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Okay, a little debate being shifted out another thread. In a nutshell, presenting the arguments for the impact of the aerial offensive on Germany(myself), and anyone who cares to argue it with me.
( A note to sebster and Chaos:- My figures may have changed slightly, as I've actually dug my research up now, instead of going vaguely off memory. The thrust is still broadly the same however)


The objectives of the Allied bombing Campaign can be separated, broadly speaking, into two major ones, and four minor ones. The two major aims of Allied bombing were the crippling or destruction of the German war economy, and the demoralization of the German civilian populace. The four minor aims were to raise British morale, in retaliation for the Blitz, the destruction of key weapons sites, and later on, to disrupt communications, and soften up military targets before assaults. As one of the two major objectives of the bombing campaign, the crippling of the German war economy can be seen as vital, and indeed, even more important than the destruction of German morale. By destroying sites of industrial significance, the West hoped to bring more pressure to bear on German forces already clamouring for supplies in the East, and reduce production of raw materials, and finished military supplies to insufficient amounts for the German war machine to operate. Attacks on transportation were also intended to increase the length of time goods took to move from Point A to B. Yet the actual effectiveness the bombing campaign had on the German economy changes throughout the war, depending on the time period you examine.

From 1940 to 1942, the actual effect that Allied bombing had on Germany was negligible. Most of the damage done by bombing was done to the civilian economy, and thus, was easily absorbed.
In virtually all cases, German production increased, as the German war economy was scaled up, in order to better accommodate the needs of the war machine. In 1942 alone, in the war economy, overall production rose by 50%. Added to the fact that Germany still had considerable reserves of oil, chemicals, metals, and many other raw materials stocked up before the wars beginning, it quickly becomes evident that that initial Allied bombing caused little to no damage at all. For example, the German estimate of oil losses due to bombing up from the start of hostilities up until the end of 1943 was a mere 150,000 metric tons. Whilst this may sound substantial, when it is realised that in the Year of 1940 alone, a total of 4,578,000 metric tons were produced, it quickly becomes apparent that the scale of loss was irrelevant to the German economy. By the end of 1942, it is estimated that the combined Allied Bombing was accounting at best for a mere 2.5% loss of production in the Reich. And this figure includes civilian production for non-essential consumer goods, building, and so on. So the actual damage done to the German war economy itself would be much smaller. Whilst you could consider this a substantial figure when considering the amount of production lost or destroyed, this was clearly a failure to achieve the main objective set down, which was to cripple or destroy the German war effort. As Germany was consistently raising its production of all war essentials throughout this period, from raw materials to finished goods, Allied Bombing during this period was most clearly ineffective.

The situation begins to change however in 1943. As Albert Speer, the former Reich Minister of Armaments and War Production said in his interrogation in 1945,' The first heavy attack on Hamburg in August 1943 made an extraordinary impression. We were of the opinion that this type of attack upon another six German towns would inevitably cripple the will to sustain armaments manufacture and war production.....the raids on the ball bearing industry at Schweinfurt in July 1943 evoked a renewed crisis'. Both of these attacks were on a massive scale, involving hundreds of heavy bombers, yet the failure to repeat them consistently, and regularly meant that German industry had time to begin to disperse, and set up additional AA defences. The still constantly increasing overall production rate in Germany meant that the war machine was able once again to absorb the damage taken through bombing without showing too much adverse effect. Yet regardless of the additional measures taken by Germany, their war industry did begin to show signs of wear and tear. There was an estimated 9% loss of production in Germany in 1943. So it would be safe to say that whilst still not achieving it's key objective in 1943, the bombing did begin to make a noticeable dent of the German economy.

