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Just watched an interesting vid by the guy who does tank chats (Chieftains Hatch) discussing this. Basically amounts to: M4 is very reliable, does the job, better than the German tanks and the “heavy tank” was a white elephant anyway. He also brought up the issue that it’s difficult to physically move the larger tanks and so it’s impractical to do so.

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=TwIlrAosYiM

I am not sure on that though. It felt like he was going too much in the direction of defending the tank and the designers reputation. Just a few general points.

- He mentions that it was impractical to move heavy tanks. But the US took heavy tanks to Korea. So it can be done with the technology of the time. We’re not talking about the Maus, this became a regular thing to move big tanks around. He sort of framed that like it was an impossibility to move a 60 ton tank.

- Just a general glance at an M48 shows that they completely threw away the old Sherman design after the war. If it was this perfect tank then why did all subsequent tanks become bigger, heavier and have bigger guns? Even just the general shape of the tanks tells a story in of itself. The lecture was framed as “oh fans of the Pershing just like the big toys and aren’t thinking about the logistics”. But, clearly the post war designers did not share this opinion which is a very good suggestion that they were not happy with the Sherman. As well as that the logistics and maintenance issues were surmountable. They did make bigger tanks with bigger guns and they use that formula to the present day. All those Sherman’s went to the scrap heap very quickly.

- We know they could have built better tanks because they did build better tanks within a few years of the war. If they didn’t get them built then that is a failure on the part of the designers and the decision makers. This is framed as if the Sherman was all that could have been built and building a better tank was impossible. This is a case of eye of the beholder, but bungling through is not the same thing as steady as she goes.

- He brought up that the Sherman could beat the German tanks. I get that he is trying to counter the myth of “the Tiger” and all that. But, the US was a vastly richer and more industrial nation than Germany; which was being bombed and lacked resources. Given that during the Cold War the US leveraged that advantage against the Soviet Union I am not sure why “good enough” cuts it when we’re talking about the Sherman. If the Germans were building trash tanks then why is it reasonable that the US build more reliable trash tanks? Are we saying that if the US could have built M48’s that they would not have used them? Wouldn’t that have given the US an edge?

- Why would the US be developing the Pershing and bigger guns for the Sherman if they were happy with its performance? If it was part of the plan to have the reliable tank through the course of the war? Doesn’t that suggest they wanted a better tank but couldn’t do it until after the war ended? I think the lecture oscillates a lot on this point between the Sherman being good enough for WW2, whilst also implying that it’s impossible to make a MBT in the 1940s.

I think it’s more that the lecture came across as making excuses for the designers and decision makers. Especially since he spends quite some listing their failures and scrapped projects. This is not evidence of the sage masters of logistics knowing that big tanks with big guns was a silly idea that would never catch on.

This seems like a strange question - retrospection doesn't necessarily put you in the mindset of the time. You could say "well why didn't they just jump right to building M1 Abrams then?"

Tank design in the inter-war had it's own trends, and once they had something it's always easier to keep making more of an average design than try for an outstanding design.

After all German tank history showed what happens when you're constantly chasing the next big thing - you end up without enough of any tank and a nightmare logistics system of a dozen different marks of tanks to get parts for.

He's not wrong entirely.

Professional historians today generally have a more approving outlook on the Sherman's field performance than is often held by the popular mind. The Sherman was a reliable and perfectly functional workhorse and did the job the army needed of it just fine. It's flaws are often overstated, or lacking in proper context.

Namely, that people often act like Tigers were abundant. They weren't. At any given time after 1943, Germany never fielded more than 200 Tigers at any given time. Most of those served in the Eastern front, and they lost Tigers almost as fast as they built them. Part of the issue is that from a distance the silhoutte of the Tiger is akin to most German tanks, including the much more numerous Panzer IV (later variants of which the Sherman matched). Another part of the issue is that Germany by 1944 just didn't have many tanks, so people are looking at the Army to solve a problem that didn't really exist.

Germany fielded 600 tanks and SPGs at the Battle of the Buldge. In the Invasion of Fance five years earlier, they fielded 2,400.

"Better" is ambiguous. It's hard to define "better" in the context of tanks in 30s-50s because no one really knew exactly what better was going to be. Everyone held a different opinion about the role of tanks and their use in the field until basically the end of the Korean war. I'd also debate that in hindsight, there was no better tank. Part of why the Pershing came so late in the war is because of that debate. Field commanders generally had a very high opinion of the Sherman, but popular opinion back home was generally sold on the "Myth of the Tiger" especially after the well publized acts of Michael Wittmann at Villers-Bocage. The Army didn't change tune until the appearance of the Tiger II in 1944, but after that point, German armor existed mostly in name only.

And that's without looking into the general design issues of the Sherman's immediate successors. The Pershing was technically superior but suffered a number of design flaws. Those flaws got inherited by the M48 in more than a few ways, and the Army was still debating what a proper tank should be able to do. The Sherman remained the main Army tank through the Korean War and wasn't retired from Army service until 1957.

