The Comanche and the Albatross - F-35 discussion, yes its that time of the month

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**chaos0xomega**

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/digital/pdf/articles/2014-May-Jun/F-Pietrucha.pdf

Found that article, its kinda longish and thus not really well suited to quoting here, so apologies for that, but the argument posited is the one that I've often argued as well: The USAF is declining in size and capability at the expense of a high-end fleet of aircraft that are ill-suited to the conflicts we've been fighting and can expect to fight in the future.

**Frazzled**

SO this isn't about COmanches? Frazzled sad.

**chaos0xomega**

Nope, fraid not, aside from its use as an example as to the benefits that can be derived by cancelling a major military aviation program.

**curran12**

Makes sense. It's a weapon that doesn't work as well as others, in a system that is overfunded as it is while everything needs to be cutting back.

Other than some pointless nostalgia or attachment to anything, why not cut them back?

**Jihadin**

The aircraft (Comanche) program had a lot of "other avenues" of development that made into main stream Army Aviation.

**whembly**

Dunno... this is just cool as all hell...

**chaos0xomega**

Jihadin wrote:
The aircraft (Comanche) program had a lot of "other avenues" of development that made into main stream Army Aviation.

Is that not the case with the F-35 as well? Pretty much everyone I know who argues in favor of the F-35 usually does so on the basis that it has all these awesome capabilities etc. as a result of its radar, avionics, etc. etc. and not because of its airframe or flight performance (except maybe the Marines who love its vtol capabilities). Given that these systems are largely already developed, and not a function of the F-35 airframe but rather avionics components that are able to be modified and/or replaced, wouldn't it make sense to take the capabilities found in the avionics, radar, sensors, etc. and port them over to legacy platforms that would be easier to push into production and already have logistics and training pipelines in place?

I can recall Seaward and I arguing back and forth about this one on a previous thread, and his argument was basically to the effect of "The F-35 doesn't need to be fast or agile or able to dodge a missile, etc. because the capabilities it presents make these metrics of combat aircraft performance outmoded and obsolete and irrelevant to the future of air warfare." Well, if thats the case, why do we need the airframe at all?

**whembly**

chaos0xomega wrote:
Well, if thats the case, why do we need the airframe at all?

Maybe because it's better to have a human pilot within these technologies? (I'm assuming you're referring to advance to UAV?)

**chaos0xomega**

whembly wrote:
chaos0xomega wrote:
Well, if thats the case, why do we need the airframe at all?

Maybe because it's better to have a human pilot within these technologies? (I'm assuming you're referring to advance to UAV?)

No, I meant in the sense of, why continue funding the 'F-35' when all the capability is evidently inherent to pieces of hardware that are theoretically interchangeable with F-16s and F-15s?

**whembly**

chaos0xomega wrote:
whembly wrote:
chaos0xomega wrote:
Well, if thats the case, why do we need the airframe at all?

Maybe because it's better to have a human pilot within these technologies? (I'm assuming you're referring to advance to UAV?)

No, I meant in the sense of, why continue funding the 'F-35' when all the capability is evidently inherent to pieces of hardware that are theoretically interchangeable with F-16s and F-15s?

Ah... I see.

Where's Seaward when you need him.

I'm not qualified to make an informed opinion... only that my guess would be that the F-35's stealth capabilities adds such a force-multiplier to the general's toolbox, that it's worth it.

To me "stealth planes" are really for first strike capabilities. Knock out your adversary's radar/detection stations stealthly... then, your F-16/F-18 will be stealthy.

But, don't mind me... I'm just noobie with these sort of things.

**chaos0xomega**

Right, thats also pretty much the argument posited in the linked article (written by someone who I would argue is qualified to discuss the topic given his credentials), though it also points out that the likely scenario in which we would utilize the F-35 (kicking in the door on China) is perhaps the mission that the F-35 is least suited for given the airframes limitations and the geopolitical and strategic realities of the region.

**Jihadin**

I wasn't Air Force Omega but I've no idea what side projects made it into the F35. I was a crew chief for 'Hawks.

**SilverMK2**

If you are going to "kick in china's door" you will need a buttload more F35's than you currently have on order...

**Jihadin**

Nothing but Tomahawks

**purplefood**

You'd need more than just those...
Unless you had like, a lot.

**Ouze**

whembly wrote:
Dunno... this is just cool as all hell...

