticking to limited, glaring examples of incompetence at the top that were simply ignored and left unaddressed. I could instead start listing officers who left the military after having blown billions of tax dollars on failed projects that payed out to corporations that they then went to work for as consultants when they got out.

 Seaward wrote:

Which is why your claims that this is business as usual - as someone neither in the military nor in the defense industry - ring hollow. Because those guys are going to jail.

Yeah, after years and years of getting away with it, and it was utterly bald faced bribery. And in all likelihood they're looking at a reduction in grade and early retirement, for the bribery, as it's unlikely that any of them will fail to plea bargain or cut deals to testify against Francis. Passing classified information, however, will likely bring the more serious sentences. However, we're looking at maybe 5 years. Unnamed sources for the Navy Times state that it was likely that the corruption was far greater and far more widespread than is currently disclosed, as this had gone on throughout Asia for 20 years. After all, if we're throwing three star Admirals under the bus...

In 2004 GAO determined that defense contractors employed 2,435 former ranking officers as consultants, many of whom had previously overseen projects that were either awarded to the companies they eventually went to work for, or had otherwise directly financially benefited. They are specifically taken on as contractors or consultants rather than employees so that they can bypass government ethics regulations. Former General Gregory Martin, according to an interview with USA Today, formerly the commanding General of the USAF's Material Command is now working as a consultant for Lockheed Martin and freely admits to contact with his former command as a Mentor while also tailoring Lockheed's pitch, thanks to his access to classified briefings.

 Seaward wrote:

Oh, shut the feth up, seriously. You have no idea what you're talking about.

I had a whole LIST of nasty rebukes to this, Seaward. Some of them were quite vile, and, frankly, true, based on your posts. But frankly, you're not worth dealing with pissing off the mods again.

Your thesis of, "Bad officers fail their way into promotions to the top, which is why we don't have any good officers at the top," is morphing into, "Bad officers go work in the defense sector."

Pick a thesis. Stick with it. I fully understand that an IT tech support guy who reads Huffington Post a lot and has never been commissioned is far and away the best authority we have on career advancement as an officer in all branches of the military, but you need to keep it consistent.

Oh, and you do need to address the inconsistency; there are far more good flag officers than bad, they simply don't have newspaper stories or books written about them. How can this be, in your mythical system?

I agree with what Seaward said....

also, arguably, the reason why there are so many bad officers at the top (more than anything) is that becoming a flag officer is more a function of politics and nepotism than actual performance or competency.

 Seaward wrote:
Your thesis of, "Bad officers fail their way into promotions to the top, which is why we don't have any good officers at the top," is morphing into, "Bad officers go work in the defense sector."

There's no morphing to it. It's just the final cap on a career of bad things. Hell, Former Gen Ricardo Sanchez was a consultant for my own damn field while Mentoring. You can try and straw man it, claim I'm saying two different things, but it's just another face of the same thing.

 Seaward wrote:

Pick a thesis. Stick with it. I fully understand that an IT tech support guy who reads Huffington Post a lot and has never been commissioned is far and away the best authority we have on career advancement as an officer in all branches of the military, but you need to keep it consistent.

Well, one, I don't read HuffPo. Nor am I the one claiming inconstancy where there is none. But I suppose, considering how you benefit every day from the way things are, a certain defensiveness about it is understandable. While, yes, I am an IT Consultant (and a damn good one) and it's a nice quiet job without having to speak Spanish and wonder what that explosion was, bluntly, I have some respect (a lot it, actually) for some of the vet posters here, but I really do have nothing but contempt for you, personally. To be honest, I see you as an arrogant fly-boy who swapped a flight suit for an empty suit, but continues to look down on others, making you a very poor sort of officer indeed.

I'll point out that I don't really have a dog in this fight, so I can sit back and say 'Here's the problem'. It's very simple. You want to retain good people, reward them for doing good work. Correct failure, and don't promote people above their level of competence. You've been in both worlds, Seaward, you know what I'm saying is true. Hell, I have an uncle I wouldn't trust to run a bagel shop, but the USAF thought he was Colonel material. Do I think that EVERY officer that stays in is like him, no. Do I think that he could be promoted that high was a sign that something is fethed up, oh yes.

