Forum adverts like this one are shown to any user who is not logged in. Join us by filling out a tiny 3 field form and you will get your own, free, dakka user account which gives a good range of benefits to you: No adverts like this in the forums anymore. Times and dates in your local timezone. Full tracking of what you have read so you can skip to your first unread post, easily see what has changed since you last logged in, and easily see what is new at a glance. Email notifications for threads you want to watch closely. Being a part of the oldest wargaming community on the net. If you are already a member then feel free to login now.

sebster wrote:
I was referring to the possiblity of things outside of the natural realm, such as a soul.

Ah, that makes more sense. I'm essentially a party-line materialist, so I'm usually including such things, to the extent that they can exist, as functionally material; even if they might behave in a way that is classically considered to be characteristic of immaterial things.

In short, if we can be affected by a thing, then it is a material thing. Ghosts, Gods, and Souls (or qualia, as the case may be) included.

dogma:

So you would reify qualia?

Yes, though whether or not that is a step along the road to quining them is something that I'm less certain of.

Essentially, I reject the inverted spectrum and philosophical zombie arguments on the grounds that, if qualia are meaningful, then their existence should affect the behavior of those that possess them. Notably, one can imagine a person who had no "red" quale never being struck by the observation of a particularly vibrant shade of red. At least, he would have no recourse to be unseated unless we also posit that simply considering the existence of that sort of red would also unseat him, which seems strange to do given that I've never been so moved, though perhaps artists have?. But even if artists have been so moved, one might posit that there can be a quale regarding the perception or possession of a given sort of thought; ie. the experience of having a certain sort of thought as a certain sort of person at a certain sort of time. Of course, if we do this often enough we end up with something that doesn't seem all that distinct from a homunculus, which is never good.

In any case, if we accept that people that possess qualia can be distinguished from those that do not, then we have to acknowledge that qualia are material. They are the bits of experiential knowledge that follows from seeing something as a given person at a given time. Directly and immediately conscious and intrinsic in a broad sense (ie. each quale is an intrinsic characteristic of the moment in which it occurs: red at time t for person x), but not ineffable or private.

Dogma:

What would you do for a Klondike Bar?

The proper question is "What wouldn't I do for a Klondike bar!"

What's a Klondike Bar?


I've been to a Dyke Bar, if that helps?

Nurglitch wrote:sebster:

I thought I might point out that Aristotelians regard the soul as part of the natural world, rather than a super-natural addendum.

Interesting way of looking at things, and fair enough.

Note my point was not that a soul removes the possibility of a deterministic universe, if as you point out the soul can be considered part of nature. I was simply arguing that a soul, or some other supernatural thing would be needed to have a non-deterministic universe, to have free will.


Automatically Appended Next Post:

dogma wrote:Ah, that makes more sense. I'm essentially a party-line materialist, so I'm usually including such things, to the extent that they can exist, as functionally material; even if they might behave in a way that is classically considered to be characteristic of immaterial things.

In short, if we can be affected by a thing, then it is a material thing. Ghosts, Gods, and Souls (or qualia, as the case may be) included.

Is, again, a fair enough interpretation. I'd argue that if a thing is outside of natural world, that it has an agency beyond the stimulus of the natural, and might react two or more different ways to the same stimulus, it can be considered outside the natural.

I don't believe in such a thing, but I can see how it might work if one was inclined towards believing in such.

Is radioactive decay random?


Automatically Appended Next Post:
No-one has answered, so I shall.

Radioactive decay at the atomic level is a random process.

When a radioactive atom decays, its mass changes.

This affects the balance of mass in the universe.

A 'clockwork' universe is affected by changes of mass. Therefore random changes affect it randomly.

A randomly changing universe cannot be deterministic.

Therefore, free will exists.

I wouldn't consider radioactive decay to be random.

Nor would I consider a universe that includes randomness to be one that includes free will.

As far as I know, physics thinks radioactive decay is random.

What is your idea concerning free will?

Kilkrazy:

No one answered (hopefully) because I already pointed out that indeterminacy no more implies free will than determinacy.

Incidentally the conclusion of the argument you gave was invalid, in the logical sense, since the best you could do is conclude that the universe may be indeterministic, so long as you implicitly assumed that indeterminacy rules out determinacy, and your premises were inconsistent on that point if by 'clockwork universe' you were assuming a deterministic universe.

As it turns out, some inconsistencies are worse than others, and the sub-field of para-consistent logics works with that notion, rather than the assumption that anything follows from any inconsistency. However, as some logicians in the field would have it, direct inconsistency such as in the first part of the fourth line of your argument is the worst inconsistency you can have even by the standards of para-consistency.