Post war is a very different atmosphere than actually-in-a-war. You have time to redo from start and begin testing.
That said, you don't stop the research- if a better design is viable and your entire supply line can be retooled to produce something new, it isn't the worst idea in the world, but you don't do that unless you're absolutely sure or the gamble is definitely worth it.

Reliability and logistics win wars. Jumping horses incautiously usually doesn't.

- We know they could have built better tanks because they did build better tanks within a few years of the war. If they didn’t get them built then that is a failure on the part of the designers and the decision makers

No. This is a claim that 'perfect hindsight can retrospectively alter reality'

At the time, no one could be certain that ~5 years later it could be done without issue (which itself is a dubious claim, not taking account to the difference five years can make).

You really need to take into account the bigger pictures and the realities of wartime- on decision making, training and _especially_ on supply chains. Post war is a completely different reality with none of the same stresses.

But US replaced Shermans later, no? We may ask why Napoleon didn't use two barrel shotguns, trenches and steel helmets. Questions like that just no meaning outside of fiction.

Replacing the Sherman would have been a bad idea, for the very reason because US Army did not thought about Tank VS Tank combat

So the Sherman was the perfect tank for what it was used for.

It was that the US never really got into big Tank Battles like the Russians did early on and their only General of thinking about future warfare was Patton.

There were a lot of tank projects to get better Medium or Heavy tanks on the field, but they were not suited for the combat doctrine and this only changed after the US army realised that the next conflict will see much more tank vs tank combat leading to the Main Battle Tank concept

"Should the US have replaced the Sherman?"

No.

More or less for every point The Chieftain makes any time someone tries to take a dump on the thing.

For your points:
- "There were heavy tanks in Korea" isn't an argument against it being impractical, not least because it's an entirely separate war fought several years of development and restructure after WW2, but also because it was still impractical there, too, as was any use of armour on the same scale and with the same mindset as WW2.

It was unquestionably difficult to move such equipment - or any similar equipment - around a theatre severely lacking in any rail or sturdy infrastructure that hasn't been bombed, or demolished during a retreat. There's a very good reason that not securing a single bridge over the Rhine during Market-Garden extended the war by months. Even getting it there to begin with is a challenge. For example, a restriction for UK armoured vehicles was that they had to be thin enough to fit through British rail tunnels, a design that is wholly useless outside the UK, but of crucial logistical importance.

- Nobody said the M4 was perfect. The Chieftain himself is careful to never say it in any of his discussions about the M4, of which he's done several, and I believe argues the entire opposite - multiple times. What is argued is that it was probably the best option for the US, at the time, all things being as they were. That it a massive distinction to make, and very much different to the point I feel you wanted him to be making, as opposed to one he was making.

- Again, same as "perfect", you need to stop throwing around words like "impossible", because nobody claimed it was impossible to build a better tank, and the fact better ones appeared later doesn't mean anything. Would you rather have a Sherman, or a promise that you'll get a better tank in 5 years?

You also simply cannot lay as much blame as you clearly want to at the feet of designers and decision-makers. Remember that just 1 year before the invasion of Normandy, the war was fought on 3 fronts: Russia, the Pacific, and the Desert. Where Panthers had only just had a minor, very rushed and catastrophic first outing at Kursk, and Tigers were still rare sights.

Every reason to develop the M26 had not yet materialised. Should it have been happening anyway? Debateable, in the M26's form. Some planning for the future should, but you can't judge that accurately from 80 years on. Also bear in mind that the US are still very much building their entire military from the ground up. The British and French have been busy resting on the laurels of WW1, poking and prodding at various military ideas, but the US, fresh out of the Great Depression, essentially has nothing, as evidenced by how much US doctrine changed to match what they found WW2 to be. The battle of Kasserine Pass is probably one of the best known examples of a militarily-inexperienced America having to learn and adapt.

By the time D-Day had occurred, and the shortcomings of even the 76mm M4s fully known, you already had to quickly reinforce units that had lost strength in the break-out, and Operation Market-Garden was already being planned, the success of which would bring a quick end to the war by giving the Allies an easy entry point into Germany.

In the wake of the failure of Market-Garden, you have such cases as the Battle of the Bulge, the aftermath of which required a lot of immediate reinforcement.

All the while the front was, by necessity, being pushed. All materiel needed to have spares ready and waiting and in number. Commanders had to react to changing conditions and terrain, requiring different approaches.

Amongst all this, why would there be a sudden interest in trying to focus on developments and productions that might easily become obsolete in a week? Light tank development is a fun example, as there was a hell of a lot of it during the early and mid-war, the majority of which got wholly binned around 1944/45 and immediately post-war when it was realised they were devloping armour for a type of war they were no longer fighting, or would likely ever fight again.

This isn't WW1, with generals spending years trying to make throwing men at machine guns work before finally accepting it doesn't. This is a war machine that actually already works, simply continuing to work. Perhaps not as optimally as it could have, but that can only be known with the benefit of hindsight.