Chaos, you're probably not wrong, but what allows that to happen is a system of promotions that is blind to merit. It's much easier to play the system in favor of Person A over Person B, if you don't have to factor in, say, Person B having a history of distinction where Person A does not.

 Seaward wrote:

Oh, and you do need to address the inconsistency; there are far more good flag officers than bad, they simply don't have newspaper stories or books written about them. How can this be, in your mythical system?

Seaward,a lot of the bad one's don't make the news either. The Airforce had 500 officers in one of the commands currently under investigation. 100 of them (or so) were crooked and 400 were not, with the majority of the crooked ones at the top. But are the guys that are not gonna stay? Or are they gone the first chance they get?

While, certainly, no, the guys that stay and become flag officers are not universally crooked or incompetent, there are enough that are that it becomes an issue.

 BaronIveagh wrote:
There's no morphing to it. It's just the final cap on a career of bad things. Hell, Former Gen Ricardo Sanchez was a consultant for my own damn field while Mentoring. You can try and straw man it, claim I'm saying two different things, but it's just another face of the same thing.

It'd be the same thing if it were only "bad" officers getting out and getting lucrative offers from the defense industry. But that's not the case. Because the defense industry wants to hire people who actually know defense.

Well, one, I don't read HuffPo. Nor am I the one claiming inconstancy where there is none. But I suppose, considering how you benefit every day from the way things are, a certain defensiveness about it is understandable. While, yes, I am an IT Consultant (and a damn good one) and it's a nice quiet job without having to speak Spanish and wonder what that explosion was, bluntly, I have some respect (a lot it, actually) for some of the vet posters here, but I really do have nothing but contempt for you, personally. To be honest, I see you as an arrogant fly-boy who swapped a flight suit for an empty suit, but continues to look down on others, making you a very poor sort of officer indeed.

I bolded the hilarious irony. I also find it amusing that you translate my dismissal of your point of view as remotely valid as contempt for everybody. Not the case, but if it helps, keep on thinking it, I suppose. Whatever softens the blow.

Anyway, my money's still on it being all about envy.

I'll point out that I don't really have a dog in this fight, so I can sit back and say 'Here's the problem'. It's very simple. You want to retain good people, reward them for doing good work. Correct failure, and don't promote people above their level of competence. You've been in both worlds, Seaward, you know what I'm saying is true.

Actually, that personal experience is what allows me to know you're talking complete nonsense.

Hell, I have an uncle I wouldn't trust to run a bagel shop, but the USAF thought he was Colonel material. Do I think that EVERY officer that stays in is like him, no. Do I think that he could be promoted that high was a sign that something is fethed up, oh yes.

Weirdly, I trust the Air Force's judgment a lot more than yours.

Chaos, you're probably not wrong, but what allows that to happen is a system of promotions that is blind to merit. It's much easier to play the system in favor of Person A over Person B, if you don't have to factor in, say, Person B having a history of distinction where Person A does not.

Seaward,a lot of the bad one's don't make the news either. The Airforce had 500 officers in one of the commands currently under investigation. 100 of them (or so) were crooked and 400 were not, with the majority of the crooked ones at the top. But are the guys that are not gonna stay? Or are they gone the first chance they get?

While, certainly, no, the guys that stay and become flag officers are not universally crooked or incompetent, there are enough that are that it becomes an issue.

According to you, and again, I'm obliged to point out that your judgement and experience are suspect at absolute best.

 Seaward wrote:

 BaronIveagh wrote:
There's no morphing to it. It's just the final cap on a career of bad things. Hell, Former Gen Ricardo Sanchez was a consultant for my own damn field while Mentoring. You can try and straw man it, claim I'm saying two different things, but it's just another face of the same thing.

It'd be the same thing if it were only "bad" officers getting out and getting lucrative offers from the defense industry. But that's not the case. Because the defense industry wants to hire people who actually know defense.

Well, one, I don't read HuffPo. Nor am I the one claiming inconstancy where there is none. But I suppose, considering how you benefit every day from the way things are, a certain defensiveness about it is understandable. While, yes, I am an IT Consultant (and a damn good one) and it's a nice quiet job without having to speak Spanish and wonder what that explosion was, bluntly, I have some respect (a lot it, actually) for some of the vet posters here, but I really do have nothing but contempt for you, personally. To be honest, I see you as an arrogant fly-boy who swapped a flight suit for an empty suit, but continues to look down on others, making you a very poor sort of officer indeed.