In theory, yes.

Unfortunately, it appears that it cooks the runway a bit.

**Jihadin**

Nail power plants.
Bridges
Comm Centers
Logistical Centers
Rice Storage Centers
Major Highway intersections
Fuel Depots

Create such a economic hardship where they spend more resources into fixing their overall logistical support then what they can put into a war effort

Never happen though being our economies are tied to each other

We more likely offer breasts enhancement centers to win them over

They in turn enhancing "Yellow Fever"

**chaos0xomega**

Jihadin, the economic ties argument holds no water really, history has shown us time and time again that economic ties, even economic integration, is NOT a barrier to war. Europes economy, prior to BOTH world wars (especially prior to world war 1) was more closely tied together than ours and China's is today. We know how that turned out.

**Medium of Death**

Why Can’t America’s Newest Stealth Jet Land Like It’s Supposed To?

The Pentagon’s gazillion-dollar Joint Strike Fighter can’t pull off maneuvers that older jets were doing in the early ’60s. Who’s to blame?
There are big air shows in the UK this summer. The British public may be a little disappointed, however. The F-35B Joint Strike Fighter—the stealth jet that’s supposed to be able to take off and land vertically, like a helicopter—will be on display for the first time outside the U.S. But it won’t emulate the vertical landings that the Harrier family has made routine since the Beatles were playing dodgy nightclubs in Hamburg.

U.S. Marine aviation boss Brig. Gen. Matthew Glavy has said that there are no plans for the F-35B to perform vertical landings (VLs) in the UK, because the program has not finished testing the matting that’s needed to protect the runway from exhaust heat. (The program office, the Marines, and Lockheed Martin did not return emails about any part of this story.) It may sound like a simple issue, but it pops the lids off two cans of worms: the program’s relationship with the truth, and the operational utility of VL.

At the very least, that will add to the challenges of operating a complex 25-ton fighter—twice as big and fuel-thirsty as the Harrier it replaces—under canvas and off the grid, particularly in a hybrid-war situation where supplying a squadron by land may be hazardous or impossible.
The F-35B—the version of the Joint Strike Fighter that the Marines and the British are buying—is designed to take off in a few hundred feet and land vertically, like a helicopter. Its advocates say that will allow the Marines to use short runways worldwide as improvised fighter bases, providing air cover for expeditionary forces. But to do VL, the engine thrust must be pointed straight downward, and the jet is twice the size of a Harrier. Result: a supersonic, pulsating jackhammer of 1,700-degree F exhaust gas.

In December 2009, the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (Navfac) issued specifications for contractors bidding on JSF construction work. The main engine exhaust, the engineers said, was hot and energetic enough to have a 50% chance of spalling concrete on the first VL. (“Spalling” occurs when water in the concrete boils faster than it can escape, and steam blows flakes away from the surface.)

Lockheed Martin, the lead contractor on the F-35B, was dismissive. The specifications were out of date and based on worst-case assessments, the company said, and tests in January 2010 showed that “the difference between F-35B exhaust temperature and that of the AV-8B [Harrier] is very small, and is not anticipated to require any significant… changes” to how the new plane was operated.

Navfac ignored Lockheed Martin and commissioned high-temperature-concrete VL pads at four sites. At the Navy’s Patuxent River flight test center, F-35Bs perform VLs on a pad of AM-2 aluminum matting, protecting the concrete from heat and blast. Why didn’t the January 2010 tests result in a change to the specifications? How were those tests performed? The Navy has referred those questions to Lockheed Martin, which has repeatedly failed to answer them.

This isn’t the only instance where Lockheed Martin has tried to shoot the messenger on the basis of weak facts. Last year, the Rand Corporation in a report concluded that the JSF—a program that incorporates three variants of F-35, each one for a different military service—will cost more than three single-service programs would have done. Lockheed Martin accused Rand of using “outdated data,” but founded that criticism on numbers that were not in the report.

One reason the F-35 program is running behind schedule is that Pentagon overseers forced Lockheed Martin and the program office to reinstate flight tests that they had cut out, a move that the current program manager thinks was necessary. But Lockheed Martin consultant Loren Thompson accused Pentagon testing experts of “wanting the opportunity to close out their home mortgages and get that last kid through college.”

After a 2011 report showed the F-35A cost per flight-hour to be 40 percent higher than the F-16’s, program leaders asserted that the Pentagon’s accountants had misinterpreted their own numbers. Three years later, the numbers have barely budged.