- I honestly don't understand what you're trying to say here. The Sherman could beat German tanks, and that's somehow a bad thing? A thing to be decried, and uttered only as a damnation?

As for the last bit of whatever point it was you were trying to make, your hindsight is showing again, as well as ignoring that, for much of the war, the US was an isolated, civillian economy. You don't just build a new factory and suddenly start pumping out prstine materiel.

The fact that it flipped and became such an industrial machine over such a short period of time isn't a given, it's a goddamn marvel. Pumping out one of the most reliable, easy to maintain tanks of the war to a similar degree that the Soviet Union were pumping out anything that vaguely had 4 armour plates, tracks, and a turret, so shortly after one of the harshest and most memorable recessions in history is, quite frankly, a social, indsutrial, and military miracle.

What you seem to think is that America waded in with fistsfuls of cash and hundreds of factories already primed to make military hardware of every kind with thousands of people fully trained to do it, and the reality could not have been further from that. The US built its military industry and might up from somewhere between Sod All and Feth All, and went through several borderline disastrous baptisms of fire to get there.

- Again, I'm not sure what your point is, here, especially trying to argue that bigger guns for the Sherman is somehow something to decry the Sherman for. It's... It's still a Sherman... You know that, right?

As for development of the Pershing... Your original points hinged on the US not doing that. And they weren't, for the most part, owing to pressure from various sources and a complete lack of intel. But I see how you're not managing to connect the dots here: you think, again, that the argument is for the Sherman being Perfect Tank™.

Being happy with something isn't mutually exclusive with working out how to improve it or make something better than it, and neither is that exclusive with using what already works. You seem to feel that development and use cannot run in unison; that you cannot try and improve what you're already using, nor can you use anything you're trying to improve.

What it suggests is that while the M4 was working, it's never a bad thing to prepare for when it stops working. The British didn't produce the Centurion until post-war. The USSR didn't produce the IS-3 or the T-54/T-55 until post-war, or the T-44 quickly enough to see combat.

Hell, the British barely got the Comet out in time to get a run about, and it certainly had no significant impact whatsoever. It was regarded as a fantastic tank, but a good enough tank you have is always better than a fantastic tank you don't. Famously, the first division to get them had to quickly go back to their Shermans to respond to the Ardennes Offensive, highlighting the issue of introducing new hardware into an active warzone: sometimes it's better to use what you know works, because you know damn well it works.

On it being "impossible" to make an MBT in the 1940s... In WW2, certainly; WW2 was an era of military upheaval in more or less every way, and it was only when the dust settled you could truly inspect the remnants. Indeed, it can be argued there was no real MBT until the 60s, in the T-64 and the M60, with the Centurion and M47/M48 Patton of the later 40s, and T-54/T-55 of the mid-50s somewhat uncomfortably straddling the definition.

I suppose the more accurate thing to say is that it was impossible to make an MBT during the war.


Ultimately, I think you're looking at this with:
A) A LOT of benefit from hindsight.
B) Some weird desire for various people in charge to be wrong about everything to do with the Sherman.
C) A pre-existing dislike to of the vehicle itself, or if not that, then at least a dislike of any good thing said about it.
D) A complete misunderstanding of what "the best tank for the US in WW2" actually means.

And to cut a very overlong post short:

"Should the US have replaced the Sherman?"

No.

I think his question has a bad premise. That being he is assuming that there was a consensus that the Sherman was good enough and there was no need to replace it, and that was why the Sherman was the main tank of the war for the US.

Its clearly not the case since they were continually rolling out new tank designs even through the war. The T26(later M26) was deployed in Europe to good reviews. It was simply that the war ended before there was any need for them there. And since this line of tanks eventually became the M48 and M60 Patton designs it wasn't like they stopped and then restarted tank design during the Cold War.

Its just that the Sherman was in mass production during the war itself and that alone will have a lot of inertia which will prevent it from being replaced. You're not going to throw away perfectly functional vehicles just because a replacement exists because it takes time to actually replace it.

I think what he means when saying its impractical to move heavy tanks is that the engine technology wasn't quite there yet during WW2. But right after the war, we ended up with the M48 and M60s. Those tanks are actually quite close to a Tiger in size.

M60A3: 54.6 Tons. 6.94 meters long. 3.6 meters wide. 3.27 meters high.

Tiger I: 54 tons(57 on the Ausf E). 6.3 meters long. 3.56 meters wide. 3 meters high.

Its not that big tanks can't work. Its that tanks the size of Tigers weren't practical in ww2 given technological limitations. But development shortly after the war made tanks of that size feasible. MBTs of today would quite snugly be defined as Heavy Tanks in WW2 based on size alone.

the Germans were building oversized tanks, for the time. They are not oversized when you consider all tanks across history. They're just on the larger end. You have to consider specific cases like the Maus to actually find a ridiculously oversized tank.

 kodos wrote:
Replacing the Sherman would have been a bad idea, for the very reason because US Army did not thought about Tank VS Tank combat

So the Sherman was the perfect tank for what it was used for.

It was that the US never really got into big Tank Battles like the Russians did early on and their only General of thinking about future warfare was Patton.