I bolded the hilarious irony. I also find it amusing that you translate my dismissal of your point of view as remotely valid as contempt for everybody. Not the case, but if it helps, keep on thinking it, I suppose. Whatever softens the blow.

Anyway, my money's still on it being all about envy.

I'll point out that I don't really have a dog in this fight, so I can sit back and say 'Here's the problem'. It's very simple. You want to retain good people, reward them for doing good work. Correct failure, and don't promote people above their level of competence. You've been in both worlds, Seaward, you know what I'm saying is true.

Actually, that personal experience is what allows me to know you're talking complete nonsense.

Hell, I have an uncle I wouldn't trust to run a bagel shop, but the USAF thought he was Colonel material. Do I think that EVERY officer that stays in is like him, no. Do I think that he could be promoted that high was a sign that something is fethed up, oh yes.

Weirdly, I trust the Air Force's judgment a lot more than yours.

Chaos, you're probably not wrong, but what allows that to happen is a system of promotions that is blind to merit. It's much easier to play the system in favor of Person A over Person B, if you don't have to factor in, say, Person B having a history of distinction where Person A does not.

Seaward,a lot of the bad one's don't make the news either. The Airforce had 500 officers in one of the commands currently under investigation. 100 of them (or so) were crooked and 400 were not, with the majority of the crooked ones at the top. But are the guys that are not gonna stay? Or are they gone the first chance they get?

While, certainly, no, the guys that stay and become flag officers are not universally crooked or incompetent, there are enough that are that it becomes an issue.

According to you, and again, I'm obliged to point out that your judgement and experience are suspect at absolute best.

You, as a member of our armed forces, are skeptical of an assessment from our resident Tacticool Operator who posses no military rank?

 Seaward wrote:
Because the defense industry wants to hire people who actually know defense.

Or as a kickback for having steered a few billion dollars their way.

 Seaward wrote:
I also find it amusing that you translate my dismissal of your point of view as remotely valid as contempt for everybody.

No, I translate your contempt for every poster that does not agree with you as contempt for everybody.

 Seaward wrote:

Anyway, my money's still on it being all about envy.

Whatever softens the blow.

 Seaward wrote:

Actually, that personal experience is what allows me to know you're talking complete nonsense.

And yet, current events and the Pentagon and the Army War Collage and Harvard all seem to support what I am saying. So, every last one of those is talking out their ass? Or just Seaward? I tend to think when the SecDef is saying that soemthing is a problem in a speech the graduating class of West point, perhaps he knows more about it than either one of us do.

 Seaward wrote:

Weirdly, I trust the Air Force's judgment a lot more than yours.

Let me put it this way: he screwed up one day and almost caused WW3. (Or at least, so he says. I'm not sure I buy it, but he retired early. This may be a 'There I was' story, but having seen him screw up other projects, I have no problem believing he sent a nuke on the wrong plane one day)

 Seaward wrote:

According to you, and again, I'm obliged to point out that your judgement and experience are suspect at absolute best.

Prove me wrong then. Or is this gonna be another of your 'I don't have to prove you wrong, it's obvious because you disagree with me and I'm always right!" speeches again, Mr "Does not know a damn thing about 16 inch guns"?

 Dreadclaw69 wrote:

You, as a member of our armed forces, are skeptical of an assessment from our resident Tacticool Operator who posses no military rank?

Being skeptical is fine, but he should at least site something besides "Word of Seaward'. Because so far he's claimed he knows more about it than not only generals in the field, but the SecDef and studies by Harvard. So, who likely knows more about the issue of bad officers and the military bleeding talent: the Secretary of Defense, or Seaward? I know which way I'm betting.

Cannot believe I'm going into this....

honestly don't remember the name of it. I read it when my brother in law got a copy when he enlisted, and the account of Taffy 3 was..... incomplete to say the least, and while it trumpeted the fact they heroically gave their lives, it left out that many died because of exposure due to being left adrift for several days due to poorly thought out orders and miscommunications. My grandfather hated Halsey to his dying day because the seaplane tender he served on had orders to not rescue them, and he felt that the Navy had abandoned those men to die for no reason, since they were standing by, prepared for search and rescue, rather near at hand.