The bigger issue is that the Pentagon bought the F-35B for two reasons: it can land on an LHA/LHD-class amphibious warfare ship, and it can operate from an improvised forward operating location, created around a 3,000-foot runway. The capabilities are complementary. Without one of those forward operating locations, the amphibious force is limited to six fighters per LHA (unless essential helicopters are off-loaded). But a short runway is of little value unless you can use it twice.

And what Navfac calls “standard airfield concrete” is military-grade, made with aggregate and Portland cement. Many runways are asphaltic concrete—aggregate in a bitumen binder—which softens and melts under heat.

The Marines could use AM-2 landing pads. But AM-2 is not a friend to the agility that justifies the F-35B over other forms of expeditionary airpower. An Air Force study calls it “slow to install, difficult to repair, (with) very poor air-transportability characteristics.” A single 100- by 100-foot VL pad weighs around 30 tons and comprises 400 pieces, each individually installed by two people.

At the very least, that will add to the challenges of operating a complex 25-ton fighter—twice as big and fuel-thirsty as the Harrier it replaces—under canvas and off the grid, particularly in a hybrid-war situation where supplying a squadron by land may be hazardous or impossible.

Rolling or creeping vertical landings can spread the heat load over a greater area. But there is no sign that they have been tested on concrete, asphalt, or AM-2 over asphalt. What about multiple, close-together landings? Will hot asphalt debris stay off the fighter’s stealthy skin?

Nobody seems willing to say when such tests will be conducted—which is odd, because we do flight tests to prove the airplane can meet requirements. How was the requirement for the F-35B to VL on a non-standard runway framed? Indeed, was that requirement formally defined at all? Omitting the latter would have been a catastrophic mistake by the Pentagon.

At least $21 billion out of of the JSF’s $55 billion research and development bill is directly attributable to the F-35B variant, which also has the highest unit cost of any military aircraft in production. The design compromises in the F-35B have added weight, drag and cost to the F-35A and F-35C. It would be nice to know that—air shows aside—it will deliver some of its promised operational utility.

**Sasori**

I always enjoy Seward's perspective on this topic, it is refreshing seeing a different side to this.

**Medium of Death**

I thought from the last Drone/Terminator/Skynet thread that the idea would be less manned fighters but having squadrons of drones? So having less of these wouldn't be a problem.

Obviously you'd imagine they'd have been able to out-perform the Harrier in all aspects but apparently not.

**chaos0xomega**

Yeah, wheres the Seaward signal, I want to hear his take.

Medium - regarding the article, I highly doubt the F-35 will ever be operated from an austere airfield. The aircrafts maintenance requirements would make it difficult to service properly (I dont even think the Harrier was able to operate from austere airfields, and from what I understand the Harrier was a more robust and less sophisticated piece of kit), and the amount of money we have invested in them, let alone the potential for compromised security, makes it a risky proposition, imagine the blowback if F-35s had been at Camp Bastion instead of Harriers?

**whembly**

Ouze wrote:
whembly wrote:
Dunno... this is just cool as all hell...

In theory, yes.

Unfortunately, it appears that it cooks the runway a bit.

I read somewhere that they fixed it. I'll see if I can find it.

**Seaward**

chaos0xomega wrote:Nope, fraid not, aside from its use as an example as to the benefits that can be derived by cancelling a major military aviation program.

And it's a false comparison in that regard. The Comanche's rather specialized mission, once the helo itself was scrubbed, was shifted to other platforms, platforms that are in many cases coming dangerously close to the end of their life cycles with no replacements in sight. It's an important mission, but it's a mission for which a dedicated aircraft wasn't necessarily requisite.

The difference with the F-35 is that it's eventually taking over everything short of electronic warfare, tactical refueling, and fleet defense.

curran12 wrote:Makes sense. It's a weapon that doesn't work as well as others, in a system that is overfunded as it is while everything needs to be cutting back.

Other than some pointless nostalgia or attachment to anything, why not cut them back?