To top it all off, you managed to insert a conclusion in the same line as a premise, which is bad form. Don't feel bad about it though, as non sequitor arguments are a hazard in this line of discussion.

Kilkrazy wrote:As far as I know, physics thinks radioactive decay is random.

Its either random or chaotic, depending on who you might talk to. I consider the argument from chaos to be superior, but I might also posit that randomness is simply a special sort of chaos in which all outcomes have an equal probability of occurring.

Also, while radioactive decay may be random, it still occurs at a constant rate. We cannot predict which atoms will decay, but we can predict how quickly a group of them will do so. As such, the changes in mass caused by radioactive decay are not random.

Kilkrazy wrote:
What is your idea concerning free will?

If a universe is random in the traditional sense, then no choices can be made according to the freedom of a will, because that will must be itself composed of random (uncoded and unassociated) bits of information that cannot become nonrandom through coding or association without violating the initial premise that a universe that includes randomness is indeterministic.

Essentially, either everything is random, or nothing is. And if everything is random, then nothing exists (as all things are uncoded and unassociated); meaning that a universe which is random cannot sensibly contain a thing called a will.

free will does not exist. After you get married . Just ask my dad.

Kilkrazy wrote:Is radioactive decay random?

No-one has answered, so I shall.

Radioactive decay at the atomic level is a random process.

When a radioactive atom decays, its mass changes.

This affects the balance of mass in the universe.

Yes, it is random. Or appears random and is influenced by other factors we cannot comprehend. Which is more or less the same thing until we actually identify those factors.

A 'clockwork' universe is affected by changes of mass. Therefore random changes affect it randomly.

A randomly changing universe cannot be deterministic.

Therefore, free will exists.

A randomness by itself doesn't mean there's free will. Randomness just determines whether there's deterministic universe or not. Given that free will is one possible source of randomness, a universe with free will would be, by definition, a non-determined universe. But simply establishing that there's randomness doesn't mean there's free will.

For there to be free will there would have to be some kind of element coming from outside of nature, which has an affect on decision making. Something outside of genetics and environment.


Automatically Appended Next Post:

dogma wrote:Also, while radioactive decay may be random, it still occurs at a constant rate. We cannot predict which atoms will decay, but we can predict how quickly a group of them will do so. As such, the changes in mass caused by radioactive decay are not random.

But we don't know which atoms will, and which atoms won't decay. Across the whole of the object you get a consistent rate, but you are getting atomic level variation. Then those minute changes will, given the incredible complexity and running time of the universe, scale up to have massive effects on the universe. Chaos theory and all that.

sebster wrote:
For there to be free will there would have to be some kind of element coming from outside of nature, which has an affect on decision making. Something outside of genetics and environment.

Not necessarily. We can simply treat the will as an emergent property, or intrinsic characteristic, of the collection of things that constitute our bodies.

sebster wrote:
But we don't know which atoms will, and which atoms won't decay. Across the whole of the object you get a consistent rate, but you are getting atomic level variation. Then those minute changes will, given the incredible complexity and running time of the universe, scale up to have massive effects on the universe. Chaos theory and all that.

Sure, but chaos theory also essentially posits that there is a distinction between randomness and unpredictability. Radioactive decay, as regards individual atoms, is unpredictable because all atoms appear to have an equal probability of decaying at any given moment. This unpredictability render the system chaotic, but not fully random, because we know that atoms will decay. For radioactive decay to be purely random, we would have to accept the possibility that the atoms in question will never decay.

dogma:

Treating free will as an emergent property is a really bad idea, particularly since we haven't yet cashed out what exactly this "free will" thing is yet. At this point in the discussion it just defers one set of abstract nonsence for another. At a later, perhaps more constructive point, it may be a convenient way for materialists to swallow dualism. Even Dennett's own account of the Intentional Stance keeps it strictly instrumental such that the emergence of mind-like behaviour is an efficient explanation rather than a metaphysical claim about some supervening property of bodies.

dogma wrote:Not necessarily. We can simply treat the will as an emergent property, or intrinsic characteristic, of the collection of things that constitute our bodies.

It would still be drawn from those characteristics, determined by them. The decisions we make still wouldn't be choices, they'd be the product of our environments.

Sure, but chaos theory also essentially posits that there is a distinction between randomness and unpredictability. Radioactive decay, as regards individual atoms, is unpredictable because all atoms appear to have an equal probability of decaying at any given moment. This unpredictability render the system chaotic, but not fully random, because we know that atoms will decay. For radioactive decay to be purely random, we would have to accept the possibility that the atoms in question will never decay.

But that variation alone is enough to produce randomness. When there is variation in decay, so that some atoms might decay and not others, that variation will, sooner or later, across the entirety of the universe, influence whether an object tips to the left or to right. Given the immense complexity and interrelated nature of everything, that's going to have flow on effects.