Baron off the top of my head I believe your refering to the cruiser Indianapolis(sp) Seaward correct me on ship names please because I'm going off the hip. The cruiser that delievered "Big Boy" or "Little Boy" whose mission, route, and knowledge was limited to very few. After delievery it got nailed by a IJS submarine. Best verbal description....

The best officers have a tendency to leave the service rather than stay in. Now, an argument can be made that they have better opportunities in the civilian market, where success is rewarded, but overall this is bad for the military. In the Army, and this is speaking in general, and I am aware that exceptions exist, success might get you medals and the respect of the men who serve under you, but it doesn't mean you get promoted. Further, the higher you go in rank, the more spectacularly you have to screw up before something is done about it. The system inside the Army is, while not entirely blind to merit, tends to reward conformity and mediocrity with promotion, and leads to a 'risk averse' mentality. I'm told that this is true in other branches as well. While being cautious can be a good trait in an officer, so is knowing when to seize the initiative. Franks is a good example of this. A rather startling report came out from the Army War Collage reviewing AARs from Afghanistan that was.... very critical of his approach. “The lack of a war plan or theater campaign plan has hindered operations and led to a tactical focus that ignores long-term objectives.”

Your using Franks as an example but not why you are using him as an example. Pat Tillman came to mind but that wasn't it so I researched it a bit further. I let you Baron to clarify it

Everyone knows going to a peace time military and draw down is going to cut good officers out due to lack of positions for them. Removing a combat Brigade from each division...how many positions got eliminated...

And Sanchez was even worse. Despite a performance review that was... frankly horrific, he was not relived of command. His ignoring the units that were enjoying success to the degree that he had to be ordered by his CO to go to various areas where the effort was succeeding and see what they were doing differently speaks volumes. Good officers listen to the men under their command, Sanchez seemed take offense to it. This and his failure to create an overall plan lead to a situation where individual commanders were in effect running their own little wars around Iraq, with predictable results.

He was relieved because of Abu Gharib (SP) Replaced by General Casey...founder of 160th and a Aviator at that..first Aviator General Officer to lead the a infatry division...101st

Factor in that defense contractors frequently headhunt before men leave the military, and you have a situation ripe for mismanagement and flat out bribery to push things like supply contracts to people based on the promised rewards rather than providing the best materials for the military. If you doubt this, take a look at the emerging 'Fat Leonard' scandal in San Diego. So far, three officers are awaiting trial and three more, including an admiral, are on leave pending investigation for bribery and corruption.

I was contract oversight last rodeo I did...they do indeed headhunt. AMC though run herd on all contractor and contracts for the US Army. Your mixing Navy with Army. I haven't really been keeping track of this but staying on the fringe....isn't an Admiral related to someone on the contract?

The men on the ground are quite adaptable, and I agree with Ensis about the men teaching the fresh fish how to best avoid getting killed. Surviving a war isn't winning one though. Before I can say I would feel comfortable about the US winning wars in Asia, I think that a long, hard look needs to be taken at the system that does not favor merit over conformity.

Training.

DJ. I want to add a bit more into the Okinawa feeling hatred. Flash point involved two rapes. The SOFA agreement gave the men back over to military custody and UCMJ. Oki's wanted to use their justice system and sited the eight military Americans in prison outside Camp Stanley South Korea.

 BaronIveagh wrote:
Or as a kickback for having steered a few billion dollars their way.

Yeah. That's worth the jail time, alright.

Apropos nothing, we need a rolling eyes emote.

No, I translate your contempt for every poster that does not agree with you as contempt for everybody.

It's limited to a select few.

And yet, current events and the Pentagon and the Army War Collage and Harvard all seem to support what I am saying. So, every last one of those is talking out their ass? Or just Seaward? I tend to think when the SecDef is saying that soemthing is a problem in a speech the graduating class of West point, perhaps he knows more about it than either one of us do.

Current events support what you're saying? Really? Do you even know what you're saying anymore? A lot of guys are getting canned for bad conduct, and that's your proof that the system rewards bad conduct?