It works better than others. There's nothing I'd rather fly for a strike; the only thing I'd rather fly on an air superiority hop would be an F-22, and if I confirmed what I suspect about the AN/APG-81, maybe not even that.

chaos0xomega wrote:Is that not the case with the F-35 as well? Pretty much everyone I know who argues in favor of the F-35 usually does so on the basis that it has all these awesome capabilities etc. as a result of its radar, avionics, etc. etc. and not because of its airframe or flight performance (except maybe the Marines who love its vtol capabilities). Given that these systems are largely already developed, and not a function of the F-35 airframe but rather avionics components that are able to be modified and/or replaced, wouldn't it make sense to take the capabilities found in the avionics, radar, sensors, etc. and port them over to legacy platforms that would be easier to push into production and already have logistics and training pipelines in place?

No. You can't really do that. There's only so much capability for expansion with legacy aircraft. Even the Super Hornet, which was designed with the idea that we'd eventually plug a bunch of different stuff into it, has basically reached the absolute limit of its adaptability with Boeing's proposed Advanced Super Hornet, and that comes out as a poor man's F-35 at best, with worse performance, a far larger radar cross-section, etc.

I can recall Seaward and I arguing back and forth about this one on a previous thread, and his argument was basically to the effect of "The F-35 doesn't need to be fast or agile or able to dodge a missile, etc. because the capabilities it presents make these metrics of combat aircraft performance outmoded and obsolete and irrelevant to the future of air warfare." Well, if thats the case, why do we need the airframe at all?

That hasn't ever been my argument. The F-35 is both fast and agile. "Dodging a missile" is a nebulous requirement, and is, in modern air warfare, more a function of countermeasures than airframe capability.

The F-35 doesn't need to be as fast or as agile as, for example, the F-22 or the latest Flanker air show stud variant, either to perform its (primarily strike-oriented) mission or to survive in air-to-air engagements. Its capabilities allow it to eschew the 'traditional' dogfight if it so chooses, but also to excel in that regime if it needs to. Neither the F-18 or the F-16 are air-to-air slouches, and the F-35 combines the best of them both in terms of its BCM performance. It regains energy like an F-16, it has the low-speed, high-alpha nose pointability of the F-18, and it can turn like both of them.

People like to look at the 'muscle' stats - maximum speed, ceiling, (what they believe to be relevant) maneuverability envelopes, range, and so on, and use those to compare Aircraft A to Aircraft B. Sometimes this is valid, sometimes this is not. In the case of the F-35, it's almost never valid, because we're almost always looking at clean or air show config aircraft going up against the F-35. Fourth gen fighters loaded for bear take considerable hits to all the 'muscle' stats the second they start hanging stuff on the pylons. (Especially so in the case of the goddamn Super Hornet. I love the Rhino, but whoever decided that canting the pylons 3 degrees to get around the fact that they just didn't have the room they wanted for everything needs to be shot. The amount of drag bare pylons alone cause is astounding.) This obviously isn't the case with the F-35, whose Day One config of all internal weapons means that its performance isn't altered drastically by doing what it was designed to do - carry gak via air into the battlespace. Looking at a clean F-16 versus a clean F-35, you might say, "Wow, that modest a performance increase doesn't seem to justify the cost!" And you'd be right, if we flew clean F-16s to war. The real (and huge) difference is in war-loaded F-16s and war-loaded F-35s, the latter of which will not be toting 2/3 external fuel tanks, external bomb loads, external defensive air-to-air weaponry, targeting and countermeasures pods, and so on, all of which cause what is technically known as "gak-tons of drag" which in turn vastly impacts performance in phallus-measuring competitions.

People like to rag on the F-35's performance. It can't do Mach 2. (It can't do Mach 2 because we discovered, after putting Mach 2-capable combat aircraft into actual combat over the course of a few decades, that nobody actually goes Mach 2 in a fight, thus making the Mach 2 juice not worth the getting-to-Mach-2 squeeze.) It can't supercruise. (Neither can the legacy platforms everyone insists we resort back to, and it turns out the supercruise isn't nearly as fuel efficient as not supercruising. Who'da thunk.) It doesn't carry enough fuel. (It carries almost as much fuel as an F-16 weighs.) It can only pull 4.3 G in a turn! (You're reading the chart wrong.) It doesn't have thrust vectoring. (Nope, sure doesn't. Post-stall maneuvering became pretty irrelevant as soon as the AIM-9X came along, and the AA-11 before it.)