There were a lot of tank projects to get better Medium or Heavy tanks on the field, but they were not suited for the combat doctrine and this only changed after the US army realised that the next conflict will see much more tank vs tank combat leading to the Main Battle Tank concept

Well... that the conflict they were planning for would likely see a lot of tank battles. Which was reasonable, since the most likely scenario involved fighting over the same ground again.

As it turned out, however, that expectation didn't materialize. A point for contingency planning and not getting too fixated on a single strategic doctrine.

It’s all about inertia; you’ve got entire countries geared up to mass produce certain designs, everyone is trained in them, from the lowest technician to the top commanders and all of the supply chain (parts, ammunition, etc.) is also geared up to support them. It’s just too difficult to change in the middle of a war where the key to victory is out-producing the other side.

You see this in all areas, not just the M4; within a few years of the end of the war you had countries wholesale equipped with jet fighters, assault rifles and early MBTs, because they could afford to take the time to change direction.

As mentioned by some of the other posters, the Allies ability to concentrate on a few adequate designs and produce them in vast quantities was probably a key factor in victory over Germany, who were constantly trying to invent super weapons. Ironically, they were probably best placed to understand that you didn’t need superior weapons if you use what you have correctly, because that’s exactly what they’d done in 1939/40!

Yes and it’s also using hindsight to say that the Sherman won the war therefore it was the perfect tank for the job and would have been perfectly fine in different circumstances that the designers risked. It’s validating the idea of just using old faithful and that’s not always a good idea; never mind not considering the benefits.

Also weren’t the US tankers told their tank was better than anything the Germans had and designers believed this? That doesn’t sound like part of the plan.

For example, what if the Sherman had come against the Soviets in the immediate aftermath of WW2 and they had been asked to oppose the annexation of Eastern Europe? They would have put themselves at a major disadvantage. As it happens they lucked out and only had to fight an enemy that could barely field a tank force and army by the end of the war.

How many times do people have to explicitly say no one's arguing the Sherman was perfect before it will stick?

 AlmightyWalrus wrote:
How many times do people have to explicitly say no one's arguing the Sherman was perfect before it will stick?

There is no perfect tank, only the tank for the job the army needs that uses it.

there is no point for switzerland to field big, breakthrough tanks or many tanks infact (terrain)

There is no point for the US army and Navy to use bigger tanks when they mostly just need them to be reliable with a supply net spanning half the world and decent enough.

THere is no point for the UdSSR to produce huge ammounts of quality material, when they just need material asap. (t34)

Armies will use their tanks or their weaponry that are adapted to their needs. because armies can learn. the issue comes into play when you have the politics interfere with the army in ways that generally are delusional with the state of the possibility.
Also for people stating that the tiger was ineficent. Sure Germany could've built more PZ IV's. But germany could not supply their vehicle fleet allready so even more tanks in the field will solve no issue, infact only worsen it. Add to that a general staff that was for decisive battles and not long term strategy in a attriton conflict with the focus of supply and you get a part of the picture.

 Totalwar1402 wrote:
- Why would the US be developing the Pershing and bigger guns for the Sherman if they were happy with its performance? If it was part of the plan to have the reliable tank through the course of the war? Doesn’t that suggest they wanted a better tank but couldn’t do it until after the war ended?

The Sherman should be considered in the context of it's creation - which was an an infantry support tank sufficently narrow to be loaded onto trains to be transported around the US (and general logistical practicality).
American doctine at the time was to send dedicated tank destoyers and later aircraft against enemy armour. Other countries had different ideas (the UK for instance retrofitted a significant portion of their Shermans with the high velocity 17 pounder).

As with all things during the war technology improved with experience, research, and the back and forth of the enemy building a better tank to counter your tank. When they faced the Japanese forces the later model shermans were total overkill for the obsolete Chi-Ha tanks.

Post war you started to see things like the Centurion but they were the culmination of lessons learned. At the start of the war expectations were very different.

To a certain degree the perfect tank (or ship, or aircraft), is the one that exists where you need it.

i.e. an average tank is better than no tank at all.

i.e. an average tank is better than no tank at all.

exception if you have no fuel for it, then it becomes a waste of material and manpower.

I think we can solve most issues by saying that the US should have mirrors UK doctrines at the time. Put a 17pdr in one tank per platoon, problem (mostly) solved.

The Firefly was adopted by the US Army but not in any numbers and way too late. There is no reason why the US army could not have had massed Firefly variants in time for the Normandy landings.

As for using the Sherman as a focus of quantity and logistical quality. I think that was sound even with hindsight.