From 1944 onwards, the Allied bombing began to fulfil its main objective, as American bombers joined English ones, and large scale raids took place all over Germany. Indeed, Albert Speer regards 1944 as the period in which the bombing began to have an effect all across the board, 'Up to the year 1944 neither the air attacks nor the defence measures taken to meet them disturbed armaments production....with regard to the year 1944, on the other hand, it may be assumed that on average there was a fall in production amounting to 30/40%, for had it not been for the air attacks, the projected output programme would certainly have been achieved...' The Allies had also steadily increased raids against German oil, and fuel production sites, which resulted in severely incapacitating the German war machine. The Luftwaffe was short of fuel from September 1944 onwards, and the Army suffered serious shortages from December 1944 onwards. Indeed, it was one of the key reasons for the failure of the winter offensive in Dec 1944, as many of the tanks had no fuel to move. There were also shortages of coal from Autumn onwards, although steel production continued to climb. The elimination of transport capability however, meant that even in cases where production might not have been falling, it was increasingly difficult to move resources, and finished products to where they were most urgently needed. This breakdown in the rail network proved decisive to the failure of the Ardennes offensive. The lack of coal distribution also meant that power networks across Germany began to run short of fuel.

The second major objective, the lowering of the German peoples morale, was invariably tied into the first objective, the destruction of Germany industrial base. It was predicted that lower morale would result in lower production rates economically, due to civil unrest and absenteeism. Not only that, by targeting the civilian populace as well as industrial targets, the Allies sought to cause pressure on the Nazi party from within, as well as affect the performance of soldiers on the front line in the East. They reasoned that if the realities of war were brought home to the German people, they would quickly become disaffected with the Nazi's, and quite possibly bring about internal change, or at least make a conquest easier. Unfortunately, Allied commanders completely failed to count one factor into their equations-that the Nazi party, wicked or not, had been legally elected, and had the German people solidly behind them. Not only that, the German people, much like the British populace, were made of tougher stuff than they might have first appeared. Despite the constant aerial assault, the German people adapted, resigned themselves to it, and generally got on with life. Whilst morale was always inevitably low in a major city following a large scale bombing, any kind of civil unrest quickly resolved, and the people set out to recover from the raid, and repair the damage. The speed at which areas recovered and got back on top of production after a large bombing raid, was also unaccounted for by Allied commanders, who usually inaccurately predicted factories to be out of commission for several weeks, when a single week was usually closer to the truth.

As I quoted Speer saying earlier, he believed that enough major raids would indeed, 'cripple the will to sustain armaments manufacture'. Yet the raids to which he referred to were only ever repeated rarely, and sporadically, as opposed to occurring on a regular basis. The British raids themselves did increase in payloads and intensity, but usually only gradually over time. This meant that the German people were became used to them, and it gave the German authorities time to take appropriate countermeasures. These ranged from dispersing industries to underground locations, to building appropriate numbers of shelters, to installing flak weaponry. In all the cases in which the RAF suddenly increased the intensity of bombings, from Dresden to Hamburg, the effect upon morale was much greater than it would otherwise have been. Had the RAF instituted a series of raids on this scale, they might well have achieved the desired effect. The RAF's policy of hitting civilian targets meant that the pressure the armaments and war industry felt was much reduced. Speer himself said, 'The American attacks, which followed a definite system of assault on industrial targets, were by far the most dangerous. It was in fact these attacks which caused the breakdown of the German armament industry'.

To conclude this miniature essay, the Allied air campaign did not have as major an effect as it could have been hoped for earlier in the war, and in crippling production rates through morale. However, the destruction of the transportation network and continuing strikes on fuel sources severely incapacitated material production from 1944 onwards, to the stage where it was impacting upon the German capability to launch offensives, and produce munitions and other necessary goods. Speer himself rated the attacks as having a fall in production amounting to 30/40% in the final year of the war in his transcripts in 1945, and as a reasonably efficient man who overhauled his own countries industrial capacity, I would expect him to be at least vaguely accurate, and have a sound basis for that view.


My sources are as follows:-

'The Luftwaffe War Diaries'-Cajus Becker-Corgi Books 1969
'Royal Air Force 1939-1945, II The Fight Avails' -Denis Richards-Her Majestys Stationary Office
'History of the Second World War, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939-1945', Volume 1, Preparation-Sir Charles Webster & Noble Frankland
'History of the Second World War, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939-1945', Volume 4, Annexes and Appendices-Sir Charles Webster & Noble Frankland

What was the most successful bombing campaign of WW2?

Did gak loads of people die?

Success!

Amaya wrote:What was the most successful bombing campaign of WW2?

August/September 1945.