The bottom line is that the F-35's 'muscle' performance is as good or better than anything else we're flying today in a similar role, and it brings to the table other massive advantages that aren't particularly sexy or easy to appreciate without a lot of time and experience driving strike fighters. Very low observability (stealth) is an obvious one, and one that people sort of get, but if I start waxing rhapsodic about its datalinking capability, I'm going to put people to sleep. The same goes for its ability to provide AMRAAM guidance without ever switching on its radar, or provide instant visual reference on SAM launches and solutions to successfully defeat them.

Even if you buy into absolutely nothing about the F-35, consider that axing the program would cost us far, far more money than completing the contract possibly ever could. We would have to build something else, from the ground up, to replace it.

Medium of Death wrote:Obviously you'd imagine they'd have been able to out-perform the Harrier in all aspects but apparently not.

They do, though.

**curran12**

If I may ask, Seaward since this is something of your cup of tea, this is something that has bothered me for some time, but what are the tactical advantage to a VTOL design?

**Seaward**

curran12 wrote:
If I may ask, Seaward since this is something of your cup of tea, this is something that has bothered me for some time, but what are the tactical advantage to a VTOL design?

There aren't any.

The Marines like VTOL aircraft. The Marines are weird like that. The Navy lets them have VTOL aircraft as long as they promise to keep running a few squadrons of real planes to supplement carrier air wings.

**chaos0xomega**

Seaward, where exactly do the expansion limitations of legacy airframes come in to play? Aside from available space (something which there would presumably be workarounds for) and weight considerations (which again, there would presumably be workarounds for... considering how the Hornet became the Superhornet (might as well be a different plane), and the Eagle became the Strike Eagle (just made the same plane bigger), etc.)

In regards to the rest of your argument, I'm still in the 'meh' category, though I get that you're a better authority on the subject, I still question some of your logic on the matter. For example, the Mach 2 thing... wouldn't the ability to do Mach 2 be an asset for a *strike* fighter? Stealth does not equal invisible, we know that the enemy will be able to scramble air defenses if we're penetrating their airspace (and considering the likely adversary they're being designed to combat is China, I highly doubt we're going to be entirely able to neutralize them in advance of such a mission), wouldn't you want the capability to ingress/egress as quickly as possible? Beyond that, consider their range for a moment, surely we would have difficult doing deep penetration missions over contested airspace (again, we cannot rely on a Gulf War situation where we completely destroy an opponents air defense capability on day one), we sure as hell wont be flying tankers in to refuel them in such a situation...

I just cannot see the F-35 being practical, and the idea of raiding the program for developments that can be pulled for use in recapitalizing the existing fleet and/or purchasing new upgraded airframes while we develop new airframes that can take better advantage of those technologies than those legacy airframes seems more effective, practical, and more solid than relying solely on the F-35 program.

Note, I do not advocate completely axing the project. The Marines need their planes (although, I sincerely doubt that they're going to find the F-35 to be the right plane for the job), our allies need their planes as well, but I think we could benefit from scaling back our planned purchases and going to the high-low mix that was advocated in the article. Realistically, we (the USAF) do not NEED a fleet of 1700 jack-of-all-trades-ballistic-missile-tracking-super-stealthy-close-air-support-air-superiority-strike-fighter-superplanes, particularly when they cost that much and still leave us with some obvious capability gaps. I acknowledge that there ARE situations where we will need jack-of-all-trades-ballistic-missile-tracking-super-stealthy-close-air-support-air-superiority-strike-fighter-superplanes, but not 1700 of them, and if we're determined to successfully fight an air campaign the way we have in the recent past, all those additional capabilities that we're paying through the nose for become unnecessary and redundant within a few days or weeks. At that point, legacy platforms like the A-10, F-15, F-16, F-18, etc. become just as viable, capable, effective, and efficient (if not moreso) at performing the necessary missions for the duration of the campaign (service life issues aside, but if we're talking about purchasing new airframes anyway, then its a moot point).

The Marines like VTOL aircraft. The Marines are weird like that. The Navy lets them have VTOL aircraft as long as they promise to keep running a few squadrons of real planes to supplement carrier air wings.

I never really understood that, specifically the 'as long as they promise' part. Couldn't the Navy just as easily cut the Marines budget back a tad and provide those additional squadrons itself and leave the Marines to their VTOL thing?

**Seaward**

chaos0xomega wrote:
Seaward, where exactly do the expansion limitations of legacy airframes come in to play? Aside from available space (something which there would presumably be workarounds for) and weight considerations (which again, there would presumably be workarounds for... considering how the Hornet became the Superhornet (might as well be a different plane), and the Eagle became the Strike Eagle (just made the same plane bigger), etc.)