Let me put it this way: he screwed up one day and almost caused WW3. (Or at least, so he says. I'm not sure I buy it, but he retired early. This may be a 'There I was' story, but having seen him screw up other projects, I have no problem believing he sent a nuke on the wrong plane one day)

You're officially in "making gak up" territory now. You might as well buy a house; with the amount of time you spend there, it'll be cheaper than renting.

Being skeptical is fine, but he should at least site something besides "Word of Seaward'. Because so far he's claimed he knows more about it than not only generals in the field, but the SecDef and studies by Harvard. So, who likely knows more about the issue of bad officers and the military bleeding talent: the Secretary of Defense, or Seaward? I know which way I'm betting.

You're mixing quite a few things up, as is so often the case. Claiming that Hagel giving a speech regarding the cheating scandal (that once again is ruining careers as we speak) proves your entire point about the system rewarding failure? That's just nonsense. You're grasping at straws to support a weak thesis. Cherry-picking a few select officers and using their example (incorrectly, at that) to make a rule about the entire system is just downright asinine, especially given your complete lack of experience or knowledge involving it. I'm not seeing why I should treat all this any more seriously than you claiming you know more about naval aviation than someone who's actually done it.


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 Jihadin wrote:
Baron off the top of my head I believe your refering to the cruiser Indianapolis(sp) Seaward correct me on ship names please because I'm going off the hip. The cruiser that delievered "Big Boy" or "Little Boy" whose mission, route, and knowledge was limited to very few. After delievery it got nailed by a IJS submarine. Best verbal description....

He's talking about Leyte Gulf, where Halsey made some bad calls. Of course, Kurita made some bad calls, too, so I guess using his logic we can conclude that the Japanese military also had a system designed to reward the bad and punish the good.

I'm starting to agree with you that engaging with military-related stuff is just not worth it, by the way.

I shouldn't have gotten into it. Baron you need to do a bit of research into the subject besides hip shooting it. You cannot be vague and go from there.

Speaking of WWII related stuff...

anyone know a way to install and play "SSI: War in Russia" a 1993 DOS game....onto Vista....that's a game you won't complete in a two months at least

@Jihadin: I think you have the wrong GEN Casey in mind. The Casey that took over in Iraq was an infantry branch guy. He was my BDE CDR in 1st Cav back in the 90s, and commanded 1st AD as his division command.

Sanchez (who was an armor branch guy) was not relieved (he remained in command of V Corps), though he should have been, and not solely for the Abu Ghraib crap, but more because of his inability to run the Iraq campaign. Frankly he was in way over his head and was not up to the job. I worked with Sanchez in Panama when he was still a COL.

thank you for the correction Jake 8). I went by what I heard. I trust you more on this matter lol

 Jihadin wrote:

Baron off the top of my head I believe your refering to the cruiser Indianapolis(sp) Seaward correct me on ship names please because I'm going off the hip. The cruiser that delievered "Big Boy" or "Little Boy" whose mission, route, and knowledge was limited to very few. After delievery it got nailed by a IJS submarine.

No. I'm talking about Taffy 3 and the loss of two baby flattops and several destroyers off Samar. The men were left in the water for days while the fleet stood by. Indianapolis was much worse, but also did not take place while the fleet was near at hand, and knew what had happened. Captain Evans of the Johnston was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honer, for having carried out a suicidal attack against overwhelming odds to try and cover the carriers escape (A hit from Yamato on the destroyer was described as 'a puppy hit by a truck'). 1200 men from USS Gambier Bay (CVE-73), USS Hoel (DD-533), USS Johnston (DD-557) and USS Samuel B. Roberts (DE-413) were recovered days later when rescue operations began. (The St Lo sank separately from this group, having been finished off by an attack by a land based Kamikaze). The total lost while in the water is unknown, estimates are around 100-300 men, including Evans.

Halsey had withdrawn the battleships that were supposed to be protecting Taffy 3 to pursue a decoy force, and due to poor communication, failed to inform Kinkaid, Group 77's commander, that he had done so, effectively leaving the carriers of Taffy 3 exposed when the Japanese battleship force came steaming through, led by Yamato. The Gambier Bay to this day holds the distinction of being the only US carrier ever lost to direct fire from battleships. Kinkaid then proceeded to botch the rescue efforts through miscommunication, leaving the men spending several days in the water. According to some accounts, some of them survived only because the Japanese sailors were so impressed by the heroic attack by the destroyers against overwhelming odds, they had thrown supplies overboard to some of the men in the water as they passed.