I see what you did there Frazz and I like it

Frazzled wrote:

Amaya wrote:What was the most successful bombing campaign of WW2?

August/September 1945.

It depends, does Photo bombing count?

If so, then its a picture taken of Hitler in Hamburg in 1938 wearing high heels and a dress and masturbating in front of a picture of Charlie Chaplin.

mattyrm wrote:

Frazzled wrote:

Amaya wrote:What was the most successful bombing campaign of WW2?

August/September 1945.

It depends, does Photo bombing count?

If so, then its a picture taken of Hitler in Hamburg in 1938 wearing high heels and a dress and masturbating in front of a picture of Charlie Chaplin.

I don't think that campaign worked out so well...

Frazzled wrote:

mattyrm wrote:

Frazzled wrote:

Amaya wrote:What was the most successful bombing campaign of WW2?

August/September 1945.

It depends, does Photo bombing count?

If so, then its a picture taken of Hitler in Hamburg in 1938 wearing high heels and a dress and masturbating in front of a picture of Charlie Chaplin.

I don't think that campaign worked out so well...

Allies won the war, so I guess it worked out ok.

Maybe that started the war in the first place?

Amaya wrote:What was the most successful bombing campaign of WW2?

The Dresden raid maybe, it did dehouse most of the citys population as was its intent.

/claps

well written Ketara, cannot argue with that one, though I would say that it largely comes to the same conclusion that I did in the previous thread, although I will say, that I think the bigger contributor to falling production rates were the manpower shortages experienced by Germany (as increasingly elderly males were being conscripted to the Volksturm and to man the air defenses, and the lack of mobilization of the female population into the factories didn't help either. Likewise, by that point in the war it must be mentioned that Germany had lost its major oilfields in Eastern Europe to the Soviets, the Allies (particularly the resurgent Soviet Navy) was interdicting Swedish Ore shipments in the Baltic, the Germans also lost their industrial base in France as the Allies liberated it, etc. etc. and in the final year of the war, the Allies were in Germany itself, so while I don't doubt Speers figures, I'm not sure that they are being correctly attributed to the proper causes considering all else that was going on. Surely the fact that your major industrial centers are now miles behind the Allies front lines has a bigger impact on production than having it bombed...

Cheers for that, an excellent piece.

It does really back up what chaos0xomega and I were saying in the other thread, that the bombing campaign wasn't the decisive factor in the war. You said yourself it wasn't until 1944 when they really began to impact German industry, and 1944 was post Stalingrad, post Kursk.

Then we seem to have been arguing at cross-hairs, the general impression I got from Chaos was that he thought the aerial offensive had not been significantly detrimental to the German war economy. To which my response was that in the later stages, it was highly effective.

I apologise if I misinterpreted.

Ketara wrote:Then we seem to have been arguing at cross-hairs, the general impression I got from Chaos was that he thought the aerial offensive had not been significantly detrimental to the German war economy. To which my response was that in the later stages, it was highly effective.

I apologise if I misinterpreted.

Okay, it's probably that chaos and I weren't sufficiently clear in our terms. We were saying it didn't impact the overall course of the war, as in by the time it was really meaningful the nature of the war in the East had shifted.

Anyway, it's a good essay and one I've copied and squirrelled away for future plagiarism

I have no sympathy.

At any time the German people could have stood up to Hitler, with the people saying no, the army would say no and the party would have no choice.

The Germans elected Hitler, and the Germans failed to remove him. Yes several thousand Berliners would die storming the barricades, but thats their problem and theirs to fix. Because they didn't hundreds of thousands of Allied soldiers and millions of Soviets had to die to do this job.

If those same German civilians who brought Hitler to power and then kept him there by inaction were also helping Germany run a wartime economy that prevented others from removing him then they and their infrastructure was a valid target for as long as it took to do the job.

Hamburg, Dresden, Berlin, they brought it on themselves.

Orlanth wrote:I have no sympathy.

At any time the German people could have stood up to Hitler, with the people saying no, the army would say no and the party would have no choice.

Yeah, see how well it's working in Syria! Wait...

Orlanth wrote:I have no sympathy.

At any time the German people could have stood up to Hitler, with the people saying no, the army would say no and the party would have no choice.