It's worth noting the Super Hornet is a different plane. It was called the Super Hornet to get Congress to sign off on it more easily as an interim solution, but it's not a Hornet, just with extra stuff. It's a different airframe. It's based on the Hornet, but it's bigger, heavier, and has some noticeable structural/planform differences.

Limitations can come from anywhere. Space and weight are big deals; so is power, software compatibility, etc. Put it this way: try installing a modern nVidia GPU into a desktop PC from, say, 1995. You'll end up rebuilding the entire thing just to get it to work. You can't just slot in a modern GPU; you'd need a modern motherboard. You'd need modern memory to run on that motherboard. You'd need a modern power supply. The list goes on. If you keep the case but replace everything inside of it, that's not really what you set out to do. When it comes to integrating avionics into aircraft, it's an incredibly apt analogy, even if the space and weight are available.

In regards to the rest of your argument, I'm still in the 'meh' category, though I get that you're a better authority on the subject, I still question some of your logic on the matter. For example, the Mach 2 thing... wouldn't the ability to do Mach 2 be an asset for a *strike* fighter? Stealth does not equal invisible, we know that the enemy will be able to scramble air defenses if we're penetrating their airspace (and considering the likely adversary they're being designed to combat is China, I highly doubt we're going to be entirely able to neutralize them in advance of such a mission), wouldn't you want the capability to ingress/egress as quickly as possible? Beyond that, consider their range for a moment, surely we would have difficult doing deep penetration missions over contested airspace (again, we cannot rely on a Gulf War situation where we completely destroy an opponents air defense capability on day one), we sure as hell wont be flying tankers in to refuel them in such a situation...

No, Mach 2 wouldn't make much sense on a strike fighter. Mach 2 makes sense on single mission interceptors, but we don't build those anymore. You burn a lot of fuel getting that fast. You do not have a lot of sustained flight time at Mach 2. Guys who fly Mach 2-capable fighters their entire careers would measure the time actually spent at or above that speed throughout the entire course of their career in minutes.

As far as range goes, the F-35 has better range than the aircraft it's replacing.

I just cannot see the F-35 being practical, and the idea of raiding the program for developments that can be pulled for use in recapitalizing the existing fleet and/or purchasing new upgraded airframes while we develop new airframes that can take better advantage of those technologies than those legacy airframes seems more effective, practical, and more solid than relying solely on the F-35 program.

Okay Legacy aircraft seem more practical based on what, exactly? (And, as an aside, the F-35 is already part of the high-low paradigm the Air Force has been using for decades. The F-22's the high slot, the F-35's the low slot. The F-22 is the 5th gen F-15, the F-35 is the 5th gen F-16.)

What do the F-16 or F-18 bring to the table that the F-35 doesn't? My answer is "nothing," while the F-35 brings huge advantages over either of them. They can't do anything the F-35 can't do. Conversely, the F-35's got longer legs, better survivability, will easily smoke either of them in an air-to-air scenario (and before either is aware the F-35's there), and can accomplish with equal ease all the strike-oriented missions they're currently tasked with.

I never really understood that, specifically the 'as long as they promise' part. Couldn't the Navy just as easily cut the Marines budget back a tad and provide those additional squadrons itself and leave the Marines to their VTOL thing?

No. The Navy doesn't really control the Marines' budget.

**Mr. Burning**

In my basic understanding of things. if say, you come up with a super duper light engine package or electronics for say the F15, you do not just install it, test it and say its good to go.

The whole airframe has to be re-evaluated. You resort to millions of dollars in finding the best place to put ballast to counter the lightness that you have introduced.

Super hornet was a new build, I believe.

edit: Should leave this stuff to Seaward.

I actually just skimmed through the report mentioned and I agree with the parts stating that the decline of Airforce EW/SEAD assets need to be reversed. The sparkvark was a great force multiplier. and though its time had come I have often wondered what the air force was thinking having no real replacement available. 20 years of flying over Iraq and high fiving in the pentagon probably hasn't helped.

Even with the f-35's capability a dedicated EW/SEAD sqdn or two should be a definite presence.

**Medium of Death**

Is the future plan not to have squadrons of drones with one or two human pilots flying alongside meaning that having less of these planes isn't really a problem?