As others have said once the Sherman was in production there was no point shifting to another tank design as redoing all the factory tooling would have been slow and expensive

(and in part one of the reasons they were able to put the Sherman into production so fast was that it made use of the lower hull running gear etc of the Lee/Grant)

while a heavy tank might have been useful as a supplement it needed to stay within the size and weight restrictions of railroads, bridges (including engineering pontoons etc), as well as being simple enough to maintain by the mechanics already in the field), plus and design work was done (even if it was a bit slower than it perhaps could have been) both in the US and UK. One of the limiting factors was engines of sufficient power that would fit in the space available (a problem the germans had too, with underpowered tigers with cooling issues which got worse when the same engines ended up in the Tiger II)

The one criticism that could have been levelled at the Sherman (especially those being used by the US) was a reluctance to realise it needed upgunning as the war went on, the 76mm could have been pushed earlier to be used as a proportion of tanks in a unit (it was worse against 'soft' targets as its HE shell was lower performance) in the same way the firefly was used by the british & commonwealth forces.

Edit: this is based on a situation where there was still abundant manpower, the Germans are criticised for overdeveloping (certainly true), but given their lack of manpower even if they'd stuck to the Pz III/IV (and to be fair Tiger I since that was in development pre-war) it wouldn't have made much difference

 Orlanth wrote:
The Firefly was adopted by the US Army but not in any numbers and way too late. There is no reason why the US army could not have had massed Firefly variants in time for the Normandy landings.

Just a matter of timing I think. The firefly conversions started at about the same time as the US were bringing their own 76mm forward for combat testing.

A quick glance at wikipedia suggests mass production of the 76s were delayed due to muzzle blast problems found in the trials, resolved in June 1944 - the same month as D-day. But the US wouldn't have known this when they turned down the firefly in 83 - given that they were already set up for the 76, that they'd already had balance issues with long guns on the sherman, and the need to rebuild the turret if they wanted the 17pdr to fit properly it made sense at the time.

 OrlandotheTechnicoloured wrote:

The one criticism that could have been levelled at the Sherman (especially those being used by the US) was a reluctance to realise it needed upgunning as the war went on, the 76mm could have been pushed earlier to be used as a proportion of tanks in a unit (it was worse against 'soft' targets as its HE shell was lower performance) in the same way the firefly was used by the british & commonwealth forces.

That was actually touched upon in other videos of "the Chieftain". US started developing heavier gun for the M4 early on, there was a working prototype as early as 1942 iirc...but it's ergonomics were so horrible the testing commision did not approve of it. Same reason why the Firefly was never adapted by the US, it was apparently horribly inefficient to work. US vehicles were, for the time period, incredibly user-friendly- to their credit, US command realized that a tank crew rattled and near-concussed by just being in a tank won't fight effectively.

In essence, the M4 was a working, comfortable and effective design that had no problem taking on German tanks until they ran into one of the cats. And there were so few of the cats, most of them deployed in the East, that statistically speaking, a US tanker would fight from 1942 till 1945 without ever seeing one. No point in bringing up the Pacific theater, except maybe to point out how universal the design was.

After the war, the situation had changed as the enemy had changed, which warranted new design, but there was little point in switching horses mid-race during WW2.

Because the Chieftain is saying that it was held back for technical limitations and insinuating that no mistakes were made. Yes I get that he’s trying to counter a common perception that the Sherman was bad but he’s overstating the point.

Take the quote below for example.

“The M4 tank, particularly the M4A3, has been widely hailed as the best tank on the battlefield today. There are indications that the enemy concurs in this view. Apparently, the M4 is an ideal combination of mobility, dependability, speed, protection, and firepower. Other than this particular request—which represents the British view—there has been no call from any theater for a 90 mm tank gun. There appears to be no fear on the part of our forces of the German Mark VI (Tiger) tank... There can be no basis for the T26 tank other than the conception of a tank versus tank duel—which is believed unsound and unnecessary. Both British and American battle experience has demonstrated that the antitank gun in suitable number and disposed properly is the master of the tank. Any attempt to armor and gun tanks so as to outmatch antitank guns is foredoomed to failure... There is no indication that the 76 mm antitank gun is inadequate against the German Mark VI (Tiger) tank.[29]”

This is a quote from General Lesley McNair who advocated for the tank destroyer doctrine; who was one of the main opponents of developing the Pershing. Clearly, this is not a man who believes the Sherman was a “just good enough” tank. He actually says it’s a better tank than the Tiger in the first sentence. If you had put a working M48 in front of this man he would have still said no. Quite a few people are saying that the US designers and planners knew they had a “just good enough tank”. That this was all part of the plan to mass produce cheap tanks. This quote suggests they thought they had the best tank in the world and didn’t need anything better. That is not the same thing and it’s a view that deserves to be on the record as bad behaviour. It’s hindsight to say that “oh but everything worked out fine so no mistakes were made”. The plan was that the US already had the best tank in the world and it was a waste of time to do anything more.

I think the Chieftain does mention the guy above but his point is that the technology couldn’t have existed at the time and therefore opinions above were reasonable. This is trying to rationalise poor judgement and mistakes; which comes across as making excuses.

So... the original question was "with perfect hindsight why didn't the US just leap to the biggest bestest tank available?" and at least one of the responses was that inter-war design philosophies/trends existed that pushed specific directions in development.

And now you're posting a quote proving that trends existed and influenced design. And that's somehow badwrong and should rile people up? Even though it answered your original question?