I take it you have not done any reading on nazi Germany?


Automatically Appended Next Post:

Ketara wrote:Okay
To conclude this miniature essay, the Allied air campaign did not have as major an effect as it could have been hoped for earlier in the war, and in crippling production rates through morale. However, the destruction of the transportation network and continuing strikes on fuel sources severely incapacitated material production from 1944 onwards, to the stage where it was impacting upon the German capability to launch offensives, and produce munitions and other necessary goods. Speer himself rated the attacks as having a fall in production amounting to 30/40% in the final year of the war in his transcripts in 1945, and as a reasonably efficient man who overhauled his own countries industrial capacity, I would expect him to be at least vaguely accurate, and have a sound basis for that view.

Overall I think your about right in your research. It is my understanding that German war production actually peaked in 1944. As stated in the OP, however, by that time it was more of a problem of getting the finished products to where they were needed. A chronic manpower shortage further reduced the effectiveness of the increasing production. It was only in the final year of the war that the strategic bombing had its intended impact on the war economy of nazi Germany.

I'd have to go dig it up, but a highly decorated Luftwaffe fighter pilot essentially said that if they had Me262s earlier in the war Germany would have been unstoppable. By the time they began producing their really impressive weapons, they simply lacked the men to use them. Not simply trained men, but any men at all. They were using boys as young as 14-15 by the end of the war and SS recruiting standards were thrown out the door.

Amaya wrote:I'd have to go dig it up, but a highly decorated Luftwaffe fighter pilot essentially said that if they had Me262s earlier in the war Germany would have been unstoppable. By the time they began producing their really impressive weapons, they simply lacked the men to use them. Not simply trained men, but any men at all. They were using boys as young as 14-15 by the end of the war and SS recruiting standards were thrown out the door.

I'm sure. Thats the problem with wonder weapons, they take too long.

You're thinking of Adolf Galland, and its somewhat of a misquote, as what Galland was saying is that the plane should have both been made operational earlier on, and in its original configuration rather than the relatively lackluster fighter-bomber it ended up being.

Yeah, it's from The First and the Last about Adolf Galland I believe.

Of course there is a great deal of interest among (pseudo) historians as to what Germany could have achieved if they had delayed 5-10 years before beginning the war.

Amaya wrote:Yeah, it's from The First and the Last about Adolf Galland I believe.

Of course there is a great deal of interest among (pseudo) historians as to what Germany could have achieved if they had delayed 5-10 years before beginning the war.

A radioactive Berlin.

What the US have been motivated to develop a nuclear weapon so rapidly with no enemy to use it against?

Amaya wrote:What the US have been motivated to develop a nuclear weapon so rapidly with no enemy to use it against?

You betcha. It would have been the same timeline. After all, Germany may have waited, but it was Japan that attacked the US.

Germany waits, develops uber planes, uber tnaks, and uberscnhitzel.
Germany declares war on France, Britain, US, and Mother Russia.
Patton is sent via ship to England to prepare the US forces in the European theater
Berlin, Hamburg, and parts of the Rhinve Valley become radioactive.
Poland invades Prussia, Bavaria, and Saxony.
French troops join up with Polish troops at the Rhine River Border.
Patton lands in England and says "What the?"

Yes, it was very effective. What was the expression the Germans were using when they started the war? They had a cannon and cosmetics economy. They were easily taking over the world and the war was all "over there". The good times were rolling for the average German. The bombing brought the reality of the war to the Germans. It was important to make them know what they had inflicted on others if nothing else.

Barksdale wrote:

Orlanth wrote:I have no sympathy.

At any time the German people could have stood up to Hitler, with the people saying no, the army would say no and the party would have no choice.

I take it you have not done any reading on nazi Germany?

Enough to understand that the German populace was overly compliant. There were murmurs of dissent in the populace and armed forces both, but neither had the bottle to make any move. This is partly due to the psychological nature of the German national character which is overly complaint. Hitler counted on and exploited that, his position was far less secure than it appeared, it was sadly inadequately challenged.

I stand by my words, the German populace had the moral obligation to remove Hitler, they didnt, so they got bombed in the process of removing him.