This is just a random shot in the dark, but isn't there a section of the Bible that explains that God has determined what shall eventually happen, but we are left to find the way there?

I read that as "the future is set, you just experience the passage of time".

I havent read the entire thread, my comments at the moment are largely restricted to the OP and immediate commentaries, so some of this may have been covered already. Apologies in advance.

Dreadnote, what you are advocating is somerthing akin to Order Theory, the idea that if you take everything to its simplest constructed parts all matter is predictable, while this is 'deterministic' its also ordered. Chaos is in fact a subset of order for this reason. What we see as patternless repetition could well be part of a lasger pattern that we cannot easily detect at our scale of reference.

I hacve only dipped my does in Chaos, and that was a long while ago, however most explanatory demonstrations of chaos involve imprefect knowledge of common otherwise predictable events. James Gleiks seminal book on the subject used as example an experiment in progress where data collection was frozen clipped to a long but set number of decimal places (causing presumably an insigncant difference in data) and resumed rather than restarted, causing huge differences in result over time compared to a single process that never had its data clipped. Is this Chaos? Gleick assumed so as a tiny variation in data changed into a huge difference over time, proving the inherent strength of seemingly insignificant randomness. However on the other hand perhaps it wasnt randomness, purely error. Restart the same experiment with the same dataset and the results will be the same not widely different.

Weather patterns are also seen as chaotic because we are unable to predict them. I suggest that is not so. Just as you summise that if we were able to determine the status of every component in the human brain precisely we could predict human action so I speculate we could predict weather with a good degree of accuracy is we knew more accurate climate data. Weather patterns appear chaotic because our weather measuring is crude at best, we detect weather patterns at certain points but not necessarily the micro-fluctuations between them.

In my opinion Chaos Theory operates in general as a subset of Order Theory based on our inability to create a complete dataset to predict what we are observing. However this is not wholy true, because we have no yet looked at threshold events. I would like to refer you to my earlier example of looking at weather patterns, which poetically at least could bear some resemblance to the storm of neutrons firing in the human brain. We can roughly determine rain catchment basins through their thresholds. Rain falling on one mountainside will run down in a predicatable path to one river, wheras one raindrop from the same cloud falkls on the other side of the slope and ends up in another river. The rain threshold is where a drop hitting the ridge of the mountain and could fall either way. You could argue, successfully I might add that local variants will effect and predetermine the path of each raindrop, however no matter how fine you 'tune' your knowledge of where each raindrop falls there is always a chance a raindrop falls on the 50/50 mark. Perhaps it divides perfectly in balance, perhaps 'fate' decides.

Perhaps there is a threshold event in the neurons of the brain also, times when the human computer has no clear path, this could result in a predictable third state like a balanced raindrop or something else. With something as complex as a human brain could a 50/50 trun up often enough for some underlying will to enact on. Perhaps a thought process generates 50/50 thresholds all the time and we become effective autonoma only when the balance of overwhelming on one isde. One thing is cetain, we are not single process machines, whatever decisions our 'cpu' is making it is doing so with lots of neurons in tandem rather than purely in series. We know this to be the case because neutrons decay all the time and yet we do not consistently fail like a computer with faulty RAM as we would if our decision making was serial rather than tandem processed. Perhaps his is where free will can be seen to reside.

Dreadnote you mentioned in the OP that the deterministic precision of your theory helps you with your atheistic worldview. Kudos to you. I choose to follow this theory in the other direction. If all matter has a predetermined course due to its predictability of action at its most elementary level, then if one could aquire a true understanding of the state of the universe for even a brief instant then it stands to reason one could also extrapolate that data to understand all history and accurately predict all futures. I have long pondered if this is in effect a methodology for onmiscience and a glimpse into the mind of God.

Interesting points, Orlanth. I hadn't considered threshold events before. Certainly food for thought.

micahaphone:

Yes, determinism is just predestination in a modern wrapping.

sebster wrote:
It would still be drawn from those characteristics, determined by them. The decisions we make still wouldn't be choices, they'd be the product of our environments.

They would be a product of us interacting with our environments, yes.

Don't eliminate the physical dimension of humanity from humanity. Your body is still you.

sebster wrote:
But that variation alone is enough to produce randomness.

Its enough to produce a highly chaotic system, but not one that is fully random. An absolutely random system is one that lacks any information whatsoever. A system in which there is no signal, and all noise.

sebster wrote:
When there is variation in decay, so that some atoms might decay and not others, that variation will, sooner or later, across the entirety of the universe, influence whether an object tips to the left or to right. Given the immense complexity and interrelated nature of everything, that's going to have flow on effects.