Maybe you should figure out what you actually want to be the point of your topic and then come back to it.

There's a very good book on this subject by Charles Baily (Faint Praise) that directly addresses this question with an in depth analysis and review of the Army's pre-war and wartime development programs. It's a worthwhile read.

Big as America is, I don't think fielding an entire country is any substitute for an armoured, self propelled weapon of war.

 Totalwar1402 wrote:
Because the Chieftain is saying that it was held back for technical limitations and insinuating that no mistakes were made. Yes I get that he’s trying to counter a common perception that the Sherman was bad but he’s overstating the point.

Take the quote below for example.

“The M4 tank, particularly the M4A3, has been widely hailed as the best tank on the battlefield today. There are indications that the enemy concurs in this view. Apparently, the M4 is an ideal combination of mobility, dependability, speed, protection, and firepower. Other than this particular request—which represents the British view—there has been no call from any theater for a 90 mm tank gun. There appears to be no fear on the part of our forces of the German Mark VI (Tiger) tank... There can be no basis for the T26 tank other than the conception of a tank versus tank duel—which is believed unsound and unnecessary. Both British and American battle experience has demonstrated that the antitank gun in suitable number and disposed properly is the master of the tank. Any attempt to armor and gun tanks so as to outmatch antitank guns is foredoomed to failure... There is no indication that the 76 mm antitank gun is inadequate against the German Mark VI (Tiger) tank.[29]”

This is a quote from General Lesley McNair who advocated for the tank destroyer doctrine; who was one of the main opponents of developing the Pershing. Clearly, this is not a man who believes the Sherman was a “just good enough” tank. He actually says it’s a better tank than the Tiger in the first sentence. If you had put a working M48 in front of this man he would have still said no. Quite a few people are saying that the US designers and planners knew they had a “just good enough tank”. That this was all part of the plan to mass produce cheap tanks. This quote suggests they thought they had the best tank in the world and didn’t need anything better. That is not the same thing and it’s a view that deserves to be on the record as bad behaviour. It’s hindsight to say that “oh but everything worked out fine so no mistakes were made”. The plan was that the US already had the best tank in the world and it was a waste of time to do anything more.

I think the Chieftain does mention the guy above but his point is that the technology couldn’t have existed at the time and therefore opinions above were reasonable. This is trying to rationalise poor judgement and mistakes; which comes across as making excuses.

You should really mention that this quote is from 1943. That is very relevant to the argument, because at this point, the Sherman almost certainly was the best all-round tank in the world at that point. Was it matched against a Tiger in a one-on-one? No, but the number of Tigers encountered was tiny, and they had massive issues when used outside of their specific role of being a heavy breakthrough tank, or being used as a gun emplacement.

The most common threat encountered by a US tanker is anti-tank guns, not enemy tanks. The 75mm Sherman was arguably the best Sherman variant at dealing with these because of its fast target acquisition, fast reloading, and good explosive payload in the HE round- the 76mm had a much less effective HE payload and the 105mm was slower to respond. Tank-on-tank combat is relatively uncommon, most of the work is tank-against-infantry and artillery.

Does the quote above show a lack of foresight? Yes. The situtation did change over the next year, and the Sherman was a little behind the curve in being upgraded as a result (in particular, why on earth HVAP ammunition for the 76mm wasn't pursued earlier is quite an oversight). Is McNair wrong in 1943? No.


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 Mad Doc Grotsnik wrote:
Big as America is, I don't think fielding an entire country is any substitute for an armoured, self propelled weapon of war.

McNair doesn’t say there are not many tigers and we have more of our cheap reliable tanks. He says, point blank, we have the “best tank in the world” and is directly comparing it to the Tiger. So he really is saying that had it come to even numbers of Tigers and Sherman’s that this wouldn’t have mattered because the Sherman was the better tank. That’s a bit more than just complacency. It’s the job of generals and thinkers to have foresight and stay ahead of the curve.

I’ll take a comparison. Let’s say that France stopped the Germans in 1940; but took significant losses until they made a more mobile army. People would look back and say “well for 1939 it made sense the French has this opinion but it all worked out anyway so no bad”. This is the line of thinking with defending bad decisions in the past, you’re really only considering the end result. For example, what if the US had been forced to oppose the Soviet Union straight after WW2. It would have lacked a major tool in opposing Russian tanks. That could have led to disaster or unnecessarily high losses. Then you would say, oh but the US should have learnt from WW2 when they were fighting a weaker opponent and had time to rearm to oppose the USSR. It is applying hindsight to say things worked out.

 Totalwar1402 wrote:
McNair doesn’t say there are not many tigers and we have more of our cheap reliable tanks. He says, point blank, we have the “best tank in the world” and is directly comparing it to the Tiger. So he really is saying that had it come to even numbers of Tigers and Sherman’s that this wouldn’t have mattered because the Sherman was the better tank. That’s a bit more than just complacency. It’s the job of generals and thinkers to have foresight and stay ahead of the curve.