Orlanth wrote:
The Germans elected Hitler, and the Germans failed to remove him. Yes several thousand Berliners would die storming the barricades, but thats their problem and theirs to fix.

Well, no, not really. It was their problem to a degree, but it was also the Allies' problem. They could have simply surrendered, and saved the lives of many soldiers.

Orlanth wrote:
I stand by my words, the German populace had the moral obligation to remove Hitler, they didnt, so they got bombed in the process of removing him.

Not at all. Largely because you're imposing that moral obligation externally, which further explains why it was the Allies' problem as well.

Again, the Allies' could have simply acquiesced.

I also dispute the complaint about national character, largely because its an argument from culture, and that's never a good idea. No, I suspect that Germans didn't try to overthrow Hitler in large swathes because there was a real fear of being shot, by one side or the other.

dogma wrote:

Orlanth wrote:
The Germans elected Hitler, and the Germans failed to remove him. Yes several thousand Berliners would die storming the barricades, but thats their problem and theirs to fix.

Well, no, not really. It was their problem to a degree, but it was also the Allies' problem. They could have simply surrendered, and saved the lives of many soldiers.

Mass surrender would have been an adequate act of defiance against Hitler and would have shortened the war. This could have been achievable from Summer-Autumn 1944, and probably earlier.

dogma wrote:

Orlanth wrote:
I stand by my words, the German populace had the moral obligation to remove Hitler, they didnt, so they got bombed in the process of removing him.

Not at all. Largely because you're imposing that moral obligation externally, which further explains why it was the Allies' problem as well.

Why not impose it externally, an 'Allied' perspective was by its nature external. A decision taken in 1939 by the UK and France.

As for the morality itself been its the same externally and internally. Nazism crossed the line, literally and figuratively.

dogma wrote:
I also dispute the complaint about national character, largely because its an argument from culture, and that's never a good idea. No, I suspect that Germans didn't try to overthrow Hitler in large swathes because there was a real fear of being shot, by one side or the other.

Effective argument though. Have you ever been to Germany, there is a culture of state complaince that marks the national character, its very much a visible feature.

Hitler would certainly order his security forces to shoot any dissenters, however with the Reich being as thinly spread as it was by 1944 a popular uprising against Hitler would have been very difficult to stop.

Orlanth wrote:
Mass surrender would have been an adequate act of defiance against Hitler.

Its surprisingly difficult to surrender to someone that's shooting at you.

And surprisingly easy to pass judgment decades after the fact.

Orlanth wrote:
Why not impose it externally, an 'Allied' perspective was by its nature external. A decision taken in 1939 by the UK and France.

Because that implies that the moral obligation fell to Britain and France, and that it was much their job to remove Hitler as that of any German citizen; possibly more so.

Orlanth wrote:
As for the morality itself been its the same externally and internally. Nazism crossed the line, literally and figuratively.

No it isn't. A person that feels a moral obligation to kill Jews has no moral obligation to not kill Jews, you don't get to determine what other people believe crosses the line.

dogma wrote:

Orlanth wrote:
Mass surrender would have been an adequate act of defiance against Hitler.

Its surprisingly difficult to surrender to someone that's shooting at you.

And surprisingly easy to pass judgment decades after the fact.

Do you understand what you are saying. If what you said was true surrender within warfare would be impossible.

dogma wrote:

Orlanth wrote:
Why not impose it externally, an 'Allied' perspective was by its nature external. A decision taken in 1939 by the UK and France.

Because that implies that the moral obligation fell to Britain and France, and that it was much their job to remove Hitler as that of any German citizen; possibly more so.

The UK and France did not vote in Hitler, nor was it their fault the Germans did nothing after subsequent elections were cancelled.

dogma wrote:

Orlanth wrote:
As for the morality itself been its the same externally and internally. Nazism crossed the line, literally and figuratively.

No it isn't. A person that feels a moral obligation to kill Jews has no moral obligation to not kill Jews, you don't get to determine what other people believe crosses the line.

Dogma, I know you like to try and argue the opposite of everything I post, but how on earth do you come to the conclusion that Nazism didn't cross actionable moral boundaries. Or worse come to a conclusion that disenfranchises those who say it did.