Sure, I'm not arguing against that. I'm arguing against the existence of random events. Granted, its a pretty esoteric argument given the highly technical differentiation between chaos and randomness.


Automatically Appended Next Post:

Nurglitch wrote:
Treating free will as an emergent property is a really bad idea, particularly since we haven't yet cashed out what exactly this "free will" thing is yet. At this point in the discussion it just defers one set of abstract nonsence for another. At a later, perhaps more constructive point, it may be a convenient way for materialists to swallow dualism. Even Dennett's own account of the Intentional Stance keeps it strictly instrumental such that the emergence of mind-like behaviour is an efficient explanation rather than a metaphysical claim about some supervening property of bodies.

Sure, I'm not necessarily arguing that an emergent form of free will is intellectually satisfying. I'm simply arguing that, given the currently nebulous understanding of the existence of free will, there is no way to postulate by necessity that it either exists or does not exist. Simply because we can treat free will as emergent property in order to escape one claim doesn't mean that we should.

Sure, but for the purposes of discussion my point was that we need a well-defined 'free will' before we make any further headway.

Ah, ok, we're in absolute agreement there.

Incidentally, the "define it" criticism is my favorite counter argument when presented with someone who believes dogmatically in the existence of free will.

dogma wrote:They would be a product of us interacting with our environments, yes.

Don't eliminate the physical dimension of humanity from humanity. Your body is still you.

But if it comes from, and has no random element or influence from any non-natural element, it is then the product of nature and nothing else, yeah? It is then a machine built from nature, responding to stimulus and effect, albeit in highly complicated ways.

Its enough to produce a highly chaotic system, but not one that is fully random. An absolutely random system is one that lacks any information whatsoever. A system in which there is no signal, and all noise.

It is enough to produce a universe in which two identical positions can produce differing final positions. Which pretty much sinks pre-determinism.

Think about it, an atom on the left side of a radioactive rock blinks out of existance, instead of an atom on the right. This causes the cliff face to collapse a hundredth of a second sooner than it would have otherwise. Which produces a massive cascade of different impacts with every atom in the cliff face, and those on the ground. Chaos theory takes over from there.

This is true whether you call it chaos or true randomness.

sebster wrote:
But if it comes from, and has no random element or influence from any non-natural element, it is then the product of nature and nothing else, yeah? It is then a machine built from nature, responding to stimulus and effect, albeit in highly complicated ways.

Sure, but then we have to ask the question that Nurglitch and I have come to, which is: "What is free will?"

Its a really slippery idea because even if we don't have it individuals would still make choices according to their desires. Its simply that those desires would be the manufactured result of physical processes.

sebster wrote:
It is enough to produce a universe in which two identical positions can produce differing final positions. Which pretty much sinks pre-determinism.

Absolutely, but you can have a deterministic universe that isn't predetermined. Determinism is only a claim that prior events cause current events in relatively rigid way.

sebster wrote:
This is true whether you call it chaos or true randomness.

Absolutely. I'm not disputing that. I'm simply disputing the notion that randomness, in the sense that it relates to uncoded and unassociated information, doesn't exist. In essence, all processes are to some degree bound by causality, and thus deterministic.

Take the atom in your example. It could decay at any time, but it absolutely must decay eventually. It all must decay in whatever location it happens to be in. It cannot decay in a different cliff face if its in the cliff face in your example. Therefore, while the specific time of the decay of one particular atom is unpredictable, it is still bound by causality due to the necessary realities of position and nature, if nothing else.

Sure, but then we have to ask the question that Nurglitch and I have come to, which is: "What is free will?"

Its a really slippery idea because even if we don't have it individuals would still make choices according to their desires. Its simply that those desires would be the manufactured result of physical processes.

The relevancy of the question doesn't easily survive conceptual discussion concerning the malleability and directionless nature of time in most alternate/expanded universe/dimension/existence theories anyway. Decision making can only really occur in a basic singular time vector.

dogma wrote:Sure, but then we have to ask the question that Nurglitch and I have come to, which is: "What is free will?"

Its a really slippery idea because even if we don't have it individuals would still make choices according to their desires. Its simply that those desires would be the manufactured result of physical processes.

Sure thing. Which is my definition would be 'some element of decision making coming from something other than physical processes'.

Absolutely, but you can have a deterministic universe that isn't predetermined. Determinism is only a claim that prior events cause current events in relatively rigid way.

Ah, see I was thinking of the two terms as the same. That'd be my lack of philosophy training.

ShumaGorath wrote:Decision making can only really occur in a basic singular time vector.

Well ,for most people, maybe. In either case, perception would seem to be the key variable.