I’ll take a comparison. Let’s say that France stopped the Germans in 1940; but took significant losses until they made a more mobile army. People would look back and say “well for 1939 it made sense the French has this opinion but it all worked out anyway so no bad”. This is the line of thinking with defending bad decisions in the past, you’re really only considering the end result. For example, what if the US had been forced to oppose the Soviet Union straight after WW2. It would have lacked a major tool in opposing Russian tanks. That could have led to disaster or unnecessarily high losses. Then you would say, oh but the US should have learnt from WW2 when they were fighting a weaker opponent and had time to rearm to oppose the USSR. It is applying hindsight to say things worked out.

Here is the quote you used:

General McNair, 1943 wrote:“The M4 tank, particularly the M4A3, has been widely hailed as the best tank on the battlefield today. There are indications that the enemy concurs in this view. Apparently, the M4 is an ideal combination of mobility, dependability, speed, protection, and firepower. Other than this particular request—which represents the British view—there has been no call from any theater for a 90 mm tank gun. There appears to be no fear on the part of our forces of the German Mark VI (Tiger) tank... There can be no basis for the T26 tank other than the conception of a tank versus tank duel—which is believed unsound and unnecessary. Both British and American battle experience has demonstrated that the antitank gun in suitable number and disposed properly is the master of the tank. Any attempt to armor and gun tanks so as to outmatch antitank guns is foredoomed to failure... There is no indication that the 76 mm antitank gun is inadequate against the German Mark VI (Tiger) tank.[29]”

Aside from the fact that a single paragraph is never going to be a detailed refutation of the advantages of the T26 over the M4, the paragraph still doesn't support what you say it does.

Firstly: "There appears to be no fear on the part of our forces of the German Mark VI (Tiger) tank... There can be no basis for the T26 tank other than the conception of a tank versus tank duel—which is believed unsound and unnecessary." He does not directly say it, but the clear implication is that a tank-on-tank duel is not a common part of warfare, or this would not be deemed unnecessary*. This is true, especially on the Mediterrannean and Western fronts. In addition: "There is no indication that the 76 mm antitank gun is inadequate against the German Mark VI (Tiger) tank." So they clearly were planning to provide sufficient tank firepower to counter the Tiger I. As it happened, the 76mm was not as effective as hoped (without HVAP ammunition) but this is only known with hindsight. The US maybe could've got 76mm guns deployed sooner, but it certainly was not sticking its head in the sand and avoiding improving the Sherman.

In all honesty, if the Germans had had even numbers of Tigers as the US had Shermans in 1943 (presumably by replacing other vehicles like Pz.Ivs, because the extra manpower can't come out of thin air), they would not have been better tanks. The Tiger was a specialised tank, it needed support to be effective in the proper context. It would not have the mobility to be used as a Pz.IV, and would leave the German forces much less able to respond to enemy attacks and make their own rapid counter-offensives. A tank that isn't there is less effective than one that is.

Ability to knock out an enemy tank is not the sole marker of how good a tank is on the battlefield or in a war. In any case, why do you suppose the US forces at the close of WWII would be unable to contend with the Soviet forces based on the armour fielded? The late war Sherman is easily on parity with the late war T34, which are by far the most common tanks for each side. The Soviets actually followed a similar strategy for the most part, focusing on reasonable, capable medium tanks in large numbers.

*McNair's adherence to the US tank destroyer doctrine was inherently flawed, but the vehicles themselves functioned very effectively as self-propelled anti-tank guns.

His arguments are completely correct.

1. Shipping. Its a numbers game. They could ship a battleship if they really wanted but the weight and dimensions allowed them to optimize the shipping they had. The weight and size limitation allowed them to effectively ship 2x a heavier tank IIRC.

2. M26. (Full disclosure I love this tank). Its a good tank but it took time to design a heavier tank. Even in late 1944 the tank was very underpowered, and it took time for them to design a bigger engine (which was the basis for the upgrade to the M46). The US did not want to put a tank out that was going through teething problems (Panther looking at you). This was not slow. The M4 came out in 1942 after an amazingly quick design, learning lessons from France. From 1941 - 1944 they designed a very capable heavy (later considered medium) tank. Considering the Tiger began development in the late 1930s this is an impressive turnaround.

3. Armor and gun were effective when it came out and remained effective through the war. Critics are focused with gleaming eyes on the German super heavies, but there were very few of them in the real world. The Sherman / Churchill / Cromwell faced infantry with antitank artillery, STGs, and the occasional PZ IV or JagdPZ. The M4 was optimized to deal with these.

4. The Army wanted high explosives on target. If anything based on the threats they faced, they may have been more optimized (and there were discussions on this) with two M4s with 76mm, and three with 105mm in every platoon.


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For example, what if the Sherman had come against the Soviets in the immediate aftermath of WW2 and they had been asked to oppose the annexation of Eastern Europe? They would have put themselves at a major disadvantage. As it happens they lucked out and only had to fight an enemy that could barely field a tank force and army by the end of the war.