 Jihadin wrote:

Your using Franks as an example but not why you are using him as an example. Pat Tillman came to mind but that wasn't it so I researched it a bit further. I let you Baron to clarify it

Reading it, I agree with you, I could have been clearer. I picked Franks and Sanchez to go after because I had written rebukes of how they were handling things from within the military at the time. They tended to bury themselves in the minutia of running the war rather than provide coherent vision and leadership, or even a coherent theater plan. Franks could take an objective, but he was out of his depth trying to run a war, and tried to palm theater strategy off on his subordinates (the fifty pound brains, he refers to them as in his book). This effectively left his subordinates to make it up as they went, with all the issues that entails.

 Jihadin wrote:

Everyone knows going to a peace time military and draw down is going to cut good officers out due to lack of positions for them. Removing a combat Brigade from each division...how many positions got eliminated...

That's true, but this has been an ongoing problem, not one that started with the draw down.

 Jihadin wrote:

He was relieved because of Abu Gharib (SP)

No, he wasn't, I did do the research. But he should have been.

 Jihadin wrote:

I was contract oversight last rodeo I did...they do indeed headhunt. AMC though run herd on all contractor and contracts for the US Army. Your mixing Navy with Army. I haven't really been keeping track of this but staying on the fringe....isn't an Admiral related to someone on the contract?

Vice Adm. Ted Branch and Rear Adm. Bruce Loveless are implicated, though the Navy is not saying (that I know of) what the connection is, only that it took place before their promotion. I'll grant that the Corps is the one that I do not have a good example of corruption from contractors (it may be I just don't know of it, or it may be the corps is doing it right compared to everyone else). But I do have examples from the Navy and USAF where mentors are being used by contractors to try and get an edge. This ranges from the acceptable (what do you think of our product, would it be acceptable in combat?) to the questionable (Hey, you know, Dynecorp has something that might work for you in this capacity). They're not subject to the same oversight as the actual contractor, as they're not employees of that contractor.

 Seaward wrote:

Apropos nothing, we need a rolling eyes emote.

 Seaward wrote:

It's limited to a select few.

Yeah, people who post on dakka.

 Seaward wrote:
A lot of guys are getting canned for bad conduct, and that's your proof that the system rewards bad conduct?

I underlined the part of that you might want to think about.

 Seaward wrote:
You're mixing quite a few things up, as is so often the case. Claiming that Hagel giving a speech regarding the cheating scandal (that once again is ruining careers as we speak) proves your entire point about the system rewarding failure?

Actually it was Robert Gates about the failure of the Military to retain it's best officers. Which I've said several times. "Which brings me to the third and greatest challenge facing your Army, and frankly, my main worry. How can the Army can break-up the institutional concrete, its bureaucratic rigidity in its assignments and promotion processes, in order to retain, challenge, and inspire its best, brightest, and most-battled tested young officers to lead the service in the future? After the major Afghan troop deployments end in 2014, how do we keep you and those 5 or 10 years older than you in our Army?"

Regarding the several scandals in the military atm, Rear Adm Kirby, spokesman for SECDEF, stated that current SECDEF Hagel believes that corruption has become 'systematic' and that new emphasis needs to be placed on ethics within the services.

Wait so your example of something being taught wrong was something from WWII? A lot of history about that war is taught wrong, both in the military and outside of it. It really isn't that big of a deal, especially considering (although this is based off my limited understanding in the area of naval warfare) the changes that have come upon naval warfare in the, what, 60 odd years since WWII? You actually had me interested to hear your side until then Baron, but if your main example is based on a bit of history about WWII that you disagreed with in a history book provided to US Navy personnel, then it loses a lot of punch.

 motyak wrote:
Wait so your example of something being taught wrong was something from WWII? A lot of history about that war is taught wrong, both in the military and outside of it. It really isn't that big of a deal, especially considering (although this is based off my limited understanding in the area of naval warfare) the changes that have come upon naval warfare in the, what, 60 odd years since WWII? You actually had me interested to hear your side until then Baron, but if your main example is based on a bit of history about WWII that you disagreed with in a history book provided to US Navy personnel, then it loses a lot of punch.

Actually it's very much a tangent to my main point.

I used it as an example of how the military cherry picks history. Since the assertion was that the military learns from it's past, the question is then how could it if it doesn't look at the whole picture? Saying 'These men gave their lives heroically' without looking at things like how Halsey screwed up and put them in that position to begin with, or Kinkaid dropped the ball when it came to recovering the men? These are just as important as a heroic example, because by seeing the mistakes made previously, they can be avoided in the future.

If young officers are not taught the mistakes (and why those mistakes happened) as well as the triumphs, it doesn't do them much good.

Well Australian soldiers have ANZAC Day, and while we do learn how everything went wrong in that campaign, we don't learn about the errors from the books we read, but rather from our instructors. Not that we can't look up additional military histories, but they aren't necessary. So who is to say the US Navy isn't the same? That the 'technically correct' books say one thing about an incident, but the instructors say 'guys, this thing is good but it does miss some points, X, Y and Z'. It certainly wouldn't be a novel concept.

And saying 'these mistakes can be avoided in the future' eventually has to lose relevance, when the technology and material available eventually outstrips that lesson. One could point to the Gallipoli campaign and say 'look at all these mistakes, lets not make them again, but it would be irrelevant because combat has changed so profoundly that the tactical lessons have lost the vast majority of their relevance. Maybe not all, but the majority

 motyak wrote:
Well Australian soldiers have ANZAC Day, and while we do learn how everything went wrong in that campaign, we don't learn about the errors from the books we read, but rather from our instructors. Not that we can't look up additional military histories, but they aren't necessary. So who is to say the US Navy isn't the same? That the 'technically correct' books say one thing about an incident, but the instructors say 'guys, this thing is good but it does miss some points, X, Y and Z'. It certainly wouldn't be a novel concept.

You're not wrong, and that's good teaching. However, that sort of lesson should not be incumbent on the whims of if the instructor knows more about it than what is written in the book.

 motyak wrote:
Maybe not all, but the majority

Again, some lessons are inapplicable, this is true.

However, I think that ensuring your subordinates know you're withdrawing forces supporting them before doing so will probably be a good idea for the foreseeable future. Same with prompt recovery of men in the water following a ship sinking.

 BaronIveagh wrote:

 motyak wrote:
Maybe not all, but the majority

Again, some lessons are inapplicable, this is true.

However, I think that ensuring your subordinates know you're withdrawing forces supporting them before doing so will probably be a good idea for the foreseeable future. Same with prompt recovery of men in the water following a ship sinking.

I don't disagree with this. However, the idea that without this example being properly presented, personnel won't learn this lesson, is false. There are plenty of other more recent, and more relevant, situations with which this lesson could be taught, with situations from a time where a lot of the combat tactics have been outdated (again, working from limited knowledge in naval warfare) where something similar occurred being relegated (not the appropriate word, but the best I can do) to a scenario to help build the esprit de corps, rather than help educate potential leaders. While I can't give a list of examples from the US Navy, you don't need to remain within a particular wing to help outline why support is important. The Army, Marines, and probably the Air Force would have examples that are more relevant to our current tactics and technology.

I do want to outline that I'm not intending any disrespect, and if any is communicated it is because of a lot of beer. Rather, I want to point out the problems with expecting a story about an engagement and the aftermath from WWII to remain relevant and important to training.

 BaronIveagh wrote:

 motyak wrote:
Well Australian soldiers have ANZAC Day, and while we do learn how everything went wrong in that campaign, we don't learn about the errors from the books we read, but rather from our instructors. Not that we can't look up additional military histories, but they aren't necessary. So who is to say the US Navy isn't the same? That the 'technically correct' books say one thing about an incident, but the instructors say 'guys, this thing is good but it does miss some points, X, Y and Z'. It certainly wouldn't be a novel concept.

You're not wrong, and that's good teaching. However, that sort of lesson should not be incumbent on the whims of if the instructor knows more about it than what is written in the book.