M4s went through T34/85s like crap through a goose in Korea. IS2s were heavy but assault tanks with their own problems. Hit them with artillery and aircraft and hit their support with artillery and aircraft, just like they did to the Germans. Both Centurions and Pattons did just fine against IS 2s and 3s in the ME later.

besides you are all wrong. PZ III with long 50mm was the best tank of the war. Prove me wrong!


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 Orlanth wrote:
I think we can solve most issues by saying that the US should have mirrors UK doctrines at the time. Put a 17pdr in one tank per platoon, problem (mostly) solved.

The Firefly was adopted by the US Army but not in any numbers and way too late. There is no reason why the US army could not have had massed Firefly variants in time for the Normandy landings.

As for using the Sherman as a focus of quantity and logistical quality. I think that was sound even with hindsight.

No. Firefly is good on paper. Its accuracy was poor at distance. Its turret ergonomics were terrible. The 3in on the M10, 90mm on the M36, and 76mm with good ammo were good guns against German armor considering distances they were facing.

They had what they needed. More artillery than Dog and enough radios to use it properly. Then you can use the best tactic: Move forward until you bump into something. Retreat and drop 210,000 artillery rounds on it (and maybe some airstrikes to spice things up) then move forward again.

 Frazzled wrote:
No. Firefly is good on paper. Its accuracy was poor at distance. Its turret ergonomics were terrible

From what I understand 25% better penetration than the 76mm shermans but half the rate of fire, and the reduced accuracy meant the higher penetration didn't particularly translate into higher range.

That said the firefly was up-gunned from the low velocity 75 as a stop gap, not built in competition to the 76mm.

 Frazzled wrote:
His arguments are completely correct.

1. Shipping. Its a numbers game. They could ship a battleship if they really wanted but the weight and dimensions allowed them to optimize the shipping they had. The weight and size limitation allowed them to effectively ship 2x a heavier tank IIRC.

2. M26. (Full disclosure I love this tank). Its a good tank but it took time to design a heavier tank. Even in late 1944 the tank was very underpowered, and it took time for them to design a bigger engine (which was the basis for the upgrade to the M46). The US did not want to put a tank out that was going through teething problems (Panther looking at you). This was not slow. The M4 came out in 1942 after an amazingly quick design, learning lessons from France. From 1941 - 1944 they designed a very capable heavy (later considered medium) tank. Considering the Tiger began development in the late 1930s this is an impressive turnaround.

3. Armor and gun were effective when it came out and remained effective through the war. Critics are focused with gleaming eyes on the German super heavies, but there were very few of them in the real world. The Sherman / Churchill / Cromwell faced infantry with antitank artillery, STGs, and the occasional PZ IV or JagdPZ. The M4 was optimized to deal with these.

4. The Army wanted high explosives on target. If anything based on the threats they faced, they may have been more optimized (and there were discussions on this) with two M4s with 76mm, and three with 105mm in every platoon.


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For example, what if the Sherman had come against the Soviets in the immediate aftermath of WW2 and they had been asked to oppose the annexation of Eastern Europe? They would have put themselves at a major disadvantage. As it happens they lucked out and only had to fight an enemy that could barely field a tank force and army by the end of the war.

M4s went through T34/85s like crap through a goose in Korea. IS2s were heavy but assault tanks with their own problems. Hit them with artillery and aircraft and hit their support with artillery and aircraft, just like they did to the Germans. Both Centurions and Pattons did just fine against IS 2s and 3s in the ME later.

besides you are all wrong. PZ III with long 50mm was the best tank of the war. Prove me wrong!


Automatically Appended Next Post:

 Orlanth wrote:
I think we can solve most issues by saying that the US should have mirrors UK doctrines at the time. Put a 17pdr in one tank per platoon, problem (mostly) solved.

The Firefly was adopted by the US Army but not in any numbers and way too late. There is no reason why the US army could not have had massed Firefly variants in time for the Normandy landings.

As for using the Sherman as a focus of quantity and logistical quality. I think that was sound even with hindsight.

No. Firefly is good on paper. Its accuracy was poor at distance. Its turret ergonomics were terrible. The 3in on the M10, 90mm on the M36, and 76mm with good ammo were good guns against German armor considering distances they were facing.

They had what they needed. More artillery than Dog and enough radios to use it properly. Then you can use the best tactic: Move forward until you bump into something. Retreat and drop 210,000 artillery rounds on it (and maybe some airstrikes to spice things up) then move forward again.

Are you saying the Patton tank would be a negligible improvement on a Sherman? Even if the Sherman can kill a Panzer or T34 that doesn’t invalidate the notion of getting the greatest possible advantage you can get.

Just because the Sherman uses combined arms warfare/numbers to be effective doesn’t mean that wouldn’t be done with a Pershing/Sherman. You’re insinuating that they would stop doing that if they had the big tank.

Is it impossible to fire a HE shell out of a longer gun? You’re assuming these technical hiccups were insurmountable but they were all overcome. Again we’re not talking about the Mause which was never going to work. We’re talking about the US being on he cusp of getting an MBT into the field.