Or, you know, using the real lessons learned and evolving doctrine as a result. And you know, doctrine changed dramatically during the war after these events, and continues to evolve as different operational experiences occur. It isn't like every history book is written with the purpose of being a critical AAR nor do they all give a plausible 'it would have been better if'. The services don't rely on published history books for much more than back ground info or to provide data points to further analysis on a topic. The instructor is teaching off an approved lesson planned based on much more than any particular book.

motyak wrote:
I do want to outline that I'm not intending any disrespect, and if any is communicated it is because of a lot of beer. Rather, I want to point out the problems with expecting a story about an engagement and the aftermath from WWII to remain relevant and important to training.

No, actually I find this much better tahn certain other posts. And again, also not wrong, but other potential incidents that might be of a similar nature were never addressed in the book.

CptJake wrote:
Or, you know, using the real lessons learned and evolving doctrine as a result. And you know, doctrine changed dramatically during the war after these events, and continues to evolve as different operational experiences occur. It isn't like every history book is written with the purpose of being a critical AAR nor do they all give a plausible 'it would have been better if'. The services don't rely on published history books for much more than back ground info or to provide data points to further analysis on a topic. The instructor is teaching off an approved lesson planned based on much more than any particular book.

Doctrine changed after these events, and has continued to do so in the face of evolving weapon technologies and operational experiences, this is again very true. However, again, it makes a much bigger impression on the student if they can understand 'why' something is done a certain way. One of my own instructors was fond of showing students a power supply that a screwdriver had been welded to by the voltage when it had fallen across the terminals while explaining why you always wanted to be sure that there was no power on while working on something. Not one student failed to follow safety procedures. Saying 'this is doctrine' always needs to be followed by 'and this is why'.

BTW: Seaward, if what he said happened was fantasy, please explain Barksdale. Or do you think that was the only time in history the USAF has ever made that sort of mistake?

 BaronIveagh wrote:
Actually it's very much a tangent to my main point.

I used it as an example of how the military cherry picks history. Since the assertion was that the military learns from it's past, the question is then how could it if it doesn't look at the whole picture? Saying 'These men gave their lives heroically' without looking at things like how Halsey screwed up and put them in that position to begin with, or Kinkaid dropped the ball when it came to recovering the men? These are just as important as a heroic example, because by seeing the mistakes made previously, they can be avoided in the future.

If young officers are not taught the mistakes (and why those mistakes happened) as well as the triumphs, it doesn't do them much good.

Oh sweet Jesus.

 Seaward wrote:

 BaronIveagh wrote:
Actually it's very much a tangent to my main point.

I used it as an example of how the military cherry picks history. Since the assertion was that the military learns from it's past, the question is then how could it if it doesn't look at the whole picture? Saying 'These men gave their lives heroically' without looking at things like how Halsey screwed up and put them in that position to begin with, or Kinkaid dropped the ball when it came to recovering the men? These are just as important as a heroic example, because by seeing the mistakes made previously, they can be avoided in the future.

If young officers are not taught the mistakes (and why those mistakes happened) as well as the triumphs, it doesn't do them much good.

Oh sweet Jesus.

Both CptJake and I actually explained our problems with this point. I know you were expanding upon your problems earlier, but a one line response isn't going to help with the discussion. Baron has admitted that instruction without accounting for advancements in technology and tactics is a problem, what did your post do but drag it back to the slap fight you two had going?

 motyak wrote:

Both CptJake and I actually explained our problems with this point. I know you were expanding upon your problems earlier, but a one line response isn't going to help with the discussion. Baron has admitted that instruction without accounting for advancements in technology and tactics is a problem, what did your post do but drag it back to the slap fight you two had going?

Not to put too fine a point on it, but I believe that discussion and actual dialogue is not the point in his case. He and, to an extent, dreadclaw, like to try and troll anything I have to say on matters military, correct or not. He's been trying to strawman most of my posts in this thread, rather than actually offer any actual counter points, or act to disprove my view as you, Jake, and Jihadin do. I might or might not agree with you, but I respect your opinions and am interested in your input. Seaward I do not. I grant I am not the best communicator in the world, I work with machines for a reason, but I at least take the time to try and pose valid counterpoints to people's arguments, even if they don't quite come out as clearly as I'd like.